## U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

+ + + + +

ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

+ + + + +

IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY/
ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY-WEST WORK GROUP

+ + + + +

TUESDAY MAY 16, 2017

+ + + + +

The Work Group convened telephonically at 10:00 a.m., Eastern Time, Phillip Schofield, Chair, presiding.

## PRESENT:

PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, Chair JOSIE BEACH, Member JAMES M. MELIUS, Member

## ALSO PRESENT:

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official BOB BARTON, SC&A
RON BUCHANAN, SC&A
HARRY CHMELYNSKI, SC&A
DOUG FARVER, SC&A
MITCH FINDLEY, ORAU Team
JOE FITZGERALD, SC&A
BRIAN GLECKLER, ORAU Team
JOHN MAURO, SC&A
JIM NETON, DCAS
STEVE OSTROW, SC&A
MICHAEL RAFKY, HHS
JOHN STIVER, SC&A
TIM TAULBEE, SC&A

This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Idaho Argonne National Laboratory-East (ANL-Esdy) Work Group, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the INL Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.

3

## Contents

Welcome and Roll Call	4
V&V plan for temporary badges at CPP	6
NIOSH Priorities for August ABRWH	. 49
83.14 re: Burial Grounds	. 49
Priorities for Evaluating Reactor	. 67
DR Records/Methods	. 67
SC&A Burial Grounds Report	114
Adjourn	129

1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	10:01 a.m.
3	Welcome and Roll Call
4	MR. KATZ: So, for folks on the phone
5	and the public or elsewhere the material for
6	today's meeting, the agenda and the materials are
7	on the NIOSH website, this program's website,
8	under schedule of meetings, today's date.
9	You can pull up all of the documents
10	that are going to be discussed or may be
11	discussed today because this meeting has more on
12	its agenda than we probably have time for.
13	But we have all those documents on
14	there. The only thing that's not on there is the
15	presentation that was prepared by Steve Ostrow,
16	just really sort of a summary of other documents
17	and discussions. And most of that material is
18	covered in the documents that are posted.
19	But we will get that posted when we
20	can; it couldn't be posted in time for this
21	meeting.

1	Okay, so roll call. Conflicts of
2	interest. None of my Work Group members have
3	conflicts so I don't need to address that, but we
4	have Phillip up here, he's the chair of this Work
5	Group on the line.
6	(Roll Call)
7	MR. KATZ: I just realized, I didn't
8	announce at the outset here. This is the
9	INL/ANL-West Work Group meeting.
10	Okay, very good. Let's go to the SC&A
11	team.
12	(Roll Call)
13	MR. KATZ: Okay, then. I just remind
14	everyone to mute your phone except for when
15	you're speaking. It will help with the audio.
16	And Phil, it's your meeting.
17	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Thank you. I guess
18	we'll go ahead and start off with SC&A. We're
19	going to follow the agenda that's out on the
20	website. So, if anybody has any questions they
21	can go to the CDC website and find the agenda

1	there.
2	So, SC&A I guess it's yours now.
3	V&V plan for temporary badges at CPP
4	MR. BARTON: I guess that's my cue.
5	The first discussion item on the agenda is the
6	V&V plan for temporary badges at CPP.
7	If you could just I'm trying to
8	fight with Skype. I wanted to put up the memo
9	just so people could try to take a look at a
10	table that's shown in there so if you could bear
11	with me one moment.
12	You know what? I can get started.
13	The document is on the website under today's
14	meeting as Ted had pointed out.
15	MR. KATZ: And Bob, everyone has it so
16	it should be okay.
17	MR. BARTON: If people want to just
18	follow along in that that's fine.
19	And this memo came out last September.
20	And this was related to a lot of discussions
21	that happened in both March, or January, March,

and August of last year in this Work Group.

2 And there's sort of two facets to it.

3 So just to give everyone a little bit of

4 background so we can kind of get up to speed

5 because it's been a few months.

There were sort of two like I said
facets to this to doing a V&V study on the
temporary badge issue.

early in 2016, was that at some point during the mid to late nineteen sixties the policy at INL was they would issue a visitor badge. But if it came back as a zero dose for that wear period and you were not already in the health physics system they kept your badge but you weren't actually assimilated into these temporary badge reports with all the other workers, who were mainly the prime contractors aren't the same. So a lot of these are the I guess sub subcontractors you'd see. And if they had zero dose they weren't actually entered in INL's system for the purposes

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

1	of being able to identify the people when it came
2	to requests for their monitoring records.
3	So even though those records weren't
4	destroyed or misplaced or anything like that they
5	just simply hadn't been, what's referred to as
6	indexed or coded so that when a request comes in
7	for a specific worker those badges weren't
8	recognized as being associated with that worker.
9	Now that problem was recognized and
10	DOE has undergone, and I'm not sure where that
11	stands right now. I don't know if Tim, you want
12	to give an update on that coding effort.
13	I think maybe it was still underway.
14	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, this is Tim
15	Taulbee.
16	Back in April, Mitch and I talked with
17	the site about their status and it is
18	progressing.
19	However, they are slightly delayed due
20	to some resource issues. At that time this
21	was about a month ago they were expecting to

be completed in mid-June.

1

Τ	be completed in mid-June.
2	MR. BARTON: Okay, great. So, anyway,
3	like I said there are sort of two things that we
4	really want to look at here.
5	One is do we physically have access to
6	all of those visitor cards and temporary badges,
7	or we're not missing whole groups of them which
8	would obviously be a very large completeness
9	issue.
10	Now that aspect of it was analyzed in
11	depth and presented to the Work Group mostly in
12	August but also in March of last year.
13	And in that analysis, I believe, in
14	August it was essentially what we did, or what
15	NIOSH went in and did is they counted physically
16	how many of these temporary badges do we have in
17	hand.
18	And then you can compare those to
19	health physics reports which report out the
20	number of temporary/visitor badges that were
21	issued for a given period.

1	I think, again, I don't want to talk
2	too much about the work NIOSH did, but they
3	looked at it on an essentially year by year
4	basis.
5	And the end game was that they
6	actually had, I believe about 2 percent more
7	badges, physical badges in hand than what was
8	actually being reported in those health physics
9	reports.
10	So that's a pretty good weight of
11	evidence argument that we're not missing whole
12	groupings of these temporary badges. So they're
13	there.
14	Now the question was, DOE is going to
15	go in and code these badges, are they going to be
16	in a form to where the implementation needs to be
17	tested.
18	That is, we have a database now, or
19	the database is currently underway so that when
20	you have a claimant who's either going to qualify
21	as the SEC or needs a dose reconstruction that

1	information comes in, they can identify the
2	claimant, and these temporary badges which had
3	heretofore been not associated with these workers
4	can now be correctly associated and those records
5	are transmitted both to DOL for any SEC
6	determination, or to NIOSH for a dose
7	reconstruction. So it's really that second
8	part that this V&V memo was about. It was
9	requested of SC&A to sort of come up with a
10	protocol or a procedure on how we could go in and
11	test the implementation of all this coding and
12	indexing to be sure that when all is said and
13	done we're still not going to be missing people
14	who were in these temporary badge records that
15	hadn't been officially entered into the INL
16	dosimetry system.
17	So that's sort of the background to
18	all this.
19	And we produced the memo again late
20	September. Not a very long document, nine pages,
21	but most of that is tables at the end.

1	So if we can look at that, I kind of
2	went through the introduction background.
3	But the method we came up with is
4	fairly simple. What we wanted to do is go find
5	some claimants who would require dose
6	reconstruction from NIOSH mostly because the
7	covered illness is not one of the 22 designated
8	SEC cancers.
9	So despite whatever happens with the
10	SEC they're still going to require dose
11	reconstruction, it's still going to be required
12	that NIOSH make a request for records from DOE so
13	that it can get all these temporary badge reports
14	which had been missing.
15	So what we did is sort of a pool
16	principle. We said all right, we'll go into
17	these groups of visitor cards which had been
18	captured by NIOSH and we found some pretty large
19	files from about mid 1967 into 1969, I think
20	early 1970.
21	And we looked for claimants with

' ~ '	
specitic	criteria.
ppcciric	CTTCCTTG.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

One, obviously that they still require dose reconstruction. And the reason why we made that a requirement is because DOE would already be searching and compiling the monitoring records for these people anyway. So this wouldn't be excess work on their end. It would be something that would already be being done so that the dose reconstruction could be revised given the new information. So that was one requirement. And also one requirement that I put in there was that I wanted to see claims that had what's called an S number, or a security number. This was a unique -- it's not Social Security. It's a unique security identification number for the site. And the reason I wanted to include that criteria was simply because you could always run into situations where there's some ambiguity, some uncertainty which you might have a John Smith, but you don't know which John Smith that

is to put a very simple example on it.

1

Τ	is to put a very simple example on it.
2	So I wanted claimants that would
3	require dose reconstruction, had an S number on
4	these visitor cards so I could absolutely
5	identify them for who they were, and then also
6	the third requirement was these records that we
7	see are not already included in the NOCTS file.
8	That is, these are the records that
9	were missing, that had not been coded and
10	indexed, and so were not being associated with
11	the individual worker.
12	So as a proof of principle, and I
13	think it's the first table there in the memo. We
14	looked through several SRDB reference numbers and
15	we came up with a group of 32 claimants who fit
16	those criteria that are definitely going to
17	require a revised dose reconstruction.
18	We have an S number that we can
19	definitely tie them to these temporary badges.
20	And the temporary badges are not currently in
21	their file so they had been missed the first time

around.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

And the idea is once all these badges are coded and a request is made to DOE to get these files for dose reconstruction now we can well, these missing badges which we've see, identified manually, are these now getting picked up by the electronic system that's now in place. So that's the general idea. There were 32 claimants with 51 total badges. So some claimants we were able to identify with multiple temporary badges at CPP again during this window that we looked at. Really the proof of principle to say well. it would be nice if we had all these criteria and we could meet them. But in practice if we can't find claimants that we can put in this value then that wouldn't be worth a whole lot. So, again these 32 claimants with 51 records were part of the proof of principle to say this is the method that we feel is the best

1	way to test the actual implementation of this new
2	database of temporary badges.
3	Can we find them? Yes, we found some.
4	And this is how we propose for discussion with
5	the Work Group on how we feel the best way to go
6	about validating the implementation side of this
7	issue.
8	And of course the other side was the
9	total number of badges, do we have all of them,
10	which is something that NIOSH looked into last
11	August.
12	And I don't think there's much more to
13	say on the actual memo. There's a fairly lengthy
14	table at the end that shows those 32 claimants.
15	And you can see what their work history was, what
16	the illness was, kind of explain what their DR
17	status is and also how many badges we found again
18	in that subset of SRDB reference numbers that we
19	present in the first table of the memo.
20	So with that I'd be happy to answer
21	any questions or clarify any points. Hopefully

you're all still there and I didn't just speak

_	100 -0 0-1 00-1 000-0 000 - 0-100 0 July of 0000
2	for 10 minutes with nobody listening.
3	MR. KATZ: We're all here, Bob,
4	thanks.
5	MR. BARTON: Okay.
6	MEMBER BEACH: So, this is Josie. I
7	guess my question is so you did these 32. What
8	sample size are you thinking we're going to need
9	once the coding is done? Will it be a percent or
10	a certain number?
11	MR. BARTON: That's where the method
12	is somewhat limited. Again, we wanted to look at
13	claimants who would require dose reconstruction
14	for the sole reason that DOE is already going to
15	have to go hunting and compile the records for
16	these specific people anyway. So this wouldn't
17	be extra work like, as you may remember, when we
18	did some claimant studies earlier on the CPP
19	Class Definition we found some that we really
20	needed DOE to go back and get those records.
21	And that generally took a couple of

1 months, extra months. So in my mind this was kind of -- at least there was a first sort of 2 3 crack at it, but I feel it's killing two birds 4 with one stone because we're already going to go 5 searching for these records, for these specific people. 6 7 So it is restricted again by claimants and by claimants that require dose reconstruction 8 9 t.hat. have that security number 10 definitively ties the temporary badge to the claimant. 11 12 Now this was looked at CPP visitor 13 badge, visitor cards again from about mid-1967 14 into early-1970. 15 As I understand it the visitor cards 16 prior to that period, so from 1963 through 1967, 17 I believe they're also available. And actually, I was going to ask NIOSH to clarify that point 18 19 because I was not able to find them yet and I 20 don't know if they're still being held up for 21 being uploaded to the SRDB or what the status of

1	those visitor cards are prior to roughly mid-
2	1967.
3	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim Taulbee.
4	The status of those cards are, actually, we
5	haven't looked for them.
6	We looked at the temporary badge
7	reports which is what was compiled from those
8	cards. And that is the information that DOE is
9	coding, is off of these reports, not the actual
10	cards themselves. They've gone back to the
11	reports and that is what they are entering at
12	this time.
13	As far as the completeness standpoint
14	that's where we looked at the monthly reports and
15	then added up the names on all of those forms and
16	got a very good positive match from that
17	standpoint.
18	The status and the access of those
19	cards, that I don't know. I know they're not
20	coding those or scanning them from that
21	standpoint.

1	What we will be receiving in the
2	future is a printout of that page with that
3	person's name on it with their dose listed. The
4	same thing what you see on these temporary
5	badge reports up through 1967.
6	After 1967, we will be seeing the
7	individual cards themselves because those they
8	did not compile into a report.
9	Does that help clarify?
10	MR. BARTON: That does help. So
11	essentially the issue that really sprung up was
12	around that 1967 time frame when if you weren't
13	part of the dosimetry system already even though
14	you had a visitor card and it wasn't getting onto
15	that temporary badge report listing.
16	Did I repeat that correctly?
17	DR. TAULBEE: Say that again.
18	MR. BARTON: Around 1967 is when the
19	issue really cropped up that you had people who
20	have visitor cards but if it was zero dose and
21	they were not already in the dosimetry system

1	then they keep the card but they did not transfer
2	them, if you will, to those temporary badge
3	reports.
4	DR. TAULBEE: Yes and no. You are
5	correct. However, prior to 1967 if somebody had
6	a zero dose they still weren't entered into the
7	system.
8	So you could have appeared on those
9	temporary badge reports and you weren't entered
10	into the system.
11	Now, in some cases, those people with
12	zero dose are listed and we get them. But the
13	nuance associated with that was that notes for
14	anybody on the page that had a positive dose,
15	they got pulled out and put to the front of the
16	file, and those are scanned early on in the
17	project which is why we get some zeroes but not
18	all of them.
19	MR. BARTON: Okay, I think I
20	understand. Really the concept would be the same
21	then. So we're saying to a certain number, again

we're restricted by the criteria of who DOE is
actually going to end up going back and pulling
these records for just for dose reconstructions
that have to be revised.
Now, the other option would be to just
pull a random sample out of these temporary badge
reports and ask DOE to go hunt down those people.
This would obviously be sort of
outside the normal record searches for dose
reconstruction for Department of Labor. That's
certainly something we could look into in which
case you could have a definitive percentage of
the records that we're looking at.
It gets a little bit muddy because as
Tim just said some of those zeroes that are in
there have already been captured for certain
people.
So again, we were trying to focus on
those records that currently aren't making it
into a worker's file. And the only way we know
that is because we have claimants currently where

1	we have DOE files from before this coding effort
2	happened, and then we'll have revised records
3	requests which ideally would include all these
4	records that were missing. And we know they were
5	missing because we can compare those to before
6	and after essentially.
7	So there's no real I can't put a
8	percentage on it because it was really restricted
9	by how many workers we can identify that fit the
10	criteria of a claimant needing a dose
11	reconstruction and also that those records are
12	currently missing from their files.
13	And the alternative would be we could
14	do a pure random sample and ask DOE to go and
15	hunt them down. I'm not sure how that mechanism
16	would necessarily work or what kind of time frame
17	we'd be looking at to do that sort of validation
18	of the implementation side of this issue.
19	I'm not sure if that answers your
20	question, Jodie.
21	MEMBER BEACH: No, but I like the idea

1	of a random sample even though I know it's got
2	some difficulties.
3	MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim Melius. I
4	have another related issue.
5	You pulled together your samples for
6	this report, the cases, claimant cases in
7	September or maybe even before that. I don't
8	know when you stopped ascertaining cases that
9	would fit this.
10	It's now May, nine months later. By
11	the time we get access to the by the time DOE
12	is supposed to be done entering, doing all the
13	data entry and so forth would it make sense at
14	this point to add go back and look at
15	additional claims since whenever you ended your
16	ascertainment?
17	MR. BARTON: That's certainly
18	something we can go do to expand.
19	Again, when I put this together it was
20	intended to be a protocol with a proof of
21	principle, not necessarily the entirety of what

we could potentially look at.

1	we could potentially look at.
2	And don't forget, just to simply test
3	the coding effort, this isn't just at CPP. It
4	could be expanded to the other facilities just to
5	see how from an implementation standpoint the
6	coding effort is going.
7	If we find visitor badges at hand that
8	were missing originally from the claimant files
9	then those would certainly, in my mind, be just
10	as valid as going towards validating the
11	implementation and DOE's coding and indexing
12	efforts.
13	So that's another avenue we can go to
14	expand to a larger sampling size.
15	And again the other option would be we
16	simply pull a random percentage of groupings. It
17	could be just from CPP since that's the topic of
18	the SEC. We could pull just random workers and
19	ask DOE to go give us all the records on those
20	workers.
21	That's the other option. Again, I

1	proposed the one in which we could look
2	specifically at claimants because these are the
3	situations where we have been missing those
4	temporary badges. And we're looking specifically
5	at those people where if you look at their file
6	right now they're missing a badge that we can go
7	manually find in the captured records that NIOSH
8	has.
9	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay. But there are
10	some number more of those captured records now.
11	MR. BARTON: Yes. This is not by any
12	means complete.
13	Again, I just wanted to prove that you
14	could go in and I listed the ones I looked at.
15	These were actually from the visitor cards.
16	We can pretty much go look at those
17	temporary badge reports and do the same process
18	to expand the grouping if that's certainly what
19	the Work Group wants us to do.
20	DR. MAURO: Bob, this is John Mauro.
21	I've got a question for you.

1	I understand how the search and the
2	completion of this I guess coding process would
3	provide information that will help in dose
4	reconstruction for the CPP workers.
5	To what degree does this very same
6	investigation help toward the definition and
7	implementation of the SEC which is based on
8	having a film badge? Does this have play there
9	also?
10	I don't know if that question is
11	clear.
12	MR. BARTON: It affects both,
13	obviously. If these badges are missing from
14	workers' records that show that they entered CPP
15	then obviously making sure that those are indexed
16	and correctly associated with a worker will
17	affect any SEC decisions for that worker.
18	At the same time, it also affects
19	the DRs obviously would miss doses and that sort
20	of thing.
21	And again, I keep talking about the DR

1	only in the context that DOE is already going to
2	be going and getting these records for the
3	subgroup of workers I identified, because they
4	need a revised dose reconstruction.
5	But yes, this coding effort is
6	definitely very important in the SEC context
7	because all you need is that one badge. And if
8	these badges aren't being associated correctly
9	with the workers then that's obviously an issue.
10	DR. MAURO: Thank you.
11	MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim Melius
12	again.
13	So, I'm trying to think of what level
14	of effort would be required to expand your
15	current sample to bring it more up to date in
16	terms of claims that have been filed since
17	whenever you since your September report, the
18	claims that are included in your September
19	report.
20	MR. BARTON: It actually runs in the
21	other direction.

1	What we did is we looked at the
2	temporary badges first and then tried to identify
3	claimants from that population.
4	So it's not necessarily that we took
5	claimant number one and then went and looked and
6	see if we could find them in the temporary badge
7	reports. It was really the other way around.
8	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay.
9	MR. BARTON: So that would be affected
10	by any new claims. In other words, the first
11	pass might have missed any claims filed since we
12	did it last fall.
13	MEMBER MELIUS: Right.
14	MR. BARTON: But also there are other
15	years, the years prior to 1967 mainly that we can
16	look at in the temporary badge reports and pull
17	out claimants from that to expand the sample size
18	if you will.
19	So there's a couple of different
20	things at play there.
21	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: This is Paul. I've

1	got a question.
2	Some of these claimants look like
3	outside of the card from the CPP. They have gaps
4	of some of them several years with no other
5	health physics records.
6	What's going to be the impact on
7	those?
8	MR. BARTON: Could I ask I'm not
9	sure I quite understood the question.
10	A lot of workers will have gaps, and
11	we really just can't say with any assurance
12	whether that gap is because they were in a non-
13	radiological area, weren't at the site at all, or
14	we are still missing records.
15	I mean, we just can never definitively
16	say that when you see a gap. I can say again,
17	when we went through the sampled workers we have
18	a badge, it has an S number that I can take back
19	for that claimant, and I can look at that
20	claimant's file and say this record is missing.
21	And then when those records get

1	revised and DOE sends the newly coded data over
2	to perform the dose reconstruction then we can
3	say well, either they got that record and it's
4	now correctly associated with a claimant, or it's
5	still missing and the coding effort did not
6	correctly identify it.
7	But as for any individual gaps for any
8	given person it's just very difficult to make any
9	sort of conclusions about why the gap exists.
10	Again, were they monitored and we
11	don't have that data? Were they not monitored
12	for good reason? Were they not even on the site?
13	We just can't know.
14	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Okay.
15	MEMBER BEACH: So moving forward we
16	need to decide what kind of sampling we're going
17	to do based on this plan.
18	MR. BARTON: Right. I think there's
19	probably two or maybe three options.
20	The first option is exactly what you
21	see here which is again, it's restricted to a

1	number of years in '67 to roughly '70. But that
2	can be expanded.
3	And then the other option, as we
4	mentioned earlier, would be a purely random
5	sample in which case we would essentially just
6	give DOE a list of names, ascertain whether they
7	exist, and ask them to pull records for those
8	individuals and see if their coding effort has
9	captured them.
10	The difficult part about the second
11	one is we don't know what's currently missing
12	from those workers' files. So we wouldn't know
13	if DOE had already been correctly sending those a
14	year ago, for example.
15	In this method we already know that
16	DOE wasn't sending this record for this
17	individual, and these records for this
18	individual. We already know that they weren't
19	included because they weren't properly indexed.
20	MEMBER BEACH: Right.
21	MR. BARTON: That's sort of the

1	difference.
2	MR. KATZ: So Bob, I'm just going to
3	expand for Josie on that.
4	So, even though scientific study, like
5	random samples. In this case, you're going to
6	have a lot of wasted hits you might say or
7	whatever, wasted cases in a random sample.
8	There's going to be a bunch of those that really
9	didn't matter anyway.
10	Whereas what Bob's proposing, it's
11	focusing on the cases that will matter. So it's
12	really a more intensive approach. Expanding it
13	to get so all the cases that could be added
14	once we have the coding done. If you do that
15	it's a more intensive approach looking at exactly
16	the problem that we're concerned about.
17	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, that makes sense.
18	Do we have a sense of how big that sampling
19	would be at this point?
20	I mean, we just did 30.
21	MR. KATZ: We can't know what he has

1	back in when he did this look.
2	MEMBER BEACH: Right.
3	MR. KATZ: We don't know how many
4	cases will be added. We find that out when the
5	coding is done and Bob does that second run,
6	basically, to pull cases.
7	MR. BARTON: That's correct, Ted. And
8	I'd just add onto that that's it not just new
9	claims that have been filed.
10	We didn't go through every single
11	possible record just to find these sort of
12	specialty claims where there is a real problem
13	that we observed simply because we wanted to get
14	approval from the Work Group before putting that
15	kind of level of effort in.
16	What we did was a proof of principle
17	saying well, we looked at these subset of records
18	and we did find claimants who fit those criteria.
19	So part of it would be simply expanding that to
20	the remaining CPP records, and if the Work Group
21	likes we can expand it even further to other

areas of INL where coding is still going on with
those sites just like it's going on at CPP.
MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim Melius. I
think the initial step is we continue on this
pathway with the expansion, as Bob just proposed.
I think then let's see. I'm not
saying that we wouldn't want to look at a
different area or whatever, but I think let's see
what we find in this exercise, this evaluation,
and then decide do we need to focus on different
time periods and so forth or how we do it.
In terms of expanding to other areas
of the site I think it somewhat depends on what
of the site I think it somewhat depends on what we're I think the next item on the agenda
we're I think the next item on the agenda
we're I think the next item on the agenda would be potential 83.14.
we're I think the next item on the agenda would be potential 83.14.  Are there other areas where we're
<pre>we're I think the next item on the agenda would be potential 83.14.  Are there other areas where we're going to have this same issue in terms of concern</pre>
we're I think the next item on the agenda would be potential 83.14.  Are there other areas where we're going to have this same issue in terms of concern about the Class Definition.

1	MR. BARTON: Just to clarify, I
2	understand holding off on the other areas.
3	Would the Work Group want us to expand
4	just to the rest of the CPP temporary badge
5	records? We have a proof of principle here, but
6	there are more records out there that we can look
7	for additional examples of claimants where the
8	files are missing.
9	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, I would say yes.
10	Gen is not on the phone call, but it's
11	a point she's made in previous discussions with
12	this is well, you know, I think Tim has also
13	we've discussed in the Work Group is sort of how
14	many is enough.
15	What is enough to say how many
16	cases with claims that don't match up are
17	adequate to say that we need a more open Class
18	Definition.
19	And so I think that having additional
20	claims in this initial effort would be helpful.
21	I also think it might help us to focus if there's

1	a particular time period, or type of worker, or
2	whatever.
3	I think we'd probably do that as well
4	as a random sampling. But let's see. We may
5	want to focus a random sampling later as the next
6	step.
7	I don't want to carry it too far in
8	terms of speculating on what might be useful, but
9	I think this would provide us with some initial
10	information, enough initial information to
11	decide, at least make a decision on what do we
12	need to do more, or has this been adequate.
13	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Do we have any
14	percentage-wise number of people that have this
15	data missing that might show up in these cards?
16	MR. BARTON: So this is Bob again.
17	Unfortunately no, we really don't know. It's a
18	process of going through and first identifying
19	claimants in the temporary badge records and then
20	looking to see if those temporary badge records
21	are actually included in their individual files

as opposed to, we capture files that NIOSH has

_	as opposed to, we capture rires that wroth has
2	that are thousands of pages and include hundreds
3	and thousands of workers on them.
4	So, it's really not possible to know
5	exactly how many which is sort of like you
6	could get a percentage of the temporary badge
7	records if you did the random sample.
8	But as Ted had mentioned, you'll have
9	a lot of it sort of muddies the water.
10	Because even though you could say well, you know,
11	99 percent were found, 99 percent might have been
12	found a year ago.
13	And so we're not really testing the
14	hypothesis of how well this new coding effort is
15	going to be able to be implemented for those
16	badges that we do know are missing, but only
17	because we found them in sort of a manual effort
18	really.
19	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Well, I've got one
20	other question.
21	I know some of the people with missing

1	badges are union people. Did the local unions
2	keep any of this information in their records
3	that you are aware of?
4	MR. BARTON: I personally have not
5	seen anything that would indicate to me that the
6	individual subcontractors necessarily kept
7	separate dosimetry files.
8	But I'd certainly defer to Tim and his
9	team on that.
10	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim Taulbee. We
11	did not check with unions from that standpoint.
12	What I do know is that a copy was
13	provided to them of their employees. But the
14	main record that is currently being coded was
15	also kept at the INL dosimetry records. And so
16	that is what is being coded at this time.
17	So, we have not pursued that and we're
18	not planning to. We don't do that at other sites
19	either. We go with what the site's records were
20	and as we indicated earlier we've already
21	compared these temporary badge reports, these

1	visitor badges with the number that they said
2	they had issued and we're seeing really good
3	agreement.
4	So, I believe this to be a complete
5	set.
6	The question as Bob was pointing out
7	is have these made it into the DOE records system
8	once this coding effort is completed such that we
9	can see these same badges now when somebody files
10	a claim.
11	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: So, the question I
12	would have this is Phil is what how long
13	do we expect this, before we would have enough
14	data that we could make a really well-informed
15	opinion of where we need to be going on this.
16	Is there any particular timeline that
17	you have knowledge of?
18	MR. BARTON: Well, this is Bob. I
19	guess from my end the first step would be to
20	expand to the other years at CPP and see how many
21	more claimants we can identify that have these

missing temporary badges.
And that can be done while the coding
effort potentially wraps up.
Then it's a question of requesting
those records from DOE which I don't really have
a good handle on. I assume it's probably a month
or two for them to research a number of claims
and get all those records together and send them
over.
But again, I don't have a great feel
for that. I don't know if anyone over at NIOSH
may have a better idea.
But once those records are searched by
DOE and transmitted to NIOSH based on the new
coding effort it's a very simple process of going
through and seeing if the ones that were missing
are now present.
DR. TAULBEE: Also, to give some idea,
it actually depends upon how many people you all
decide that you're going to evaluate and re-
request the records from.

When we did the ANL-West effort of

Τ.	when we did the ANL-West effort of
2	specific people from the early time periods to
3	see if the records were complete, or whether they
4	were in Idaho, or whether they were over in
5	Illinois, it took about I want to say about
6	one to two months for about 30 claims.
7	So, if the number stays about the same
8	or maybe 40 then we're probably looking closer to
9	the two-month range.
10	If the number increases and you decide
11	you want to look at 80 you're probably looking at
12	three or four months.
13	So it really depends upon how many
14	people you all select and send over to DOE for
15	them to pull the people's files. Does that help?
16	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Yes. I was just
17	wondering if there's any way we could maybe, I
18	don't know, make this process a little sharper so
19	that we don't have as long of a lag time.
20	Because you know, this could drag it
21	out given the number of years could drag it

1

out for quite a while.

2	I guess what I'm looking for are
3	suggestions on how to speed this process up a
4	little bit if anybody has a suggestion.
5	MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim. I think
6	the only way to speed it up is going to be, you
7	know, whatever can be accomplished before to
8	make the June deadline then they've got to have a
9	little bit of time for looking for additional
10	cases, claims, and then it can also be done
11	incrementally.
12	So the claims that have already been
13	identified can request those records. And then
14	new ones can be done as another batch or
15	whatever.
16	Does that make sense?
17	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: It seems like a
18	reasonable approach.
19	MEMBER MELIUS: Make sense to Bob and
20	Tim?
21	MR. BARTON: This is Bob. I think

1	you're exactly right. I think right now as
2	soon as the coding effort's done, we can send the
3	first batch for DOE to start researching and then
4	when they get those records in like I said it's
5	going to be a pretty quick process to go and look
6	at the new transmittal from DOE and see, alright,
7	those missing badges are there, or they're still
8	missing.
9	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim. I agree.
10	I would not send that list until they finish the
11	coding though.
12	And the reason is the same people that
13	are doing the coding are the same people who are
14	going to be responding and culling the data.
15	If you send it now your coding's going
16	to be delayed while they're beginning to look up.
17	I would wait.
18	MEMBER BEACH: That sounds good. So
19	the other thing we haven't talked about is you
20	noted in your conclusion, Bob, that there were at
21	least two claimants that had spelling errors and

coding transposed numbers.

1

1	couring cransposed numbers.
2	And you said it has an implementation
3	issue possibly. Can you expand on that just a
4	little bit? Would these two individuals not be
5	included because of those two issues?
6	MR. BARTON: I would want to include
7	them, I think, because those types of errors are
8	sort of what preempted this entire discussion is
9	that notion that we're sort of working off in
10	some cases handwritten records, in other cases
11	they're typed.
12	But the human errors present such as
13	spelling mistakes, or the transposition of the S
14	number, and how is that reflected in this coding
15	effort.
16	Now you know, I don't think it's
17	possible or even reasonable to assume that they
18	would be able to catch everything along those
19	lines, but it would also be very informative to
20	say like well, listen, we had this person that's
21	part of our study. There was a transposed letter

1	in his last name but it still was caught based on
2	the S number. There was a transposed S number
3	but it was still caught based on that person's
4	last name. It kind of goes both ways in that
5	front.
6	So I think it would be useful to
7	include those people just so we can have a
8	discussion about how the coding effort either did
9	or did not catch, I guess you can call them
10	variations when you try to code that kind of data
11	from some cases handwritten, some cases typed.
12	But there's going to be human errors,
13	unavoidable. It's good to understand what those
14	are, how well they're dealt with, and then have a
15	discussion about what the implications are on
16	that.
17	MEMBER BEACH: So those two were
18	caught and they would have been included so that
19	that process you're saying worked and caught
20	those.
21	MR. BARTON: I would certainly hope

1	so. I would hope that it would catch them. But
2	again we don't know until all the coding is done
3	and then we go and request the records for some
4	of the individuals where we saw a couple of
5	variations.
6	MEMBER BEACH: Okay. So it's good to
7	make note of that then. Thank you.
8	MR. BARTON: No problem.
9	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Does anybody else
10	have any input on this particular subject?
11	DR. TAULBEE: None from NIOSH.
12	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: SC&A?
13	MR. BARTON: I guess I just want to
14	clarify our marching orders if you will.
15	As I understand it obviously we're not
16	going to be sending in any data requests to DOE
17	until the coding effort is done.
18	But as I understand it we would look
19	to expand the number of claims at CPP for some of
20	those early years in the meantime while that
21	coding is still being performed so that when it

1	is done we'll have a hopefully somewhat larger
2	cohort to look at.
3	Or should we just keep what we have
4	for now and when the coding effort is done we
5	make the request for 32 claims and then we see
6	what we see with those 32 first before trying to
7	expand.
8	MR. KATZ: Bob, so I think the
9	decision was and the recommendation from the Work
10	Group was to expand as much as you can expand it
11	at the point you have all the coding done.
12	MEMBER MELIUS: So it's expanding the
13	earlier years and also additional claims from
14	that weren't in the original sample that might be
15	from the years that are covered already.
16	MR. KATZ: Right.
17	MR. BARTON: Okay, I understand.
18	Thank you.
19	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Josie, do you have
20	any input?
21	MEMBER BEACH: I'm comfortable with

1	that action.
2	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Okay, then I think
3	we've got that covered. I'd like to spend time
4	on the burial grounds now.
5	NIOSH Priorities for August ABRWH
6	83.14 re: Burial Grounds
7	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim Taulbee. I
8	didn't notice this actual typo until it was too
9	late here.
10	From the August Advisory Board on
11	Radiation your August meeting the 83.14 that
12	we'll be proposing to you all will be for CPP,
13	not the burial grounds.
14	This is an expansion of the CPP Class
15	up through 1980. So, the burial grounds 83.14 is
16	a separate effort that I do want to talk to the
17	Work Group about so it's okay to be on the agenda
18	here.
19	But as far as the Advisory Board
20	meeting in August we do have a draft of the 83.14
21	for the CPP expansion that is working its way

1	through review, and we do hope to have that
2	well, we plan to have that out to the Work Group
3	to the full Board in advance of that meeting
4	such that I can present it at that meeting, at
5	the August meeting.
6	So are there any questions about that
7	before I jump onto the 83.14 for the burial
8	grounds?
9	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes, one question.
10	Just in terms of timing, is it feasible for that
11	to be released in time that we so the Work
12	Group can have an opportunity to review it prior
13	to the August meeting? And to possibly meet to
14	discuss it.
15	DR. TAULBEE: Let me check the current
16	timing of that. I'm actually not sure.
17	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay, so if you can
18	just let us know. I'm trying to facilitate if
19	there are questions about it or something.
20	DR. TAULBEE: Right, no, I understand.
21	I understand. Give me just a second here.

1	It's currently scheduled to be
2	delivered to us in the middle of June. So
3	probably four to six weeks after that.
4	MEMBER MELIUS: So we're cutting it
5	close.
6	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, we're cutting it
7	close.
8	MEMBER MELIUS: So let's just see
9	where we are then.
10	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
11	MEMBER BEACH: To be clear, Tim, that
12	83.14 is simply CPP, and it does not have
13	anything in the later years, and it has nothing
14	about the burial grounds.
15	DR. TAULBEE: That is correct. That
16	is correct. This is where we concur. What we
17	found was those procedures and changes of CPP
18	monitoring that were recommended by in that
19	report of October 1974 to increase the bioassay,
20	to clean up the areas, to reduce the
21	contamination levels, improve the air monitoring

1	and so forth actually do get implemented as fast
2	as what we anticipated it might be.
3	And so we committed when we presented
4	the original ER to evaluate when they actually
5	implemented all of those things.
6	And the bioassay really didn't begin
7	to kick in until 1980 is when that began to
8	happen. And they did have some other incidents
9	in the late nineteen seventies with that shift
10	lot as well.
11	So that's the basis for the 83.14 for
12	CPP, to expand that Class.
13	MEMBER MELIUS: And refresh my memory,
14	but the monitoring practices at the time were the
15	same as before, or changed, or what?
16	DR. TAULBEE: As far as badging to get
17	into the area? Actually, they changed back.
18	They reverted back to the one area one badge
19	one area.
20	So that actually might have some
21	bearing on what Bob and you all are proposing

1	here as well.
2	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
3	MR. BARTON: So, they did implement
4	they went away from the all-area badging back to
5	one badge one area.
6	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay.
7	DR. TAULBEE: And like I said I'll go
8	through all of this more when the report is out,
9	the presentation to the Board. So that's what
10	we're planning for the August Board meeting.
11	Okay. As I mentioned in the March
12	Board meeting that we are going to pursue an
13	83.14 for the burial grounds for the retrieval of
14	waste.
15	Now, this is before we got the report
16	that SC&A released last week, or the week before
17	last rather on the burial grounds. That is the
18	fourth bullet here on the agenda.
19	And so my question to the Work Group
20	is do you want us to pursue the 83.14 for that
21	waste retrieval operation, or do you want us to

1	focus on responding to SC&A's report. Due to
2	kind of resource issues we can't do both
3	simultaneously. I guess we potentially could,
4	but that would take some herculean effort here.
5	Or so we prefer to do them
6	serially, but which one is the higher priority to
7	the Work Group.
8	MEMBER BEACH: Tim, a question for you
9	on that burial ground. I had sent an email
10	asking, requesting some information on some of
11	your data.
12	And I thought we would have that
13	before now. Can you say where you're at on that?
14	DR. TAULBEE: Yes. Mitch and I are
15	assembling that. I apologize for it being late.
16	Both of us have been out quite a bit the past
17	month. I'd hoped to have it to you last week, but
18	we're just not ready yet from that standpoint.
19	But we are working on your request there of
20	pointing out specific special bioassay of workers
21	being monitored.

1	I do hope to get that to you in the
2	next couple of weeks.
3	MEMBER BEACH: Okay. So, you're
4	talking about working on an 83.14 for the burial
5	grounds, correct?
6	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
7	MEMBER BEACH: And what time period?
8	DR. TAULBEE: This would be 1970
9	through around '77, '78 when we began to see a
10	lot of bioassay for the burial grounds. Specific
11	bioassay for the burial grounds.
12	MEMBER BEACH: Okay. And this report
13	that SC&A has out is for those earlier years, and
14	you're saying you cannot simultaneously work on
15	both of those.
16	DR. TAULBEE: No, we've got the same
17	people doing both. So I'm asking which is the
18	higher priority for us to respond to.
19	MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim. I'd say
20	the 83.14.
21	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, I can't say I

1	disagree with that, but how far off would be
2	responding to that report be then, the early
3	years?
4	DR. TAULBEE: It would be fall at the
5	earliest, I would think.
6	MEMBER BEACH: It almost seems to me
7	the 83.14 should encompass that '53 all the way
8	to '77.
9	DR. TAULBEE: Well, we only made a
10	decision about the earlier time period, and this
11	is where SC&A's comments come into it.
12	The reason for us potentially
13	expanding was there's a big change in operations
14	in 1970. The big change is, one, they were
15	burying waste. Starting in 1970 time frame,
16	1971, '72 they started digging it up.
17	So, from our standpoint there's a much
18	higher potential when they were doing that
19	digging up of the waste. And like I said, we
20	don't see any bioassay right now, but that's part
21	of the 83.14 evaluation.

1	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: This is Phil. I've
2	got a question on that kind of limited experience
3	of our facilities that have burials going on.
4	That's the fact that these personnel
5	working in those areas, the materials going into
6	those dumps comes from all over the site.
7	You've got about every isotope you can
8	think of going into this waste stream. Which
9	unless they had a very broad spectrum analysis
10	done, I would be concerned about whether you're
11	catching a lot of what potential exposures are
12	when they were burying this material, and not
13	just when they were digging it up.
14	MR. KATZ: Phil, that concern is sort
15	of at the heart of the SC&A review which they
16	will address.
17	But with an 83.14 once NIOSH
18	determines feasibility for a Class of workers it
19	has to proceed with that 83.14. It can't really
20	say okay, we're going to put that off and
21	evaluate the present thing, and add that to this.

1	If they have a claimant who's
2	represented by an 83.14 they're supposed to
3	proceed with that.
4	DR. TAULBEE: Right, Ted, but we're
5	not quite there yet with this 83.14.
6	The potential that we see right now is
7	that we know they were digging it up under what
8	we call the initial drum retrieval operation, and
9	then there was a second one where they were
10	beginning to dig up the waste.
11	From the coding for the coworker data
12	set looking at the bioassay for the people
13	involved with that and we're not seeing much
14	routine type of bioassay until we get into the
15	'77 and later time period.
16	So, we're seeing the potential there
17	that causes us concern which is why we want to
18	investigate.
19	(Simultaneous speaking)
20	DR. TAULBEE: the point you were
21	saying yet, but we're kind of guessing that we're

1	going to have an infeasibility during those
2	recovery operations, the early part of the
3	recovery operations.
4	MR. KATZ: Okay, got it. So you would
5	have to identify a claimant anyway to proceed
6	with the 83.14, right?
7	DR. TAULBEE: That's correct.
8	MR. KATZ: Okay.
9	DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. Just
10	a quick observation. After reading Joe
11	Fitzgerald's report, it's a very broad-based
12	report with lots and lots of rich information on
13	places where there may be some weaknesses in
14	terms of the ability to reconstruct doses.
15	So I guess I would just say that
16	reading the report and getting a sense of SC&A's
17	perspective on where there's softness in the
18	records, and the HP oversight program almost as
19	if it's background information that I think it
20	would be very useful as you're pursuing your
21	83.14. It may be self-evident to say that, but I

1	just wanted to point that out.
2	DR. TAULBEE: I understand. I agree.
3	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Just from my own
4	perspective I have a question as far as you're
5	looking at like the bioassays and stuff that were
6	done.
7	Was there program bioassays that you
8	would consider to be at least a decent standard
9	in the earlier years when they were burying a lot
10	of this material before they started digging some
11	of it back up?
12	DR. TAULBEE: Yes. In the earlier
13	years they were one of the first sites to really
14	kind of implement whole body counting for the
15	mixed fission products.
16	There was also from the alpha
17	monitoring. The bioassay laboratory and the
18	techniques at that time were RESL, Radiological,
19	Environmental Sciences Laboratories.
20	So they were quite top notch as far as
21	being able to analyze the samples.

1	The question that SC&A and Josie has
2	posed well, from the report, and SC&A, what we
3	want to get back with Josie on in our initial
4	evaluation we indicated that when something
5	happened that would require a bioassay or follow-
6	up that they sent people to Central Facilities
7	for that particular analysis.
8	So Josie's asked for examples of where
9	that has occurred. And that's what we're
10	compiling hopefully within the next few weeks
11	here for Josie. Well, for the whole Work Group,
12	obviously.
13	But that's what we're currently
14	looking at.
15	They did not have a routine monitoring
16	program at the burial grounds during burial. It
17	was on an as-needed basis.
18	Now, and that actually appears to have
19	continued through when they were retrieving
20	waste. And that's what's causing us some
21	concern.

1	But we do begin to see a routine
2	bioassay monitoring program in the late-1970s for
3	the burial grounds.
4	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Okay.
5	MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim. I still
6	think the 83.14, or potential 83.14, ought to
7	take precedent in terms of NIOSH efforts at this
8	point in time.
9	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: I agree with you,
10	Jim.
11	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes. I just think it
12	needs that. We'll get to the other report, the
13	earlier years in turn. And maybe looking at the
14	later years will shed light on the earlier years.
15	More helpful to address that issue, some of
16	those issues.
17	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. If that's the
18	direction then we can certainly pursue that.
19	That's actually the opposite that I thought we
20	were going to go, but that's quite all right. We
21	can certainly adjust and do that.

MEMBER MELIUS: You said you were going

1	MEMBER MEDIOS. Tou Salu you were going
2	to do the opposite.
3	DR. TAULBEE: But that's quite all
4	right. We can do that. Not a problem. Thank
5	you. Thank you for the clarification on that.
6	That was all that I had for this
7	particular topic there, Phil, was the requesting
8	of the priorities of what it is you wanted us to
9	work on from that standpoint.
10	I will say this for the whole Work
11	Group's benefit. There are other reports that
12	SC&A has put out in the past that we are going to
13	begin to work on and we can work on those in
14	parallel.
15	It's just the people that focus on the
16	burial grounds are skilled in the burial grounds
17	and so those people are the ones most informed on
18	it. And that's the resource issue.
19	But other things such as Argonne-West
20	and so forth we can begin to pursue in parallel.
21	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: I just had a

1	question. Was there any feel for I mean, I
2	really don't know, did they tend to have a small
3	crew that handled the burial grounds? Or was
4	this a much broader effort where they brought in
5	people from other areas to assist in the
6	retrieval of some of these drums and burial
7	containers? What kind of numbers are we looking
8	at I guess is the point of what my question is.
9	DR. TAULBEE: Dozens. A few dozen,
10	let me put it that way.
11	But it might be more people. But at
12	any one time it's probably around, even during
13	the retrieval around 20 to 24 type of people
14	working. But it might be a different crew every
15	day.
16	The burial grounds used yardmen and we
17	found this from the interviews numerous times.
18	So one day a yardman might be assigned
19	to the burial grounds. The next day he might be
20	assigned to a hot cell. The next day he might be
21	at MTR. So they moved around a lot.

1	Now, the health physics crew, there
2	was four or five of them that were kind of
3	dedicated from CFA and on any given day one of
4	them might have been down at the burial grounds.
5	Heavy equipment operators, we don't
6	think that there's that many of them, but that
7	they might have also been rotating around as
8	well.
9	So, it's not a huge number of people
10	during this time period, but it might be a lot of
11	different people, if I said that correctly.
12	Mitch, is that your impression and
13	understanding as well?
14	MR. FINDLEY: That's correct, Tim.
15	Looking at some of the area exposure reports in
16	1975 it's like you said kind of dozens and then
17	over time it looked like it ramps up as it
18	becomes more of a more of a facility, if you
19	will, instead of an operation.
20	DR. TAULBEE: Does that answer your
21	question, Phil?

1	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Yes, it does. I
2	mean obviously the numbers will start shaking out
3	as you get farther into this.
4	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
5	MEMBER BEACH: Tim, you also indicated
6	you'd have a short White Paper on emergency
7	responders. And I realize that hasn't been
8	isn't out yet.
9	What is that about or for?
10	DR. TAULBEE: That was the kind of
11	summarizing all of the interviews where the
12	question at CPP was were they monitored during
13	call-outs. That's what that's about.
14	MEMBER BEACH: So we should see that
15	shortly as well.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
17	MEMBER BEACH: Thank you.
18	MR. BARTON: Are we ready to go to the
19	next agenda item?
20	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Unless somebody else
21	has some input I think we're ready to go on to

the next -- for the dose reconstruction records

priorities for the reactors.

	<del>-</del>
3	MR. KATZ: So I think that's Steve,
4	right?
5	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: I believe so. He's
6	got the
7	Priorities for Evaluating Reactor
8	DR Records/Methods
9	DR. OSTROW: This is Steve. I'm
10	looking at the agenda. There's two points,
11	priorities for evaluating reactor dose
12	reconstruction records. That one we know about,
13	who is doing it.
14	The second point is flush methods.
15	That's my stuff.
16	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Your presentation is
17	on the website for the public, isn't it?
18	DR. OSTROW: The presentation, I don't
19	think so because I don't think NIOSH has been
20	able to post things the last couple of days.
21	MR. KATZ: So Steve, the reactor

1

1	prioritization methods is the same, right?
2	DR. OSTROW: Okay. That's fine. I'm
3	ready to give a presentation. Let me see if I
4	can get a PowerPoint presentation up here.
5	Everybody in the Work Group and the
6	SC&A and NIOSH and ORAU got my PowerPoint
7	presentation a couple of days ago by email so
8	they can refer to it. Let's see if I can get it
9	up on Skype also. Let me see if it works here.
10	(Off the record comments)
11	DR. OSTROW: Alright, so this is the
12	reactor prioritization. And if you have the
13	slides, great.
14	Just a brief introduction is on page
15	2. We've been looking at many different aspects
16	of the Site Profile and SEC investigations one of
17	which is related to reactors. And that's what
18	I'm going to focus on.
19	And we have about a two-year history
20	of discussions and White Papers and going back
21	and forth between SC&A and NIOSH.

1	Did it just come up right now?
2	MR. BARTON: Yes, Steve, I just tried
3	to throw it up there. I don't know if people see
4	it.
5	DR. OSTROW: Okay.
6	MR. KATZ: Yes.
7	DR. OSTROW: Yes, it did go away. Do
8	you want to give it another try and see if you
9	can get it up?
10	Okay, anyway, we'll go on. So we're
11	right now on the introduction slide, page 2.
12	Alright, so we came out with a report
13	on December 8. Oh now it's up again. It
14	disappeared.
15	Anyway, we came out with that report
16	on December 8 looking at responding as I said
17	there was a whole series of going back and forth
18	between us, NIOSH and ORAU about looking at
19	reactor analyses.
20	And our latest report, the December 8,
21	looks at NIOSH's reactor analysis plan that Tim

1	Taulbee had created. And also discussed a few
2	other issues that were related to reactor
3	modeling.
4	And the purpose of our report is to
5	put everything together in one place and to
6	inform the Work Group of where we are, and to
7	provide for the Work Group and to provide some
8	guidance to NIOSH and SC&A what we should do
9	next.
10	NIOSH needs information on
11	prioritizing the new reactor and the irradiated
12	fuel characterization studies related to
13	reconstructing internal doses where bioassay data
14	are not available. So what do they look at next?
15	And we also address some specific
16	concerns we had relating to modeling the Test
17	Area North and test reactor area operations. We
18	had expressed those concerns in separate reports
19	in 2015.
20	Next page, page 3, background. This
21	is the we've been discussing this for years

1	already, the OTIB-54 which is fission and
2	activation product assignment for returning dose-
3	related gross beta and gamma analyses.
4	Where is this applicable?
5	Specifically for INL reactors. We had performed
6	preliminary assessments in 2015 and 2016 of
7	whether the OTIB envelope be important condition
8	to the INL and ANL reactors and prioritized
9	reactors to high, medium, and low categories.
10	Subsequently we focused just on high
11	priority category.
12	NIOSH responded last July, Tim's
13	report, with a plan for additional reactor
14	evaluations.
15	We were asked by the Work Group to
16	look at Tim's report and comment, and that's what
17	the current December report is on which was about
18	five months ago now.
19	Page 4 slides. Just to remind people
20	why we were looking at this. The operations at
21	INL/ANL-West were very complex involving

2	And we had all sorts of unique
3	situations about fuel, blankets, reflectors,
4	moderators, coolants, operating scenarios,
5	burnups which would all affect the applicability
6	of the OTIB-54 methodology.
7	And to remind people, there were 52
8	reactors at INL. There were 34 INL reactors and
9	ANL-West reactors. Those are the ones we're
10	concerned with. And there were also four at the
11	naval research facility which we're not concerned
12	with, and two reactors never actually operated.
13	So we're left with a lot of reactors.
14	Next page, slide 5. Just to refresh
15	everybody's memory about what is OTIB-54. And
16	this is a real nice tool that NIOSH developed.
17	It determines internal doses when you
18	only have gross beta or gross gamma measurements.
19	And it assigns fission and activation product
20	intakes to different radioisotopes that are
21	directly tied to indicator radionuclides, either

1

reactors.

strontium-90 and cesium-137.

1

_	belonelam yo ana ooblam 107.
2	So, the OTIB looked at four different
3	reactors which are supposed to be representative
4	of the whole universe of reactors and generated
5	nine different representative cases using the
6	ORIGEN code.
7	So the question we have now, this was
8	investigating, is given a particular INL/ANL-West
9	reactor does it fit within the OTIB-54 envelope,
10	or conversely can you use OTIB-54 to model these
11	reactors adequately.
12	Okay, page 6. We had in two different
13	reports as I mentioned looked at all the INL and
14	ANL-West reactors, and assigned priority rankings
15	to each, high, medium, low, which they should do
16	first, second, third.
17	So, we looked at things like fuel
18	types, moderators, reflectors, coolants,
19	operational modes. Some were steady state, some
20	were intermittent, some operated in burst mode.
21	Some were deliberately or inadvertently melted.

1	Length of operation and overall burnup.
2	And at the last Work Group meeting the
3	Work Group asked us also to take a look at the
4	potential for exposing workers to radiation.
5	Because if you had a reactor, a
6	bizarre reactor, something which couldn't be
7	modeled, but it didn't expose anybody, then you
8	don't really care about. So that goes to the
9	exposure potential.
10	And in our report Appendix A covers
11	that. Bob Barton did a terrific job with that.
12	So it's there to look at.
13	And finally were there any particular
14	incidents, other factors that have potential to
15	expose people.
16	So we here we're at page 7. We
17	ended up looking at just high priority category,
18	and we categorized seven INL and seven ANL-West
19	reactors in the high priority category.
20	For INL we had LOFT, OMRE which is the
21	organic-moderated reactor, Power Burst Facility,

1	and the SPERT 1, 2, 3, 4 reactors.
2	ANL-West we had also seven reactors,
3	the five BORAX, boiling water experiment
4	reactors, and the two EBR reactors, experiment
5	breeding reactors.
6	That's what we recommended for high
7	priority.
8	Page 8. Responding to our report,
9	NIOSH wrote a long memo that made several
10	recommendations. And I took this from Tim's
11	report. I'll talk in more detail later.
12	But basically it posed merging the INL
13	and ANL-West high priority categories together.
14	It didn't make any sense to do them separately.
15	Eliminating several reactors from the high
16	priority category and reasons were given in the
17	report for the SPERT reactors modeling the most
18	extreme experiment as a bounding case, and also
19	modeling the bounding case for the last two EBR-I
20	cores.
21	That's a quick summary of what's in

1	Tim's report.
2	Page 9 lists that NIOSH proposes to do
3	the evaluations they proposed to do. So it's
4	OMRE, PBF, the SPERT reactor, BORAX reactors,
5	EBR-I core 4 and EBR-II.
6	So I read that quickly but you can go
7	read it from the slides or the report.
8	I'll get into the guts of it now.
9	Beginning on page 10 of 15 pages I had listed
10	here on the second column NIOSH's recommendation
11	from Tim's report.
12	And the last column is SC&A's
13	evaluation from the December report that we put
14	out. And this is taken verbatim from both
15	reports.
16	And there were eight different items
17	here from Tim's report that we responded to. In
18	general, we concur in most cases with NIOSH. We
19	only have a few differences here.
20	So the first item, NIOSH proposes
21	merging the INL and ANL-West high priority

1	categories for evaluation. And we concur.
2	There's no reason to have INL separately and ANL-
3	West done separately. So however NIOSH wants to
4	do it, whatever order, that's fine with us.
5	Item 2, NIOSH proposes that the LOFT,
6	that's the loss of fluid test, be removed from
7	consideration because nuclear operations did not
8	commence until December 1978.
9	So we disagreed with NIOSH here.
10	First, we recognized that the first five LOFT
11	experiments were non-nuclear thermohydraulic
12	experiments, and the potential for radiation
13	exposure didn't occur until December 1978. So
14	NIOSH is correct about that, which is after the
15	SEC period.
16	But we believe that given the facility
17	5 long operating history, beyond design basis
18	operating scenarios, and potential to have
19	exposed a significant number of personnel that
20	LOFT deserved a more detailed examination with
21	respect to OTIB-54.

1	While it may not be an SEC issue
2	they're recommending that this be conducted
3	perhaps as a Site Profile exercise. We think
4	it's important that LOFT be modeled. That was
5	item 2.
6	Item 3, both NIOSH and SC&A agree that
7	OMRE, the Organic-Moderated Reactor Experiment,
8	be modeled because that had a unique moderating
9	coolant that's certainly not covered by OTIB-54.
10	It's not obviously covered anyway. So item 3,
11	on OMRE, we agree.
12	Next slide is slide 11, item number 4.
13	We agree that the Power Burst Facility should be
14	evaluated since they used ceramic fuel which is
15	different. So we agree on item 4 for OMRE.
16	Item 5, this is the SPERT experiments.
17	NIOSH proposes a model for the most extreme
18	experiment from all the SPERT in terms of
19	possible departures from OTIB-54, be used to
20	represent the bounding case to cover all four
21	SPERT reactors.

1	So NIOSH basically wants to pick one
2	case that they think is the worst from all these
3	SPERT reactors and model that.
4	We disagree. Although the four SPERT
5	reactors were all part of the same series of
6	reactor experiments that subjected the reactor to
7	large reactivity excursions, they still differed
8	significantly from each other and should be
9	examined separately, perhaps by choosing the
10	worst case scenario for each reactor.
11	So rather than picking one worst case
12	for all four SPERT experiments, we recommend
13	picking looking at each of the four
14	experiments and just picking one worst case for
15	each one of the four.
16	So we disagree with NIOSH. We think
17	they should do a bit more modeling than they're
18	suggesting.
19	Item 6 which is on the next slide,
20	slide 12. This is the BORAX reactors, boiling
21	water reactor experiment.

1	And NIOSH notes that BORAX-I, II and
2	III all ceased operations toward the end of the
3	SEC period for ANL-West. BORAX-I was 1954 it
4	ended. BORAX-II was 1955 it ended. And BORAX-
5	III ended 1956.
6	So NIOSH proposes removing BORAX-I
7	through III. But NIOSH agreed with us that
8	BORAX-IV should be evaluated for the OTIB-54
9	applicability due to the use of uranium thorium
10	oxide flow which was different.
11	And NIOSH proposes that BORAX-V be
12	removed from consideration because its primary
13	function was to evaluate steam superheating. It
14	was basically the same reactor as BORAX-IV, it
15	just had a steam superheating module added to it.
16	So, we agree basically with NIOSH in
17	this evaluation. But we do looking at it
18	again like yesterday and discussing it with John
19	Mauro, and we can write this down, we do have a
20	bit of a concern for reconstructing doses even
21	during the SEC period.

1	This is like a general comment too.
2	You have non-presumptive cancers and you have to
3	do a dose reconstruction for them even if they
4	are in the SEC period.
5	So it's a question if that happens it
6	would be nice to know if OTIB-54 would apply to
7	these reactors. That's just like a general
8	comment John and I had.
9	John, are you on the line? Do you
10	want to say anything about that?
11	DR. MAURO: No, I heard you. Yes, I'm
12	on the line and you explained it. It's as simple
13	as yes.
14	DR. OSTROW: And this doesn't apply
15	just to BORAX. This is a general comment about
16	all these reactors that operated during the SEC
17	period.
18	Okay, next page 13, next slide, item
19	7. These are the Experimental Breeder Reactor 1
20	core, EBR-I.
21	And NIOSH proposed that the most

1	bounding case of the last two EBR-I cores be
2	used.
3	And they further stated while it was
4	initially believed that plutonium core would be
5	bounding, some preliminary modeling would need to
6	be performed on all four cores to confirm this.
7	And we agree. We concur with NIOSH.
8	And we noted also that several hundred workers
9	and visitors were present during the period of
10	operation for the Mark 4 core. That's one of the
11	last cores, if not the last.
12	And finally, item 8. This is EBR-II.
13	NIOSH agreed with us that they should model the
14	EBR-II.
15	And just a little note here also, in
16	some years the average worker penetrating doses
17	were greater than 100 millirem. So that has the
18	potential to expose a good number of workers.
19	So that sums up our response to
20	NIOSH's prioritization recommendations.
21	Our big report from December, also

	adding Appendix A which the Board requested, and
	Bob Barton did this.
}	This looked at the exposure potential
ŀ	of different reactors. And I'm not going to go
	through it because it's many, many pages.
)	But just in summary, the reactor sites
,	that we prioritized as high generally employed
}	hundreds of monitored workers with the exception
)	of PBF which only had about 30 workers assigned
)	during most of its badging cycle. But most of
	the other reactors had hundreds of workers
	assigned.
}	Penetrating doses were significant.
Į.	And with some monthly badging cycles averaging
)	hundreds of millirem. So if you have hundreds of
	workers and the average was hundreds of millirem
,	per monthly badging cycles those are significant
}	exposures. We recognize external
)	exposures do not necessarily imply internal
)	exposure potential. We know that. But the
-	magnitude of the external doses give you some

1	indication of the source terms that are present
2	and the potential for internal exposures too.
3	So, coupled with the extensive
4	internal dosimetry program at INL for fission
5	products, an adequate characterization of the mix
6	of source term contaminants appears warranted.
7	So basically, we concluded that there
8	was an exposure potential at these prioritized
9	reactors. So it's worth looking into.
10	Now, there's two special cases. This
11	fell through the cracks somewhat, and the Board
12	last meeting asked us to take a look at it.
13	We had put out two reports in 2015,
14	both on the same day, September 28. One looked
15	specifically at the applicability of OTIB-54 to
16	the TAN reactors. And the other one looked at
17	the applicability to the PRA facilities.
18	So we included the comments from these
19	two reports in our December 8 report to put
20	everything into one place.
21	So slide 16, Test Area North. And

John Mauro led this. It got complicated so if I

1	John Mauro led this. It got complicated so if i
2	stumble here, I hope John jumps in.
3	This report John studied, looked at
4	the applicability of OTIB-54 which is
5	potentially you only have gross beta or gamma
6	data available. And in the TBD, internal dose
7	TBD, tables 5-22 and 23. That's when you have
8	bio data, bioassay data available. To the
9	applicability in OTIB-54 and these two tables to
10	the internal dose reconstruction at TAN.
11	And John's study looked at the fuel
12	from the heat transfer reactor experiments, HTRE
13	test.
14	They were of particular interest
15	because the reactor fuel operating conditions and
16	so forth that underpinned OTIB-54 methodology
17	reflect situations in which the burnup usually
18	occurred over protracted periods of time,
19	hundreds of days. The fuel maintained its
20	integrity.
21	In contrast, the HTRE fuel had very

1	short burnup times and the reactors operated at a
2	high temperature which allowed the fuel to melt
3	in some cases.
4	In addition, HTRE used highly enriched
5	uranium which is a little bit different.
6	Next page 17. So we decided to do a
7	scoping study. To explore these potential
8	concerns, SC&A performed ORIGEN runs ourselves
9	where the isotopic mixture of fission and
10	activation products were compared at different
11	lengths of continuous operation.
12	We looked at 20 megawatts which is a
13	low-power case and 200 megawatts, a high-power
14	case.
15	When we looked at 20 hours and 200
16	days as extremes of power level for both power
17	levels. And we also did an additional 20-day run
18	for the high-power case.
19	So these were intended to give us an
20	idea, a general representation of the operating
21	conditions of HTRE tests. For example, HTRE-I

1	was operated at the 20 megawatts for 151 hours.
2	We were just getting some idea of what ORIGEN
3	would do to these reactors.
4	So, the long period of time, the 200-
5	day case, this is on page 18, are indicative of
6	the long burnup times that were used to derive
7	mixes of radionuclides in table 7-3 of OTIB-54,
8	while the shorter burnup times, 20 days and 20
9	hours are typical of the TAN experiments. So
10	and a further cooldown period of 10 days.
11	And then once we've got the isotopic
12	mix we multiplied the relative amounts of fission
13	products by organ dose conversion factors which
14	yielded a relative index of harm for each fission
15	product.
16	Then we summed up the indices of harm
17	for each of the burnup durations. That would
18	give us a rough measure of how we compared to the
19	OTIB or the TBD.
20	And there's a lot of information in
21	our original reports which we did in 2015, but

1	just in summary, it's on slide 19, for fission
2	products the high-power levels, 200 megawatts,
3	the indices of harm for the 20-day burnup and the
4	20-hour burnup rather short were about the
5	same, were slightly higher than or slightly
6	lower than the 200-day burnup organs of concern
7	which is good, except for the thyroid where the
8	relative index of harm was substantially higher
9	by a factor of over eight. But for all the other
10	isotopes it's about the same.
11	For low-power level, 20 megawatts, the
12	derived indices of harm for the 20-hour burnup
13	compared to the 200-day burnup for all organs of
14	concern were not claimant-favorable.
15	So, for the case of HTRE, for example,
16	where you have short burnup times we found that
17	the comparison was not claimant-favorable.
18	Slide 20. We looked at actinides. We
19	found that the ratio of the inventory of all
20	actinides to the inventories of cesium-137 and
21	strontium-90 were grossly overestimated compared

1	to the ratios in tables 5-22 and 5-23 of the TBD.
2	And we stopped our scoping analyses at
3	that point.
4	So, what are our recommendations? We
5	recommend that NIOSH continue these types of
6	investigations to better understand the
7	applicability and limitations of OTIB-54 and TBD
8	tables 5-22 and 5-23 for reconstructing internal
9	doses for TAN workers where the power levels and
10	burnup durations are significantly different from
11	those upon which the isotopic mixes are derived
12	in OTIB-54 and the TBD tables.
13	So we did a scoping study and we came
14	up with some looked like anomalies and avenues
15	that we think NIOSH should be looking at further.
16	They're better equipped than SC&A to
17	go through all these ORIGEN runs.
18	And finally, I'm running out of steam
19	here, but slide 21. This is a test reactor area
20	report which I did in September 2015.
21	I looked at the three major TRA

reactors which is material test reactor, the
engineering test reactor, and advanced test
reactor that were run there.
They were all material testing
reactors of similar designs but with size and
power levels and capabilities increasing from the
smallest, the MTR, up to the biggest, the ATR.
And the idea is that they have high
flux capabilities. So they could simulate long-
term irradiation of reactor materials in a
shorter time.
The designs are similar. Pressurized
light water moderated beryllium reflective
reactors primarily using highly enriched uranium
fuel and they had an unusual curved plate
configuration.
Slide 22. So we found that the OTIB-
54, in general, adequately envelopes the three
TRA reactors. So we're fine about that.
And the OTIB actually explicitly
modeled the advanced test reactor. It's one of

1	their characteristic reactors for uranium fuel
2	operations.
3	But we noted that the MTR also ran for
4	a period with plutonium fuel. In fact, in 1958
5	it became the first reactor run with a plutonium-
6	239 core, which was different.
7	So the last slide 23. Our conclusion
8	is not clear which, if any, of the nine OTIB-54
9	representative reactor cases would envelope the
10	MTR with plutonium fuel.
11	So we recommend that NIOSH actually
12	look into that, make some runs and see if with
13	plutonium fuel and see if OTIB-54 models that.
14	So that's the end of my slides. Now I
15	can breathe again.
16	DR. MAURO: This is John Mauro. Just
17	a couple of perspectives.
18	In the examples of these index of harm
19	tables that are at the end of the presentation
20	this was a way in which Mike Mallett you may
21	know him worked very closely who runs these

1	codes.
2	And we sort of put our brains together
3	and said listen, what can we do. And that's a
4	relatively simple that it comes up in an index of
5	harm that would give an indication.
6	I think what we did was an attempt at
7	a shortcut to try to get a handle on this. It's
8	not intuitively obvious under what circumstances,
9	what type of reactor, and what burnup rates, and
10	durations are going to deviate from the claimant-
11	favorability of OTIB-54.
12	And it wasn't apparent until we make
13	these runs. And there's a lot of discussion, by
14	the way, that supports all of these tables
15	explaining why are things behaving the way
16	they're behaving and these ratios, can we trust
17	them.
18	So I guess the first thing I'd like to
19	bring up is that I don't know the extent to which
20	NIOSH has looked at our work, but we're very
21	interested in seeing if they see it the same way

1	we do because it is a unique way to try to come
2	at this problem.
3	And then also given that it holds up
4	you will note that in most cases the ratios, the
5	degree of non-conservatism is on the order of
6	less than a factor of 2, on the order of 1.5.
7	In other words, OTIB-54, even in these
8	unusual circumstances where these HTRE cases, the
9	short-term versus long-term burnup, high burnup
10	rate.
11	OTIB-54 isn't that bad. I think
12	that's one of the the glass is half full here.
13	Pretty close. If it came out at 1.0 that means
14	bingo, OTIB-54 works.
15	When the number comes out greater than
16	1 it means that, well, it looks like OTIB-54 at
17	least in this simulation is what I would call a
18	shortcut approach to come at this problem shows
19	that for some organs, many organs it doesn't
20	it's not entirely claimant-favorable, but it's
21	not that bad.

1	So I guess what I'm trying to say is
2	that in the bigger picture where we're talking
3	about just in my case here we're talking TAN, and
4	really the heart of the TAN was the burnup rate
5	and the burnup duration. Fundamentally simple
6	but very fundamental to reactor operation and the
7	fuel and what it might produce where we have
8	fission products and activation products.
9	When it comes to a steam discussion,
10	which is a much bigger story of a lot more
11	reactors, that differ in more what I would call
12	nuanced ways. In other words, as you described,
13	reactor design, reflector, cooling, that sort of
14	thing, as opposed to my HTRE where I said listen,
15	these things had a very, very high burnup rate
16	for a very short period of time so these are very
17	different.
18	What I'm trying to say is that two
19	things.
20	One, I would really be interested in
21	seeing if NIOSH agrees that this index of harm

1 approach that we applied here as the test for 2 OTIB-54, for at least the HTRE fundamental situation, that they agree, yes, this is a good 3 4 way to come at the problem. Or maybe no, you 5 really can't do that, there are too many other complicating factors. 6 7 And we would be the first to agree that that could happen if you start to actually 8 9 run ORIGEN runs for these very specific cases. 10 But given it holds up more or less, one of the thoughts I had is given this bigger 11 12 of all these reactors, high priority, 13 medium, low priority, I would imagine, that these 14 ORIGEN runs are not a walk in the park. are complicated, very difficult runs taking a lot 15 16 of resources. And all I would offer is that there 17 may be some way of a shortcut to try to say, 18 19 if it turns out OTIB-54 is not always 20 claimant-favorable is there a way to say, listen, 21 well one thing we can say is that when it's off

it could be off by a factor of less than two,
except for this iodine issue that's brought up
that might be a very special case.
So I guess what I'm trying to do here
is to say there may be some innovative,
simplifying, creative approach to attack this
problem without having to run through all of
these ORIGEN runs.
Now, I don't run ORIGEN, but I got the
impression that it's extremely complex as applied
to any particular real reactor and real operating
circumstance. It might require a lot of
resources.
And all I could offer up is that if
there's a way to sort of scoping to see how far
off first to see if the work we did holds
water. We realize that we tried to do something
pretty creative here.
And if it does there may be some ways
in which to come at the problem that would help
place a plausible upper bound, an adjustment

1	factor so to speak on OTIB-54 to accommodate
2	these unusual reactors.
3	So I just throw that on the table as a
4	think piece for us. Because I realize we're
5	entering into a mode where these could be very
6	resource-intensive investigations.
7	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim. I
8	certainly don't have any problem with us well,
9	actually we'll get back to you on the index of
10	harm comparison. We had not looked at that in
11	great depth yet from that standpoint.
12	But I can tell you one quick
13	comparison we can do is using your same index of
14	harm is compare the OTIB-54 with the runs that we
15	did for the Savannah River Site where we actually
16	went through ORIGEN and developed a different set
17	of factors for Savannah River to see if we've got
18	if that possibly makes out the differences
19	that we saw again with the iodine.
20	Does anyone hear a squeal on their
21	phone?

1	DR. MAURO: I'm hearing some static.
2	I don't know if everyone else had the same
3	problem.
4	MR. KATZ: I was hearing it too. It's
5	gone away. Hopefully it's passed.
6	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. So, I guess at
7	this point I'd say let us get back to you on that
8	index of harm issue.
9	I can't agree more with you on the
10	issue of ORIGEN being labor-intensive and
11	resource-intensive. This is part of why we were
12	trying to prioritize what the Work Group wanted
13	us to look at kind of first high priority and
14	which ones, and why we were trying to pare them
15	down from that initial component because these
16	are resource-intensive.
17	But we will look at this index of harm
18	more closely and get back to you on that.
19	I do have a few questions going back
20	up to Steve's presentation here. And that is on
21	the LOFT where you all disagree.

1	I don't think we're actually in
2	disagreement here. The issue is we do intend to
3	look at LOFT. The question is whether it's under
4	the SEC evaluation or under the TBD.
5	So, I really would like it to be put
6	under a Site Profile issue and we will look at it
7	at some point. But right now from an SEC
8	standpoint we were wanting to exclude it.
9	It's not that we want it off the table
10	completely, it's just for the SEC so that we can
11	try and manage this a little better because of
12	the resource intensity of doing such.
13	That was our point with number 2, the
14	LOFT reactor.
15	DR. OSTROW: This is Steve. I agree
16	with you. We don't care whether you do it for
17	SEC or Site Profile, unless the Work Group cares.
18	But we agree with you on that.
19	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Any questions
20	from the Work Group on that?
21	MEMBER BEACH: None here.

1	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. With regard to
2	SPERT
3	MEMBER MELIUS: Excuse me, I had
4	myself muted. Jim Melius.
5	I guess maybe backing up a little bit
6	are any of these reactors significant SEC issues?
7	In terms of when you combine how difficult they
8	may be to model and the years involved of
9	operation and significant population of people
10	exposed.
11	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim. My general
12	impression is no from the standpoint of we can do
13	the modeling and so we can make adjustments to
14	the TBD if we see differences.
15	DR. MAURO: Jim, this is John Mauro.
16	I don't entirely agree with that and let me
17	explain why.
18	One of the reasons we did the TAN
19	HTREs is to ask the question because the basic
20	approach that's been adopted in TAN which of
21	course is not part of the SEC issue, or is it I

1	believe being held in reserve, is that the idea
2	being that, well, we could use this OTIB-54
3	approach.
4	And that was the reason we worked
5	through this exercise is to say listen, can you
6	do the OTIB-54 approach. Is it scientifically
7	sound and claimant-favorable.
8	And the results are the results that
9	we have here where we are seeing ratios of index
10	of harms that's greater than one.
11	Now, does that mean that you cannot
12	reconstruct the doses? I would say no, you can.
13	Of course you can always run ORIGEN and do the
14	full-blown treatment of the problem.
15	But at the same time I just want to
16	caution that if that is going to be the solution
17	we're talking about something that might be quite
18	overwhelming.
19	So, I'm not disagreeing. I just want
20	to point out that taking that if we determine
21	that my index of harm approach is valid, and that

1	the difference that we're seeing and they're
2	not big for most organs as may have noticed, 1.2,
3	1.5.
4	The question of okay, we agree that
5	OTIB-54 really is not always necessarily
6	claimant-favorable by some factor of 20, 30, 40,
7	50 percent for different organs. Okay, we agree
8	with that.
9	Now the question is what do you do
10	about it. And if there is a plausible reasonable
11	way of expeditiously going through the process of
12	reconstructing doses, great.
13	But it's not apparent to me that there
14	is. And I think that is a challenge if it does
15	turn out that OTIB-54 doesn't really work for
16	these unusual burnups.
17	So I just wanted to add that into the
18	landscape of the issue we're dealing with.
19	MR. KATZ: John, just to respond a
20	little bit to what you just said there. It's
21	Ted.

1	Expeditious is not really a criterion
2	for whether you decide, okay well, it's too much
3	work so we're going to do an SEC instead. It's
4	not really an option.
5	DR. MAURO: I agree. I guess I jumped
6	the gun on that one. But I was just thinking
7	about how are we going to do this. But you're
8	absolutely right.
9	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: This is Phil. I do
10	have to agree with one thing and that's that I'm
11	more concerned about the fact that a lot of these
12	I don't know how well the documentation is for
13	some of these runs.
14	I mean, you used mixed fuel
15	combinations out of their normal testing, and how
16	this would affect the people that are there doing
17	the operation.
18	DR. TAULBEE: So, this is Tim. That's
19	what makes this quite complex is that this was
20	the National Reactor Testing Station. So they
21	did multiple different configurations.

And so what we've done, or what SC&A
has done, as well as NIOSH, is we've gone through
the reactors and looked at what is different from
the reactors they were testing there versus what
is covered in OTIB-54, the style of reactors, the
type of fuel, et cetera.
And so what we're talking about here
is really just the outliers, the ones that caused
us some concern that those values in OTIB-54 may
be different than what we saw at a particular
area. Does that help answer your question?
CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Yes.
DR. OSTROW: This is Steve. Just
following what Tim said, it's not only the
outliers, but the outliers that we thought might
have significant doses. Because they had a whole
bunch of more reactors that were truly bizarre,
but they were low power, short periods of time,
et cetera, et cetera. And we didn't put those
into high priority. Neither did NIOSH.
They're really strange reactors but we

1	didn't think they had any high potential for
2	exposures to people for various reasons.
3	My question is where do we go next on
4	this. We agreed to modeling reactors and looking
5	at the high priority, and looking at this table I
6	have, this multi-page table we agree with NIOSH
7	in most of the cases which reactors to model.
8	So what's the next step? Does NIOSH
9	can just go ahead and start modeling whatever
10	they have their time on their schedule the
11	reactors we agree on and the reactors we didn't
12	agree on?
13	DR. TAULBEE: Let's if we can I'd
14	like to discuss it because there's only two more
15	or only really the SPERT reactors, that I
16	wanted to ask you all about.
17	You're proposing that we model the
18	worst case or what we believe to be the worst
19	case of each of the four, is that correct? Did I
20	understand that correctly?
21	DR. OSTROW: Yes. I think so. That

1	is what we're recommending. Because they really
2	operated fairly differently from each other.
3	And we're not convinced that you can
4	pick one worst case for all four tests unless
5	alternatively if NIOSH can justify picking one
6	case for all four reactors that's fine, we'll
7	look at that also.
8	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Either way we're
9	looking at a large number of test runs from that
10	standpoint. It's not something that we'd just
11	kind of use best educated guess to pick one.
12	It's more of we would do some
13	preliminary type of ORIGEN runs and then kind of
14	hone in on, okay, this is having a bigger effect.
15	And that was what we were planning on doing, much
16	like what we were proposing for the EBR-II.
17	So it's not something or not EBR-
18	II, EBR-I where we believe it might be the
19	concerning core there that would be bounding. But
20	we'd perform some preliminary modeling to make
21	sure of that.

1	That's what we were kind of planning
2	to do with SPERT as well, but only really report
3	on one of them.
4	DR. OSTROW: Okay, I understand. I
5	understand the procedure. I actually know how to
6	run ORIGEN and have done it and understand how
7	the whole thing works.
8	But your method all I'm asking then
9	is if you do go through this and pick one reactor
10	that whatever you deduce, point to it, document
11	it. Show enough that we can actually take a look
12	at it and say yes, NIOSH did it the right way.
13	DR. TAULBEE: Okay, sure. Absolutely.
14	Absolutely. Okay.
15	And the other one that I wanted to
16	just briefly mention is you mention the BORAX
17	ones for the BORAX-I, II and III with regards to
18	the people who don't make it into the SEC.
19	I just wanted to clarify or to I guess
20	in a sense let you know that we've designated the
21	SEC due to an internal infeasibility in that we

1	believe these workers were monitored based upon
2	some interviews and other documentation.
3	But we do not have data. It is
4	incomplete. So we made it an SEC due to we know
5	people do not have complete internal dosimetry
6	records up through 1957.
7	So we really can't reconstruct their
8	internal doses. If they have something then we
9	will use it and we will apply it to 54, but we
10	already know it's incomplete. So to do
11	additional work there just doesn't seem fruitful
12	in a sense.
13	DR. OSTROW: Okay, I understand and it
14	sounds right. John Mauro, do you have a comment
15	on that?
16	DR. MAURO: No, I can't add anything
17	to that.
18	DR. OSTROW: Okay, so we'll your
19	point's well taken.
20	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Then the only
21	other one that I have here is it looks like from

1	your TRA reactor, TRA slide 23, that you would
2	like us to look at the MTR plutonium core.
3	DR. OSTROW: Yes, from what I
4	understand about the MTR, I looked into it a lot.
5	It seems that the core configuration is the same
6	physically, the same curved plates, the same
7	strange cylindrical control mechanisms and all
8	that, but with a different so basically we'd
9	like you to take a look at the plutonium case.
10	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
11	DR. OSTROW: Because that's different.
12	I didn't see looking at the OTIB-54 I didn't
13	see where that would really fit in.
14	DR. TAULBEE: No, it doesn't. I think
15	initially in our initial thoughts that's part of
16	why we're looking at EBR-I separate from the EBR-
17	II while they are different reactors, different
18	styles.
19	But the other issue is the EBR-I had a
20	plutonium core as well, but unfortunately it's
21	not light water so you're looking at a fast

1	reactor versus slow. So we probably should look
2	at both. We concur with you on that.
3	DR. OSTROW: Okay. That sounds like
4	we agree now on what you're going to be looking
5	at.
6	Do you have any idea about schedule
7	for this?
8	DR. MAURO: Steve, before we jump to
9	that I just want to make one point that I think
10	we went through very fast. This business of
11	highly enriched uranium not having the U-238, to
12	a large degree, which means that in this respect
13	the approach that's being adopted by these tables
14	5-22, 5-23 is grossly conservative because it
15	predicts substantial quantities of plutonium-239
16	which I believe are really not going to be there
17	because you don't have the 238 where it would
18	grow in from.
19	So, we didn't really talk too much
20	about that, but I think an entirely different
21	strategy might need to be taken with regard to

1	these transuranics when you're dealing with fuel
2	that is highly enriched.
3	I just wanted to remind everyone on
4	that aspect of this analysis which is still like
5	the flip side.
6	In that case I believe your strategy
7	will substantively overestimate your doses.
8	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim. We believe
9	that to be the case, and that's the goal of OTIB-
10	54 was to take these four different styles of
11	reactors and one of them, the trigger reactor is
12	high enriched uranium, just the scenario you're
13	talking about, but combining it with the ATR
14	which is highly enriched uranium.
15	But the Hanford inner reactor is of
16	course plutonium production. So the goal of 54
17	is to create a massive envelope around them all.
18	And so what we're really looking at is does
19	something fall outside the envelope.
20	DR. OSTROW: Okay. So you have that
21	covered. I guess I have to say I missed that,

1	that you basically have that circumstance covered
2	in your current OTIB-54. Thanks for helping out.
3	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. So if I could
4	just briefly recap here which ones that we are to
5	look at and then I'll try to address schedule a
6	little bit.
7	We will evaluate OMRE, PBF. With
8	SPERT we will then go through and do kind of a
9	sub-analysis of which one tends to be the most
10	dominant not dominant but outlier in a sense
11	and that's the one that we will pick to do the
12	full evaluation.
13	We'll look at BORAX-IV, EBR, the core
14	number 4 which is the plutonium one, EBR-II and
15	the MTR with the plutonium core, the Phoenix
16	core.
17	DR. OSTROW: That sounds like it to
18	me, Tim. This is Steve.
19	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. All right, well,
20	and now I'll try to address schedule a little bit
21	here.

1	From one standpoint there's really
2	good news here is that we may have a resource
3	that can work on these in parallel with all of
4	our other efforts. So that I need to get with
5	the ORAU team more on and we'll be doing so
6	tomorrow. And we'll be trying to build out the
7	schedule. So I hope I'll be able to provide an
8	update to the Work Group on some of the schedule
9	now that we've got a priority set.
10	So I can't give you hard numbers right
11	now, but I do want to let you know that it's not
12	going to be dependent on something else I don't
13	believe. So that's the really good news.
14	I just can't give you exact time
15	periods right now because I don't know that
16	potential resource's availability completely and
17	what the time schedule would be.
18	But I did want to show the Work Group
19	that this is something that I do think can be
20	going on parallel with the burial grounds 83.14
21	that we'll be working on and the response to the

ANL air monitoring.
So I do think we can have three
parallel efforts going on right now from this
standpoint.
Mitch, am I overstating anything?
MR. FINDLEY: No, I don't think so.
Again, we're going to discuss it tomorrow so we
can kind of work through the details of it at
that time.
DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
SC&A Burial Grounds Report
MEMBER BEACH: So in terms of
MEMBER BEACH: So in terms of priorities if you cannot work on them in parallel
priorities if you cannot work on them in parallel
priorities if you cannot work on them in parallel the priorities are the burial grounds, 83.14, is
priorities if you cannot work on them in parallel the priorities are the burial grounds, 83.14, is that correct?
priorities if you cannot work on them in parallel the priorities are the burial grounds, 83.14, is that correct?  DR. TAULBEE: Yes, that would be our
priorities if you cannot work on them in parallel the priorities are the burial grounds, 83.14, is that correct?  DR. TAULBEE: Yes, that would be our top priority for sure.
priorities if you cannot work on them in parallel the priorities are the burial grounds, 83.14, is that correct?  DR. TAULBEE: Yes, that would be our top priority for sure.  MEMBER MELIUS: This is Jim Melius

1	DR. TAULBEE: The problem with the
2	early years of the burial grounds is that the
3	same 83.14 folks would be working on that.
4	MEMBER MELIUS: I understand. So you
5	would be doing this sequentially.
6	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
7	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay. I guess my
8	concern is well, you're going to talk tomorrow
9	about so the ORAU staff availability resource
10	issue.
11	But there's also a bigger resource
12	issue in terms of overall budget available for
13	this and other sites. It seems we keep running
14	into that issue more and more. And I guess
15	that's so your internal prioritization overall
16	in the program.
17	I guess I'm still not convinced that -
18	- and I don't know the resources involved in
19	going into this, but it seems to me if they could
20	be that they are a significant evaluation of
21	reactors that we I don't see them as a

priority for the site.

1

1	priority for the site.
2	If it's all the same resource and same
3	people involved I think those are the last of the
4	certainly after the burial grounds.
5	DR. TAULBEE: Understood.
6	MEMBER MELIUS: And I think the other
7	thing that I guess I get concerned a little bit
8	about in terms of how you prioritize the reactors
9	is that which you've already taken into
10	consideration in some of your responses is the
11	whole issue, if we establish an SEC covering the
12	site, the entire site for certain years then that
13	may change your priorities in terms of which
14	reactors to look at when and so forth.
15	But those are all hypotheticals. But
16	I just sort of keep it in mind so that when we
17	complain about getting something done at another
18	site, or ask Stu about it we don't get the answer
19	well, you guys all wanted the reactors done right
20	away.
21	DR. TAULBEE: Understand. Okay.

1	MEMBER BEACH: Good point.
2	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Sorry to change the
3	subject here, but I was wondering if people need
4	a short break before we continue or not.
5	MEMBER BEACH: What's our time frame,
6	Ted?
7	MEMBER MELIUS: Ted has morphed into a
8	dog it sounds like.
9	MR. KATZ: No, that wasn't me, but my
10	phone keeps locking me out after I put my code in
11	just to get the phone open to unmute it. Sorry.
12	Anyway, the time frame is really we
13	set this meeting at 10 o'clock instead of the
14	normal 10:30 because some Board member or two had
15	at some point conflicts later today.
16	So it's really up to the Board
17	members. You can run it longer if it works for
18	the Board members. We can break and reconvene
19	after lunch too at some point if people start to
20	get hungry. I have no constraints.
21	MEMBER MELIUS: What's the time frame

1	for what's left to do?
2	MR. KATZ: Right. So there's two
3	items. They're both SC&A items. I don't know
4	how long they take to present. One I think might
5	be Joe's.
6	MEMBER MELIUS: I don't think it makes
7	sense to do the I mean, we may need a short
8	update from Joe on the burial grounds, but I
9	don't think NIOSH is ready to
10	MR. KATZ: Right.
11	DR. TAULBEE: We are not ready to
12	respond. That is correct.
13	MEMBER MELIUS: And the same on I
14	don't know where you are with the ANL-West
15	monitoring in terms of a response.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Same with that one.
17	MEMBER MELIUS: Okay.
18	MR. FITZGERALD: I'd say 5 or 10
19	minutes, Jim, on mine.
20	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
21	MR. KATZ: So then if it's that brief

1	and you want to hear a short presentation from
1	and you want to hear a short presentation from
2	Joe then we can adjourn after that it sounds
3	like.
4	MEMBER BEACH: That sounds good.
5	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Let's go ahead and
6	continue. It doesn't sound like it will take
7	much longer here.
8	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. You have the
9	report and in fact I think pretty detailed.
10	I think we, Tim, NIOSH and SC&A agreed
11	about a year, a year and a half ago that even
12	though I think there was a conclusion in the
13	first ER that there was sufficient data and
14	programmatic considerations that NIOSH concluded
15	it could dose reconstruct with sufficient
16	accuracy.
17	I think there was the desire to
18	supplement the information that was available.
19	Most of the records for the early years of the
20	burial grounds were fairly thin, I think that's
21	safe to say.

1	And we wanted to go out and do a
2	fairly extensive round of interviews with workers
3	that worked at the burial grounds which we did.
4	I lost count, but we probably talked
5	to specific to the burial grounds probably 20 or
6	30 if not more of those workers trying to piece
7	together something that again is not really well-
8	documented in terms of practices and the history
9	of that site.
10	And we agreed to report. I'm not
11	going to go ahead and present that in terms of
12	the findings, but I think it's safe to say our
13	conclusion after that year, year and a half is
14	that we find ourselves in disagreement with some
15	of the basic conclusions or tenets that are in
16	the ER for that period. This is '52 to '70.
17	Granted it's a weight of evidence type
18	of deliberation and I fully appreciate one has to
19	consider availability of data, the programmatic
20	issues.
21	But again we find some real concerns

1	in that.						
2	Now, saying that we have not been able						
3	to pin down at this point in time what exact I						
4	think Tim alluded to this what exact data.						
5	And it's referred to in the latest ER as data in						
6	hand, but the bioassay information and maybe air						
7	sampling, we don't know.						
8	So in terms of any conclusions one						
9	could make as far as the approach we don't know						
10	what the specific dose reconstruction approach						
11	will be.						
12	So, it's sort of saying well, okay, we						
13	can probably paint around that issue and look at						
14	the weight of evidence as we have it. And we						
15	have concerns over what we do have.						
16	But there can't be a real hard-edged I						
17	think conclusion from our standpoint for the Work						
18	Group until we are able to look at what Tim's						
19	referring to in terms of the information.						
20	And a lot of this was collected over						
21	the past year. So we have yet to do that.						

1	I guess in terms of how this might						
2	inform the 83.14, I would just kind of emphasize						
3	that certainly as NIOSH goes through their look						
4	for the '70 to '77 period I think a lot of the						
5	issues, the programmatic issues for one, the						
6	monitoring issues for another, and certainly the						
7	practices themselves did not shift dramatically						
8	even though the operations did.						
9	They were certainly retrieving rather						
10	than dumping and burying, but a lot of those						
11	basic health physics practices were very similar.						
12	It didn't change from December of '70 to January						
13	of '71. So I would certainly emphasize that						
14	point.						
15	And in terms of looking at the						
16	monitoring information, I think the key from what						
17	we were able to look at is needing to fit the						
18	monitoring that was being done to the actual						
19	activity on the ground.						
20	I mean, yes, they had air sampling						
21	going on, but they also had workers inside the						

pit cleaning up after spills. And they certainly weren't being monitored in the same somebody on the edge of a pit or a trench. The same thing goes for the special We talked to some of the former bioassavs. workers and it was pretty clear that this whole notion of drums breaking open and having contents spilled and having to clean up the kind of contamination you would get when an equipment operator buries contaminated soil as overburden over drums and containers, and you're dealing with resuspension, the kind of -- those weren't necessarily subject to special bioassays. this whole notion that you had special bioassays when you had "events." these contaminations were so routine they weren't considered events. You would not have had any bioassays that would fit the kind of exposures they were experiencing. I would just encourage in this 83.14 that NIOSH look closely at some of these

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

activities that predated '70 but certainly
continued, and to look at whether or not the
monitoring truly and effectively fit the activity
at hand.
And from a programmatic standpoint, I
think we tried to document very clearly, and it's
all there in the report, that so-called defense-
in-depth I think is perhaps overstated for the
burial grounds.
Certainly I've heard that term for
reactor safety, but for the burial grounds it
sort of evolved from a municipal landfill type of
approach to something a little better than that.
But clearly there were some real
questions about to what extent the radiological
controls were comprehensive, thorough, and
whether the monitoring was done as consistently
or not.
And a lot of that wasn't remedied
until the mid-seventies. So certainly a lot of
that has to be addressed in the context of the

1	83.14.							
2	I think that's all I'm going to say at							
3	this point. I think it's pretty well laid out.							
4	We tried to be complete. And I know Tim and his							
5	staff were along for a lot of these interviews.							
6	They heard the same things we did.							
7	So, certainly I know they're going to							
8	take a hard look when they go through the 83.14.							
9	That's it.							
10	MEMBER MELIUS: You left us speechless							
11	except for the dog.							
12	MR. FITZGERALD: The dog likes it.							
13	MEMBER MELIUS: The dog likes it.							
14	MEMBER BEACH: I think that's Phil's							
15	dog.							
16	MEMBER MELIUS: Phil, is that your							
17	dog? Phil's on mute, the dog's not.							
18	MEMBER BEACH: Okay, maybe it's not.							
19	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Yes, that was mine.							
20	MR. KATZ: Thanks, Joe. I think that							
21	will be useful actually for review.							

1	MEMBER MELIUS: Yes.
2	MR. KATZ: So with that, Phil, I think
3	unless you have something else, or Board members
4	have something else I think we can adjourn and
5	thank everybody for all the hard work that went
6	into preparing for this.
7	MEMBER BEACH: So, and I was wondering
8	on the last report, on the ANL-West monitoring,
9	is there anything that needs to be said on that,
10	or we just hold off for the next meeting?
11	MR. BARTON: Yes, Josie, this is Bob.
12	I put that report together and actually it was
13	briefly discussed back in the August 2016
14	meeting. I think I had four and a half minutes
15	to try and go through it.
16	So, when we were kind of putting the
17	materials together for this meeting, I had
18	offered it up as something that's still yet to be
19	discussed.
20	But at the same time I think I heard
21	Tim say that there's not really a response ready

So I'm not sure if it would 1 from NIOSH's group. 2 be all that fruitful for me to go through the 3 presentation again, maybe in a little bit longer and more detail, if NIOSH hasn't had a chance to 4 5 really sit down with it. Do I have that correct, Tim? It's 6 7 sort of still in the queue? Yes, you're correct. 8 DR. TAULBEE: Ιt 9 is in the queue and on our radar, but we have not worked on it. And so with the other things that 10 I would propose that we kind of 11 are going on, 12 table this at this time, or put it to the side 13 for a future meeting. That's fine with me. 14 MR. BARTON: Τ 15 guess one other thing if we're going to adjourn 16 shortly, I wanted to inform the Work Group that 17 another piece of the puzzle that we sort of researched in parallel with the burial grounds 18 19 work that Joe just described was exposures at the CPP prior to 1963, so prior to the currently 20 21 proposed SEC period.

1	And that report has gone through SC&A							
2	internal review. Right now it's with our tech							
3	editor who's fixing all my horrible grammar. And							
4	then after that, I imagine it will have to go to							
5	DOE. But that is certainly in the pipeline and							
6	you all should be seeing that fairly soon.							
7	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Thanks for that							
8	heads up, Bob.							
9	MR. KATZ: Phil, are you on the line?							
10	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Yes, I am.							
11	MR. KATZ: Okay. So time to adjourn?							
12	CHAIR SCHOFIELD: Unless anybody else							
13	has anything I think we will adjourn at this							
14	point.							
15	MR. KATZ: Great. Well, thanks							
16	everybody.							
17	MEMBER BEACH: Before we adjourn, I							
18	was wondering, should we set up something							
19	tentatively just to discuss that 83.14, or are we							
20	just going to wait?							
21	MR. KATZ: Well, Josie, I was thinking							

1	about that. Why don't we just wait a little bit						
2	for more certainty from Tim in terms of the time						
3	frame.						
4	The more time before the Board meeting						
5	the better, so I'd like to give Tim a little bit						
6	of time to make more progress, and then						
7	absolutely I'll schedule even if we may not be						
8	able to use it I'll schedule an INL Work Group						
9	meeting for before the August Board meeting so we						
10	have that opportunity.						
11	MEMBER BEACH: Okay, thanks.						
12	DR. TAULBEE: And again, this is the						
13	83.14 for CPP.						
14	MEMBER BEACH: Correct.						
15	MR. KATZ: So thanks, Josie.						
16	MEMBER MELIUS: We can only do it once						
17	with the agenda.						
18	Adjourn						
19	MR. KATZ: Okay.						
20	MEMBER BEACH: Bye everyone.						
21	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter						

This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Idaho Argonne National Laboratory-East (ANL-Esdy) Work Group, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the INL Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.

1	went	OII	tne	recora	at	12:22	p.m.)
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							
11							
12							
13							
14							
15							
16							