# U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION
AND WORKER HEALTH

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KANSAS CITY PLANT WORK GROUP

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FRIDAY

JULY 17, 2015

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The Work Group convened in the Hampton Inn Cincinnati Airport-North, 755 Petersburg Road, Hebron, Kentucky, at 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time, Josie Beach, Chair, presiding.

#### PRESENT:

JOSIE BEACH, Chair BRADLEY P. CLAWSON, Member\* JAMES E. LOCKEY, Member JOHN W. POSTON, SR., Member LORETTA R. VALERIO, Member

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

### ALSO PRESENT:

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official BOB BARTON, SC&A\*
RON BUCHANAN, SC&A\*
PETE DARNELL, DCAS
JOE FITZGERALD, SC&A
JOYCE LIPSZTEIN, SC&A\*
JOHN MAURO, SC&A\*
PAT MCCLOSKEY, ORAU Team
JIM NETON, DCAS\*
MUTTY SHARFI, ORAU Team

\* Present via teleconference

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Page</u>
Welcome and Roll Call  Ted Katz5
REVIEW OF OPEN SEC ISSUES UNDER CONSIDERATION (SEC ISSUES MATRIX)
<pre>Issue 13 - Magnesium-Thorium Alloy Operations/Exposure Potential-Action NIOSH     Joe Fitzgerald</pre>
Issue 7 - Radioactive Waste Handling/ Storage/Transportation - Action NIOSH and Issue 17 - D&D (Decontamination & Decommissioning) Period Issues - Action NIOSH
Pat McCloskey61
<pre>Issue 1 - Data Completeness-Action NIOSH and Issue 9 - Coworker External Dose Modeling Issues - Action NIOSH</pre>
Issue 11 - Neutron-Photon Ratio Basis-Action WG Discussion Ron Buchanan110
Issue 15 - Thorium Oxide Exposure Potential - Action WG Discussion Joe Fitzgerald113
Issue 16 - Use of TBD-6000 - Action WG Discussion Josie Beach
<pre>Issue 18 - Use/Adequacy of Workplace Incidents Records - Action WG Discussions     Josie Beach</pre>
Issue 20 - Tritium Exposure Potential - Action NIOSH

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

Pat McCloskey12	21
Issue 20 - Nickel Exposure Potential - Action NIOSH Pat McCloskey	33
Adjourn	

1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(9:04 a.m.)
3	MR. KATZ: Okay. Good morning,
4	everyone. We're still awaiting Dr. Lockey, unless
5	he joins us by phone. We expect him here, but we
6	are going to get rolling here.
7	So, this is the Advisory Board on
8	Radiation and Worker Health, the Kansas City Plant
9	Work Group. And this is second day of a two-day
LO	meeting.
L1	Yesterday we heard from Wayne Knox and
L2	went down a large list of his issues. And today
L3	we have a fairly full agenda of issues being worked
L4	through by the Work Group.
L5	The agenda for today and papers related
L6	to the agenda today are posted on the NIOSH website
L7	under the Board section, schedule of meetings,
L8	today's date. So, anyone on the phone can look
L9	there and all those documents should be PDFs that
20	you can open and follow along with the discussion.
21	We will do roll call in a second. The
22	other thing I would just like to note before

well, I'll wait until we have done roll call and

we are formally in meeting.

So, roll call, we are speaking a specific site, so any Agency-related people, please speak to conflict of interest as well.

(Roll call.)

MR. KATZ: That takes care of roll call. Let me just ask everyone to mute their phones, except when you're addressing the group, for the audio call or the conference call. If you don't have a mute button, \*6 to mute your phone, \*6 to take your phone off of mute.

Yesterday Mr. Knox had raised an issue about whether GSA employees at Kansas City Plant, some of them should be considered contractor or subcontractor employees to GSA. And the main point of that discussion response was that that is not a determination that's made by the Board or by NIOSH. It's a DOL matter.

Then I said in that discussion that federal agencies are not contractors to other federal agencies. Someone kindly wrote in from the public that DOL has designated other federal agencies within the Department of Interior as

contractors to DOE at other facilities, and Nevada 1 Test Site was one example given, I think Savannah 2 River another. So, I don't know about that, but that 3 I'm not aware of it, but that still may be true. 4 remains a DOL matter, not a Board of NIOSH matter. 5 But I wanted to put that on the record. 6 7 I may be incorrect. It may be that federal agencies can be designated as contractors or 8 subcontractors in this program. And I wanted to 9 make that clear. 10 11 And that takes care of my business. Okay, thank you. Josie. 12 Okay, thank you. 13 CHAIR BEACH: am wondering, for those of you on the phone and in 14 the room, if it would be okay if we started with 15 16 Issue 13, the mag-thorium issue. I talked to Pete. He said that was okay. Any objections, anybody? 17 Joyce, does that work for you? 18 19 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Hello? I'm sorry. 20 CHAIR BEACH: Hi, I'm just wondering. I was thinking we should go ahead and start with 21 22 Issue 13, the mag-thorium issue. Are you prepared 23 for that to start?

1 DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, yeah. CHAIR BEACH: 2 Okay. So, we had a 3 couple of different White Papers exchanged: SC&A's White Paper of May 2015 and then we have NIOSH's 4 response. Both of these are posted on the website, 5 6 as Ted indicated. Do you want to start with issues 7 from the SC&A side and then go to NIOSH? MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, I think in this 8 particular case, that would be appropriate. 9 10 CHAIR BEACH: Okay. 11 MR. FITZGERALD: We had a couple of 12 different issues. I really want to defer to Joyce who has actually authored the White Paper. 13 14 mag-thorium has had a fairly long history in the Work Group of research because there was so little 15 16 specific monitoring data for thorium. And so a lot of the effort was just trying to pinpoint the 17 timeframe, locations, and source term for that 18 19 particular operation, from the late '50s up through 20 the late '70s. And I think we've actually made steady 21 22 progress throughout that time. And I think we are

at the point now where we've identified pretty much

what information is available and I think we have refined the method, or methods, to a point where it is a lot clearer than it was maybe even a year ago.

So, this last White Paper that Joyce will walk us through really was pointing to what we felt were remaining gaps or areas of clarification that we were hoping that we could bring before the Work Group in terms of NIOSH's response.

We just received NIOSH's response this past week and I think it was just posted a few days ago. So, we don't have anything more than our reaction to it, but I think over the last couple of days we have been able to digest it and I think we're prepared to talk about it before the Work Group. So, I think we're in reasonably good shape.

Joyce, maybe the best way to do this is if you could catch us up in terms of where we left off at the last Work Group meeting in March, and maybe just go through the essential issues that we raised in this last White Paper of May of this year. And then we can turn to NIOSH in terms of their

response to that White Paper.

DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. I will begin by repeating what Joe already said. That NIOSH posted the response to our White Paper and I only saw it posted yesterday morning. But we have, SC&A, we have reviewed NIOSH's response to our concerns, and although it was a fast review but reviewed all the documents that NIOSH had in their response. And I must say we are satisfied with most of NIOSH's responses.

So, I'm going now to explain all the concerns that we have posted in our May 2015 White Paper.

The first thing is the start of the mag-thorium machining operation at the Kansas City. SC&A agreed with NIOSH's revised information that KCP's magnesium-thorium machining was performed offsite by subcontractors from May 1, 1957, until August 1961 and not at the Kansas City site itself.

So, according to NIOSH, mag-thorium machining operations at Kansas City Plant actually began on August 23, 1961. And SC&A is in agreement

with the documents NIOSH has presented.

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Second of our concerns was the location οf the mag-thorium machining. First, they mentioned several departments on the location of the mag-thorium machining. So, the machining of mag-thorium first took place in Department 22. In October '65, Department 22 changed its name to Department 20D. So, whenever it is Department 22 and Department 20D, they are the same department. They just changed names. But after August 1970, mag-thorium machining took place in another department, which was called the model shop. mag-thorium machining was moved to the model shop in 1970.

Now, about the bounding limit that NIOSH posted, which is 3E-11 microcuries per milliliter. SC&A agrees with NIOSH on the application of this bounding value for thorium exposures in the machining work for the periods of time and locations where this limit was enforced. The application of this limit depends on NIOSH being able to corroborate for relevant operational time periods and locations that this limit was

bounding of air concentrations to which mag-thorium machining workers were exposed.

So, let's go to the period 1961 to 1963. From the period August 1961 to 1963, it is clear that there are gross alpha monitoring data for the location in question, which is Department 22, and mag-thorium and DU operations were co-located. So, SC&A agrees with application of the bounding limit to this time period.

For 1963 to 1966, we still need some information regarding the mag-thorium machining workload in concert with co-located DU operations. Because what happens is NIOSH was using this limit at this building, but this limit was enforced based on the DU machining. And if DU machining was done at the same time or in the same location as mag-thorium machining, using the same machines, then we can apply the results for the DU air sampling to thorium. If not, we cannot apply the limit.

For the 1966 to 1970, the information remains lacking regarding the location, the specific timeframe and workload for mag-thorium

machining during this period.

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Department 20D, where the DU machining took place until 1966, started to be decontaminated in that year and was likely not used, in whole or part, for mag-thorium machining. So, this is problematic, given that NIOSH makes use of DU area air samples and surface smears for Department 20D to show that the limit was achieved in the mag-thorium operation, without knowing whether those operations had been relocated relative to these monitors.

I have to say that when NIOSH is going to discuss their responses, I just reviewed it, that they review the information from 1963 to 1970. This is the new paper that was posted yesterday, and certainly NIOSH to tell this again, but I just want to say that those two locations from 1963 to NIOSH has determined that 1970, mag-thorium operations were suspended in 1963 and did not begin again until August 28, 1970. And we saw the documents they had presented. We think that their conclusions are probably correct, although there was a fire in 1963. But as the limit is going to

1	be used for this period with probably no
2	mag-thorium operation I don't know, that is for
3	NIOSH to answer, if they are going to use this limit
4	for the 1963, the whole period, 1963 to 1970 period.
5	Okay, now let's go to the 1970 to 1979.
6	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Joyce, may I interrupt
7	for a second? Did I just hear you say the word
8	"fire" or did I mishear?
9	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yeah, there was a fire
10	in 1963 that I saw in one of the documents that
11	actually NIOSH referred to.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: And then you went on to
13	say that causes you to wonder how NIOSH is going
14	to apply the 3E-11 from '63 to 1970. Is that
15	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: I think the confusion
17	Joyce, wasn't that fire in '64?
18	DR. LIPSZTEIN: In '64, yes.
19	MR. FITZGERALD: Yeah, I think there
20	was some incident involving a pyrophoric magnesium
21	fire that she's referring to. And I think it is
22	just a question for clarification, if in fact that
23	was the case, you know, if there was in fact

And I think that is the important 1 exposure. aspect: What would be applied to that exposure in 2 3 '64 for that one incident? Of course, it also begs the question, 4 if there was a fire, does that mean there was 5 residual mag-thorium on the premises that might 6 7 have been involved or not. MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yeah, we're not going 8 to be able to respond to that today. It'11 9 probably sound like, what Joe just said, that we 10 11 are going to need to think about how that fire will 12 be handled, because I need to see that SRDB reference again and review that fire. 13 Yeah, I recall the 14 MR. FITZGERALD: incident, but I don't recall it being '64. 15 If it 16 was '64, then it'd be sort of a little bit of an aberration in terms of, what do you do with that? 17 18 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay. But that doesn't 19 MR. FITZGERALD: 20 necessarily mean there was an exposure. But there So, clearly, the ones that were 21 was a fire. 22 involved in putting it out, there might be some need to cover it. 23

MR. MCCLOSKEY: We'll have to review that. Sorry for interrupting, Joyce. You can go back.

DR. LIPSZTEIN: Oh, okay. Now for the period of 1970 to 1979. One of SC&A's concerns was that beyond the 1970 the breathing zone that sampling conducted in the model shop, there are no early sampling data applicable to mag-thorium machining in the model shop, where mag-thorium machining operations took place from 1970 to 1979.

SC&A found that most of the references cited in NIOSH's response paper -- I mean the old response paper, not the one from yesterday, provided air sampling or surface contamination data to corroborate that the time limit was met or either not valid or relevant to its purpose, due to wrong time period, not falling within the 1970 to 1979, or wrong plant location, not of the model shop during September 1970 to 1979.

So, there was no air sampling, just the one that they did as a test before commence -- before starting the mag-thorium operation in the model shop.

SC&A calculated the significance of the limiting air concentration. We wanted to know what does this mean in terms of dose for the worker. So, we made a calculation for the committed equivalent doses from exposure to limiting air concentration.

For example, if we use type M thorium and we use one year continuous work by a mag-thorium worker, for inhalation of thorium-232, thorium-228 and radium-224 considering the activity ratio from thorium-228 to thorium-232 equal to 0.19, as suggested by NIOSH, this gives a 20-year committed equivalent dose to the ground surface of 136 rems and a 50-year ground surface committed equivalence dose of 300 grams. Ground surface is the main arm for the position for thorium and is the highest dose.

So, I think that this limit is pretty conservative, looking at what one year of continuous work would give as a dose to the worker.

If we use this type of Type M thorium, if you use Type S thorium, and of course the most exposed organ, they have the highest dose is the

exit of airways and the lungs.

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for And each year that the mag-thorium would work, considering thorium-228 and thorium-232 they can even actually, if the 0.19 was used, the difference is very small. The 20 to 50 year committed equivalent dose of t.he extrathoracic airways is about 30 rems and the 20 to 50-year lung-committed equivalent dose is about I mean 20 to 50 years because it doesn't vary too much.

So, in summary, we have concluded in our White Paper that critical information regarding mag-thorium machining location workload and times range are lacking from '63 to '70, that the lung set of 1970 samples, as samples taken in the models shown are inadequate to demonstrate that the limit was bounding for the model shop from 1970 to 1979. But the limit itself that is being applied is very conservative and likely claimant-favorable.

So, we made some recommendation that in the absence of measurement data, NIOSH should validate the proposed air concentration limits for source term-based exposure model, followed by

suitable sample dose reconstruction to demonstrate 1 this is ability of applying this limit for the 2 3 values operational time periods in question, 1963 to 1966, 1966 to 1970, and 1970 to 1979. 4 I must say that you are going to see now 5 6 that I am going to say it before NIOSH, NIOSH 7 complied with most of SC&A recommendations for the period 1970 to 1979. They presented in the White 8 9 Paper that was published on the website. Yes, they presented documents showing that the 1970 to 1979 10 11 machining were wet operations and they calculated 12 source term-based exposure modeling. And the only thing that was missing from our recommendation was 13 the dose calculations for that period. 14 15 So, that's it. 16 CHAIR BEACH: Thank you, Joyce. So, any Work Group discussion? Ouestions for Joyce? 17 Brad, do you have any questions for 18 19 Joyce before NIOSH starts? 20 MEMBER CLAWSON: No, I don't. Thanks, Josie. 21 22 CHAIR BEACH: Okay, seeing none at the 23 table. Pat.

1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay, so thanks,
2	Joyce. The paper that she was referring to that
3	got to the NIOSH website yesterday, we had that
4	phone call a week or so ago and we told you then
5	that we would not have this paper ready for today's
6	meeting. We were expecting a verbal response to
7	this paper.
8	CHAIR BEACH: Right.
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Before we went on
10	vacation we got approval, technical approval, and
11	so we initiated the agency reviews and it moved
12	along a little bit faster than we expected. So,
13	it is out there.
14	I have copies of it, if you want me to
15	hand those out. They are not appropriately marked
16	because there were further PA reviews done after.
17	But if you think that would be a good idea.
18	MR. KATZ: You don't need to really
19	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay.
20	MR. KATZ: because it is available
21	now, posted, and everybody will have it.
22	CHAIR BEACH: Before you go on, I
23	wasn't sure if the Work Group knew about the meeting

1	that we had. Pete had asked for myself to get on
2	a meeting to talk about the dose reconstructions
3	for a couple of different items. And I was sitting
4	here thinking that the rest of the Work Group may
5	not have been aware of that meeting.
6	I was on the meeting with Pete and then
7	I asked Joe and Ted to be on the meeting. So, it
8	wasn't a Work Group meeting. There was no
9	transcript taken and it was basically so that
10	it was a technical call.
11	Has this been sent out? I'm wondering
12	if the Work Group has a copy of this so that they
13	know what we discussed. I didn't send it to
14	everyone.
15	MR. KATZ: I didn't forward your no,
16	I don't think so.
17	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, we will
18	forward the note. It just basically talks about
19	the dose reconstructions that we want for 13 and
20	14, which will be discussed today also. I'm
21	sitting here feeling bad that I hadn't gotten that
22	out. So, sorry for interrupting.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay. No, it's okay.

1	So, Joyce and SC&A put out their White
2	Paper that we received on May 15th of this year and
3	we were in the middle of working on responding to
4	some of the other issues for this meeting. And so
5	we didn't think we were going to get any lengthy
6	response put together in time for this meeting.
7	So, I mean, Joyce, you added a lot of
8	issues within there, within your paper that, if we
9	would have taken the time to answer all of them,
10	we wouldn't have it ready for today.
11	We recognize that there were a lot of
12	things unanswered by the paper posted just the
13	other day. So, we will just move forward with what
14	we do have.
15	So, the paper I will be reading from is
16	on the website. I'm not going to read the whole
17	thing. Joyce touched on some of the key issues
18	there. The second paragraph says that we now have
19	agreement for the period of August '61 to March
20	31st, '63. It is the start of the mag-thorium
21	machining operations at the Kansas City Plant.
22	So, we are in agreement there.

For the remaining period, we had some

discussion about how to apply the methodology there. So, that is what this paper attempts to do is to describe what to do with the remaining period.

And then the SC&A paper, they wanted some more validation and they raised the question was mag-thorium even machined during the period of 1963 to 1979. And in the absence of confirmatory data that showed actual operations occurring during that period, we were making the assumption that they continued. We didn't have confirmation that they stopped. We have records of a formal D&D of that process. So, we were moving and trying to acquire more data from the site and try to lock it down. But over time, we never got there.

So, what we are saying now, let's see -- since January -- I'm reading from page three, the first paragraph. Since January, NIOSH has continued to obtain and review documents and perform interviews. And based on the review of the information available from 1963 to 1979, NIOSH has determined that mag-thorium operations were suspended during April first '63 and did not begin again until receiving approval from Health

Services on August 28, 1970. 1 So, we have now removed that period from 2 3 the operations. Joyce touched on that already and we are saying they were suspended during that 4 5 period. We found some information t.o 6 7 corroborate it and that would be the inventory information that shows -- it comes from NMMSS. 8 Ιt 9 comes from these documents called Statement of Measurement documents. 10 11 So, there is an inventory document that 12 has information beginning in 1969 and it documents the presence of mag-thorium inventory starting in 13 And another document of the NMMSS only 1971. 14 15 corroborates the inventory information also, 16 documents the presence of mag-thorium beginning in '71. 17 So, we used inventory information to 18 19 confirm our dates of operations. 20 Also, there are these reports from the Weekly Activity 21 site called Reports. They 22 corroborate the suspension of mag-thorium

They document a very small staff

operations.

working in the area where we said the operations were occurring, Department 22. So, they had only five people working in that area on one shift and they also began their D&D of Department 22 beginning in May of '64.

And by August of that same year, half of the machines were removed from the area and the staff was reduced to two part-time personnel. So, it was a very small staff in that area during that time period where we are saying that operations were suspended.

So, then we move on to 1970, where we do have information of another campaign starting. So, we reviewed the memo that helps define the date of operations for the second operational campaign starting in '70 and ending in 1977. In this memorandum, a 1970 start date was identified by model shop management, which corroborates the operational information discussed above about the suspension of activities. And the 1977 ending date agrees with the Source and Special Nuclear Material inventory information, which shows the last receipt in March of 1977.

And NMMSS information does not indicate a later date of operations, other than waste management. So, if you look at the NMMSS, I have the report, a copy of it, here. It has mag-thorium dates of that inventory at the site and it has alloyed thorium up until -- what is it, '76 -- and then -- oh, here we go, that'll look better.

So, it has alloyed metal up until '76. Those are Joe's notes from NMMSS. And then the only other time with dates after '76 it is thorium/other awaiting disposal. So, yes, the mag-thorium was still on-site after '76 but as a waste in barrels.

I just held up SRDB reference 137786, for those of you on the phone.

Okay. SC&A wanted us, in their White Paper, to produce more air-monitoring results. There are no other air-monitoring results after 1970, other than that one we have discussed several times. That was that negative exposure assessment where they followed each operation through model shop and took breathing air samples. That is all we had for that.

But NIOSH considers other things when we think about whether or not our methodology is bounding and when we looked at pyrophoricity of the material and how that would have caused the site to control this with work practices.

So, we looked at the pyrophoric nature and the controls Kansas City Plant implemented to prevent fires. From the beginning of the operations in '61, KCP was sensitive to the hazard and required fire department involvement prior to any work. And they were explicit about that hazard, saying, quote, this alloy is a potential problem, primarily as a result of the pyrophoricity of the magnesium.

Those guidelines followed throughout that campaign in the '70s, continued to address the pyrophoricity and included statements, such as the Fire Protection Department shall be contacted before initiation of the project and regarding any alterations in the process. So, we made sure that they had buy-in from fire protection personnel when any changes to this process occurred.

And we took some interviews in March of

this year and a few of those interviewees corroborated the fact that information was driven down to the floor level of operations and they actually implemented it and they were told that it was extremely flammable. Those are taken from Ted's notes of the March meeting.

So, that pyrophoric nature is a driver for many of their IH, industrial hygiene controls, such as their Good Housekeeping. If you look through those Health and Safety Management Guides, they talk about making sure there is no dust accumulation or waste accumulation. They make sure they run a clean operation.

And the pyrophoric nature also provides us with something that is very valuable in the health-physics regard and is that wetting controls. So, we looked at that and saw that all reports indicate that that work was a wet process. The mag-thorium machining was done wet. And some machine operations, such as those at a tape lathe in the model shop were performed completely submerged in coolant. They used a Cadet Z mineral oil coolant for these machine operations.

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They kept those work practices throughout the '70s. They included state of the art controls that we even have in place today in our DOE world: medical surveillance, respiratory protection. And so they had that in place at the start of the campaign in 1970.

I have moved over to page five, for anyone that is following along.

And one of the guides says in quotes, all machining operations of this material shall be machined wet, using mineral oil base coolant, Cadet Z.

The interviews did in we March corroborated the implementation on the floor that chips were always kept wet. Then, considered that, given that the material wetted, it is not plausible that KCP machinists would generate a significant amount of dust. After 1970, the magnesium-thorium was a two percent thorium by weight and it doesn't seem plausible to reach concentrations greater than microcuries per milliliter on a consistent basis. NIOSH estimates that breathing that air, one would

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inhale approximately 33 grams of alloy in a year, 1 which is a very high number for a wet process. 2 3 So, then we went and looked at the SC&A report on Dow Madison. That is the organization 4 that created the same magnesium-thorium that KCP 5 operated with, that they machined. 6 7 And there were some interesting parts from that report. They took an affidavit from a 8 mill operator and he said that there was no airborne 9 He said any dust generated would have been 10 11 smothered by the mill coolant. 12 And Dow Madison was working procedure that they also provided to Kansas City 13 Plant and it was the basis for many of the controls 14 at the beginning of all of the controls that Kansas 15 16 City Plant used. So, they were all using similar controls for the work. 17 So, in that same SC&A report, they had 18 19 some breathing zone air sampling discussed, while 20 Dow Madison was doing some very aggressive machine operations, such as open-wheel surface grinding, 21 22 air-operated vibration sanding, buffing

drumming of mag-thorium powder. And during those

fairly aggressive activities, the highest air 1 concentration they saw in the breathing zone was 2 3.9E-12 microcuries per milliliter. So, that is 3 almost an order of magnitude lower than the control 4 level that we have used for our methodology. 5 So, that would have yielded a dose of 6 7 8 rem per year at that highest level with that Dow saw during those aggressive activities. 8 That would be CEDE, committed effective dose 9 10 equivalent. 11 MR. SHARFI: If it's an annual dose. That was for a year, right? 12 13 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes. Okay, and then NIOSH believes that the operations at Dow represent 14 15 a worst case exposure scenario, and it is not likely 16 the Kansas City Plant's machinists were exposed to 2000-hour 17 higher concentration а on а time-weighted average basis. 18 19 Okay, so now I will jump down to the 20 SC&A requested corroborating data source term. and, in the absence of such data, recommends a 21 22 source term-based exposure model. So, they asked

for some air-monitoring data and we said after

1970, we wish there were more but there isn't. they came with a solution, not just wondering where is the data but they offered us something we could And what we did was we looked at what try. We reviewed inventory information was available. didn't it. and we see extensive source-term information and recognize that it was limited, however, it could be explained. The lack of this inventory information could be explained by the small-scale nature of those operations and that there just wasn't much inventory after they started tracking it in 1969. provide And we corroborating information from Waste Management reports for that.

But, nevertheless, we go on with our calculation. We took the largest set of inventory information for a particular year we could find, that was 1973 and there is the reference there. It comes from the Statement of Measurement records that Joe found at Kansas City Plant. And then we had information from eight separate months during that year, added it up and it came up to 42 kilograms of thorium. And we used NUREG-1400, their

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equation 1.2, and it is listed here. You can go through that if you like.

That NUREG provides guidance from the NRC for sites to determine whether or not they need to do air monitoring. And there is a calculation available there where you can assess your operations and determine what degree of protection you are using, glove bags, glove boxes, inhalation, what state the material is in, is it a metal, is it powder. And you apply all of those that you think are appropriate.

And what we did, if you went through it there, you would see that we went with the more conservative decisions on each one of those and we came up with a -- and that yields an intake rate. The person around that material would receive -- fire alarm.

MR. KATZ: Fire alarm. Okay. Well, we are going to break for the fire alarm. I'm not going to kill the phone. I'm just going to put it on mute, so you don't have to hear the alarm. And we will be back as soon as they let us back.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter

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went off the record at 9:48 a.m. and resumed at 9:53 1 2 a.m.) 3 MR. KATZ: Okay, so we are back in the There was no fire but everyone is good. 4 room. 5 So, continue. CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, Pat, you were 6 7 saying. MR. MCCLOSKEY: 8 Yes, so that 9 NUREG-1400 calculation that we showed starting on 10 page six and continuing onto seven, it yields an 11 intake rate for someone that works around that 12 material. And we calculated 4.2E-3 grams per 13 year. We used the specific activity thorium-232 and converted it to activity and came 14 15 up with 4.62E-10 curies per year of an intake and that converts to 17.1 becquerel per year. 16 17 When we compare that amount, that amount that you would get 18 intake from 19 NUREG-1400 calculation to an intake amount based 20 on our bounding methodology, the 3E-11 microcurie per milliliter and SC&A did us the service of 21 22 calculating that in their Finding 7 of their most

recent May document, May 2015. You can see where

they have calculated it. And what they came up 1 with is 2,664 becquerel per year. 2 That's a good 3 calculation. So, what that shows it the source-term 4 calculation, based on all that conservatism and 5 based on the highest inventory amount for a year 6 7 that we could find is 156 times smaller than our ER method. 8 9 So. there is corroborating some information for 10 you. We used plenty 11 conservatism, we think, in that calculation but if 12 we want to go off and see if in fact '73 was the worst-case for that year, we could go back to NMMSS 13 and see if we can refine that. 14 We just offer that in response to SC&A's 15 16 request, just as an additional layer of assurance. We are not going not use that for any DRs or 17 anything. 18 19 So, in conclusion, at the end of the 20 paper, we say that NIOSH, along with SC&A and the Advisory Board Work Group, has been reviewing 21 22 Kansas City Plant documents and interviewing 23 personnel since 2004 regarding radiological work

1	at the Kansas City Plant. And for the last several
2	years, we have specifically been searching for
3	mag-thorium information. NIOSH continues to seek
4	and review additional information.
5	Based on a review of the information
6	available at this time, NIOSH believes the weight
7	of evidence supports the ER's bounding method, as
8	modified with the Advisory Board's and SC&A's
9	assistance, as plausible and claimant-favorable.
10	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, thank you, Pat.
11	Just for clarification, I have one action that
12	Joyce brought up about the fire in 1964 that Pat
13	was going to go back and review the SRDB for that
14	incident. So, that was one action.
15	Joyce, are there any other issues with
16	NIOSH's paper, just in summary?
17	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, I don't think it
18	is clear how they are going to apply this limit of
19	3E-11 microcuries per milliliter. They are going
20	to apply it to the whole period from 1961 to 1979
21	continuous exposure of workers. How are they
22	going to apply this limit?
23	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, I think that is

1	part of the Work Group's question as well, how it
2	is going to be applied and to whom.
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay, first, Joyce, if
4	you get a chance or someone gets a chance to find
5	the SRDB reference for the fire, I heard you say
6	that you read
7	DR. LIPSZTEIN: I'll get it now. It is
8	in one of the papers that you gave just one
9	second.
10	CHAIR BEACH: While Joyce is looking
11	for that, Work Group Members, any questions for
12	NIOSH or SC&A at this time?
13	Brad, anything?
14	MEMBER CLAWSON: No, not at this time.
15	CHAIR BEACH: All right.
16	DR. LIPSZTEIN: It is 137860.
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay.
18	CHAIR BEACH: Thank you.
19	DR. LIPSZTEIN: It's a paper that you
20	cite just before the second campaign in the last
21	line. Then, on page three, there is something
22	about the fire in October 28, 1964.
23	And I think that I would like to know,

1	as part of the dose calculation and was already
2	asked, to whom is this going to be applied.
3	Because I saw some interviews of people that were
4	working on D&D and they were dismantling the
5	machines and things like that, so their exposure
6	is certainly different.
7	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
8	MR. MCCLOSKEY: So, to start that off
9	with Joyce asked from the period of '63 to '79, are
10	we going to apply the 3E-11 continuously.
11	So, we have now said from '63 to '70,
12	those operations were suspended. So, it is pretty
13	clear that we are not applying it there.
14	CHAIR BEACH: So, '63 to '70, so I am
15	clear.
16	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, no operations.
17	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
18	MR. MCCLOSKEY: So, we now have two
19	mag-thorium periods.
20	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We have a '61 to '63 and
22	then a '70 to '77, roughly.
23	And so, from and Mutty will help with

how we apply the 3E-11 over the years, now where it is, in effect. So, we have everyone that submits a claim that has a job description that we match to the TBD-6000 generated can job descriptions in the ER, such as operator, supervisor, laborer, and other categories there where they give different ratios of what the operator gets, different ratios of the 3E-11.

So, at the March visit you guys obtained some really good, useful documents for us to help apply this. And those include job descriptions. One of them is an Excel spreadsheet that has each Kansas City Plant job description, what all they would have done, and where they would have done it, what area.

And this one file that he got, he got, well I will say three or four of them, so that is going to help us, when claims come in, determine which of those four TBD-6000 categories that person fits into.

And so they will -- we will determine where they were, to the best we can, with our normal DR practices, and apply their category of exposure

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1	for that period of time.
2	Am I missing anything?
3	MR. DARNELL: No. I'm actually
4	looking at the SRDB reference that Joyce gave us.
5	I don't see any reference to fire in the Weekly
6	Activity report but in Joe's note, he references
7	a magnesium fire in Department 90, which is
8	MR. FITZGERALD: I don't even remember
9	what 90 is now.
10	MR. DARNELL: Ninety was not part of
11	radioactive work. It was magnesium work done in
12	other places.
13	MR. DARNELL: Oh.
14	MR. FITZGERALD: But Department 90 was
15	never one of those.
16	MR. DARNELL: Oh, it may be a magnesium
17	fire that was not related to the mag-thorium work.
18	MR. MCCLOSKEY: They did machine pure
19	magnesium without the thorium. Correct?
20	MR. DARNELL: That is the only
21	reference. Joyce, is that correct, the reference
22	that you are talking about?
23	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes. Actually

1	MR. DARNELL: Okay, that was actually
2	not radioactive work.
3	MR. FITZGERALD: That may be magnesium
4	not related to magnesium-thorium, now that we have
5	the reference in hand. We can verify that.
6	DR. LIPSZTEIN: In 1964, there was
7	still some activity, although
8	MR. DARNELL: Oh, there is no
9	disagreement that there was activity going on with
10	the mag-thorium. It is just that in this
11	particular location, they did not use radioactive
12	materials.
13	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Well, actually, we
14	said there is no machine operations in '64. So,
15	if it even indicates that there is machining
16	operations after '63, we still need to evaluate
17	that.
18	MR. DARNELL: It is just evaluate to
19	see if it is pure magnesium or magnesium-thorium.
20	DR. LIPSZTEIN: I think '64 has to be
21	evaluated.
22	(Simultaneous speaking.)
23	MR. FITZGERALD: I think that

1	clarification should be we should be able to do
2	that pretty straightforward.
3	MR. DARNELL: I'm almost positive that
4	there was never radioactive work in Department 90.
5	We can just double-check that.
6	MR. FITZGERALD: We can double-check
7	that but that very well may be the case.
8	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Because we know that
9	there was machining came out of uranium in other
LO	departments after they cleaned Department 22. So,
L1	I don't know if the magnesium-thorium also moved
L2	to other places.
L3	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, what we are
L4	saying, Joyce, is that it is worth just confirming
L5	
L6	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, looking at it.
L7	MR. FITZGERALD: looking at it as
L8	far as what exactly Department 90 was at that time
L9	and what was being machined in there.
20	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, what I am
21	hearing yes, NIOSH is going to do that 1963
22	to 1970, other than clarifying the 1964, that there
23	was no mag-thorium work done. So, there is no dose

1	reconstruction going to be done.
2	But 1970 to 1977 is still
3	MR. SHARFI: It would be 1964 to 1970.
4	Right?
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Let me read the exact
6	dates.
7	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, give me the exact
8	dates, so I can have them. Thank you.
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I think we can find
LO	those in our White Paper.
L1	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
L2	MR. MCCLOSKEY: So, there is a period
L3	from August '61, so that would be August 1, '61
L4	through March 31, '63. That is the first period
L5	of magnesium-thorium operations that we have
L6	agreed on.
L7	Then the second period, so operations
L8	are suspended from April 1, '63, they are suspended
L9	up until and did not begin again until after
20	receiving approval from Health Services on August
21	28, 1970. Yes, that is practically the end of
22	August but that is our first indication.
23	And that ends up being, the first thing

Τ	that we see that they have done there is that one
2	where they took the air sample. That ends up being
3	the first firm confirmation of operations
4	occurring.
5	But we were saying as soon as they got
6	the release to do work in August, on August 28th
7	of '70, that is when the second campaign starts.
8	And since we were using the inventory information
9	to corroborate all this, we also said that since
10	the NMMSS information and other inventory
11	information shows and especially a document from
12	a manager of the area, where I can pull that out
13	and read it. It might help. But we used that also
14	now to cut off operations in '77.
15	MR. FITZGERALD: You're cutting it off
16	in '77 rather than '79 at this point.
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, since we were
18	using that inventory information to confirm other
19	dates, we were going to stick with it and say
20	MR. KATZ: Do you have a month for that?
21	MR. FITZGERALD: This says December of
22	'77.
23	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, December 31, 1977

1	because the inventory information is annual now.
2	Annual dates, so we went with December 31st. Is
3	that clear for you, enough?
4	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
5	MR. FITZGERALD: So, if a worker
6	self-identified as a mag-thorium worker who
7	happened to work from the beginning of that period
8	to say '61 and, thereafter, that individual would
9	get the ER, I can't remember the exact value but
LO	the value in the ER for '61 to '63. And then even
L1	though he self-identifies as a mag-thorium worker,
L2	no credit for '64 through '70.
L3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: For mag-thorium.
L4	MR. FITZGERALD: Right. But then
L5	would get the 3E-11, if we was an operator from '70
L6	to '77.
L7	If the individual is not an operator,
L8	but had access to the area, then they would get
L9	proportionally less, depending on the worker
20	category. I think there were three other
21	categories of labor, something like that.
22	So, that is kind of the ER picture.
23	MR. DARNELL: I actually have a little

bit of a problem with saying a worker self-identified as a mag-thorium worker because we have had evidence in the interviews that workers actually never really knew specifically what they were working with.

I think that we had a worker with medical records --

MR. FITZGERALD: To substantiate that they were doing it.

MR. DARNELL: Yes.

MR. FITZGERALD: Okay, good point.

The only wrinkle in this that we actually can pick up on D&D and waste handling is whether that pre-established category that is discussed in the ER where you proportionately assign less than 50 percent, depending on worker category, it is still a little fuzzy as how it would apply to the laborers who were, in fact, doing direct handling. We can deal with that in the other issues but I know that was set up before we actually started investigating what these other categories were doing. And I think that was more of a generic labor category. And we are sort of

1	looking a little more specifically at laborers who
2	happen to be carrying waste or happen to be doing
3	small letter D&D. So, I am a little bit uncertain
4	about whether that generic would apply to those
5	kind of folks.
6	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, I mean anytime you
7	just simply have four categories for a site as
8	complex as Kansas City Plant, you are going to come
9	across categories of workers that their square peg
10	doesn't necessarily fit perfectly into that round
11	hole.
12	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, just as an
13	asterisk on this one. I think we are, generally,
14	pretty satisfied but I think that is the only
15	and that is addressed in other issues.
16	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We can talk about that
17	further.
18	MR. FITZGERALD: We can talk about that
19	further later.
20	But so that is kind of the ER. I think
21	that is the ER picture for mag-thorium.
22	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, the other
23	part of this is also the example dose

1	reconstruction that we had asked for being
2	completed and we are going to get that at a later
3	time. Correct?
4	MR. DARNELL: Correct, once we get done
5	agreeing on all the aspects, we are planning on
6	giving you the entire product, instead of a
7	piecemeal product.
8	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, other action
9	items, anybody? Joyce, do you have anything else?
10	I know NIOSH is going to still track down that time
11	period and get back to us on that.
12	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay. No, that is it.
13	And I have just the people from decontamination,
14	how they are going to be treated.
15	CHAIR BEACH: Did you say D&D?
16	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes.
17	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, D&D, one set, for
18	example, went through and dismantled the
19	equipment, the lathes after the mag-thorium period
20	ended. I think it is certainly in question. That
21	is kind of addressed in a different issue.
22	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, we can do that now
23	or later.

1	MR. FITZGERALD: It's up to the chair.
2	CHAIR BEACH: I think it fits better in
3	the other issue.
4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, if it comes to a
5	point where we close this issue and then move to
6	another issue, whichever you think is appropriate.
7	Whatever you want to do.
8	MR. FITZGERALD: We can move to those
9	two issues, if you want to segue into D&D and waste
10	handling. It does include mag-thorium,
11	obviously.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
13	CHAIR BEACH: So yes, we can what is
14	the Work Group's preference here?
15	MEMBER LOCKEY: It is a good segue into
16	those too.
17	CHAIR BEACH: It is, actually. And we
18	were going to go to 11:00 but Ron's not with us now.
19	So, any other issues with 13? Any
20	other clarification? Everybody comfortable with
21	that? Then, we will move
22	DR. MAURO: Josie, this is John Mauro.
23	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, hi, John.

DR. MAURO: Hi, everybody. I've been on for a while, listening. I have one question sort of after I started to read some of this material, and in light of the fact that I did a lot of work early on at the site and also at Dow.

CHAIR BEACH: Of course.

DR. MAURO: This limit to dust, the airborne limit that was established, that 10 to the minus 11 number that was in place and that becomes sort of the rock you are going to stand on right It is my understanding that the airborne thorium was really actually a magnesium-thorium dust that was two percent by mass of thorium. that correct? The inhalation exposure that we are dealing with is airborne thorium that is basically a thorium-magnesium alloy that consists, in terms of it's two percent of thorium by mass. And I was wondering what the milligrams per cubic meter are when you have that limit on thorium because I seem to recollect that certainly -- I understand the arguments being made here but I would be interested in knowing what that converts to in terms of milligrams per cubic meter because I think that

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also goes toward weight of evidence as to whether 1 strategy is, in fact, fairly kind 2 3 favorable. I think you may find -- I can't say this for certain because I haven't run the calculation 4 -- I just thought of it while you were talking, that 5 the number of milligrams per cubic meter might be 6 7 quite high, when you are dealing with a two percent 8 alloy. So, I would just like to raise that 9 question. 10 Maybe it could be looked into and help 11 to get some insight as to whether not that is a fairly high dust load. 12 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, actually, John, 13 I think Jim Neton, when he sat in on one of our Work 14 15 Group meetings, raised the question of whether you 16 would reach the threshold of breathability, just because of the amount of thorium involved. 17 That was a comment he made back in January, I think. 18 19 DR. MAURO: Okay. 20 DR. LIPSZTEIN: And we answered it, John, and we calculated it and we saw that it is 21 22 fairly invisible dust. It doesn't impair your So, it is what is possible to have 23 respiration.

1	that in the air.
2	DR. MAURO: Okay, thank you.
3	DR. LIPSZTEIN: So, we made out a
4	calculation to see if that dust was visible but not
5	in carrying the health of the respiration of the
6	worker.
7	DR. MAURO: Very good. Thanks for
8	answering my question.
9	CHAIR BEACH: John, Pat was going to
LO	answer it as well. But if you are satisfied, then
L1	
L2	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, I remember that
L3	dialogue because Jim Neton raised that same
L4	question.
L5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: It is in our January
L6	15th paper, and it equates at 1.1E-11 microcuries
L7	per milliliter.
L8	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, we are going
L9	to go ahead oh, go ahead, John.
20	MEMBER POSTON: I'm sorry. I've been
21	sitting here trying to figure out exactly this
22	whole thing because I used to run a lathe and I never
23	did anything that didn't use coolant. And it seems

So, I have to me the coolant knocks down the dust. 1 been trying to figure out how you get to this high 2 3 number for any situation, especially something that is like magnesium, which is pyrophoric in 4 5 certain situations. MR. SHARFI: And the Dow Madison's were 6 7 an order of magnitude well below that, when made in the similar operations. 8 9 MR. MCCLOSKEY: That was our thought 10 all along with saying that we could bound this and 11 that there would not be high airborne values. 12 wouldn't exceed their engineered bounds because of adherence 13 their to wet methods and the pyrophoricity of the material. 14 And they are concerned with that. 15 16 MEMBER LOCKEY: hard metal For 17 pneumoconiosis, actually the coolant is potentially for sensitization to cobalt. So, I am 18 19 not -- you say it knocks down the dust, but in that 20 particular disease process, cobalt just dissolves in the coolant and actually is the biggest risk for 21 sensitization. 22

MEMBER POSTON: How do you aerosolize

1	the coolant?
2	MEMBER LOCKEY: In the process of
3	machining it is aerosolized.
4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: So the coolant makes
5	things worse, really?
6	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes, because the metal
7	is dissolved into the coolant. And the machine
8	process, whenever you have a machine process, you
9	are going to aerosolize the coolant, unless it is
LO	contained.
L1	(Simultaneous speaking.)
L2	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Are you familiar with
L3	that applying it to anything else, besides cobalt?
L4	MEMBER LOCKEY: It is just I know in
L5	cobalt it is a risk factor. So, I am just saying
L6	there is another side of that.
L7	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, there is.
L8	MR. DARNELL: We need to take a step
L9	back and look. We are dealing with two pyrophoric
20	materials.
21	MEMBER LOCKEY: I'm sorry?
22	MR. DARNELL: We're dealing with two
23	pyrophoric materials. If we aerosolized them, we

1	would have had many fires.
2	MEMBER LOCKEY: I'm not knowledgeable
3	about that. I just know that with cobalt, it is
4	an issue.
5	MR. DARNELL: I agree with you.
6	Actually, I remember it from the Pathline days
7	because we had that same issue when we had to grind
8	inside piping. But for magnesium or thorium, both
9	pyrophoric materials, if you are able to aerosolize
10	them, you are also able that separates that from
11	the oil for some part of that also, which would have
12	meant a flash fire hazard. We didn't have that.
13	We have no evidence of that. We have no records
14	of that happening. It would have been happening
15	quite often, had that same process with cobalt-60
16	been occurring here.
17	So, because we have a loud
18	preponderance of no fires, we know that that wasn't
19	going on.
20	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, thank you. So,
21	thank you.
22	We are going to move on to Issue 17. It
23	segues naturally into this. NIOSH has a paper they

1	put out June 11th that discusses that topic, and
2	then SC&A's memo. NIOSH, would you like to go
3	ahead and start?
4	MR. DARNELL: Let me think where we
5	are.
6	CHAIR BEACH: Seventeen, D&D
7	Operations.
8	MR. DARNELL: Give me just a second.
9	CHAIR BEACH: Sure.
10	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Are you talking about
11	the memos? There were a bunch of memo responses.
12	CHAIR BEACH: We'll go through the D&D
13	and then take an official break.
14	MEMBER POSTON: No fire alarms.
15	CHAIR BEACH: Hopefully not.
16	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay.
17	CHAIR BEACH: So, do you want to
18	summarize anything, Joe, first, and then have Pat
19	or what do you guys
20	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I can read your summary
21	that we have.
22	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, we've given
23	each other a summary. Either way.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: All right, here is Joe's summary of where we are on 17. He says or SC&A says similar to Issue 7 for radwaste handlers, SC&A concluded that these activities were being performed by worker category distinct from uranium or thorium workers, who were not necessarily monitored based on interviews and that these workers or laborers would have been, potentially, exposed.

Again, NIOSH notes that it had identified two out of four laborers as having internal monitoring records and, quote, will use that data, where appropriate, to reconstruct doses.

further noted Tt. is that the ER acknowledges and addresses the fact that various worker categories had a varying exposure potential and that, furthermore, an extensive procedural review confirmed that Kansas City Plant implemented a robust air and personal monitoring Similarly, a review of SC&A's 2007 program. report a focused review of operations in thorium the Dow Chemical Madison plant exposures at

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concludes that it is not likely the Kansas City
Plant handlers were exposed to a higher
concentration of airborne thorium-232 on a
2000-hour time weighted average basis.

SC&A's comments on that are that NIOSH, again, references the two bioassay data points identified for laborers and goes on to make a programmatic case. The Kansas City Plant had a robust contamination control program and that the monitoring data for uranium workers validate the bounding methods of the ER.

However, with only two data points for laborers and some question as to whether both of these particular laborers conducted D&D, it is not clear how these bounding data would be applied for them. Assuming they were cleaning rooms where uranium machining had taken place, such as those in Department 20, it remains unclear why any such unmonitored workers conducting these activities in uranium contaminated areas would not have the bounding uranium worker dose distribution applied for the D&D time period in question.

NIOSH's case regarding thorium is more

1 persuasive. SC&A agrees that these workers were residual thorium 2 unlikely to be exposed to concentrations in excess of 1.5E-11 microcuries 3 per milliliter. 4 So, that is basically what --5 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, I think that is 6 7 where we are at. MR. MCCLOSKEY: 8 Okay. MR. FITZGERALD: And that 9 issue, 10 again, is that we sort of just got into in March 11 looking at some of these cases and interviewing 12 some of these workers. And we weren't aware that there was actually any internal data, internal 13 bioassay data for any of them, because initially, 14 15 they didn't recall any, but you found, I think, at 16 least two out of the four that we did interview did have data. 17 18 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes. 19 MR. FITZGERALD: So really, kind of 20 before it was sort of like okay, what do we do because they are, essentially, unmonitored workers 21 22 but now we actually have some data points.

so the question is a little different and saying

okay, we do have some data and you are going to use 1 that in some fashion for dose reconstruction 2 3 apparently or maybe for those individuals alone. But I just want to broach this subject 4 to clarify. We got into this issue originally 5 because I think there was some uncertainty about 6 7 whether the operators handled their own waste and who did D&D and that was the whole genesis of let's 8 figure out how this was done. And we did find, I 9 think, that well, there was this whole category of 10 11 workers that we were aware of but didn't quite 12 appreciate everything they did. These laborers actually handled a lot of the waste that fell to 13 the floor and picked it up and moved it to a central 14 15 area. For the D&D, the small D&D, not the 16 two-year D&D that the ER refers to, that happened 17 pretty continuously, which is not surprising. 18 19 that was handled by laborers who took machines 20 apart and decontaminated them and all that. people 21 MR. DARNELL: Those were 22 laborers that were actually dressed out. MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, dressed out and 23

everything. But the question was okay, so we do have this subcategory of laborers that we weren't appreciative of when the ER was put together. In terms of dose reconstruction, those folks, the ones that we can establish did small D&D, small letter D&D and did handle the waste, what bounding dose would they get or what contribution would be assigned them?

It wasn't clear from the last write-up. That is kind of what you just read, exactly what would be done. I mean it looks like for certain individuals that happen to have data, they would be given that dose but if there was a category of workers, some of whom don't have any internal dose but were established as having done D&D or handling waste, there doesn't seem to be enough to do a coworker model.

So, it is kind of an open question. How would you actually implement dose reconstructions if you were to find these categories of workers that we, I think, found from interviews? Yes, they actually, day-to-day handled a lot of waste that would go into the waste site and D&D, they actually

1	did pick this equipment apart. So, it seems like
2	they were a category of workers that were being
3	exposed more than this generic sort of, of all the
4	laborers in the plant, they were getting exposed
5	more.
6	Now, were they being exposed as much as
7	the operators? It's not clear but sort of begs the
8	question how do you treat those, in terms of these
9	workers if they do file claims, how would you dose
10	reconstruct them?
11	MR. DARNELL: My personal opinion, I
12	believe this is rather straightforward. The way
13	we have handled it in other sites is these type of
14	workers were getting the 50th percentile of
15	operator dose.
16	MR. SHARFI: Are we talking about
17	uranium now?
18	MR. FITZGERALD: Just talking uranium
19	for now, yes.
20	MR. SHARFI: At that point, I mean, I
21	guess your question of whether or not there is
22	enough data to do a coworker, are you talking about
23	a stratified coworker or are you talking about

1	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I am just saying
2	that
3	MR. SHARFI: Generally, we have a
4	coworker set. I don't know whether or not we will
5	be able to stratify it in that sense, to stratify
6	them but we would have a coworker approach for those
7	individuals that you could apply coworker.
8	MR. FITZGERALD: That was one of my
9	questions saying that okay, they were exposed to
LO	uranium but they weren't operators.
L1	MR. SHARFI: Correct.
L2	MR. FITZGERALD: The thing you are
L3	talking about, 50 percent, I would be a little
L4	concerned about that.
L5	MR. SHARFI: There is not a percentile
L6	at that point. I mean the internal coworker is,
L7	depending on whether you fall at the geometric mean
L8	or the distribution where you are getting the 95th
L9	percentile, that is generally how the coworker
20	MR. FITZGERALD: As I recall the ER, it
21	does carve out groups; operators would be given the
22	full dose. Laborers, the different categories
23	would get a portion of the last 50 percent, say.

In this case, I think that would not necessarily fit very well just because I think the exposure potential is specifically, and you mentioned this earlier, Pat, that you have groups within this broad category that are a little different. They were certainly handling stuff more directly than the rest of the laborers in the plant.

So, if they came forward and said well, yes, I did D&D or my job is to go in and clean up after the uranium lathe operators, I would think — and I was just thinking out loud in our response, that I probably would apply the uranium coworker model to them since, basically, without splitting hairs, they probably got more than the standard generic person in the plant. Did they get as much as an operator? Who knows? But they certainly fell in that category where it would be easier just to apply the uranium coworker model.

But it wasn't clear after we went through all that in your response on what data you found exactly what would be the NIOSH approach to dose reconstruction in those particular

1	subcategories of workers.
2	MR. SHARFI: Yes, I mean generally I
3	would say those people fall into the use of
4	coworker.
5	MR. FITZGERALD: The broader uranium
6	coworker model.
7	MR. SHARFI: Yes. Yes, I mean it
8	depends upon the year period because I think
9	pre-'59 we used the Battelle 6000 approach to cover
10	them and then from '59 to '70, there is a coworker
11	model that would cover that.
12	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, that is the
13	clarification I was looking for. What would you
14	do with these workers? Would you include them in
15	the broader coworker model for the uranium worker,
16	operators, workers, or would you assign them this
17	fractional? I think the ER has some fractional
18	dose assignments which I would have more of a
19	problem with because I think they probably would
20	fit that generic category.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, it could have been
22	more clear, though. You are right.
23	For natural uranium, it is that

1	issue, I think we are closed on that one, but it
2	is a TBD-6000 was the various operator, supervisor,
3	admin, whatever ratios.
4	MR. FITZGERALD: Right.
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: But what we do for the
6	depleted uranium is coworker. And that is what you
7	are saying would be more appropriate. And that is
8	what we plan to do.
9	MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. I think that
10	was one clarification I would like.
11	MR. MCCLOSKEY: And as far as like
12	understanding these many categories of workers, I
13	think we are getting better at that with more
14	information that we get describes all of their
15	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, we have gone
16	we weren't sure who was actually handling the waste
17	and who was actually doing some of these small
18	letter D&Ds. And I think that became a lot clearer
19	from the last set of interviews, that you did have
20	people that were focused on doing that kind of work.
21	MEMBER LOCKEY: I'm sorry?
22	MR. FITZGERALD: That were being
23	assigned to do D&D on the site. The ER speaks to

1	a very major D&D that took place like '83 and '84,
2	something like that.
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, '84 to '87.
4	MR. FITZGERALD: 1984 to 1986 but
5	doesn't account for any other D&Ds. And of course,
6	in a plant with a 50-60 year old history, you are
7	always tearing things down and cleaning things up.
8	And we did establish that the laborers,
9	which is the category of workers at Kansas City,
10	were assigned to do that kind of work.
11	CHAIR BEACH: A small scale D&D.
12	MR. FITZGERALD: A small scale D&D,
13	yes.
14	MEMBER LOCKEY: So, there were four
15	were interviewed, two actually had records.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, which was
17	interesting because when you talked to them, they
18	didn't seem to account for any monitoring but when
19	NIOSH looked at the records and matched up the
20	names, they did find some bioassay data, which is
21	good. But that sort of begs the question. We are
22	sort of 50-50. The other two
23	MR. DARNELL: Well, it follows the

1	plant having these, doing medical monitoring,
2	doing radiological monitoring for workers assigned
3	to those projects.
4	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.
5	MR. DARNELL: And whether or not
6	part of the problem that we continually run into
7	and ask a worker did you do this kind of work and
8	they may have done that kind of work but it was for
9	non-radiological projects but they didn't know
10	that.
11	MR. FITZGERALD: They weren't told.
12	MR. DARNELL: They weren't told. And
13	they are so kept in the dark, it hinders some of
14	the information that we can get from them
15	accurately.
16	MEMBER LOCKEY: Do we know who those
17	workers are?
18	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, if you look at the
19	latest paper that we posted on the website, our
20	response, we give NOCTS members do you have
21	access?
22	CHAIR BEACH: Is it the June 11th?
23	MEMBER LOCKEY: I guess the question is

1	how many workers were involved with that.
2	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, that is a
3	different issue.
4	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, it is.
5	MR. FITZGERALD: We happened to find
6	three or four workers that seemed
7	MEMBER LOCKEY: But how many were
8	involved with it? That is what I am asking.
9	MR. FITZGERALD: We don't know. It's
10	not clear. We didn't see any records that carved
11	out here is by task or assignment. How many
12	workers did D&D or how many workers were devoted
13	to cleaning up waste.
14	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Well and in the case of
15	these four workers, you were able to identify, you
16	went back to the records and found bioassay data.
17	So, there may be additional bioassay data in the
18	records, you just haven't accessed it or you don't
19	know where to access them. Is that correct?
20	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Well, we don't know to
21	go looking for Person X that was a D&D or a waste
22	handler and see if there are in fact records for
23	him. We only knew to go look for these four.

MEMBER LOCKEY: I understand, 1 there may be, in the records that have not be 2 3 searched for whatever reason, there be additional bioassay data. 4 5 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Sure. Oh, yes, sure. MR. DARNELL: Okay, we did a quick 6 7 review of people that were identified on some specific access lists and we found bioassay data 8 on a lot of those folks. And some of those folks, 9 during interviews, were telling us, we were never 10 11 monitored. We never had bioassay. We went and 12 found it because they were on specific lists. The remainder of workers, we just don't 13 know because we either haven't found them on a list 14 15 or they haven't been part of one of the different 16 things that we have done research in yet. That's kind of what we 17 MR. FITZGERALD: are talking about, saying okay, we may be covered 18 19 but in case we do find some of these workers that 20 are established as being D&D or waste handlers, 21 they don't have records. 22 What I think Mutty is saying is that 23 they would apply the coworker model of the uranium

operators and that would be fine. They would apply 1 that and that would be the dose they would get. 2 3 MEMBER LOCKEY: I think SC&A was asking whether that was adequate. If you have two 4 four, 5 bioassays οf the is that adequate information? 6 7 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, it wasn't clear from the response are we going to apply that which 8 we find or is the uranium coworker model, which we 9 kind of thought that was the case but we wanted to 10 11 confirm that, that the uranium coworker model would be applied for those that don't have individual 12 records because we batted 50-50 on the four. 13 it is likely that some might not have any records. 14 15 But it is not easy to know how many 16 actually did the small letter D&D or -- it wasn't something that was carved out very clearly. 17 We were lucky, I think, to even find people that 18 19 acknowledged they did that work. MR. DARNELL: 20 And the other thing to remember is some of this small letter D&D that was 21 22 going on was on machinery or equipment that was 23 never radioactive to begin with. The people that

were doing the work never knew it. 1 It makes it more and more difficult, 2 3 more challenging to find enough data to support the different positions we are trying to come up with. 4 MR. MCCLOSKEY: This logic applies to 5 Issue 7 that we just --6 Yes, I think 7 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. the questions are tied together. 8 9 Now, for the benefit of Joyce, we looked at the thorium aspect of that because, obviously, 10 11 you have mag-thorium lathe operations and these 12 issues apply equally to those but the value that was being proposed, as far as the bounding value 13 discussed 14 for in the the reasons we last 15 discussion, are very conservative. So, if that is 16 the bounding dose that is going to be applied, or the air concentration that is going to be applied, 17 I don't think there is any question that would be 18 19 bounding of what those folks would have been 20 exposed to. this is 1.5E-11 21 So, Joyce, the 22 microcuries per milliliter, that is the value that 23 NIOSH bounding thorium is proposing as а

1	concentration for D&D workers, as well as waste
2	handlers, I would imagine.
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
4	MR. FITZGERALD: So, in both cases,
5	that would be the bounding air concentration that
6	would be applied for them, as far as any residual
7	thorium.
8	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes. Why it is half
9	the concentration you are going to apply to the
10	regular workers?
11	MR. MCCLOSKEY: The regular workers
12	being operators on TBD-6000 approach defined as
13	four categories, operators, laborers,
14	supervisors, and other. And so we evaluated their
15	work and determined that the infrequency of the
16	clean-out and the D&D would reduce their exposure
17	to someone who was actually doing the machining
18	continuously.
19	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Like for example,
20	would you apply this limit for a continuous work
21	during one year or for some time during the year?
22	MR. MCCLOSKEY: If they come to us with
23	a claim, we determine if they are a mag-thorium

1	worker that worked in the area for the entire year,
2	they would get 2,000 hours of the 1.5E-11
3	microcuries per milliliter exposure for those
4	2,000 hours. All right?
5	DR. LIPSZTEIN: But that is not what
6	you generally would do for the workers that they
7	don't know what happened.
8	MR. MCCLOSKEY: For workers
9	CHAIR BEACH: So, Joyce, the question,
10	could you nobody understands your question.
11	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay.
12	CHAIR BEACH: So, for workers that you
13	don't know what they did. Is that your question?
14	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, because sometimes
15	you know exactly when the worker was maybe they
16	recall whether some data thing from March to April
17	this person was in D&D in mag-thorium. But
18	sometimes you don't know. They just say well, I
19	have cleaned the mag-thorium floor.
20	One interview, for example, says he
21	worked with mag-thorium and after that, he cleaned
22	the machine and the floors and everything. They
23	don't know for how long. Do you have all the data

1	from when the cleanup was done? Because if you
2	apply a limit of exposure to a worker, you have to
3	know for how many hours you are going to apply
4	during that year.
5	CHAIR BEACH: And how many years.
6	DR. LIPSZTEIN: So, what is the
7	criteria for the number of hours that is going to
8	be applied for each D&D worker?
9	MR. SHARFI: Well once they are put
10	into the mag-thorium worker category, then they are
11	going to get the entire exposure.
12	MR. FITZGERALD: I think what she is
13	saying, though, is if you are not an operator but
14	somebody who might have done some cleaning in the
15	context of this issue, how would you
16	MR. SHARFI: Reducing their hours.
17	MR. FITZGERALD: We are basically
18	saying that they are working 2,000 hours in the area
19	just at a reduced concentration.
20	MR. SHARFI: Right, okay.
21	CHAIR BEACH: So, that is for laborers,
22	for the
23	MR. SHARFI: I mean category

adjustments are really adjusting -- well either you can look at it they are adjusting concentration because the work is less intense or you can say they are working -- they are adjusting the hours. Concentration versus time. So, however you want to look it.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: The intake per year.

MR. DARNELL: Basically, these workers are going to have medical records and training records to back up that they were in the area. We show that they were in the area, that is going to be their airborne exposure for the year.

MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, I think this gets into just the dose reconstruction, how one approaches the claims themselves, how establish the time frames, the locations, and what work they did and trying to figure out what exposures to give them credit for. And then you would apply the values that you have in the paper.

So, the first part, though, is I think pretty standard: try and establish the worker's history, exposure history. Then, Joyce, they would apply the 1.5, which is the 50 percent of the

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three that we have been talking about. 1 Because you know one of 2 DR. LIPSZTEIN: 3 the interviews that I read, I don't know that is really Joe knows better because he interviewed the 4 person, the individual himself. He said from what 5 6 I understood from this summary, that he was, this 7 was involved in the cleanup of magnesium-thorium area and they opened 8 machines to clean it but when they entered the area 9 -- this is for the period of 1970 to 1979, okay, 10 11 was the model shop. 12 MR. FITZGERALD: Right. LIPSZTEIN: 13 DR. There were other 14 machines that were working with magnesium-thorium at a distance from other machines and that area was 15 16 only roped with a caution tape but the area was open in the middle of everything. 17 CHAIR BEACH: Yes, Joyce, I happen to 18 19 have that interview and I have it highlighted. 20 we'll remember that. But again, if I think 21 MR. FITZGERALD: 22 if that were the claim that was being submitted,

that whoever was submitting the claim would get

1	credit for the exposure potential for that area.
2	I think you always you have to establish the
3	exposure history and whether or not there was any
4	exposure, in this case, to mag-thorium before these
5	values would be applied.
6	But if the interviewee was a claimant
7	and he indicated that the machinery, you
8	established a time frame that the D&D took place
9	and then you would give them the value.
10	But I think it goes through that process
11	for every claimant.
12	MEMBER CLAWSON: Hey, Joe, this is
13	Brad. You know I am kind of sitting here listening
14	to this. I understand the point you are getting
15	at. But if you remember most of these interviews,
16	most of these people didn't even know what they were
17	working with.
18	CHAIR BEACH: Right.
19	MR. FITZGERALD: Right, that is what
20	Pete was saying.
21	MEMBER CLAWSON: They just went in and
22	cleaned stuff. And when we start talking D&D, most
23	of them didn't even understand, what do you mean

D&D time period. We have the big D&Ds back there but that was done by Rockwell and everything else. These other guys, it was just another day in the park. I mean they just went in and did what they were told.

I am kind of with Joyce a little bit here, kind of wondering how we are going to pick out these people that we are involved with here.

MR. DARNELL: Like I said earlier, Brad and Joyce, the people that were assigned to this work had medical monitoring records. They have radiological training records. And they had other requirements that they had to meet for plant operations to be able to go into radiological areas. We have got a lot of documentation that shows that was the case throughout the site's history.

So, if they self-identify, I worked on magnesium-thorium, we are going to look at their medical records and their training records. And if they were in those areas the entire time that they say they were in the areas, they're getting that concentration.

1	MR. FITZGERALD: I think Brad raises a
2	question that we have been touching on, which is
3	if somebody says they did D&D, and of course by
4	definition, decontaminate and decommission, that
5	suggests that they might have been involved in
6	something to cleaning up a machine that had
7	radiological contamination.
8	MR. DARNELL: To us it means cleaning
9	up radiological contamination.
10	MR. FITZGERALD: Right.
11	MR. DARNELL: To a site like Kansas
12	City, it could mean cleaning up anything.
13	MR. FITZGERALD: Well I think, though,
14	he is broaching the question, this gets back to
15	MR. SHARFI: I'll go farther and I will
16	just say you don't talk to the worker, he has passed
17	away, and we are talking to survivors. At that
18	point, you know nothing.
19	MR. FITZGERALD: Right.
20	MR. SHARFI: And we still do get their
21	medical monitoring information and they do
22	identify like departments and some of the cards,
23	we saw they did identify mag-thorium workers

related to that department.

So, even if there is no interview process, we can identify workers that were part of the department and those people would get it regardless, whether they said it or not.

MR. DARNELL: As a matter of fact, the records were so clear that you can see timeframes the worker was qualified to go in the Department; he was disqualified for a little while, then requalified to go back in at another time. That is how detailed some of these records are that we have seen. Now, of course, we haven't looked at every single record, so I don't know that all records are the same but we would have to go back to those records for each individual worker that makes a claim so that we can be fair to all of them to give them as much credit for the exposure that they think that they have.

MEMBER LOCKEY: Well, records are precise enough that you can say if I was a laborer, my status as a laborer, I worked in decontamination, you can tell whether it was DU or mag-thorium.

1	MR. DARNELL: Yes, it specifically
2	MR. SHARFI: Medical cards do identify
3	departments that they were part of.
4	MEMBER LOCKEY: So, you can get down to
5	that precision based on the medical records.
6	MEMBER LOCKEY: We have actually seen
7	DU qualifications. We have seen Department 20,
8	Department 22. We have seen mag-thorium
9	qualifications. We have seen model shop
10	qualifications, all of the different areas that we
11	have looked for, for radioactive material use, with
12	the exception of the tritium stuff, we have seen
13	on those cards.
14	On the bioassay portions of the medical
15	sections, we have seen tritium.
16	MEMBER CLAWSON: I'm glad to hear that
17	we have got that good of a record. So, what you
18	are telling me is that if somebody had a Department
19	20 acknowledgment on their medical card, then they
20	get dosed.
21	MR. DARNELL: They get what?
22	MR. KATZ: They get dosed.
23	MR. DARNELL: Yes, that is the way we
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have it set up.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay, I'm just trying to get a better understanding of this. Because to be right honest with you, these are some of the better records of all the other sites we have found. Usually we have found holes in it and stuff like that. When push comes to shove, this is what I have found interesting about Kansas City was that they loaned the people out; they went from one side to the other. You know they just had a labor pool there. This is what I am wanting to make sure is we are getting to the right people, that they are supposed to get this dose and that we have a ways and a means to be able to do it.

MR. DARNELL: We feel pretty strongly that we are able to get to the right people that would give them the right doses but we are still looking, too, Brad.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Oh, I understand.

I'm just -- I just want to better understand how

we are going about this because you know as well

as I do this is a difficult one because we have a

whole other group or set of people that really

aren't even working with any of this stuff. 1 MR. DARNELL: 2 Yes. 3 MEMBER CLAWSON: And I understand this. am trying to understand in my mind, 4 looking at it, what I have seen, what I have talked 5 to with people that look into the right people. 6 7 Because many of these people didn't even know what they were working with and when we asked them, they 8 9 give us this blank look. Then all of a sudden we find medical records that yes, they were set up to 10 be able to work with this. 11 12 MR. DARNELL: Yes. This is all I MEMBER CLAWSON: 13 trying to understand is how we are going to do it. 14 15 MR. DARNELL: Well, I think that you 16 can rest assured that we are taking the most conservative approach that we can to ensure that 17 we get the most people covered, giving them the 18 19 benefit of the doubt as they got the dose. 20 MEMBER CLAWSON: And I understand that 21 and I appreciate that. I am not criticizing you 22 I am just for me trying to picture how we are trying to do it. 23

1	And I think you guys are doing a great
2	job. I just am looking at pieces of this so I just
3	want to make sure that I have a full picture. I'm
4	not criticizing in any way. I am just trying to
5	understand it myself.
6	MR. DARNELL: Yes, I'm just trying to
7	make sure I answer all your questions right.
8	MEMBER VALERIO: So, my question was
9	whether or not there were training records found
10	by NIOSH which Pete touched on before I had a chance
11	to ask the question. So, I think that that
12	clarifies it in my mind that they did have some type
13	of training before entering this specific
14	building, whether it was D&D or machining or
15	whatever operation they were actually
16	MR. DARNELL: Remember, it is not
17	actually entering a specific building. It is
18	entering a specific area of a huge building.
19	MEMBER VALERIO: Okay. So, 22 is
20	within Department 20. Is that right?
21	MR. DARNELL: Yes, it was basically the
22	same area. Sometimes it was called Department 20.
23	Sometimes it was called Department 22. Sometimes

1	it was 22D, going down to the specific parts. And
2	that was an area within two areas.
3	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, and Pat has a map to
4	that. He can show you the different areas. I know
5	you weren't at the last meeting in person to see
6	that map. Or at least he had it yesterday.
7	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, I have it.
8	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
9	MR. DARNELL: Just for everybody's
10	information, in the ER on page 35 of 70, Table 6-4
11	has all the different occupation descriptions that
12	we went over and bioassay measurements for the
13	descriptions in general. So you can see even that
14	they were doing a lot of bioassay over a lot of
15	different job descriptions.
16	CHAIR BEACH: All right. Are there
17	any other questions or comments? No.
18	So, for recap, let's recap and I will
19	try to do this. Joe will step in and help me out
20	if I muck it up too much.
21	So, we are looking to apply the dose
22	through a coworker model for laborers, anyone that
23	was described as a mag-thorium worker I'm

probably not saying this quite right.

MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I think what we were saying, or what Mutty was saying is that for the waste handlers and D&D workers who handled uranium, if they didn't have individual data, which they may very well have, but they didn't have it, that you would apply the uranium coworker model for them for the appropriate years of course, for the right years.

And if it involved the mag-thorium, in terms of thorium, it would be one-half of the 3.0, which would be the 1.5, which is still very conservative. We just went through that whole discussion of how 3.0 is very, very conservative. This is very conservative.

CHAIR BEACH: Which is listed in your White Paper.

MR. DARNELL: Yes. So, I said in our response that we understood the degree of conservatism and still, we are okay with the 1.5 in this case. We were a little fuzzier on the uranium but I think we are satisfied with the use of the coworker model for those that don't have

1	individual data.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
3	MR. DARNELL: So are we going to rely
4	on coworker models for I guess Issue 17 and Issue
5	7?
6	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
7	MR. DARNELL: Both of those should be
8	transferred over to the TBD.
9	CHAIR BEACH: I think we wanted to
10	wait, hold off on that until we saw your
11	MR. FITZGERALD: The fire issue. Oh,
12	no, not the fire issue.
13	CHAIR BEACH: No, the dose
14	reconstruction examples. Yes, so I think we are
15	close but we would like to see that. So, for Issue
16	13, the mag-thorium and then the D&D and waste
17	handlers, how that is going to look as a sample.
18	MR. DARNELL: Since we have agreed on
19	the numbers and the approach, then we can do the
20	sample.
21	CHAIR BEACH: You can do the sample.
22	Okay.
23	MR. SHARFI: I guess you are going to

go back to if you want the approach for the
unmonitored if you want the example, are you
wanting me to us the current, given that we are
going to validate as part one, we are going to
be talking about validating the coworker study.
At one end as an example an ER with a coworker that
hasn't yet been relooked at or are you willing to
wait for Issue 1 to be resolved?
CHAIR BEACH: I think we need to
resolve Issue 1.
MR. SHARFI: Okay.
CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, just for
recap, so we are done with Issue 13 and 17.
Anything else we need to discuss on Issue 7 or is
that covered, I believe?
MR. DARNELL: Part and parcel of what
we just talked about.
CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, we will break
at this time for a break and then Ron should be back
with us and we will go ahead and move to Issue 11
when Ron comes back and then go back to the top at
Issue 1, so everybody is ready.
MR. KATZ: How long a break?

1	CHAIR BEACH: What have we got? Let's
2	take until 11:05 or so. A ten-minute break.
3	MR. KATZ: Ten-minute break.
4	MR. Fitzgerald: And Joyce, you don't
5	have to hang in. We are trying to take care of you
6	and Ron so you don't have to stay on the phone all
7	day.
8	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, thank you, Joe.
9	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
10	went off the record at 10:54 a.m. and resumed at
11	11:10 a.m.)
12	MR. KATZ: Okay. We are back online.
13	CHAIR BEACH: Bob, have you rejoined
14	us?
15	(No response.)
16	CHAIR BEACH: Or Bob. Excuse me, not
17	Bob. Pardon me. Ron, are you back with us?
18	(No response.)
19	MR. KATZ: Maybe not.
20	CHAIR BEACH: No, okay. So, we were
21	going to go to 11 but now we will go back up to the
22	top of the list, Issue 1.
23	MEMBER CLAWSON: I'm here, Josie.

1	CHAIR BEACH: Hi, Brad. We knew you
2	would be there.
3	MEMBER CLAWSON: Oh, yes, sure. Okay.
4	MR. KATZ: That's why we didn't ask.
5	CHAIR BEACH: We knew for sure you were
6	back. Okay, so we will just go ahead and go back
7	up to Issue 1, which is the data adequacy and
8	completeness issue. And NIOSH is prepared to talk
9	about that. We are reshuffling.
LO	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Well you keep bouncing
L1	around.
L2	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, it is just part of
L3	what I do.
L4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay, Issue 1 is linked
L5	to Issue 9. And as a reminder, what these two
L6	issues are about is so NIOSH used a database of
L7	dosimetry information provided by the Kansas City
L8	Plant to build our coworker model that is in the
L9	TBD and that the ER references.
20	And for internal and external Issues 1
21	and 9, a question came up that we should validate
22	that database to compare to something like raw
23	dosimetry records to see if it is a good database

to be used.

And so we submitted a preliminary plan to SC&A from the Board where we suggest that we will use the existing NOCTS raw data. So, whenever a claim is filed, the site sends us photocopies of dosimetry records, and we use what we have and compare that to the database.

CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so when you are talking about the database, you are talking about the DOE-supplied records and you are comparing the raw records to that database. Is that correct?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes. So, this is a printout of what you can see. The database was provided to us and it is referenced --

CHAIR BEACH: That's from DOE.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: It came right from the Kansas City Plant. Yes, the DOE. And this is a page from it. And I took away the Social Security numbers.

But the columns look like that. You have the year that that employee worked. So, this employee worked from '58 to '59. That is one employee. The next column would have been their

Social Security number.

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And then reading across, it shows the beginning date of monitoring, the ending date of monitoring for that person, separate line items. And then it has columns for deep dose, eye dose, neutron dose, shallow dose, ring dose, those are the dosimeters you wear on your fingers. it has internal for uranium only in micrograms per liter. This is something that Ron Buchanan looked at and we covered in another issue about what do all these values mean; how do we use them for DRs? But so this is what we need to validate There is over 18,000 records in It goes on. there. I only got two pages.

And so from the NOCTS raw records, if you go in NOCTS and say you pull up a claim number, I have it listed here, I won't say it, but you would find a bunch of raw records such as this one. I blacked out the Privacy Act stuff.

And what we have begun doing already, we have our data ready group, they have started compiling information for each one of these records and building a spreadsheet. This is an example of

it.

So, this employee with this record, it was entered here. And what this compilation will do, it will have the NOCTS number in the farthest column. It will have the Social Security number as well, as we are able to positively marry a record from the NOCTS files to the database with Social Security numbers in. And there are names available for the database personnel as well. So, we can get a good match there.

The next column shows you exactly where

-- I moved it over so you can't read it all now
but it shows you where in NOCTS you can find this
exact record, what page number. So, if anybody
wanted to go back and check how we entered
information from the raw record to our compilation
they can do that.

And then we have a start and stop date for the employee for that monitoring. So, this whole grayed out section at the top is one employee, all his records. Then the next one starts here and it goes all the way down to here. That is all one employee. And so the highlighted ones there are

where this data was entered for that person.

And we are copying the data from the raw records exactly how the site described it, if they described it in rads, rem, or roentgen, or X or Y, or neutron, ring doses, shallow doses, however they described it, we were capturing it exactly the way they described it.

And then once that is compiled, we will do a comparison with the data records. And so I guess SC&A had a question about what portion or percentage of sampling do you intend to do. I think we got agreement that they are using existing raw data that you have already and it seems like a good approach to validate the database but exactly how much of that will be used.

MR. FITZGERALD: That is a standard question because we have done it in the past, where we have done it very statistically based and we have done it sort of let's do 30 or 50. And that was just a clarification question, what kind of sampling were you intending to do.

MR. MCCLOSKEY: I can say that you know Dr. Lockey brought up the question in January about

a priori parameters, you know what is acceptable 1 error rate and things like that. A number of these 2 questions are being worked on in a program-wide 3 quidance for coworker modeling. 4 There is going to be next week, 5 Brad's hometown, going to have the 6 we are 7 presentation prepared in Idaho from Dr. Neton and Dr. Melius about this coworker effort. You know 8 9 so that is being worked on program-wide. It is not something you just choose for each individual site. 10 11 We feel that quidance should be somewhat universal. 12 MR. FITZGERALD: So this coworker approach will be subject to the new guidelines. 13 MR. MCCLOSKEY: Oh, absolutely. 14 15 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, so we're just 16 going to have to make sure that this is consistent. So, it kind of hard to 17 MR. MCCLOSKEY: 18 answer entirely. 19 you know we have started SO 20 compiling it and there is a lot to do. And so we are going to just down that path going after all 21 of the NOCTS records at the moment and I talk about 22 23 how many there are.

1	MR. FITZGERALD: Six hundred
2	ninety-one.
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: It's somewhere, I'm
4	sure you are right. And we are going to see where
5	that gets us.
6	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, you said in your
7	paper 691 NOCTS claims currently available.
8	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Right and I break it
9	down into external and internal.
10	CHAIR BEACH: There are 223 external.
11	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
12	MR. FITZGERALD: So the NOCTS claim
13	file has, as you were pointing out, the actual
14	source records there.
15	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, you can click on
16	the DOE supply response.
17	MR. FITZGERALD: Because in the past we
18	found that of course, we have gone back and done
19	V&V, the validation and verification was that in
20	a lot of cases, DOE never validated the electronic
21	database against the original source records and
22	the contractor never did. So, it just turned out
23	that since nobody down the chain had done it

1	CHAIR BEACH: Hang on just a sec.
2	Everybody on the phone may have lost connection.
3	MR. FITZGERALD: Oh.
4	MR. KATZ: Okay. I'm sorry this is an
5	interruption but Brad has been disconnected. And
6	you are sure you dialed the number right? Because
7	I don't know how that could be.
8	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Is everyone else
9	hearing us now?
10	CHAIR BEACH: Is there anyone on the
11	line that can hear us right now?
12	MR. BARTON: Yes, this is Bob Barton.
13	I'm still here.
14	CHAIR BEACH: Thanks, Bob.
15	MR. KATZ: Everyone else is still
16	connected, Brad. So, keep trying. Okay, bye.
17	CHAIR BEACH: Well when you said
18	everybody was disconnected
19	MR. KATZ: No, Brad is disconnected and
20	he is trying to call in and it is not working for
21	him.
22	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
23	MR. KATZ: I was worried he wouldn't be

1	able to.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Do you want us to just
3	wait a couple of minutes and let Brad get back on?
4	MR. KATZ: We're off the record.
5	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
6	went off the record at 11:20 a.m. and resumed at
7	11:21 a.m.)
8	CHAIR BEACH: Brad, are you back with
9	us?
10	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes. Yes, I am.
11	CHAIR BEACH: Thank you. Okay, so we
12	interrupted Joe. So, hopefully, Joe can go back
13	and recap where he was.
14	MR. FITZGERALD: Brad, this is for you.
15	MEMBER POSTON: Pay attention, now.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: I was saying before,
17	the reason I really focused on clarifying whether
18	the raw records were available through NOCTS is
19	that the issue we have had in the past is that for
20	some sites, the validation had not been done by
21	either the contractor supplying the electronic
22	records that were presumably transcribed from raw

and DOE had not done any QA to go back and do the

1	same thing. So, the records that were arriving for
2	NIOSH use had not been QAed all the way down. So,
3	sort of a standard of practice, unless there is some
4	documentation that that was done by either DOE or
5	the contractor would be just to do that sampling
6	to validate that the electronic version can be
7	married up to the raw record.
8	So, the clarification there was just to
9	make sure that when you said DOE-supplied records
10	for NOCTS that that included the source documents,
11	the source records. If that is the case, we are
12	fine. Then it is just a question of, as you say,
13	on a coworker, what sampling fraction that's
14	fine.
15	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, there is an
16	example of one of the source documents.
17	MR. FITZGERALD: Right. It wasn't a
18	second generation. The record was actually source
19	records that were included. So, we are fine with
20	that.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: All right.
22	MR. FITZGERALD: So, we will wait for
23	the guidelines that would be applied for the

1	coworker model for KCP as well as the other sites.
2	That is something we can wait for. That is still
3	in process.
4	CHAIR BEACH: Yes. All right.
5	Anything else, Pat?
6	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I was just going to say
7	that is on the agenda for next Thursday and Brad's
8	time is at 9:30 in the morning.
9	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
10	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes.
11	CHAIR BEACH: All right, I'm just
12	making a quick note.
13	Any other comments or questions on this
14	issue?
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: No, I appreciate you
16	allowing me to hear it again.
17	MR. FITZGERALD: Just for you.
18	CHAIR BEACH: Anything for you, Brad.
19	You know that.
20	MEMBER CLAWSON: Thank you.
21	MEMBER LOCKEY: I take option. I'm
22	not sure about that, Brad.
23	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.

1	MR. FITZGERALD: We have a naysayer.
2	CHAIR BEACH: All right, anybody in the
3	room, Work Group Members, questions or comments on
4	this? Everybody is
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: That is two issues
6	right there.
7	CHAIR BEACH: That is 9 and 1 and 9.
8	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Is Ron back with us?
9	CHAIR BEACH: And Ron, are you back
10	with us? Ron Buchanan.
11	DR. BUCHANAN: Yes, I just came back.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Perfect timing.
13	CHAIR BEACH: Wonderful. We are going
14	to go ahead and start with your issue, if you are
15	ready, Issue 11.
16	DR. BUCHANAN: Okay. This is Ron
17	Buchanan of SC&A. And this is an issue that we have
18	covered in the past and that was the neutrons at
19	Kansas City Plant. And, obviously, there wasn't
20	a lot of neutron exposure but there was some
21	radiation-generating 14-MeV neutron generators
22	and a few of the solid state UV sources and such.
23	And so they did have NTA film monitoring

there and we investigated whether it was able to detect the doses potentially received. And we originally objected to using the method that NIOSH suggested. And they went back and looked at it and said yes, okay, we agree. And so they came back with a plausible method.

And there was monitoring and consisted of the monitoring at Kansas City. They had over 2,000 neutron badges read and only a few of them, about 34 or 35 of them had any positive dose and most of them were less than 0.1 rem. was only three greater than 0.1 rem. And so they used a favorable method by looking at the 95th percentile of that and that came out to .154 rem per year and they will assign that to workers that were potentially exposed to neutrons at Kansas City Plant. So, agreed that that is а we claimant-favorable method and that we suggested that the issue has been addressed and that the Board consider closing that issue.

CHAIR BEACH: Okay, thank you, Ron.

And everybody should have got the memo dated April

21, 2015 with Ron's write-up on this issue.

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1	Questions for Ron from the Work Group
2	Members? And this was written up 11 and 12; 12 was
3	actually closed at the January 20th meeting.
4	Hearing no questions, NIOSH, you are in
5	agreement, I assume?
6	MR. DARNELL: Reluctantly so.
7	CHAIR BEACH: Reluctantly, okay. So,
8	at the advice of SC&A and no questions, I would say
9	that we should go ahead and close Issue 11, based
10	on the report from SC&A. Is everybody in agreement
11	with that? Heads shaking yes.
12	MEMBER CLAWSON: This Brad, yes.
13	CHAIR BEACH: Brad, thank you. So,
14	Issue 11 is now closed. That was easy. Thank you,
15	Ron.
16	DR. BUCHANAN: Okay.
17	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so just kind of a
18	recap. So, Issue 2 is a TBD issue. Issue 3, the
19	last meeting we closed 4, 5, 6, 8. Issue 10 is a
20	TBD. Issue 11 we have now closed. Issue 12 was
21	closed at the last meeting. Issue 14 and 19 were
22	also both closed at the last meeting.
23	That brings us to Issue 15. And we have

already discussed 13. So, this is the thorium oxide.

MR. FITZGERALD: This is the thorium oxide and this is the infamous NMMSS issue. When I looked at the classified database, it had two listings for thorium, alloyed and unalloyed. And so the effort was trying to figure out if the unalloyed -- the alloyed was clear. That mag-thorium. But the unalloyed, that was suggestive of possibly thorium oxide beyond the site, even though the documentation suggested otherwise.

So, a lot of it was just simply trying to find some information on-site that would explain why NMMSS seemed to have two listings that way. And it took a while. But actually in the end, in the March on-site visit, we came across the precursor documentation, the documentation that was used to compile the NMMSS, which is actually kind of what I was looking for.

And very clearly, in that documentation, what they had done at Kansas City is done two calculations. They certainly had the

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1	estimate for the mag-thorium. They went ahead and
2	calculated how much actual pure thorium that would
3	represent and they submitted both values to DOE,
4	which as you can imagine, would be a source of some
5	confusion because that is actually listed. Both
6	are listed in NMMSS. So, anyone looking at that
7	would think there was more thorium than there
8	actually was. So, it was double-bookkeeping in a
9	sense, but that explains why there was two listings
10	for alloyed and non-alloyed. The non-alloyed is
11	just simply an estimate that was done to come up
12	with what that represented in terms of pure
13	thorium.
14	MR. MCCLOSKEY: And the years marry up
15	perfectly.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, so I went back
17	and took some values that Kansas City provided me
18	and compared that by year with what was in NMMSS
19	and it matched up pretty exactly. So, that issue
20	went away but for a while it just seemed like a loose
21	end because it certainly suggested there was
22	something in the way of an alloyed thorium.

So, that is one and the same. So, I

1	would recommend the Work Group close that.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, any comments or
3	questions on that issue? That was the final thing
4	that we needed to work out regarding that issue.
5	So, I would recommend that the Work
6	Group take SC&A's advice and close Issue 15. Any
7	questions? Does everybody agree?
8	Brad?
9	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
10	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so Issue 15 we are
11	closing.
12	Okay, Issue 16 was an issue, if you
13	recall, that we discussed at the January 20th
14	meeting. SC&A, at that time, recommended closure.
15	NIOSH agreed with that. However, the Work Group
16	was not quite ready to let go of that issue. We
17	were looking for validation on the proposed
18	application of TBD-6000. We asked for some maps
19	so that we could validate the different areas where
20	rad work was being done at the site. Those maps
21	were delivered to us in March.
22	So, really, this is a Work Group
23	discussion on where you want to go with this issue.

1	We do have recommendation for closure.
2	So, I'm looking to the Work Group for
3	discussion. Brad, do you have any other issues?
4	MEMBER CLAWSON: No, I don't, Josie.
5	I think we've about run this to ground.
6	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, I agree with that.
7	How about other questions or comments, Work Group
8	Members?
9	So, we are in agreement with closing.
10	Okay, so we are closing Issue 16 as well.
11	Okay, so, that brings us to Issue 18.
12	And this was another issue. We were looking for
13	other incidents. There is quite a history on this
14	one. I am going to let Joe speak to it, if he
15	doesn't mind.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: No.
17	CHAIR BEACH: We are looking for
18	incidents. Our March visit was one that we used
19	quite a bit of time looking for incidents at the
20	plant. And Joe, I will let you
21	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, this issue came
22	from our reviewing the ER. And there were two
23	admittedly major incidents, the promethium and

what was the other one? 1 Erbium tritide. MR. SHARFI: 2 3 MR. FITZGERALD: Erbium tritide, Those were the two that were cited in the right. 4 ER. 5 And our reservation at the time was we 6 7 felt that, given the lengthy history of the plant that that seemed to be a short list of what may have 8 been a longer list of what radiological incidents 9 10 they had at the plant. 11 And so in the ensuing year or two, we 12 wanted to shake the tree to see if there were other records of radiological incidents taking place. 13 And iteratively, I think we have added NIOSH and 14 15 certainly we have added through research, a number 16 of files that contain more incidents but they still stand as the two major ones. That hasn't changed. 17 And there certainly is a better record, I think, 18 19 of other incidents. 20 maybe overlooking Our concern of something of substance that would contribute to the 21 22 understanding of the plant, I think what we were

able to validate was, no, there wasn't a large

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history of contaminations and whatnot that would give one pause about the ER's premise. And so, I think we are satisfied.

I wanted to look at the classified files as well, make sure there was nothing in there, which I did in Germantown I guess back in May. So, I didn't see anything else that would add to that, make a difference, in other words.

So, I think, what I would say to the Work Group is I think the documentation on incidents is much better than it might have been a year or two ago and we are pretty satisfied that is about as complete as one can get at this point.

We were kind of hopeful that we would find more weekly activity reports. For a while there was a glimmer of hope that we found a couple years and there would be a whole history of these weekly activity reports. It turned out we only found I think four years' or so worth.

But even in those four or five years' worth, there was a pretty rich documentation of what was going on week to week in terms of even small minor incidents: fires, what have you. Nothing

that were really significant or eye-catching radiological incidents.

So, I think the group, collectively, had worked pretty hard to make sure that there wasn't anything that was unreported, undocumented, that would be of benefit to the ER. And I think we can report today that we have not found anything substantial. I think the record is better but nothing substantial that would change anything. So, that is kind of where we are at.

And we also spent a great deal of time talking to workers as well as to the petitioners, just trying to unpack anything that would represent an overlooked event, incident, what have you. We heard a little bit of this yesterday that we are pretty confident that there isn't anything like that that has been overlooked. That's where we are.

CHAIR BEACH: Okay. There was also one issue that I was -- I know NIOSH ran it down -- a petitioner issue. NIOSH ran it down. I ran it down, trying to find some extra information about a source that was uncovered and we didn't get

1	anywhere with that either.
2	So, I am going to agree that we can close
3	Issue 20 or excuse me, 18.
4	Brad, any comments or concerns on that
5	recommendation?
6	MEMBER CLAWSON: No, we have done all
7	we can. We have tried to address it. I feel good
8	about it.
9	CHAIR BEACH: Other Work Group
10	Members?
11	MEMBER VALERIO: I think we can close
12	it.
13	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, we will go
14	ahead and close 18 as well.
15	So, our last issue is the tritium and
16	nickel. Let's go ahead and go through.
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, I think I can do
18	it, unless
19	CHAIR BEACH: It is Issue 20. It is
20	the tritium and nickel. The last White Paper on
21	it was the May 7th NIOSH's update answering SC&A's
22	
23	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay, I will read

SC&A's review -- I mean summary first.

MR. FITZGERALD: Summary of your summary?

MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes. So, in Rev 01 to its paper, these are from SC&A's memo, tritium nickel-63 at Kansas City Plant -- May 7, 2015 is the date of that White Paper. NIOSH has added more details regarding the operational history of tritium use at Kansas City Plant and has added a last page that identifies an upper-bound dose estimation in millirem per year for each identified tritium and nickel-63 operation at Kansas City Plant.

And SC&A's staff's comments on that paper are, while the more specific treatment of bounding doses for each operation is helpful, NIOSH does not explain how that dose will be used in dose reconstruction, i.e., to whom it would be applied, parenthetical, only workers identified as handling tritium, all workers from certain parts of the Kansas City Plant, for example, laboratory, or all workers at Kansas City Plant during those specific timeframes. So, that is their question.

A teleconference was held on June 29, 1 2015 to clarify possible avenues to performing 2 3 sample ERs to validate that these bounding doses can be applied to a defined worker category. 4 nickel-63, SC&A 5 For concurs with NIOSH's bounding analysis showing no external 6 7 exposure potential and a bounding annual dose of 0.02 millirem per year, which the Work Group may 8 9 consider negligible exposure. 10 So, that is SC&A's position or comments 11 at the moment. 12 So, our response would be that the White SC&A referenced describes 13 Paper that 14 scenarios, the high-low switchplate and tritium 15 monitor operations. NIOSH can use those scenarios 16 to bound tritium exposures. NIOSH can assign these doses to all claims submitted as follows. 17 And these dates are in that White Paper, the dates 18 19 that those exposure scenarios or bounding 20 scenarios are applicable to. From January 1, 1959 through December 21 22 31, 1975, all claims submitted should be given 6.66 23 millirem per year. And from January 1,

1	through December 31, 1968, all claims submitted
2	will be assigned 1.77 millirem per year.
3	There is some overlap there. And for
4	those years that overlap, which are 1963 to 1968,
5	NIOSH will add the doses and assign 8.43 millirem
6	per year.
7	MR. FITZGERALD: That's all workers,
8	all claims.
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: All claims. It is
10	such a small amount, the highest it gets is 8.43
11	millirem per year, if you use that bounding method
12	that we have already presented.
13	MEMBER POSTON: Why do they quote so
14	many figures? My God, the 8 millirem is probably
15	the right estimate.
16	MR. MCCLOSKEY: That's me. That's my
17	fault. That is the way it was calculated in the
18	paper. The significant figures is what you are
19	saying.
20	MEMBER POSTON: Yes, it is an estimate.
21	You have a model. All models are wrong, some are
22	useful, you know.
23	MR. FITZGERALD: Just going back on the

1	timeframes. I know there was some ambiguity about
2	the tritium bottling at the time. I don't recall,
3	was that nailed down a little better as far as what
4	time periods would be recognized as the tritium
5	bottling time periods?
6	Because I know that we had originally
7	found that in the weekly activity reports but the
8	term during which that was done wasn't clear at that
9	time.
10	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, it even is a
11	little fuzzy. You know we say I should just open
12	up and tell you what we say. It is in the White
13	Paper, those dates.
14	MR. FITZGERALD: I know I was just
15	trying to find it.
16	CHAIR BEACH: The dates that they
17	ordered the stuff
18	MR. MCCLOSKEY: And I will direct you
19	to the dates that I have used to establish that
20	here.
21	CHAIR BEACH: So, I think it began in
22	1959 on page 10. Is that it?
23	MR. MCCLOSKEY: So, on page eight,

1	first paragraph, you can see that, based on the
2	period during which it is known that switchplates
3	were used, NIOSH assumes the tritium exposures
4	occurred continuously between 1963 and 1968. So,
5	that is the high-low switchplate scenario. That
6	is the second one I listed there.
7	I started at January 1, 1963 and went
8	to December 31, 1968. And so you can see defense
9	of that date earlier in here. But what I was about
10	to say is I rounded out, I think we rounded out to
11	January first and December 31st there to capture
12	those entire years.
13	And then for the other scenario, the
14	longer one
15	MR. FITZGERALD: The tritium bottling?
16	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes you can find the
17	source of my dates on page 12 of the White Paper,
18	second paragraph, closing statement.
19	To ensure claimant-favorability, it is
20	assumed that some part of the decanting operations
21	occurred in Kansas City Plant's Chemistry Lab every
22	workday beginning in 1959 and ending in 1975.
23	MR. FITZGERALD: So, it would be

1	January 1, 1979 or '59?
2	CHAIR BEACH: 1959.
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, January 1, '59 and
4	December 31, 75.
5	MR. FITZGERALD: For the
6	CHAIR BEACH: Bottling.
7	MR. FITZGERALD: And the '75 end date
8	was based on?
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay, let's go through
10	how we got that. Bear with me, Joe. I will get
11	us there.
12	MR. DARNELL: I'm just trying to find
13	the basis for 1975.
14	CHAIR BEACH: Right.
15	MR. FITZGERALD: That was a question we
16	had for a long time because we knew it began in the
17	early '60s, if not earlier but the end date was
18	unclear at the time.
19	CHAIR BEACH: Wasn't it based on when
20	the items were purchased? I thought I read that.
21	MR. DARNELL: I brought it up
22	electronically. There is only one mention of 1975
23	on page 10 and one more on page 12.

1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
2	MR. DARNELL: Sorry, I guess we didn't
3	put it in here. Was it an earlier iteration,
4	maybe?
5	MR. FITZGERALD: I think the only
6	reference I recall now, it is written here on page
7	11, is that the market for those tritium counter
8	instruments presumably ended by the early '70s,
9	when liquid scintillation counters became widely
10	available. That was the rationale for why you
11	wouldn't certainly be putting these kits together
12	anymore but maybe '75 was just a conservative
13	endpoint based on that.
14	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I'm not sure yet, Joe.
15	MR. FITZGERALD: Okay.
16	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I thought we had a
17	better basis than that.
18	And I didn't know that was '75 was
19	one of your sticking points.
20	MR. FITZGERALD: Not a sticking point.
21	I think we were just looking for some hard edges
22	on the dose reconstruction implementation.
23	That's all.

1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay.
2	MR. DARNELL: It could have been in the
3	previous paper. In the January paper, it talks
4	about scintillation counters coming in.
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, newer technology
6	has arrived and we back away from this technology.
7	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, is that a question
8	you want to come back to then
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I suppose.
10	CHAIR BEACH: on why the end date was
11	
12	MR. FITZGERALD: It is sort of part and
13	parcel of the dose reconstruction limitation and
14	so it fits with everything else that you are coming
15	back with. I think it is just a detail but since
16	that was such a question mark early on, because we
17	just had no idea how long they were doing this would
18	be of interest, I think.
19	MR. DARNELL: Considering that we have
20	not found that date any of the records, none of our
21	keyword searches have been helpful in doing that.
22	I think it might be of benefit just to come to a
23	consensus.

1	We know that in the early 1970s, the
2	technology changed. We have picked 1975 for some
3	reason. Right now we don't know what it is but it
4	stands to reason that we have exhausted the
5	possibility of finding it in the record. And what
6	we need to do is come up with a consensus as to what
7	is reasonable for a site for dose reconstruction
8	purposes. That is a suggestion.
9	CHAIR BEACH: Right. And then did we
10	determine who it was going to be applied to?
11	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Everybody.
12	CHAIR BEACH: So, everybody, because
13	we can't pin down that it was just I know we
14	talked about just lab techs but we couldn't pin down
15	that it was just and it is such a small dose.
16	Yes, I understand.
17	MR. DARNELL: It is a lot easier just
18	to
19	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, the last amount was
20	purchased in 1970. Okay, so we will come back to
21	that.
22	There is still the sample dose
23	reconstruction that you are going to do for this,

1	so that question can be answered.
2	MR. DARNELL: You don't want to try to
3	come to a consensus as a Work Group?
4	CHAIR BEACH: For?
5	MR. DARNELL: An end date.
6	MR. SHARFI: I would agree with Joe. I
7	think, in fact, that '75 would cover all the early
8	'70s.
9	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, I am okay with the
10	'75. I think he was just wanting to know what
11	brought you to that point.
12	MR. FITZGERALD: I think the basis of
13	liquid scintillation counters going out or
14	coming into vogue explains it. I don't have a
15	problem with it.
16	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, just curious, more.
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Oh, I know. I wish I
18	could land on something right now.
19	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
20	MR. FITZGERALD: Given the amount of
21	dose involved, it may not be worth it. It is up
22	to the Work Group, obviously.
23	MR. DARNELL: If I'm allowed to make a

1	motion, I will make a motion.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
3	MR. DARNELL: You said 1975 is the end
4	date. Move on.
5	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so any questions on
6	NIOSH's White Paper from the Work Group? Brad,
7	since you are on the phone, I will ask you.
8	MEMBER CLAWSON: No, not at that this
9	time.
LO	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, the rest of the
L1	Work Group Members, are you comfortable with that
L2	end date? Yes, I am comfortable with that as well.
L3	This one, I am going to not close again
L4	because we are looking at the dose reconstructions
L5	that we had talked about.
L6	MR. DARNELL: So, in our example dose
L7	reconstruction, everybody gets a tritium dose to
L8	December 31, '75.
L9	MR. SHARFI: Yes, it just gets rolled
20	into the environmental and TBD gets to determine.
21	CHAIR BEACH: Right. Okay,
22	comfortable with that?
23	MR. SHARFI: Yes.

1	CHAIR BEACH: All right, so everybody
2	okay to move on to the Nickel-63?
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I suppose. I think we
4	said that is negligible on the exposure.
5	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
6	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We said it is, they
7	said it is. I can say that number again if anyone
8	wants.
9	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, as two
10	hundredths of a milligram, I think we can safely
11	say that is negligible.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
13	CHAIR BEACH: The nickel?
14	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, 0.02 millirem per
15	year.
16	CHAIR BEACH: So, for closure, let's
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: It wasn't its own
18	separate issue.
19	MR. FITZGERALD: It was linked to the
20	high-low plate.
21	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, it was. I think we
22	just lost part of our Work Group Members.
23	MR. KATZ: You can go ahead and talk

1	over them.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. Yes, so, I will.
3	So, we are saying this is a negligible
4	dose and nothing more to say on the nickel-63.
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I mean we have a paper
6	there. We've run it down, we presented it to you
7	guys.
8	MR. FITZGERALD: We reviewed the
9	analysis and don't have any problems with the
10	analysis.
11	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so questions or
12	comments from the work Group? Are you comfortable
13	with what was written and reported?
14	Okay, so we can close that portion of
15	the issue. Correct? It is not a separate issue,
16	so it is not a separate
17	All right, so we are done talking about
18	nickel-63, then. Correct?
19	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
20	CHAIR BEACH: All right, so that ends
21	our topics for discussion also.
22	Action items are pretty clear. Just
23	the Issue 13, just tracking down that mag-thorium

1	was not used based on the SRDB for the year '64.
2	Did I miss any other actions?
3	MR. FITZGERALD: That is the one I had
4	down.
5	CHAIR BEACH: That's the one I had,
6	too. And, okay. And then the example DRs,
7	correct.
8	All right, good work.
9	MR. KATZ: Very good work.
10	CHAIR BEACH: Very good work and very
11	efficient.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We got a lot
13	accomplished.
14	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, we did.
15	MR. MCCLOSKEY: It will be interest to
16	see if Brad thinks it was good work.
17	CHAIR BEACH: Brad?
18	MR. KATZ: Brad, did you hear that?
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: What's that? I
20	didn't hear that.
21	CHAIR BEACH: Pat is concerned that you
22	think that this was good work and are ready to move
23	on to

1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Bigger and better
2	things.
3	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so no other
4	comments. I am going to go ahead and close the
5	meeting at this time. Thank you, everyone, for all
6	your hard work and attendance.
7	MR. KATZ: Have a good day.
8	CHAIR BEACH: Have a great day.
9	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
10	went off the record at 11:53 a.m.)
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