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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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INL/ANL-WEST WORK GROUP

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MONDAY AUGUST 14, 2017

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The Work Group convened telephonically at 10:30 a.m., Eastern Time, Phillip Schofield, Chair, presiding.

PRESENT:

PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, Chair JOSIE BEACH, Member JAMES M. MELIUS, Member GENEVIEVE S. ROESSLER, Member

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ALSO PRESENT:

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official BOB BARTON, SC&A RON BUCHANAN, SC&A DOUG FARVER, SC&A MITCH FINDLEY, ORAU Team JOE FITZGERALD, SC&A BRIAN GLECKLER, ORAU Team JOHN MAURO, SC&A JIM NETON, DCAS STEVE OSTROW, SC&A MICHAEL RAFKY, HHS JOHN STIVER, SC&A TIM TAULBEE, SC&A

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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(10:33 a.m.)
3	Welcome and Roll Call
4	MR. KATZ: Welcome, everybody. This
5	is the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
6	Health for the INL and ANL-West Work Group.
7	And some preliminaries here. The
8	agenda for today, and the material that will be
9	discussed today are posted on the NIOSH website
10	under the Board section, schedule of meetings,
11	today's date. Go to that page and you can look
12	at the agenda, you can see the documents that are
13	being discussed and follow along accordingly.
14	We also have Skype, but that's only
15	for the Members, because it has to be that way to
16	protect privacy. And on Skype, folks who are
17	online with this meeting, are not public members,
18	if you want to follow along, and, actually, Tim
19	is going to show a presentation there, but I'm
20	not sure.

1	Okay. Board Members, we have Phil
2	Schofield, Josie Beach, Gen Roessler, and Jim
3	Melius. None of them have conflicts of interest
4	of this site, but please, as we do roll call, the
5	rest of the folks, speak to conflict of interest,
6	and let's start with the NIOSH ORAU team.
7	(Roll call.)
8	MR. KATZ: Okay, let me just ask
9	everybody to please mute your phones, except when
10	you're addressing the group. If you don't have
11	any button press *6 to mute your phone, *6 to
12	come off of mute, and don't put the call on hold
13	at any point.
14	And with that, it's your meeting,
15	Phil.
16	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Okay. I think we'll
17	start off with SC&A, unless somebody has a better
18	idea here.
19	MR. KATZ: Phil, I think you need a
20	presentation, right, from NIOSH first.

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1	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Oh, okay.
2	DR. TAULBEE: Well, Ted, this is Tim.
3	I actually didn't prepare a presentation for the
4	Work Group. I've got one for the full Board
5	meeting for next week. I can certainly go through
6	that with the Work Group if that's
7	MR. KATZ: Okay.
8	DR. TAULBEE: what you want.
9	MR. KATZ: Well, if you don't feel the
10	need to, then that's fine. I'm not
11	DR. TAULBEE: Well, I mean, I can give
12	an overview of what we're going to be talking
13	about next week, and that's certainly I can
14	certainly do that. I'm not sure if you wanted a
15	presentation, but if you do, we can.
16	MR. KATZ: No, no, no. I'm not trying
17	to drive the train here.
18	NIOSH SEC Petition Evaluation for CPP
19	Recommended Class Extension
20	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.

1	I guess, first of all, everybody did
2	get a copy of the ER, correct? It is posted on
3	the website, the 83.14.
4	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
5	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. And what you
6	found in that is that we are recommending to
7	expand the Class from January 1975 up through
8	December of 1980, and the reason is, as we learned
9	in our evaluation, that the site did not
10	implement their routine bioassay monitoring
11	program as quickly as one might have expected
12	given that report in October of 1974.
13	It took some time with, I guess,
14	negotiations with the bioassay lab as to how many
15	samples they could do, but there just didn't seem
16	to be any urgency to that until there was some
17	implementation around 1978, and they saw some
18	additional low-level intakes, and then at that
19	time, they began to really get it in gear in a
20	sense and implemented the bioassay by 1981.

1	I guess, the most important thing that
2	I would draw the Work Group's attention to is
3	Table 5-2 in the ER, and there it clearly shows
4	that, you know, you go from just a handful of
5	bioassay for plutonium during the years let's
6	see, 1976 and '77, there were none, and then
7	you've got a few fecal samples in 1978, '79 a few
8	more, 1980 a few more. But then in 1981 is when
9	you can see it jumps into the hundreds of people
10	being monitored.
11	So, that's why we're recommending
11 12	So, that's why we're recommending extending this Class is that even though there
12	extending this Class is that even though there
12 13	extending this Class is that even though there was an evaluation done and a recommendation to
12 13 14	extending this Class is that even though there was an evaluation done and a recommendation to institute routine bioassay, it wasn't
12 13 14 15	extending this Class is that even though there was an evaluation done and a recommendation to institute routine bioassay, it wasn't accomplished until 1981.
12 13 14 15 16	extending this Class is that even though there was an evaluation done and a recommendation to institute routine bioassay, it wasn't accomplished until 1981. So, that's the crux of the main reason
12 13 14 15 16 17	extending this Class is that even though there was an evaluation done and a recommendation to institute routine bioassay, it wasn't accomplished until 1981. So, that's the crux of the main reason why we were expanding, or recommending expanding,

the sites which backed to one area or one badge
one area methodology for external monitoring.
The reason they did this was that well, the
main reason they went to the all-area was they
had one contractor who was controlling, or
managing NGR, as well as CPP, Test Area North,
and the Central Facilities, and they both got the
contract again in 1975, and individual
contractors didn't want to be responsible for
dose at other facilities, and the only way to
track that was to go back to the external
monitoring of one badge one area, and so we found
the documentation of that, and it certainly
appears that way from the record and the review
that we did, and so in the report, we included a
table showing, again, the monthly reports those
that we had with a number of badges to try and
show the completeness inside the Evaluation
Report this time instead of doing it after the
fact.

1	So, those are the two things that I
2	wanted to point out to the Work Group, and answer
3	any questions if you have them.
4	(No audible response.)
5	DR. TAULBEE: Hearing no questions,
6	then I'll be happy to or, again, I'll be
7	presenting this next week at the Board meeting to
8	the full Board as we do generally 83.14s, and
9	well, actually, all of the SECs, and I can
10	certainly address any questions then if you have
11	them as well.
12	So, with that, Phil, I'll send it back
13	to you.
14	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: I don't particularly
15	have any questions unless somebody else does.
16	MEMBER BEACH: Tim, this is Josie.
17	I'm sorry I didn't jump in. What was the can
18	you remind me what the cutoff date was for the
19	original ER? I know you're only going up to '80s
20	'80s here.

1	DR. TAULBEE: The original ER asked
2	through 1970, and when we got to 1970, we saw
3	that there was still an infusibility, so we
4	continued on until the first opportunity where we
5	thought it might change, and that was with that
6	report talking about implementing a routine
7	bioassay, and so that was why we cut it off in
8	December of 1974, December 31, 1974, and we
9	continued, or we indicated at that time that we
10	would look at further depending upon when they
11	implemented the bioassay, the routine bioassay.
12	If they had implemented it in January
13	of 1975, we would not be recommending an SEC
14	extension here under the 83.14. So, the original
15	petition though only went through December of
16	1970.
17	MEMBER BEACH: Okay, that's what I
18	thought. Thank you.
19	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Anybody have any
20	questions for Tim?

1	MR. BARTON: Yes. This is Bob Barton.
2	Could you talk just a little bit more about, I
3	guess, kind of the characteristics of the
4	plutonium change? I mean, actually, we have over
5	200 urinalyses from 1981, and almost 300 fecal
6	samples.
7	Do we know an idea of how many workers
8	were actually in that routine program? I mean,
9	how does that really break out from total samples
10	to like the number of actual workers we're
11	talking about?
12	DR. TAULBEE: That I don't have at the
13	top of my head here. I mean, in general, here if
14	you can let me go down here and look at the
15	external monitoring here in that time period.
16	It looks like there were I'm
17	looking at Figure 5-1 now. Just a second here.
18	It looks like there were about well, by 1981,
19	it looks like there were about 1,200 monitored
20	workers, so we're looking at about 20 percent of

the workforce.

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And keep in mind, CPP is quite large.

You've got the calciner running at this time

period, and so you've got a lot of mixed fission

products going on. The plutonium exposure is

really limited to that separations building.

Not everybody worked there, so you had some -- you had the calciner operation, you had the spent fuel pool -- I can't remember the building number, I want to say it's 603, but that could be wrong, where they received all of the fuel, so there's kind of three major operations going on there at that same time, so the plutonium exposures are really limited to the, the main processing building, the 601 facility.

They also broke out a separate kind of engineering area during this time period that was in another building, so there were a lot of people there on site, but not all of them going into CPP, so they were monitoring the operations folks

1	that were routinely gaining access.
2	We have coded this data by the way,
3	but we are in the process of checking it for
4	completeness and accuracy, and once we do, then
5	we'll have a better idea of the demographics of
6	the individual workers that were monitored from
7	urinalysis and fecal.
8	I don't know if that answers your
9	question at all, but I hope it does.
10	MR. BARTON: Yes. Obviously, you guys
11	are still working through the, like you said,
12	kind of parsing out the demographics.
13	I mean, are these samples do they
14	actually delineate the area within CPP, or do we
15	just know that they were in CPP when they
16	submitted these samples?
17	DR. TAULBEE: Mitch, do you happen to
18	know that?
19	MR. FINDLEY: They were working at
20	CPP, Tim.

1	And, Bob, to elaborate a little bit on
2	what Tim said. They typically tried to focus the
3	analyses for plutonium on those that may work
4	with materials that didn't have the mixed fission
5	products in them, so these were the chemists,
6	analysts, decon technicians in certain areas,
7	that types of, types of people, and those were
8	actually the list of personnel that were
9	generated and sent to RESL each month, as far as
10	who needed to be included in the bioassay
11	program.
12	MR. BARTON: I see. Thank you.
13	MEMBER BEACH: Well, and this is
14	
	Josie. I kind of had a question on that also.
15	Your cutoff is 1980, and I can see on your Table
15 16	
	Your cutoff is 1980, and I can see on your Table
16	Your cutoff is 1980, and I can see on your Table 5-2 that the urinalysis and the fecal increased,
16 17	Your cutoff is 1980, and I can see on your Table 5-2 that the urinalysis and the fecal increased, but then I see they went down again in '86.

1	1980?
2	DR. TAULBEE: Well, you know
3	MEMBER BEACH: Well, I ask that, Tim,
4	because you say CPP was a large operation, and -
5	_
6	DR. TAULBEE: But until we go through
7	and we look at exactly which jobs people were
8	doing, I guess, there's no way for us to really
9	answer that at this time exactly. I mean, by
10	just looking at the numbers, I mean, and as Mitch
11	pointed out, they were trying to sample the
12	people that had a potential for a plutonium or an
13	actinide-type of an exposure without an exclusion
14	product one, and, you know, you see the numbers
15	jump tremendously here. I mean, it's a factor of
16	10 or 20.
17	MEMBER BEACH: Well, yes, I see that.
18	DR. TAULBEE: And the other thing that
19	I would say here about 1986 is, you see a decrease
20	in the urine, but an increase in the fecal, so it

1	went more towards fecal sampling at that point in
2	time, so I you know, like I said, unless we -
3	- until we do a, you know, kind of case-by-case
4	type of evaluation of what was their job and
5	looking at that, at that level of detail, then,
6	you know, we've got the list of the people who
7	were provided or who were requested to leave
8	a sample, and, you know, as Mitch pointed out,
9	those tended to be the people who could be working
10	with just actinides and not have a mixed fission
11	product component.
12	MEMBER BEACH: Phil, this is Josie. I
13	don't have anything else right now.
14	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Phil, hearing no
15	other questions, I'd send it back to you then.
16	MEMBER BEACH: Phil, are you on mute?
17	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Yes, I am.
18	(Laughter.)

1	SC&A Review of CPP Internal Exposure to
2	Alpha Radiation Prior to 1963
3	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Yes, I was on mute.
4	Since there are no other questions at
5	this time, I'd like to have SC&A, their review of
6	CPP internal exposures for the alpha radiation
7	prior to 1963.
8	And one question I have right off the
9	bat on that is, if they have any real idea if
10	there was much plutonium used going through the
11	process at that time?
12	MR. BARTON: I don't know.
13	Tim, do you want to tackle that one,
14	or I can talk a little bit about it if you want?
15	DR. TAULBEE: I can I can tackle a
16	little bit of it.
17	There wasn't any effort to separate
18	out the plutonium prior to the 1963 time period.
19	In 1963 is when the lab started doing some
20	experimentation with doing the separations in
21	preparation for a campaign that started in 1965

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and continued through 1972, so while there could 1 be some plutonium coming through in the sampling, 2 the sampling would also be containing the uranium 3 and, I believe, that most of the alpha that you 4 see, especially, in the bottling room that SC&A 5 talks about is uranium-235 in a nitrate form 6 7 during that time period. 8 CHAIR SCHOFIELD: They looked at the how far did you guys get through on that 9 10 looking for maybe the exposure records, not just with people, but like in some of the rooms and 11 stuff for alpha contamination which would be an 12 indication where all this was used? 13 Well, so I don't have a MR. BARTON: 14 formal presentation, but what I did do is I went 15 through the report and kind of pulled out the 16 17 slides and tables, which I can put up on Skype, and we can kind of go through them, and you'll 18 19 see a lot of the logbooks that we were able to pull during data capture, and there's room survey 20

1	logs, some air sampling sheets that are in that
2	report.
3	These are really examples that we
4	pulled when me and Joe were out there, and Josie
5	and Gen Roessler too, and really kind of
6	concentrating our efforts on boxes that had not
7	really been looked through yet as part of the ER
8	process, and so that sort of forms a basis of
9	this report.
10	I don't know. Would it be beneficial,
11	I can kind of go through the report and maybe
12	stop after each finding, and then we can discuss
13	them each in turn, or we can go through the whole
14	thing and discuss it at the end?
15	I don't know what's going to be most
16	beneficial, but I think it might answer at least
17	some of your questions right off the bat to sort
18	of go through the report, and then we can talk
19	about it as we go.
20	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: That might be

1	helpful. I know it would be to me.
2	MR. BARTON: Okay. Let me see if I
3	can get this up on Skype. And if anybody's on
4	that, can you just let me know when, if anything
5	pops up?
6	DR. MAURO: It just showed up on mine.
7	MR. BARTON: Okay.
8	DR. OSTROW: Yes, this is Steve. It
9	showed up on my computer also.
10	MEMBER ROESSLER: Mine says it's
11	loading. There it is.
12	MEMBER BEACH: I got it.
13	MR. BARTON: Okay, great. Alright,
14	so, obviously, we're talking again about CPP, but
15	prior to 1963 where the current SEC evaluation or
16	recommendation is. And as you know, the purpose
17	of CPP was obviously to kind of take, you know,
18	uranium that had already been run through the
19	reactors and strip away the undesirable
20	contaminates and fission products, some of those

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transuranics, and be able to essentially reuse the uranium.

Now, the main question is is, what -how do you bound any exposures to the alpha
component of the source term? And currently, as
we understand it, and as it's in the INL TBD,
it's basically a ratio method.

There's extensive fission very product bioassay at CPP pretty much throughout, and so if you take those fission products and apply a certain ratio, you can kind of back calculate to what the, the alpha component is based on those fission products, but we asked the question, "Well, are there any ourselves situations where you're going to have people who were exposed to just, you know, sort of the alpha component where the fission products have already been stripped away that wouldn't allow you to really use a method, because you just don't have the fission product component?"

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quess, I'd note here that 1 2 released the report back in January that's sort of a companion report to what we're about to talk 3 That one was done by Ron Buchanan. 4 entitled. titled, Evaluation 5 or "SC&A's of Cesium-137 Strontium-90, Fission 6 and and 7 Activation Product, and Actinide Values Using INL Monthly and Annual Waste Reports in Relationship 8 to Assigning Intakes." 9 10 So, that looks at the specific ratio method and what data is out there to support those 11 As I said, that's sort of a companion 12 13 report. This one's more looking at, are there any situations where using a ratio might not be 14 15 appropriate? 16 the way SC&A went around, you 17 know, tried to wrap around that problem was we 18 look at, obviously, the SRDB documents that are 19 already there. They are some survey data and a couple of incidents, which we're going to talk 20

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about, and there was the additional data capture that we were involved in back in January and March of last year. There was also some focus interviews Now, the interviews weren't with former workers. only focused on the issue of CPP prior to 1963, but we did specifically ask them questions about alpha emitters during that timeframe to try to glean some information. Those interviews were in person in January and November, and by telephone in February, April, and December of last year. And then, the last thing we did was we files went into some claim and looked specifically at job titles, such as chemists and other laboratory type personnel, or people who would be involved in the end stages of the product sampling and packaging, and -- you'll see why, but it's sort of intuitive. Those are the people who if there was potential for exposure to alpha emitting

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1	material that wasn't sufficiently comingled with
2	fission products that's pretty much where you'd
3	look first.
4	So, the first slide we're looking at
5	here and, again, this is from our data capture.
6	This is a health physics daily shift report. And
7	as you can see there's spaces for 36 different
8	entries.
9	If you look at the bottom of the page
10	here, this one was from January 1955. It was on
11	the third shift with Crew C. And I called a
12	couple of things out here in blue.
13	And for those, I don't know if there's
14	anyone on the phone who doesn't have access to
15	Skype, but this report is on the website. And
16	right now, we're looking at Section 2, and it's
17	on page 11.
18	And I called out a couple of lines
19	here, lines 6, 7, 9, and 10 for location 207.
20	It's a little hard to read, which is why I tried

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to blow it up into a PowerPoint slide, but as you 1 2 can see, those rooms were there's contamination survey that was done. 3 That's sort of that second column with a check, the next 4 5 column over. Consultation special services, 6 or 7 that's what's checked there, and then count the number of smears that were taken, the number of 8 smears that were counted, and then over at the 9 10 far right, you'll see under remarks and explanations, they found wall contaminations, and 11 there's the alpha after, floor contamination, 12 13 again, alpha, and then as you notice -- so that's entry six and seven, and then down at nine and 14 15 ten, it appeared they went back during the same 16 shift and took more samples. 17 So, this is sort of the format of one of the records that we were looking for. These 18 19 things contained really were in large compilations of logbooks, and so we went through 20

1	them and we pulled a few examples, which we
2	summarized basically in our own table form, which
3	is going to be the next slide.
4	This is Table 1 in the report. It's
5	on page 12. So, this shows, again, these are the
6	alpha contamination surveys. You can see there's
7	an alpha incident, there's a contamination of the
8	hands. These the ones you're looking at right
9	now are from 1953 to 1954. You see there's a
10	column labeled area, and you have LB-1 and LB
11	Halls, which seemed to be laboratory locations.
12	If you look specifically at example
13	five in this table, you can see that an incident
14	report was completed as a result of that
15	activity. We could not locate that incident
16	report, so we're not really sure where that is or
17	if it was kept.
18	So, on the next one, we're still
19	looking at more of these examples from the Health
20	Physics log sheets. These are from 1954.

1	If you look at example nine, there was
2	a spill, then later in the shift, they surveyed
3	it again before cocooning a hood, which I assumed
4	to mean they wrapped it up in some packaging
5	possibly for potential disposal or maybe just
6	keep it in place until it could be
7	decontaminated. I don't really know.
8	Example 11 on this sheet, again, this
9	is from Room 207, which would be the example we
10	provided before. Again, there was a spill.
11	If you go to the next one and,
12	again, these are all examples, which are in the
13	report, and that we found in the shifts,
14	essentially, activity shift logbooks to document
15	what each, each shift was doing.
16	So, now, again, we're looking at
17	this is on page 14 of the report. Again, you
18	have alpha contamination found, they're surveying
19	some tools, there's a survey in the final product
20	bottle room. These are, again, 1954 to 1955.

If you look at example 18, there was 1 2. an explosion, then they used a Samson meter, which is an alpha meter, but also a GM meter, but 3 4 we note here that there was also decontamination survey the very next day after 5 this explosion event, and they only used the 6 7 Samson meter at that one, so I assume that they only found alpha the first time, and so went back 8 after decon to see if there was 9 alpha any 10 remaining. And, obviously, there was an incident 11 report compiled over this, but we were not able to find that either. 12 13 And the last entry is on -table, again, this is Table 1 14 Sort of more of the same. 15 16 contaminations, possible spills, and, again, 17 similar locations. We have Room 207, we have laboratory areas, and also noted activities in Q-18 19 cell and E-cell. Another type of record we found was

more descriptive about individual activities. 1 2 It's loading up on my screen, so it may take a second for you folks, but this is a 3 little bit more descriptive than those logbook 4 entries that I was just showing you, and this 5 really talks a lot more about it. 6 7 Here's one example that we pulled. This is -- this is in Lab 32. This is from 1954. 8 It doesn't say it on this sheet, but this is, 9 10 this is a log from 1954, and it says, to the best my ability, "Got to checking around LB-32 11 after floor plan showed quite a bit of alpha 12 13 contamination. Took smears off of walls, equipment, etc., all extremely contaminated. 14 only thing this could be due to is airborne 15 To add to the problem, most of 16 contamination. 17 the activity is U-233, which is three to four 18 times more hazardous than U-235. Started a 24-19 hour air sample and roped off the area, about 15 smears taken and counted." 20

1	So, again, this is sort of a different
2	type of record that documented HP activities was
3	going on, then obviously gives a lot more
4	information, so just like we did before, we kind
5	of summarized some examples of these into a
6	table, and, hopefully, that table is popping up.
7	So, what we're looking for for
8	those following just from the report, this is
9	Table 2 on page 17. Again, you have the lab
10	areas, the PM area, which I assume is the product,
11	product area.
12	You see example six here was an air
13	sample that they counted for alpha, and had no
14	significant beta-gamma counts.
15	Example seven had a it says,
16	"Routine Area Survey. Found several hot spots.
17	Reported same. Forty-one smears taken, and
18	counted for alpha-beta-gamma. Found an alpha
19	contamination at LB-32 again." And again was
20	underlined in the actual record. That's not

1	something we added.
2	So, that brings us to Finding 1, which
3	should pop up on your screens, and I'll read this
4	one.
5	"SC&A found multiple examples and
6	sampled HP logbooks that indicate alpha
7	contamination was detected without corresponding
8	indications that beta-gamma contamination was
9	also present. This is indicative that they were
10	certain situations and locations at CPP in which
11	alpha contamination may have existed that was not
12	comingled with fission and activation product
13	material."
14	So, I guess, I'll ask, do we want to
15	stop here, are there questions so far, or I can
16	keep going?
17	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Does anybody have
18	any questions?
19	(No audible response.)
20	MR. BARTON: Okay. Hearing none, we

1 can move on. 2 Another thing we found, move on to -moving on to the next slide shortly. We found 3 some alpha monitoring in the Product Bottle Room. 4 essentially taken 5 These the were smears bottles check for contamination 6 uranium to 7 presumably on the outside of the container. These are from 1954. 8 And, again, if you're looking at the 9 10 report, you know, what we're seeing right now is Figure 3 on page 19, and, again, Figure 4 on page 11 20. 12 13 So, as you can see here, I called some things out in red. Obviously, they're analyzing 14 It's in the -- it's a product bottle 15 for alpha. 16 You can see some notes that some of them 17 taken after the bottle itself had been 18 decontaminated. There's some indications in some 19 of the other samples that they should be

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decontaminated.

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As you look in the bottom left, you 1 2 can see that bottle 108 was rechecked, and that's one of the ones called out that needed to be 3 decontaminated, and it was clear it was okay. 4 So, we'll head into the next slide. 5 Again, this is -- this is the next day again we're 6 7 analyzing for alpha. You see there's a couple of 8 checkmarks here. that that Ι assume meant decontamination was necessary, and that's only 9 10 because directly below that, you can see that rechecks were taken for bottles 101 and 11 which were the ones checked off above, and so 12 13 they were actually rechecked again during the same day, again, presumably after they had been 14 decontaminated. 15 Figure 5 in the report, it has an air 16 17 sample from 1954. Again, this is the Product The result appears to be five-18 Bottle Room. 19 times-ten-to-the-minus-11, and for has а uС 20 microcurie. It doesn't say per milliliter, but

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that's kind of -- or per cc, but that's pretty 1 2 just based on the much assumed surrounding records that we looked at, I mean, don't report 3 air samples as simply an activity, it's always 4 got to be normalized at some volume, and the 5 volume that always appeared was per milliliter. 6 7 So, again, here they were taking air samples during -- in the final product room. 8 Again, this was from 1954. 9 10 So that will bring us to Finding 2, found 11 reads, "SC&A examples of alpha monitoring taking place in the Product Bottle 12 13 Room, including smear surveys of product bottles and bird cages, as well as air monitoring for 14 15 alpha. This is evidence that alpha contamination, including airborne contamination, 16 17 was a concern to the HP staff for this area. nature of routine work activities 18 Given the 19 encountered in the Product Bottle Room, it is unlikely that workers in this area would also 20

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encounter the fission products," because whole point was to pull them off, "that commingled with the enriched uranium." So, that is Finding 2. Again, if anyone has any questions or wants clarification, please just jump in and stop me. Another thing that we found during data capture, and also there were a few of these on the SRDB, were area survey maps. And here's one example. And, again, these are the types of activities that were kind of described previously on those log sheets of going to different areas and performing contamination surveys. So, as you can see here, and it may be difficult, but you can see there's several things called out in counts per minute. And then you'll see the little alpha symbol after the results. So these were in a glove box, a sink, and a hood, and then there's sort of unidentified

It kind of -- I'm not sure what that would

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1	be, maybe a desk or something like that, towards
2	the bottom. So this is one example.
3	Moving on. That was from 1961. This
4	one's from 1955. This one is specifically
5	looking for alpha, as you can see in the top-
6	right corner, an alpha contaminations survey.
7	And we kind of circled this area by the hood in
8	the upper-right corner. And I'm just going to
9	head right to the next slide, which kind of blows
10	up that section, because it's pretty hard to
11	read.
12	Okay. So, again, I'm looking at a
13	same hood. And you can see there was a 31 count
14	per minute alpha on a smear. Around the hood, it
15	was up to 1,500 dpm per 100 centimeters squared,
16	which the radiation control guide for alpha was
17	20 dpm per 100 centimeters squared, so that
18	result in that hood was about 75 times higher.
19	But there's also a note here that the
20	blotting paper that was used should be changed.

1	And you'll see, when we get into some of the
2	interviews, they described how the HP staff would
3	use blotting paper pretty regularly to try to
4	hold down contamination levels.
5	DR. TAULBEE: Bob, can I comment here?
6	MR. BARTON: Sure.
7	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. The 1,500 dpm,
8	that was taken with the Samson, so that's a direct
9	reading, not a removable. The 31 dpm or cpm
10	I think, it's cpm was what was removable, not
11	the 1,500.
12	MR. BARTON: Okay.
13	DR. TAULBEE: So, the Rad Control
14	Guide was for 20 for alpha for removable.
15	MR. BARTON: Okay. And then,
16	obviously, that 31 would have to be converted to
17	a certain area, and from counts to
18	disintegration. So I'm not sure what that would
19	actually come out to, but good to know that that

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if it directly goes from that counts per minute 1 to dpm per 100 centimeters, it's still above, but 2 75 times above. So, thank you for that 3 clarification. 4 Another example, this is within the X-5 Cell, and they're doing alpha/beta/gamma surveys. 6 7 You have one unlabeled result on the floor there, so we're not really sure what that is. 8 Most of the other reported results are simply alpha, but 9 10 there one beta/gamma result on the, Ι was 11 believe, that's the floor, the bottom left. Ι assume that's in front of a process cell 12 something like that, but, again, the only thing 13 reported here is alpha. And that was in 1961. 14 Again, this is -- the Another 1961. 15 16 survey type was kind of -- I don't know if it's 17 It's slightly cut off on cut off on your screen. mine, because it says I'm presenting. 18 But the 19 survey type was, again, a routine contamination and radiation survey, and you have a couple of 20

areas where we have 110 dpm alpha, 70 dpm alpha,

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and those areas are suggested to be cleaned. 2 This one's from 1960. And, again, you 3 have 40 counts on furnace and the face of a hood, 4 and the floor was marked as okay. Again, I can't 5 quite see if this was alpha-specific. 6 7 this was another one. I don't know if everyone can see what type of survey it is. 8 Again, it's cut off on my screen, unfortunately. 9 But, again, 10 this is another instance where they came in and 11 they found some alpha. And it didn't actually say "recommend cleaning," but did check out that 12 13 the floor was okay. Head to the next one. Okav, here we 14 Again, this is a radiation contamination 15 qo. And there are several locations on the 16 survey. 17 floor where they noted alpha contamination. have contamination found on a stool, and also 18 19 notes here that all smears for beta/gamma were 20 less than 50 counts per minute. And then a note

that all of the locations are shown for alpha. 2. And that was in 1957. Another This is 3 one. just 4 contamination survey. And, again, here you have one that was measured for both alpha and beta, 5 and the alpha counter is more larger than the 6 7 beta component in the hood, and then over on the 8 other side, you see that an alpha result 890. Ιt 9 doesn't say dpm, cpm, or anything, but it does 10 say that area needs to be mopped. This is in LB-32, and this is actually 11 the location where we had an example where they 12 13 said they found uranium contamination again. This is in 1954. We even see there's several 14 15 values in here. Now, it doesn't say what they -16 - I mean, there's some counts per minute results 17 There's this dpm is 100 centimeters. circled. It doesn't necessarily specify there if it's a 18 19 Samson, so I'm not sure. It might be that there's 20 direct reading, and so it might not be a

1	removable, but we really don't know. But, again,
2	you have it around the hoods, you have one spot
3	right on the floor, lab benches, the sink right
4	near the cabinets. And this survey was
5	specifically for alpha contamination.
6	That brings us to Finding 3. "SC&A
7	identified several area contamination survey maps
8	from 1954, '55, '57, and '60, and '61 that
9	indicate that alpha contamination may have been
10	the primary radiological concern for certain
11	locations at the time of the survey. In many
12	cases, the survey is a general contamination
13	survey that did not detect beta/gamma activity,
14	but directed that the identified locations with
15	alpha contamination be cleaned up."
16	So, those are some examples of the
17	survey maps that we were able to find during data
18	capture.
19	The next thing we're going to look at
20	is some air sampling that we were able to find.

1	These were all for the 216 lab, and these are
2	let's see, these are 1954.
3	And, again, they found U-233. And
4	there they were specifically measuring for alpha.
5	And, again, there's a notation there,
6	handwritten, that says, "The contaminant is U-
7	233, and is likely in the form of U-308, uranium
8	oxide."
9	We'll look at another example. Here's
10	another one again where they found U-233
11	concentration. Again, this is well, I don't
12	believe it specifically says it here, but this
13	is, again, for the 216 laboratory, and, again,
14	from 1954.
15	This one here is, again, 216 area,
16	1954, and they actually measured for both long-
17	lived alpha and beta. And, in this example, they
18	did have measurable alpha contaminations in the
19	air, but the long-lived beta measurement was
20	zero.

1	Here's another example where they did
2	both alpha and beta. And the ones I've called
3	out, again, are for 216. And so that's sample
4	six. And as you can see towards the bottom here,
5	they report the results. You have long-lived
6	beta of 8-times-7-to-the-minus 13 microcuries per
7	cc, and long-lived alpha 9.6 times 10. And the
8	number is a little hard to figure out. It's
9	either 10-to-the-minus-12 or 10-to-the-minus-13.
10	In either case, it's a little bit higher than
11	that beta measurement.
12	Looking at Finding 4. "Based on a
13	limited set of air samples in Room 216 from
14	November of 1954, it is apparent that there was
15	airborne alpha activity present. Evidence
16	suggests the airborne alpha activity was U-233 in
17	the form of U-308. In two of the three examples,
18	the airborne long-lived alpha activity bounded
19	the airborne beta activity."
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more about the interviews. And I just want 1 2 kind of that finding interviewees say is obviously a little difficult just because of the 3 timeframe we're talking about at CPP, you know, 4 prior to 1963, but also the level of technical 5 information about different 6 source terms 7 exposure potentials that you might have. It is very difficult to find people 8 with direct knowledge of that. 9 The interviewee 10 on the screen here is obviously one of those 11 people that was very, very helpful in establishing the conditions. 12 13 Here's one quote I pulled from the interview, which I'll read out. And just for 14 those following, the quote I'm looking at is, I 15 16 believe, on page 36. 17 It says, "The analytical lab did U and Pu separations on third cycle process samples in 18 19 the 1950s for process control. The lab was Plutonium-238 20 surveyed shift. at every

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contamination was found on a lab bench. 1 found, reported, and cleaned up because of the 2 shift When alpha contamination was 3 surveys. discovered in the lab, the entire crew was sent 4 for urine bioassay looking for U and Pu. 5 Alpha done when conditions indicated. 6 bioassay was 7 Alpha contamination was not seen often. Alpha bioassay would be done if alpha uptakes were 8 suspected, mostly for lab personnel. 9 The highest 10 potential for internal alpha exposure was the third cycle extraction." 11 12 Another quote from the same 13 interviewee. He tied to make management and workers aware of Pu. He gave the interview team 14 a copy of a document titled, 'Why Concern for 15 16 Plutonium at an Enriched Uranium Processing 17 "This was a presentation he gave to Plant?' operation staff in the cafeteria about 1959. 18 Ιt 19 was not well understood. Fission products were the controlling dose issue. The technical staff 20

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believed the controls were adequate for alpha 1 and survey equipment 2 contamination, the capable of detecting alpha contamination. 3 4 only present in small amounts, but it recognized that it doesn't take much to create a 5 problem." 6 7 Now, this interviewee did provide a presentation, as it's shown here, "Why Concern 8 for Plutonium?" The presentation itself, we 9 10 believe, was probably not from 1959, based on a information 11 couple of pieces of that were 12 included in it. It was likely more from later 13 maybe the late 1970s or later on. So it's not really clear whether he did 14 to us give 15 presentation in 1959. Unfortunately, the raw 16 interview notes we were not able to locate, so 17 all we have is the summary, and the summary has this quote in it. 18 19 Here's another. This person was an HP mid-1950s, then they switched 20 in the to

1	supervisor in '60s. And I believe this quote is
2	on page 39.
3	This person was aware of one location
4	at CPP where alpha contamination was a concern.
5	Not certain of the specific location now; it may
6	have been the uranium packaging area or an
7	analytical laboratory. He only recalls alpha
8	contamination events happening about three to
9	four times during his five years. He doesn't
10	recall the details clearly.
11	This is an interview with a chemical
12	operator that began in the late '50s. This quote
13	is from page 38.
14	He wasn't very knowledgeable of HP
15	instrumentation. He recalls taking a sample of
16	the end product, which contained uranium.
17	Several people were there. Security had to open
18	the door/vault to access the sampling area. He
19	doesn't specifically recall HP monitoring, but
20	they were probably there. So, again, that's sort

1	of the sampling of the end product.
2	This interviewee was a
3	chemist/laboratory tech in the analytical lab
4	Shift Cell and X-Cell during the 1950s. He
5	describes a lot of the HP practices and
6	activities. This quote that we're looking at is
7	on page 37.
8	"In the Shift Lab, blotter paper would
9	be placed on benches and floors. Even the
10	interior of the hoods would be papered down. All
11	of this was done to control contamination and
12	keep the work surfaces as clean as possible.
13	Health Physics did smears at the end of the shift.
14	They, being the analytical lab, always prepared
15	blotter paper for the next shift as directed by
16	the HPs. Papering was done quite frequently."
17	Just trying to move to the next one.
18	Here we go. Here's again, this was an HP at
19	CPP, and this describes, again, some of those
20	contamination control activities, which, you

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know, we talked about before by going around and surveying the different laboratory areas and some those activities we talked about, but some of the general things. When you entered CPP, you changed into On the way out, they showered, and anti-Cs. walked through a monitor. The floors were cleaned every day. Air samples and smears were taken. Blotter paper was used, and operations workers would help police and keep the and they also had to clean up when contamination was found. So, this brings us to Observation 1. "Based on five identified interviews with former CPP workers having some knowledge of radiological operations, it is apparent that the HP staff were and took steps to control, aware of, contamination in certain areas of the plant. These areas include the laboratories and other product areas where the interviewees indicate

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1	that an incident-based internal monitoring
2	program was employed for alpha emitters, but it
3	is unclear what levels of alpha contamination
4	would actually trigger special bioassay samples
5	versus more common decontamination activities."
6	So, the next thing we did
7	MEMBER ROESSLER: Bob, let me ask a
8	question before you go on?
9	MR. BARTON: Sure.
10	MEMBER ROESSLER: This is Gen. On
11	page 37, you mentioned well, I'm wondering,
12	has the interviewee seen your report?
13	MR. BARTON: Not to my knowledge.
14	MEMBER ROESSLER: Okay. They have
15	not. And you said you didn't have the original
16	notes, only the summary, and I'm just wondering
17	if it would be appropriate since there's some
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10	questions in there to let the interviewee see the
19	report and verify pretty much what you're

1	MR. BARTON: I don't know what that
2	process would necessarily be.
3	MEMBER ROESSLER: I don't either. I
4	know that this interviewee has been called in
5	several times, and I don't know how important
6	that would be, but it just seemed like there's
7	some questions hanging there.
8	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim. I think
9	the, the areas where you're making some
10	assumptions, Bob, based upon the summary, I think
11	we can get clarification on that from the actual
12	interviewee.
13	I don't think it would be appropriate
14	though, Gen, for the interviewee to review the
15	documents in that the interviewee is actually
16	we got approval or a waiver to interview him,
17	because of his, because of, you know, the unique
18	experience here, but I don't think the review of
19	the document is appropriate, but I do think the
20	clarifications, some of what Bob has, you know,

1	indicated he's not sure what this meant, we
2	certainly can go back to the interviewee and ask.
3	MEMBER ROESSLER: Probably at this
4	point in time until we have a time to study this
5	a little further, it's probably not appropriate,
6	but I was just wondering what procedure might be
7	if there were questions.
8	DR. TAULBEE: I think we could just do
9	a follow-up interview with the, with the
10	individual.
11	MEMBER ROESSLER: Okay. I think
12	you've clarified that, so thank you.
13	MR. BARTON: Okay. Very good. So,
14	those were, those were the interviews that were
15	conducted in 2016. One of them, the interviewee
16	we were just discussing, I believe, was actually
17	2014, but another thing we did, as I discussed at
18	the beginning, is we went into claim files,
19	specifically job titles, most likely to have the
20	potential to be working in these laboratory areas

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or otherwise job titles that may have come into 1 contact with the alpha material that may not have 2 been comingled, so these are your lab techs, 3 chemical 4 chemists, engineers, 5 engineers, scientists, those οf iob sorts categories. 6 7 We found that 62 fit those job 8 criteria, and were obviously employed during the period of interest. Of those 62, 32 had some, or 9 10 all of their employment, at CPP based on their Only 1 of those 32 had any uranium records. 11 bioassay, and we'll show that. 12 13 Again, this is, this is for one of the claimants, and this is from 1959. You can see, 14 these are actually two records that I kind of 15 16 placed together, so they're two separate records. 17 The top part, again, December 1959. It's not actually labeled as routine or special, but as 18 19 you'll see on the next slide, it was actually a routine bioassay just based on the date. 20 And

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then the -- the bottom one is a special -- we'll 1 follow a sample, because the first one showed a 2 positive result. 3 A little bit about this claimant. 4 spent the first few years as a chemical analyst, 5 and analyzed samples from the plant, and quality 6 7 control, they prepared standards to check the 8 accuracy of samples sent from plant. They describe radiation 9 usina work permits. 10 Specifically, they say radiation work permits were required when he worked with U-233, 11 other types of special jobs, but he did not work 12 So, again, this person 13 under one routinely. submitted U-233 urine results from 1959. 14 15 And I'm just going to go to the next This is actually also from the claim file. 16 17 And as you can see, that top result was a routine as shown in their chronological record of medical 18 care, but then there's also, and they're called 19 out special samples required later in that month, 20

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and also in January follow-up samples, and then there was another routine sample in February of that year. we couldn't find any specific So, incident that this person was involved in, but it like they were on a routine program, or maybe there was a bioassay required by a work permit, and then when they took that routine bioassay when they realized they needed some follow-ups. Now, in the original DOE file, only one of the follow-ups was included, so really a routine sample, and then three was follow-ups, follow-ups so one of the was included. NIOSH was actually able to identify using a technique that I believe is another "Optical Recognition called, Imaging," and essentially when they capture records from a site and they can match names or other identifying

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information, a lot of times, they'll hotlink that into a claim file.

So, DOE provided two of the records, NIOSH on the third, and then there's a fourth one that we couldn't find anywhere. It wasn't found by the Optical Recognition, and it wasn't in the DOE records, so we're really not sure what happened to that one.

So, that kind of brings us to Finding 5. "SC&A identified a single example in which internal monitoring for uranium, specifically, U-233, occurred out of the 32 reviewed claims who held job titles with the potential for laboratory work at CPP. Two samples were provided in the claim monitoring record; however, a log of all medical treatment indicates that two additional follow-up samples occurred, which are missing from the dosimetry records supplied by DOE. One of those two follow-up samples was located via the NIOSH process known as 'Optical Recognition

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The disposition and availability of 1 2. the other samples is unknown." So, that was 1 of the 32 claims, 3 the other 31 claims did have accepted beta/gamma 4 internal monitoring, and also sometimes iodine 5 was included in that specifically, but, again, no 6 7 alpha monitoring. So, that brings us to Observation 2. 8 "Thirty-one to thirty-two claimants who worked at 9 10 CPP prior to 1963 and had job types most likely to be associated with laboratory work did not 11 have any internal monitoring results to uranium 12 or other transuranic material, either special or 13 routine. Tt. be inferred from 14 cannot available claimant files whether these workers 15 should have been monitored and were not, were 16 17 monitored and the records are unavailable, or did not experience any exposure potential to uranium 18 19 warranting routine monitoring." 20 Now, during -- when we're going

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through these 32 claim files, we noted that on 1 2 the dosimetry, the internal dosimetry records, obviously, there will be results for other people 3 that are not the claimant. And we noticed a lot 4 of them actually had routine uranium, and so we 5 took note of those when we saw them. 6 7 You know, I'm going to put a table up 8 So, you're looking directly at the report. It's Table 3, and it should be on page 43. 9 10 on the left side. Obviously, there's not going 11 to be any names. 12 But, as you can see, these are the 13 samples that we were able to associate with these people. based looking 14 Just on at claimant's records, not the specific dosimetry 15 files for these workers. 16 17 And, as you can see on some of them are spaced -- and, again, all the ones in that 18 19 far right column, if they don't have the asterisk, they're all labeled as routine samples. 20

1	The ones with the asterisks, and there's only a
2	few of them, were actually special samples taken.
3	For a lot of the workers, they're
4	fairly evenly spaced for this period. And,
5	again, these aren't complete internal dosimetry
6	files for these workers. These are just we
7	noticed their name as a routine uranium sample,
8	and so we took note wherever that happened during
9	the course of the claimant review.
10	So, some of them appear to be on maybe
11	a quarterly schedule. Reference numbers 2, 8, 9,
12	11 through 13. Some looked more like six months.
13	The fact that these are really routine sort of
14	indicates that there was a group of workers who
15	Health Physics believed could have the potential
16	for more of a chronic exposure, and so should be
17	monitored on a routine, and not a special or
18	incident basis.
19	So, that brings us to Observation 3.
20	"During its review of claimants, who may have

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laboratory areas of 1 in the CPP. 2 identified several non-claimants who appear to have been part of a regular routine monitoring 3 4 program for uranium. This is logically indicative that a group of workers existed at CPP 5 who had the potential for chronic rather than 6 7 episodic exposure to uranium that was of 8 radiological concern to the health and safety staff." 9 10 Okay. Moving on. The last thing going 11 we're to talk about is а couple of 12 incidents, because we wanted to go through the 13 SRDB and see what was documented there. We really only found two of them. 14 The first one was airborne U-235 in 15 the Z-cell in January of 1958. 16 The Z-cell itself, 17 the way it's described in the TBD, it says, "The Z-cell was the last stop for CPP-601's final 18 product concentrated liquefied uranyl nitrate. 19 For a time, the liquid was stored and packaged 20

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for shipment in L-10 bottles at the facility set 1 up within the Z-cell. So, during this incident, 2. an alpha proportional counter measured an air 3 concentration that was 10,000 times the maximum 4 permissible concentration. 5 Smears showed positive alpha on the floor near the sump, the 6 7 stairs leading to the bottom of the cell, and the product room near the exit of the cell. Bioassay 8 were taken for five of the workers 9 samples 10 involved and were positive, but follow-ups were below the detection limit, which was one times 11 ten to the minus five grams per liter." 12 13 And what you're seeing now are actual quotes from the incident report. 14 "The consequences of this particular 15 incident are not especially alarming except that 16 17 the situation could well have been more serious. Perhaps operational procedures with respect to 18 19 this area of work should be reviewed to avoid incidents, 20 future like since hazards from

1	ingested and/or inhaled uranium are present."
2	And, then a follow-up report to that
3	incident, follow-up to the incident report noted
4	the following changes were made.
5	"A rotameter was, should be installed,
6	air spargers measure the amount of air to the
7	spargers from front excessive sparging, the flow
8	of air was increased, and the procedure for any
9	further mixing experiments was changed to pull
10	only one sample at a time when those are in
11	operation."
12	So, there was some recommendations
13	made, and as a result, they did make some changes.
14	The only other incident we found was
15	a product solution spill that was actually in the
16	access corridor in December 1958. And what they
17	were doing is there was a maintenance activity,
18	there was a blocked plug in one of the lines.
19	The product line from X-Cell and Z-cell, they had
20	to remove about 100 feet of the line, but they

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didn't realize that there was an auxiliary pump 1 2 that had been left on, which was still tied in when they went to go cut and to replace that 3 section. 4 Here's a couple of quotes from that 5 6 report. 7 Hold on a second. I lost a slide. 8 Alright. I'm sorry. I was supposed to read Observation 4 before talking about that 9 10 other incident, so just to wrap up that other incident. 11 "A documented 1958 incident involving 12 13 U-235 alpha activity in the Z-cell indicates that HP was notified immediately and 14 appropriate actions were taken, including air 15 16 sampling, area swipe contamination surveys, and 17 Multiple bioassay samples worker nasal wipes. were collected in the days immediately following 18 19 the incident. Analysis of the available bioassay related to the incident indicates that exposures 20

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This incident was also were likely minimal. discussed in NIOSH 2015b, " which I believe is one of the SEC ERs. And, so, again, back to the, the spill from cutting the line. These are quotes from the incident report. "Most of the solutions caught in a plastic bag with some spilled on the floor and some splashed on a maintenance fitter, who cut into the pipe. That person's coveralls were gathered up in a plastic bag and spilled liquid was cleaned up, and all were taken to the product room for a full recovery, " so were able to reuse it. And these were the recommendations based on that incident. "Don't start a critical job without having the written work request in the hands of the maintenance foreman; all work requests contain written precautions. If to be checked back by operations, approvals by safety,

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safeguards, etc. when special hazards exist; if 1 there are critical hazards, maintenance should be 2 advised how to do their job safely; and add 3 details of HP and safety procedures on the HP and 4 safety permits; and then adhere strictly to the 5 tag out procedure." 6 So this leads us to Observation 5. 7 Oh, I would also note that while that 8 report didn't specifically say that 9 incident 10 internal monitoring should have occurred, we were able to find monitoring for at least one of the 11 workers who was involved, but we don't know if 12 13 the other workers who were involved in the situation were similarly monitored. 14 we were able to find at least one of the names 15 that was included in the bioassay records. 16 17 So this takes us to Observation 5, and this is the final observation. 18 19 "A documented incident in December describes

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maintenance

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activity that resulted in a spill of U-235 in the 1 access corridor of CPP. The activity involved an 2 HP permit, and also had -- an HP presence in at 3 least one of the two maintenance locations," so 4 they were cutting in two ends of this pipe, and 5 the HP was at one end. 6 7 "Follow-up reports indicate HP and 8 safety permits required more detail to avoid future incidents. Although not specified in the 9 10 incident report, SC&A located at least one 11 special uranium sample that was taken for a pipe fitter who was involved in the spill." 12 13 So, after all that, our summary conclusion is. "We identified several 14 15 locations and time periods for which contamination was identified and does not appear 16 17 directly comingled be with fission to activation product material. Reconstruction of 18 19 internal exposures to alpha material by ratioing

to calculated intakes of fission and activation

1	material would not be technically appropriate for
2	at least some of these workers, activities, and
3	locations within CPP."
4	So, that is the summary of our report
5	evaluating the potential for alpha exposure to
6	CPP prior to 1963. Be happy to answer any
7	questions or clarify any points or whatever I can
8	do to help move the conversation.
9	MEMBER BEACH: I think you've stunned
10	everybody, Bob.
11	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: I don't have any
12	questions, but maybe someone else might though.
13	MEMBER ROESSLER: This is Gen. I
14	don't have any questions, but I'm looking through
15	your summary statement that you showed on the
16	slides in the report. The report's a little hard
17	to read, because of all the blackouts. Is that
18	in the reports?
19	MR. BARTON: Yes, I believe that's in
20	the executive summary.

1	MEMBER ROESSLER: Okay. It's not at
2	the end, which is where I was. Okay. I just
3	wanted to make sure it was in there.
4	MR. BARTON: Yes, it does. It appears
5	on page the bottom of page seven, which is the
6	executive summary.
7	MEMBER ROESSLER: Okay. I see it.
8	Okay. Good. Okay.
9	MEMBER BEACH: Bob, this is Josie. I
10	found your report to be very thorough, and I don't
11	have any questions at this time other than
12	waiting for NIOSH's response.
13	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim at NIOSH. I
14	don't have any questions at this time either, but
15	we are developing a response to this just so the
16	Work Group is aware that we are doing that.
17	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes. Tim, this is Jim
18	Melius. Any idea on timing on that response?
19	DR. TAULBEE: Well, that's a good
20	question there, Dr. Melius.

1	MEMBER MELIUS: It sure is.
2	DR. TAULBEE: Trying to get this into
3	the discussion of priorities again,
4	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
5	DR. TAULBEE: and that was one of
6	the things I wanted to make sure we touched on
7	before we finished today was to talk about the
8	priorities in a sense.
9	So, do you want to jump into that now
10	as to how soon you guys want to see this or
11	would it better for me to tell you what all is on
12	our plate that we're trying to get off, and then
13	you can kind of order, reorder them as you see,
14	you would like to see them? Would that be
15	helpful?
16	MEMBER MELIUS: Tim, for me, yes,
17	definitely, and also, hear the same from SC&A.
18	MEMBER BEACH: Well, this is Josie. I
19	was going to ask later, but it would be nice to
20	have something in writing updating priorities,

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1	because it's this is becoming a bit of a large,
2	large items that we're, we're prioritizing, and
3	I don't I just don't want anything to get lost,
4	so
5	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
6	MEMBER BEACH: I don't know if that's
7	NIOSH's or SC&A's. Our matrix is a little
8	unusual, so it's a little harder to kind of keep
9	track of everything.
10	DR. TAULBEE: What why don't we
11	take NIOSH, why don't we take a stab at it
12	first as to what we've all got on our plate and
13	what we are responding to, and then SC&A can add
14	to it from that standpoint, so why don't we commit
15	to get you a draft, I guess, our kind of priority
16	list following a little bit of discussion here
17	today, because I did want to update you guys a
18	little bit on the data capture that we did for
19	the burial ground.
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Would that be acceptable then?

1	MEMBER BEACH: Yes. Tim, this is
2	Josie. I think there was a draft or there was a
3	priority's list out there, so you might start
4	with that, or at least include some of that. That
5	was a couple of meetings back.
6	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Alright, we will
7	certainly do so, okay.
8	Well, I guess we should make sure
9	there aren't any other questions on Bob's
10	presentation here first. Are there any other
11	questions for Bob?
12	MR. BARTON: It looks like I'm getting
13	off easy today.
14	(Laughter.)
15	Plans for August Board Meeting and
16	Status/Path Forward on Ongoing Issues
17	Resolution for INL/ANL-W
18	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Well, as you know
19	from our last meeting, the 83.14 for the burial
20	ground was puts just under the 83.14 for the

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CPP evaluation, which we have now delivered to 1 you all, and so we have been working on the 83.14 2 the burial around, and we 3 went conducted a data capture. 4 Mitch and Brian went out and collected data. 5 And one of the interesting things that 6 7 was found is that there's some air sampling data out there for the burial grounds during that time 8 period when these recoveries were taking place. 9 10 We requested that data. Now, is this is sufficient to support 11 We don't know yet, but we 12 dose reconstruction? have not received that data back from the site. 13 This data capture took place the last week of 14 June, and it was targeted for the burial grounds. 15 16 So, from that standpoint, the 83.14, 17 once we get that data, then we'll know better whether or not we're going to be recommending an 18 19 83.14 or not from that based upon the, those retrieval operations that took place. So, that's 20

1	kind of the status of that particular effort.
2	At the same time well, shortly
3	after that data capture is when we received the
4	CPP, or the reports that Bob just talked about,
5	so that's on our plate to respond to.
6	The ANL-West air monitoring that was
7	brought up, I guess, a year ago in November maybe,
8	I think that was when, but we had a Work Group
9	meeting and discussed that one. You guys had
10	indicated that after the 83.14, that we would
11	then go with the ANL-West air monitoring, and
12	then responding to the burial ground report by
13	SC&A. That was the current path.
14	I wanted to know where the CPP
15	evaluation that we just received last month falls
16	into your priorities. Do you want us to do that
17	before the ANL-West and the burial ground
18	response, or where do you want this?
19	MEMBER BEACH: Well, my guess I wonder
20	where we at for the, the CPP SEC from '63 to '70.

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1	It's still to be determined. Can anybody kind of
2	give us an update on that?
3	DR. TAULBEE: I think that's the next
4	agenda item with the V&V.
5	MEMBER BEACH: Is it?
6	DR. TAULBEE: I believe so.
7	MEMBER ROESSLER: It's not stated on
8	the agenda.
9	DR. TAULBEE: Oh, I'm sorry. It's not
10	on there.
11	MEMBER BEACH: No, it's actually not,
12	so
13	DR. TAULBEE: I apologize. I thought
14	that was on a draft again that I saw. Okay.
15	Well, the one big news I can give, and then I'll
16	give it over to Bob, we did receive word last
17	week that the site has finally completed all of
18	the coding of all the temporary badges that you
19	can now begin to do that V&V, and Bob sent out a
20	memo about that.

1	Go ahead, Bob.
2	MR. BARTON: Yes, that's right. If
3	you remember the last meeting, we had presented
4	a proposed path to try to perform the V&V
5	activities. What we had done is we'd gone through
6	a set of visitor cards, mostly from 1968, 1969,
7	and early 1970, to identify claimants who were in
8	those files.
9	Also, with a caveat that those same
10	claimants would still require dose
11	reconstructions regardless of the SEC either
12	because they didn't have an SEC cancer or, I
13	believe, medical dose reconstruction still had to
14	happen, even if you have qualified for the SEC,
15	but you have non-SEC cancers in addition, I
16	believe, a dose reconstruction still happened.
17	So, at that time, we had a little over
18	30 claimants that we identified from those
19	visitor cards, and there was about 50, or, you
20	know, a little over 50 samples that we would be

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able to check, and the Work Group requested that we try to expand the pool of potential claimants and the number of samples that could be used in a sort of V&V analysis. Unfortunately, don't have the we visitor cards for the remaining years. As I said, the visitor cards we examined were from the late 1960s, but we do have temporary badge reports, which are a little different in that they're a listing of a number of workers instead of a visitor card, which obviously only has one worker on it. One drawback to the temporary badge reports is that they do not include a security number, which is really a direct link between that temporary badge or non-routine badge, if you like, and the worker that we would like to be checking, but nonetheless, we went through those temporary badge reports and attempted to match those workers and those to our claimant database,

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1	and, obviously, it's mainly based on the name,
2	but also when the sample was taken and how that
3	lines up with their actual covered employment,
4	does it makes sense that that could be that
5	person, and also their employer.
6	And, let me see. Would it be helpful
7	if I put that memo up on the screen, or does
8	everybody have it from the website?
9	MEMBER BEACH: That'd be helpful.
10	MR. BARTON: Okay. Just give me one
11	moment here. It always seems to go a little slow
12	when you need it. You can keep talking while I
13	try to work to get that up there.
14	That's actually through our
15	expansion activities, we went from about 32
16	claimants to 137 claimants based on the
17	combination of the temporary badge reports and
18	those visitor cards, and so we have 137 that we
19	can check, and also we found additional claimants
20	that really would qualify for the SEC, so it

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2 reconstruction. that's important 3 Now, why remember we're trying to -- if we're going to use 4 the resources of the site to sort of research the 5 histories of these people, we'd prefer to keep it 6 7 with ones that we'd be researching anyway, 8 because dose reconstruction would be required, again, with our list of any SEC determinations, 9 10 but there is another group, so if we include those, those workers who we identified, you would 11 have a pool of 228 total workers. 12 13 seems really high considering that based on past experience, it does take a 14 little while for the site to respond with the 15 full dosimetry histories for these workers. 16 An 17 estimate was given that, you know, for, for maybe 20 workers, you might be looking at a month, month 18 19 and a half. For 40 workers, maybe you're looking more at like two months. 20

wouldn't

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So, what we did, and this in the most 1 2 recent memo, is we actually went through and sort of picked off or parsed those claimants we're 3 able to identify sort of based on how useful we 4 felt they would be to any sort of V&V analysis, 5 and we essentially have three groups that we 6 7 split those 137 claimants in. And the first 2 groups are 30 claimants each. 8 I'm still, still trying to get that 9 10 table in front of you guys. I'm having a little difficulty today, but in the first group, which 11 I would say are the higher priority ones, because 12 13 I believe we're going to get the most out of those claimants researched, 14 checked again, the responses we get from INL. 15 In those 30 claimants, you have 34 16 17 visitor badges, and those include actual number, so it's a direct link between the 18 19 visitor badge and the claimant. Six hundred and eighty-eight temporary badges among those thirty 20

1	claimants, so we found some people that they
2	really had temporary badges.
3	Like, I think, the highest one, we had
4	a worker who had 135 total temporary badges
5	issued to them at CPP during this period. So, in
6	that first group, you have essentially 30
7	claimants with a total of 722 non-routine badges
8	that we can check.
9	The second group, those numbers go
10	down among the second group. We only have one
11	visitor badge among them that has the S number,
12	about half the number of temporary badges of the
13	first group, so about 350 temporary badges.
14	For group 2, we have about 354 total
15	badge, total non-routine badges to be able to
16	check, and then there's the remainder group,
17	which was it's the remainder, so that's 77
18	that were left that would require dose
19	reconstruction.
20	Two there you'd have two visitor

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badges that we can check, about 184 temporary 1 badges, so that's a total of 186 badges among 77 2 claimants. And, again, you have to think about 3 it that it's generally lower the number kind of 4 claimants we're going to get it from the site, I 5 don't believe it's actually the number of badges 6 7 that would really slow them down, but maybe 8 that's, that can do it too. But not only the number of badges, one 9 10 thing we kind of looked at when we were analyzing did observe 11 groups was, we see, name variations, 12 because that would be very 13 important thing when you're trying to code from these temporary badge reports and visitor cards 14 15 is if you see slight changes in the spelling, 16 would be important to see how those are dealt 17 with in the new database. The other thing that we wanted to try 18 19 to get is a little bit of diversity among the 20 employees. We wanted to see some subcontract

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employees, as well employers, 2 contract. So, the group one, which is a group, 3 again, we feel is going to be most beneficial to 4 look at first, about three-quarters of them were 5 employed by the prime contractor, and about a 6 7 quarter by subcontractors, and half of them, we 8 actually saw some variations in the name, so that would be something that I think would offer a lot 9 10 of, at least, qualitative information to the Work 11 Group. And when you see a name variation, and 12 13 they worked for the same contractor in the same covered period, to see how that was dealt with 14 during the coding process. 15 16 So, what we recommended was that to 17 sort of do this in a graded fashion where we'd 18 request from the site the records for the group 19 one claims, and then we'd get those back and those could be processed on our side very quickly just 20

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to verify whether or not those badges we noticed 1 in fact included in the claimant. 2. are now dosimetry files, so once we get 3 those records back from the site, it will be a very quick 4 turnaround to be able to report back to the Work 5 Group, and then we can either send out group two 6 7 if we feel more analysis should be done, or we 8 could send out group two as soon as group one is I guess that's really at the behest of the 9 10 Work Group. 11 So, that's where we're at with that. 12 expanded. We have the names and Social 13 Security numbers ready to go. Tim said, just the coding effort 14 15 was really just completed last week, so, I quess, our recommendation now would be that we send off 16 17 the group one claims, and see what we get back, and then at that time, we can either ask for the 18 19 group two, or if the Work Group elects, we can 20 send off group one, and then have group two sent

1	off immediately after group one comes back before
2	we're actually able to make any determinations on
3	it. If we're only given the 30 claims, it seems
4	insufficient.
5	MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim Melius.
6	Yes, I'd go with option two that you do group
7	one, and as soon as you get those back, you send
8	out group two, because otherwise, we're just
9	going to lose time. By the time we set up the
10	Work Group, call, and you do the analysis, we do
11	Work Group call, and so forth
12	MEMBER ROESSLER: I agree with Jim in
13	that.
14	MR. BARTON: Okay. I have a note,
15	again, that these are claimants for whom the site
16	will be, or should be researching these dosimetry
17	files anyway, so you're right. As far as the
18	question of timing, they'd be doing the work
19	anyway, so it might be smarter to do them
20	sequentially like that.

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1 DR. TAULBEE: When you send 2 request to the site, could you co me on that, please? 3 Well, actually, that was 4 MR. BARTON: going to be a question, because I'm not sure of 5 6 steps how about making those on we go 7 requests. I don't know if that's something that 8 should probably go through NIOSH's channel, given that we end up on NOCTS, the result would likely 9 10 end up on NOCTS anyway, so I guess -- I don't 11 know what the proper procedure would be to, to make that request, so I was hoping for a little 12 13 quidance on that. Let me get back DR. TAULBEE: 14 Okay. 15 to you on that, because I think you all are 16 correct. It would probably be the most efficient 17 for us to get our regular claims processing group 18 to get them, and then we can put them and identify 19 them to you when we receive the responses, but I'll get back to you, hopefully, later today on 20

1	that.
2	MR. BARTON: Okay, great.
3	MR. KATZ: Yes, Tim, this is Ted. I
4	think that's a good idea also, because you have
5	sort of a well-established quality process for
6	getting this kind of data from the sites.
7	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
8	MR. KATZ: Thanks.
9	MEMBER BEACH: Tim, when do you think
10	we could expect a draft of the priorities of most
11	of which we discussed?
12	DR. TAULBEE: I'm hoping later this
13	week, if not sooner. I don't know what the rest
14	of my team's schedule is for this week.
15	MEMBER BEACH: And then I have a
16	tasking question if that's appropriate, Phil, now
17	or there's more to go through?
18	MEMBER MELIUS: We still have one
19	Tim had a prioritization question.
20	MEMBER BEACH: Okay.

1	MEMBER MELIUS: It's whether he
2	whether they respond to the SC&A report or
3	whether they follow-up on the ANL-West issue.
4	Was that correct? Tim, was that your
5	question?
6	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, it is.
7	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, okay.
8	DR. TAULBEE: I mean, because right
9	now, we're in kind of a well, I wouldn't say
10	a low, but we're working we're waiting on the
11	data for the 83.14 from the burial ground, so
12	until we get that data, we can't be working on
13	either INL or ANL-West or the CPP one or the
14	burial ground's follow-up, the SC&A's burial
15	ground report, so I guess it's between those
16	three, but I would think the top, the first two
17	I mentioned, the CPP and ANL-West, are you all's
18	top priorities.
19	MR. STIVER: Yes, Tim, this is Stiver.
20	That's what I recall from the last fall when you

1	set up a list of priorities under the report on
2	the air sampling at ANL-West, and then following
3	up after that with a response to the burial ground
4	paper.
5	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. So, I guess, then
6	the question for the Work Group is CPP or the
7	ANL-West air monitoring.
8	MEMBER MELIUS: And what if we throw
9	it back to you? What's your preference?
10	DR. TAULBEE: I guess, my preference
11	would be the CPP only because I'd like to try and
12	get this one wrapped up.
13	(Laughter.)
14	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, I would agree, I
15	think.
16	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes, I agree too,
17	although, I'm not strong on that.
18	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Alright, then we
19	will go ahead and move that one to the move it
20	up into the current slot, and readjust. And,

1	again, I hope to send out kind of this priority
2	memo to the Work Group by the end of the week.
3	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay.
4	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Will this report be
5	ready in time for the meeting in Santa Fe?
6	DR. TAULBEE: Phil, this is just a
7	memo of the priorities. That's all.
8	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: It's just going to
9	be strictly a memo to the Work Group then?
10	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
11	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Okay.
11 12	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Okay. MEMBER BEACH: So, no, it won't be
12	MEMBER BEACH: So, no, it won't be
12 13	MEMBER BEACH: So, no, it won't be ready, right, Phil? Okay. So, can I ask about
12 13 14	MEMBER BEACH: So, no, it won't be ready, right, Phil? Okay. So, can I ask about tasking the 83.14 that we just reviewed, Tim?
12 13 14 15	MEMBER BEACH: So, no, it won't be ready, right, Phil? Okay. So, can I ask about tasking the 83.14 that we just reviewed, Tim? Can that be tasked to SC&A to review it?
12 13 14 15	MEMBER BEACH: So, no, it won't be ready, right, Phil? Okay. So, can I ask about tasking the 83.14 that we just reviewed, Tim? Can that be tasked to SC&A to review it? MR. KATZ: This is Ted. Yes.
12 13 14 15 16	MEMBER BEACH: So, no, it won't be ready, right, Phil? Okay. So, can I ask about tasking the 83.14 that we just reviewed, Tim? Can that be tasked to SC&A to review it? MR. KATZ: This is Ted. Yes. MEMBER BEACH: Okay.

1	that done, that's fine.
2	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but the only
3	question I have on that is that in cities, they
4	were going to do more work on that. This whole
5	question of, you know, who's being monitored in
6	post-'81 and so forth.
7	DR. TAULBEE: Actually, we weren't
8	going to unless given a specific question about
9	that. I mean, is that
10	MEMBER MELIUS: You sound like
11	okay. You sound as if you were planning on it
12	that's why
13	DR. TAULBEE: No, no, no, no.
14	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay.
15	DR. NETON: This is Jim. This is an
16	83.14, you know, we identified the infeasibility
17	through a certain date, and we need to just go
18	ahead with that, and then we can proceed later to
19	identify any additional infeasibilities.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but we've got the

1	Class Definition issue, right?
2	DR. NETON: Yes, that's true.
3	MEMBER MELIUS: That's what make this
4	one different, and I don't think that's going to
5	get resolved for a couple of months.
6	DR. NETON: Good point.
7	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes. So, yes, I
8	guess, it makes sense then for I mean, I think,
9	there are issues that, that have been raised or
10	questions anyway, so to have SC&A go through that
11	would make sense, but not in relationship to the
12	card timeframe of the report. I don't know.
13	Maybe it doesn't make sense until we get a better
14	handle on
15	MR. KATZ: Yes, Jim, I'm yes, Jim,
16	I'm unclear what the, I guess, focus about SC&A's
17	review would be at this point.
18	DR. NETON: I think the only issue is
19	probably the cutoff date, right?
20	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, I think, that's -

1	-
2	DR. NETON: Yes, that's been
3	MR. STIVER: That would be the first
4	thing we'd look at would be the cutoff date, yes.
5	DR. TAULBEE: Well, this is Tim.
6	Under the 83.14, we tend to, you know, we've
7	identified an unfeasibility. If there's an
8	additional unfeasibility after the cutoff, that
9	cutoff date is not good in a sense, then we would
10	do another 83.14.
11	MR. STIVER: Right.
12	DR. TAULBEE: So, on this one, you
13	know, we're stating that there's an unfeasibility
14	here, and there's things that we can't do, so,
15	you know, we can expand the Class at a later time.
16	MR. STIVER: Right.
17	MR. KATZ: Tim, this doesn't if
18	SC&A reviews this, this doesn't delay the process
19	on this current 83.14 Class as defined, so it
20	wouldn't delay you, Tim, in any way. It's just

1	I think, the only thing hanging out there for
2	this 83.14 is the same thing that is on the
3	original CPP, which is the Class Definition
4	thing, and so there's not more for them to do on
5	that I don't think, but that's why I was saying,
6	I'm not sure what the focus is, but if they're
7	looking at whether that end date is appropriate,
8	it doesn't mean that that holds anything left in
9	terms of the Board acting on this 83.14 when it's
10	ready to with respect to the other issue in the
11	Class Definition whether these people can be
11 12	Class Definition whether these people can be identified.
12	identified.
12	identified. MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but it, I mean,
12 13 14	<pre>identified. MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but it, I mean, it does raise some one is, what else is SC&A</pre>
12 13 14 15	identified. MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but it, I mean, it does raise some one is, what else is SC&A working on, so how much of a priority do they
12 13 14 15 16	identified. MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but it, I mean, it does raise some one is, what else is SC&A working on, so how much of a priority do they give to this?
12 13 14 15 16 17	identified. MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, but it, I mean, it does raise some one is, what else is SC&A working on, so how much of a priority do they give to this? MR. KATZ: Right.

1	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, we do.
2	MEMBER MELIUS: We do? Does it cover
3	goes beyond this time period then?
4	MR. TAULBEE: Oh, does not go beyond
5	this time period. No, not beyond this period.
6	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, and so it gets a
7	little I mean I'm just not sure how much of
8	a priority I guess, personally, I'd rather get
9	a better handle on what priorities are for both
10	NIOSH, and then SC&A at this point and how we get
11	everything coordinated before we go ahead and do
12	additional tasking.
13	MEMBER BEACH: So, how about tasking
14	SC&A to update and review the matrix for, for
15	INL, kind of get a handle on all these different
16	areas?
17	MEMBER MELIUS: I thought we were
18	already doing that. I think we're getting what
19	work NIOSH had underway, and then at the same
20	time, we'd see what work SC&A had underway and -

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2	MEMBER BEACH: Yes. Yes, I guess
3	you're right.
4	MEMBER MELIUS: get it coordinated.
5	MR. KATZ: So, I guess, what I'm
6	hearing is just maybe hold your horses, let's get
7	this CPP Class Definition thing sorted out, the
8	V&V did or whatever Bob's next step is first.
9	Certainly that's super important since CPP is
10	sitting there until that gets done.
11	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes. We're going to
12	have a Work Group meeting, you know, at least at
13	the time within a couple of months, and maybe
14	we'd want to do one sooner, or, you know, a quick
15	call, because of the when we get the
16	information on what's active and so forth.
17	MEMBER BEACH: That makes sense.
18	MR. KATZ: Okay then. Is that a wrap?
19	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: I think that's a
20	wrap.

1 (Laughter.)

2. Hi. This is Steve DR. OSTROW: We're talking about schedules. 3 is these reactor studies that related to OTIB-4 54. You know, we had put out a report in, last 5 December where we consolidated comments that we 6 7 had on reactors, reactor characterization from 8 and ANL-West, and also we captured some INL comments and findings that we had from two older 9 10 reports we did about, I think, in 2015 on TAN and 11 TRA areas. And when we had the Work Group meeting 12 13 last April, at that time, we were talking about the schedule for that. Tim had mentioned that 14 15 they had, NIOSH had a new person available to do analysis work parallel to the other efforts, but 16 17 when I asked subsequently about a, I think, on 18 July 18th, Tim and I emailed each other, and he 19 indicated that because of staffing issues that NIOSH wouldn't get around to this until, I think, 20

1	March of 2018, so I just wondering from NIOSH, is
2	this still the schedule that you anticipate to
3	respond to our reactor study comments?
4	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, it is. It's just
5	one of those that's on the, kind of a lower
6	priority here. I will say that there was some
7	work that has, has begun on that. The additional
8	resource though that we have is quite limited,
9	but they did participate in the data capture in
10	June, and did gather some information for one of
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
11	the priority reactors.
11	the priority reactors.
11	the priority reactors. DR. OSTROW: Okay, good.
11 12 13	the priority reactors. DR. OSTROW: Okay, good. DR. TAULBEE: But, again, we haven't
11 12 13 14	the priority reactors. DR. OSTROW: Okay, good. DR. TAULBEE: But, again, we haven't received that yet. We are still projecting that
11 12 13 14 15	the priority reactors. DR. OSTROW: Okay, good. DR. TAULBEE: But, again, we haven't received that yet. We are still projecting that it'd be next spring.
11 12 13 14 15 16	the priority reactors. DR. OSTROW: Okay, good. DR. TAULBEE: But, again, we haven't received that yet. We are still projecting that it'd be next spring. DR. OSTROW: Okay. That could just be
11 12 13 14 15 16	the priority reactors. DR. OSTROW: Okay, good. DR. TAULBEE: But, again, we haven't received that yet. We are still projecting that it'd be next spring. DR. OSTROW: Okay. That could just be included on the work, I guess, you know, of your

1	not sure who all on your all side for								
2	distribution, so								
3	DR. OSTROW: I'm sure John can, you								
4	know,								
5	DR. TAULBEE: distributed out.								
6	DR. OSTROW: Okay. Thank you.								
7	MR. STIVER: Thanks, Steve.								
8	MR. KATZ: Okay. Then, if there are								
9	no other questions or issues, Phil, can we								
10	adjourn?								
11	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: I don't have any								
12	unless anybody does, I mean, otherwise I think								
13	we've kind of covered it. We should be getting								
14	the documents to kind of give us path forward								
15	where we are right now by going in order of								
16	priorities.								
17	MR. KATZ: Okay, then								
18	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Lest I be confused.								
19	(Laughter.)								

1	Adjourn								
2		MR.	KATZ:	No,	I	think	you	got	it
3	straight.	Thar	nk you,	every	bod	.у.			
4		(Whe	ereupon,	the	abc	ve-ent	itled	l mat	ter
5	went off t	he re	ecord at	12:0	8 p	.m.)			
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