U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION WORKER HEALTH

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KANSAS CITY PLANT WORK GROUP

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THURSDAY
JULY 16, 2015

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The Work Group convened in the Hampton Inn Cincinnati Airport-North, 755 Petersburg Road, Hebron, Kentucky, at 1:30 p.m. Eastern Time, Josie Beach, Chair, presiding.

PRESENT:

JOSIE BEACH, Chair BRADLEY P. CLAWSON, Member* JAMES E. LOCKEY, Member JOHN POSTON, Member LORETTA R. VALERIO, Member

ALSO PRESENT:

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official BOB BARTON, SC&A*
RON BUCHANAN, SC&A*
GRADY CALHOUN, DCAS*
PETE DARNELL, DCAS
JOE FITZGERALD, SC&A
ROSE GOGLIOTTI, SC&A*
WAYNE KNOX
PAT MCCLOSKEY, ORAU Team

A-G-E-N-D-A

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1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

Welcome and Roll Call
Discussion: Petitioner's Issues with Responses from NIOSH, SC&A and Work Group Members
Adjourn

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1:38 p.m.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

1	MR. KATZ: Good afternoon, everyone in
2	the room and on the line. This is the Advisory
3	Board on Radiation Worker Health. It's the Kansas
4	City Plant Work Group.
5	And we are getting ready for a two-day
6	meeting beginning now.
7	For folks on the phone the agenda for
8	the meeting and materials that are going to be
9	discussed mostly tomorrow are posted on the NIOSH
10	website under the Board section under meetings,
11	today's date.
12	So you can go there, click on that date
13	and you'll find the agenda and other materials.
14	And you can follow along with the meeting that way.
15	Let's get started with roll call. And
16	since we're speaking about a specific site please
17	speak to conflict of interest while we're at it for
18	agency-related officials.
19	And let's begin with Board Members with
20	the Chair.
21	(Roll Call)
22	MR. KATZ: Very good. Okay, then
23	folks on the phone, please keep your phones muted

1	except when you're addressing the group just for
2	audio quality.
3	And if you don't have a mute button *6
4	to mute your phone, *6 to take it off of mute.
5	And Josie, it's your agenda.
6	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. Thank you, Ted.
7	Like Ted said, the agenda is posted.
8	Today we try to start at 1:30 with no end time
9	listed.
10	So I'm going to ask up front does
11	anybody have a time that they have to be finished
12	today? Is there anybody that okay.
13	I don't suspect we'll go longer than 5,
14	but if we run a little late I wanted to make sure.
15	The meeting in January, the last time
16	the Work Group got together, January 20, we ran
17	short of time. Mostly my fault. I had a flight
18	to catch.
19	And the petitioners didn't really have
20	a chance to discuss their issues.
21	Wayne Knox had given us a one-page list
22	of issues that we were going to address at that
23	meeting and were unable to.

1	So I decided at that time and we
2	discussed it then and at the March meeting, the
3	Advisory Board meeting in Idaho last March, that
4	we would have a day for the petitioners to meet.
5	So, the only topic today will be
6	petitioners' issues. We'll discuss them, try to
7	come to some closure on them. If we can't it will
8	give us something to work on for our next meeting.
9	[Identifying information redacted],
10	I'm going to ask again are you on the line?
11	(No response)
12	CHAIR BEACH: I know [identifying
13	information redacted] had some issues. If he
14	doesn't join us I'll go over those after Wayne has
15	a chance to go through his.
16	So, did anybody else have any comments?
17	Wayne, I'm going to turn the floor over
18	to you.
19	MR. KNOX: Well, thank you.
20	CHAIR BEACH: You're welcome.
21	MR. KNOX: I'm going to state at the
22	offset I was not aware that I was going to be front
23	and center on this issue.

1	In the past I have not been permitted
2	to speak up as a health physicist with experience
3	concerning the issues.
4	And I received a copy of the agenda
5	which says petitioners' issues with responses from
6	NIOSH.
7	And it meant that business as usual.
8	We were not expecting you to say anything.
9	But now I understand I am supposed to
LO	be the central figure in this discussion. So it
L1	might be a little choppy.
L2	CHAIR BEACH: So, Wayne, let me say I
L3	don't want you to feel like you're on the spot.
L4	But I know that you needed time to go
L5	through issues, and I wanted to make sure you had
L6	that opportunity.
L7	So, don't feel like you're on the spot,
L8	or you have I mean, if you want to start with
L9	the list you gave us and let us go through that.
20	I know SC&A prepared some responses,
21	not written, just verbal. We can go through those
22	to start with.
23	I know you have another form you gave

1	us that none of us have had a chance to read.
2	But if you can stick to topics on Kansas
3	City that would be very helpful. And then we can
4	try and work through that and see if we can come
5	to some resolution I'm hoping, or not in some cases.
6	MR. KNOX: That's fine. First of all
7	
8	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Excuse me. Dr.
9	Lockey, do you have that login information?
10	Sorry.
11	MR. KATZ: Go ahead, Wayne.
12	MR. KNOX: First of all, I do not think
13	people have an understanding of what happened in
14	the good old days.
15	These large contractors were provided
16	a hold harmless indemnification for establishing
17	the nuclear weapons program.
18	But they used the cover of that hold
19	harmless indemnification and all of the government
20	facilities and workers in order to develop other
21	applications of radiation and radioactive
22	materials.
23	That included propulsion systems,

medicine, and many other industrial 1 nuclear 2 applications. And Bendix was one of the key players 3 in discovering new applications and different 4 5 applications for radiation and radioactive material. 6 7 They were a member of this large committee of companies. 8 They used every resource available from 9 10 the government under the cover of the Atomic Energy 11 Act for corporate profits and developing all of these technologies. 12 So, the facility that we are dealing 13 14 with, and you said stick with the facility. The Kansas City Plant was not designed, 15 staffed, sited for performing hazardous work with 16 radioactive material. 17 18 It was located in the city of Kansas There was a daycare center right by it. 19 City. 20 they had no provisions for surveying in and out of the facility. 21 22 They had two cafeterias and people 23 walked between each one of these cafeterias.

1	Now, the people from the GSA side were
2	not permitted to go to the cafeteria on the
3	contaminated side of the building.
4	However, the contaminated people were
5	allowed to go into the other cafeteria, the GSA
6	cafeteria, without any surveys.
7	The question is have you seen any kind
8	of exit surveys in that facility.
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: You're talking about
LO	like a person who was working with radioactive
L1	material and then would need to survey out of the
L2	area to go to lunch sort of thing?
L3	MR. KNOX: Yes.
L4	CHAIR BEACH: Can you tell us time
L5	period-specific that you're talking about for this
L6	incident?
L7	MR. KNOX: It was a continuum.
L8	CHAIR BEACH: Can you give me time
L9	periods? Like from '63 to?
20	MR. KNOX: From 1949 until. I don't
21	know if they are doing it today. I don't know.
22	And that's what I would expect you to
23	have done is to get the exit surveys and determine

1	that.
2	So, did you get any exit surveys?
3	CHAIR BEACH: So, that would be a
4	question for NIOSH.
5	MR. KNOX: Yes.
6	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I'm trying to think
7	here now. We did routine contamination surveys
8	during our period of radiological work, our
9	greatest period of radiological work which has been
10	the DU machine from '58 until '71.
11	And so we have routine contamination
12	surveys of areas, not people.
13	Typically when people survey
14	themselves out of an area those are not documented.
15	The only documented indications of
16	I'm sorry.
17	MR. KNOX: The question is did they
18	have provisions for exit surveys.
19	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Procedures and
20	MR. KNOX: And equipment.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes. They had
22	provisions for that. But I'm not prepared to
23	I don't have that information in front of me. I

1	didn't know this was something we were going to talk
2	about today. I'm sorry.
3	CHAIR BEACH: So you'll make note of
4	that? I'm making note of it as well.
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I'm going to go look
6	and see what I can get for you procedure-wise.
7	MR. KNOX: And while we're on that
8	subject, what about equipment sales?
9	They sold equipment. And we did it at
10	Hanford. And we did it all around these
11	facilities. We sold equipment in public sales.
12	Were those pieces of equipment
13	surveyed? Do you have surveys of the equipment
14	that was sold to businesses and the public?
15	And I understand in talking to the GSA
16	people they went into the other side of the building
17	and brought contaminated equipment out of that
18	building to be sold to the public.
19	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We have examples of
20	machinery, like lathes and mills and things like
21	that being decontaminated.
22	MR. KNOX: And you have
23	decontamination records?

1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes. Yes.
2	MR. KNOX: And the survey okay.
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, we have some of
4	those records.
5	MR. KNOX: Okay.
6	MR. MCCLOSKEY: That's actually one of
7	our issues that we've been talking about most
8	recently. We call it our lower capital D&D efforts
9	of areas and equipment.
10	MR. KNOX: Okay.
11	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Informal cleanups.
12	CHAIR BEACH: So what will satisfy you
13	on that? Knowing that NIOSH has them? Or is there
14	something more specific you're looking for in
15	regards to those records?
16	MR. KNOX: I'm looking for any time we
17	performed a survey, a release survey on the
18	equipment with the name of the person who did it
19	and the contamination levels. And there were
20	limits that we had.
21	And most of that equipment that we had
22	was not worth decontaminating because it was
23	difficult to survey.

1	If you look at a piece of equipment and
2	you try to survey, you can't get into all of these
3	crevices. You just can't.
4	CHAIR BEACH: Sometimes it just gets
5	thrown away.
6	So what are you looking for then in
7	regards to those records?
8	MR. KNOX: What I'm looking for are
9	release surveys.
LO	CHAIR BEACH: So you want copies of
L1	release surveys?
L2	MR. KNOX: A copy of the release
L3	surveys.
L4	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. And I don't know
L5	if we can how does that work, Ted? I'll have
L6	to
L7	MR. KATZ: Well, I mean, with any DOE
L8	records, whether they can be released to the public
L9	is a DOE question, not a NIOSH question.
20	CHAIR BEACH: Right.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Here's an example of
22	something maybe that this speaks to our issues
23	that we'll probably be talking about tomorrow.

1	It's a letter that the subject is
2	"Cleaning of Equipment Contaminated with Beryllium
3	or Radioactive Material."
4	And so, one of the people that we
5	interviewed in March at the site talked about an
6	episode where he was involved with this sort of a
7	decon of equipment. So I pulled this out to talk
8	to that tomorrow.
9	But here's an example of and you can
10	take a look at this when we have a break or
11	something.
12	MR. KNOX: Okay.
13	MR. MCCLOSKEY: But it talks about the
14	wet cleaning methods they used for machines.
15	And here's the decon levels that they
16	had to achieve to release the equipment.
17	So. I mean, I didn't know we were going
18	to talk about this now.
19	MR. KNOX: But I'd like to get into the
20	nitty-gritty of it. Show me the release surveys.
21	MR. KATZ: Well, so I think you'll have
22	to FOIA DOE to get those surveys.
23	Because even if NIOSH has some of those

1	in its records it will have to the way FOIA works
2	it has to go to the sort of owning agency to deal
3	with FOIA requests.
4	And that would certainly fall within
5	the basket of what's covered by FOIA, the agency
6	records like that.
7	MR. KNOX: Now that we are on the
8	facility that Kansas City Plant has a huge
9	building. I think it's 3 million square feet in
10	the main building.
11	CHAIR BEACH: The old building.
12	MR. KNOX: Yes. And that was
13	primarily where the contaminated work was done.
14	Part of it was GSA. The other part was
15	the Kansas City Plant.
16	But the Kansas City Plant was not
17	maintained only by the Kansas City Plant people.
18	It was maintained by GSA people.
19	GSA people went into the Kansas City
20	Plant side of the building.
21	Now, keep in mind this is one huge
22	building. The same common ventilation system.
23	CHAIR BEACH: We've toured it, empty,

1	just recently. So we're aware of the contaminated
2	where they've had contaminated areas. We're
3	aware of what the ventilation looked like in those
4	areas. So we were able to do that.
5	MR. KNOX: But the GSA people went in
6	and out of that facility to do maintenance work on
7	contaminated equipment.
8	CHAIR BEACH: But you're also aware
9	that we can't you're looking for GSA people to
10	be within this Class designation, is that correct?
11	Because we don't make those
12	determinations. That's DOL.
13	So while you're saying they went in and
14	worked maintenance it's nothing we can do here, is
15	that correct?
16	MR. KNOX: The regulation says a
17	contractor. GSA was a contractor to the Kansas
18	City Plant.
19	I have listed here the memorandum of
20	understanding. They were actually paid, that is,
21	the Kansas City Plant actually transferred cash to
22	GSA for those workers going over there doing it.
23	So, in principle GSA was a contractor.

1	MR. KATZ: Wayne, I understand what
2	you're saying, and it's perfectly sensible, but
3	legally they're not contractors. They're federal
4	employees.
5	It doesn't work that way. It's just
6	legally it's not correct that they're contractors
7	to DOE.
8	And for that reason I think DOL is not
9	covering GSA employees at the Kansas City Plant.
10	MR. KNOX: But they were exposed during
11	the performance of duty.
12	MR. KATZ: No one's arguing no one's
13	arguing with that.
14	MR. KNOX: Based upon the statutory law
15	it covers exposures during the performance of duty.
16	It covers the
17	MR. KATZ: Of DOE employees and their
18	contractors. And GSA employees are not
19	contractors.
20	MR. KNOX: Why not?
21	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so, here's the
22	deal.
23	We can't solve it here. We can't

1	change the designation.
2	So, to argue or talk about it here
3	wastes some of your time for other things.
4	MR. KNOX: Okay.
5	CHAIR BEACH: That's something you'll
6	have to take up with
7	MR. KATZ: Well, you can discuss it
8	with DOL. But I mean, they can't change the law
9	either.
10	It's statutory.
11	(Simultaneous speaking)
12	MR. KNOX: So these people were
13	exposed. They have as many cancers. They have
14	chronic beryllium disease the same as the people
15	in the same building now.
16	MR. KATZ: We understand.
17	CHAIR BEACH: We understand.
18	MR. KNOX: And yet
19	CHAIR BEACH: Our hands are tied. We
20	can't change the law. So, we understand, but we
21	can't there's nothing we can do about it here.
22	MR. KNOX: Okay.
23	MEMBER LOCKEY: It has to be through an

1	act of Congress.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Is there anything on this
3	list that I gave you a copy of that you wanted to
4	try to get through today? Or some of these you've
5	already come to closure on?
6	MEMBER LOCKEY: Can I ask a question?
7	The exit surveys, what how does that apply?
8	Does that apply to GSA? The exit survey is in
9	relationship to GSA issues?
LO	MR. KNOX: It applies not just to GSA,
L1	it applies to the workers.
L2	MEMBER LOCKEY: Okay.
L3	MR. KNOX: They were not allowed to
L4	change clothes. They took all these clothes to the
L5	cafeteria, home.
L6	So in principle they were exposed not
L7	just at work. They were exposed when they went
L8	home. Contamination was tracked home.
L9	And some of the surveys show that, that
20	contamination was found in the homes of workers.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: That's the
22	promethium-147 incident.
23	MR. KNOX: Yes, true, but the only

1	reason we know that promethium was there because
2	we specifically looked for it. We didn't look for
3	the other contaminants in people's home. So if you
4	don't look, it's not there.
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Since you brought this
6	up I started thinking about it. And I do have a
7	procedure that you might be interested in. And
8	it's dated August 17, 1951. So this would have
9	been in place very early in your site's operations.
10	It's addressed by the SRDB number
11	128346.
12	And so this is
13	CHAIR BEACH: Did you say 346?
14	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, 128346. And so
15	this is one of those procedures that governs the
16	radioactive work, the controls that would have been
17	applied, the PPU acquired.
18	And on the second page, so it's in
19	Section 1.01 TAC E, Tolerance Level for Clothing
20	talks about clothing shall not be worn when
21	contamination exceeds 500 counts per minute.
22	So it specifies the actual surveying of
23	the PPE that you're allowed to wear, how

1	contaminated it's allowed to be.
2	Shoes will not be worn when the
3	contamination exceeds a certain value there.
4	And so there's also contamination
5	limits for the area. It talks about the dosimetry
6	and what kind of personal monitoring for medical
7	surveillance like urinalysis and things like that.
8	So, early on, this would have been
9	during the natural uranium machining operations
10	that we discovered there, they had this in place.
11	And we have examples of this throughout
12	the site's history, procedures like this.
13	So, that's one part of the thing you
14	asked about. You asked about are there procedures
15	in place and do they have instrumentation. And
16	then you asked for documentation of the surveys
17	that were performed. So this is the procedure part
18	of that.
19	MR. KNOX: Okay.
20	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I can show you many
21	examples.
22	MEMBER LOCKEY: And you can get the
23	actual surveys.

1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We have surveys of
2	equipment. But people, no.
3	MEMBER LOCKEY: No, no surveys of
4	people.
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: No. When you leave
6	CHAIR BEACH: Hand and foot.
7	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
8	CHAIR BEACH: It's usually a hand and
9	foot out.
10	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, there's a PCM 2 or
11	something you walk into. It surveys you. You
12	leave.
13	When there's a discovery of
14	contamination on a person that gets documented.
15	CHAIR BEACH: And there's room survey
16	records.
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes.
18	CHAIR BEACH: All kinds of them.
19	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Equipment and areas.
20	MR. DARNELL: But DOE did not
21	eventually do surveys to say this person was clean.
22	They only did it if this person was dirty.
23	MEMBER LOCKEY: So they surveyed when

1	they left the site.
2	MR. MCCLOSKEY: There was a boundary to
3	the work area and a locker room where they would
4	shower. And so they'd change from their coveralls
5	that they wore in the work area and surveyed before
6	they took off their coveralls and showered.
7	MEMBER LOCKEY: What I was trying to do
8	is make sure I understood what you were asking for.
9	The exit surveys meaning before the
10	employees went home they went through some kind of
11	screening.
12	MR. KNOX: Yes. They went through
13	screening. When they went to lunch they surveyed
14	out.
15	And it turns out that in reality if you
16	are surveying it is very difficult to do because
17	you have tucks in your clothing.
18	You cannot perform an adequate survey
19	of people
20	CHAIR BEACH: But when they've been
21	surveying, we survey every day out of areas.
22	There's TACs that you're trained how to discover
23	that contamination in the folds and stuff.

1	MR. KNOX: But you had industrial
2	you did not have health physicists here at the
3	plant.
4	MR. DARNELL: That's true.
5	CHAIR BEACH: That's true.
6	MR. DARNELL: They had basically a
7	health protection program which included health
8	physics, industrial hygiene, environmental
9	safety, all rolled into one type of technician and
10	one type of professional. They put it under the
11	industrial hygiene program.
12	We reviewed it. We've been through it.
13	We see procedures from it. We see procedures that
14	had they been called health physics procedures they
15	would have been perfectly adequate.
16	So it does not matter that they weren't
17	called health physicists in the early days, nor
18	does it matter that there was no health physicists
19	there. The program was there to cover the people.
20	MR. KNOX: Did you take a look at some
21	of the investigative reports following the
22	promethium-147 spill?
23	They said that they had purchased the

1	instrument package, but they did not purchase the
2	detector.
3	They said that the instruments were not
4	designed for detecting this.
5	MR. DARNELL: Which instruments are
6	you referring to?
7	MR. KNOX: The instruments for
8	detecting promethium. Based upon the reports that
9	I provided to you from the auditors they said that
10	they
11	MR. DARNELL: From your memory, what
12	does promethium give off? What type of radiation
13	does it give off?
14	MR. KNOX: It gives off a beta.
15	MR. DARNELL: Okay. The site had
16	instrumentation for beta gamma.
17	MR. KNOX: Did you read the report
18	which stated that the instrumentation was
19	inadequate for detecting the radiation?
20	MR. DARNELL: I don't remember that
21	report.
22	MR. MCCLOSKEY: One of the findings
23	that Mr. Knox is referring to was, you know, a DOE

group came in and said that you have these sources 1 that you were treating as sealed sources and you 2 3 shouldn't have been. A long time ago when they were bought, 4 the promethium-147 5 sources were bouaht, engineers that purchased them knew they were not 6 7 sealed sources, meeting the definition of a sealed source by the agency and NRC and others. 8 Because with the beta they couldn't 9 The beta had to be able to come 10 totally seal them. 11 out to do its job, its backscatter work. 12 And so over time they lost track of the fact that it was not a sealed source. 13 14 And they were doing their routine source leak checks with an ion chamber instead of 15 16 a pancake probe like you would expect, like any good HP would expect. 17 And so that's what he's talking about 18 19 not having the proper instrumentation for the 20 required routine source checks. MR. KNOX: And they also indicated that 21 22 they had purchased equipment. They did not 23 purchase the detector. They only purchased the

1	instrument package.
2	MR. DARNELL: In any regard I
3	understand that you're not happy with the
4	promethium incident. Nobody that's a health
5	physicist is happy that that incident occurred.
6	The simple fact of the matter is that
7	somebody at the plant did find the contamination
8	regardless that it was after the fact or not.
9	An incident investigation was
10	reviewed, performed, completed, not only by onsite
11	personnel, but by offsite personnel.
12	They even hired a professional health
13	physicist from the local university to come in to
14	look at the entirety of the program.
15	What I fail to see is where you're going
16	with this.
17	CHAIR BEACH: And I was going to jump
18	in too, Pete.
19	So that is a well-documented incident.
20	And I think what you're looking for is the recovery
21	from that incident so that they had the correct
22	equipment afterwards so that that would not occur
23	again

1	Is that what you're looking for?
2	Because we can't change the fact that they had an
3	incident. People took it home. People got
4	cleaned up. They had reports written, yes, we
5	messed up here. We found our holes in our system.
6	But they fixed those, my understanding.
7	So then you move onto what the rest of the program
8	is.
9	Every DOE site has incidents. Hanford
10	has incidents. I mean, you're well aware of them.
11	So, we can't go back and make that so
12	it didn't happen. They had problems. So they
13	moved forward, changed their processes, bought the
14	right equipment based on those findings.
15	So what more can we do with that
16	promethium?
17	I mean, it's very well documented.
18	We're all aware that it occurred.
19	MR. KNOX: The problem was it was not
20	just promethium. They reported that it was just
21	promethium, but then if you look into the
22	inspection reports they identify a lot of other
23	radioactive materials that were leaking. And it

1	wasn't just promethium.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so those reports
3	are also out there which means once they're
4	documented they had to do something about it,
5	correct? They would have had to have
6	MR. KNOX: Yes.
7	CHAIR BEACH: And I know there was a
8	time period I don't know the year that all
9	those sources were gathered up and a lot of them
10	were shipped out.
11	Isn't that's correct? A lot of them
12	were turned into waste.
13	MR. DARNELL: Well, some of them were
14	turned into waste. Some of them were returned to
15	the manufacturer.
16	CHAIR BEACH: Manufacturer, correct.
17	MR. DARNELL: Some of them stayed in
18	service.
19	CHAIR BEACH: Because I know there was
20	a time period where they really did a cleanup to
21	get rid of all the sources that they had.
22	MR. DARNELL: Like a lot of sites that
23	are comparable to the Kansas City the radioactive

1	material use at Kansas City went up and down
2	depending upon the type of job.
3	CHAIR BEACH: Right.
4	MR. DARNELL: The actual footprint of
5	the radioactive material use in the site as we
6	noticed when we did the walk-through this past
7	winter was extremely small.
8	I mean, even to get into those areas,
9	you had to go out of your way to get into those
10	areas.
11	So, you've got monitoring programs.
12	We've got times when sealed sources were used and
13	then disposed of.
14	We've got times when different types of
15	radioactive material projects were used and then
16	stopped over the history of the site.
17	So, this is not a general walking the
18	place, it's dirty everywhere type of site.
19	MR. KNOX: How can you say that the
20	footprint was small when this happened over a
21	period of 12 years based upon the documentation.
22	It was found at Sandia. It was found
23	at Oak Ridge

1	MR. DARNELL: Okay, we have to limit
2	our talk to Kansas City.
3	MR. KNOX: Wait
4	(Simultaneous speaking)
5	MR. KATZ: One person at a time,
6	please.
7	MR. DARNELL: Kansas City. That's
8	what we're concerned with. I don't care what
9	happened at Sandia. I don't care what happened at
LO	Oak Ridge. It is Kansas City only.
L1	MR. KNOX: You're saying that the
L2	footprint was small, and I am saying that it
L3	happened over a 12-year period.
L4	You have it found in the homes of five
L5	workers, on their carpet, on their toilet. And the
L6	janitors cleaned those facilities and spread it all
L7	around.
L8	Now, how can you say the footprint
L9	(Simultaneous speaking)
20	MR. KNOX: And may I finish, please?
21	It was located in Sandia.
22	MR. DARNELL: I don't care.
23	MR. KNOX: It was located in Mound.

1	MR. DARNELL: I do not care.
2	MR. KNOX: But it was spread
3	MR. DARNELL: I do not care about these
4	sites.
5	MR. KNOX: The argument is whether the
6	footprint is small
7	MR. DARNELL: You're wasting your time
8	for your presentation by talking about the other
9	sites.
10	MR. KNOX: No, I
11	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, wait, I want to
12	make sure
13	MR. KNOX: talking about the size of
14	the footprint.
15	CHAIR BEACH: I want to make sure I
16	understand. When you're talking about Sandia, was
17	that contamination that came from Kansas City and
18	was found at Sandia?
19	MR. KNOX: It came from
20	MR. DARNELL: It was ascertained
21	MR. KNOX: It came from Kansas City and
22	was shipped to Sandia. They shipped things to
23	Mound. They even shipped things to Amersham,

1	England that were most likely contaminated.
2	CHAIR BEACH: I'm aware
3	MR. KNOX: So, the footprint was not
4	small.
5	MR. DARNELL: documentation.
6	MR. KNOX: Huh?
7	MR. DARNELL: As we've asked for you in
8	the past, every time we've addressed this topic
9	with you in the past we've asked for some type of
10	documentation.
11	MR. KNOX: I've provided that to you.
12	MR. DARNELL: You've never given us
13	anything that has documented that the promethium
14	incident was spread to Amersham, England, was
15	spread to any of the other sites.
16	None of the documents that you have ever
17	given us has shown us that.
18	MR. KNOX: Not true. I have.
19	MR. DARNELL: Well, we have a
20	difference of opinion.
21	And as far as the footprint of
22	radioactive material use at the site I was speaking
23	of the specific projects. Not promethium. I'm

1	talking about the projects versus the size of the
2	entire site.
3	The footprint of radioactive material
4	use for those projects at the Kansas City site is
5	very small.
6	We're not talking about a place that is
7	dirty all over.
8	We have a promethium incident where, as
9	unfortunate as it is that it happened it was
10	discovered, it was reviewed
11	MR. KNOX: Twelve years.
12	MR. DARNELL: it was it doesn't
13	matter. It was discovered. It was reviewed. It
14	was investigated. Dose was assigned and the site
15	moved on.
16	Talk about 12 years all you want. Talk
17	about Mound. Talk about Oak Ridge. Talk about
18	anywhere in the world all you want. It doesn't
19	matter.
20	MR. KNOX: Why doesn't it?
21	MR. DARNELL: Because it's not the
22	Kansas City Plant. We're here for the Kansas City
23	Plant.

1	If that contamination were sent to a
2	different place and it was found to be the similar
3	type of incident in a different place it becomes
4	an incident on that site, part of their exposure
5	history.
6	MR. KNOX: But it went out of this spot
7	right here. Over a 12-year period it was spread
8	most likely throughout that plant.
9	How did it get into the homes of people?
10	CHAIR BEACH: Wayne, you're aware of
11	the incident because there was an incident report
12	and you read the incident report, is that correct?
13	MR. KNOX: Yes. Several of them.
14	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, the incident
15	is well documented. It's out for public.
16	I guess I want to bring it from out here
17	to what can this Work Group do. What's your
18	question that we can do for this incident so that
19	we can move past that?
20	MR. KNOX: Number one, the incident
21	footprint as we define it was not small.
22	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. He was talking
23	about a different footprint, not the promethium

1	footprint is my understanding. So, I believe
2	you're talking two different issues, right, Pete?
3	MR. DARNELL: Yes.
4	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, take the
5	footprint out. That was something different.
6	We understand that this happened.
7	It's well documented. As Pete said, the workers
8	involved have gotten dose assigned to them from
9	this incident.
LO	And that's all we can do on that
L1	incident. Because we know the levels. We know
L2	who was contaminated, where it was contaminated.
L3	All we can do is assign dose, and we have.
L4	So, what more can we do here?
L5	MR. KNOX: You can look at the other
L6	radioactive materials that
L7	CHAIR BEACH: Other sources.
L8	MR. KNOX: Other sources that they said
L9	were leaking too.
20	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so
21	MR. KNOX: You can look at the uranium
22	and other materials that they were dealing with and
23	see that you have contamination in clean areas.

1	And how did that but may I say this.
2	You've already acknowledged that you had
3	contamination in clean areas. And the janitors,
4	people tracked in it.
5	How can it not be all over the facility?
6	CHAIR BEACH: Well
7	MR. KNOX: It was in the homes of
8	people. How can it not be?
9	CHAIR BEACH: I can tell you that when
10	we visited the facility in when did we go? Was
11	it the March visit?
12	So, the March visit, when we were there
13	and we toured all the rad areas they had people
14	working as we were there surveying all those rad
15	areas for leftover contamination, hot spots, on the
16	walls, the floors, the joints.
17	So that report I'm assuming should be
18	ready. We don't have it now. It will be awhile.
19	MR. DARNELL: It's going to be a long
20	time. What they're performing is survey of the
21	entire site.
22	CHAIR BEACH: To sell it, because it's
23	for sale, right?

1	MR. DARNELL: So far they haven't found
2	anything. There's been no spread, okay?
3	Even with a 2.6-year half-life of
4	promethium, if there was a lot of promethium around
5	they'd still see it. And it's not there.
6	MR. KNOX: I will make this statement
7	and that I will stand by. The criminal controls
8	the crime scene. What do you expect to get?
9	They are doing the surveys. They don't
10	want to find anything.
11	CHAIR BEACH: No, we watched the guy
12	doing the surveys. They're doing a very thorough
13	survey.
14	I think Pat had something he wanted to
15	add to the discussion.
16	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, just a couple of
17	things.
18	You brought up other sources. We had
19	promethium. It's well documented.
20	And you talk about what about the other
21	sources that were leaking. Well, we have an Issues
22	Work Group that's working on about 21 issues.
23	And Issue Number 18 is titled

1	"Accidents, Incidents and Fires."
2	So we looked at a whole gamut of mishaps
3	that could have happened at the site.
4	And we looked at a lot of things. I
5	mean, there was some reports of other sources
6	leaking. In May of '90 there's low levels of
7	thallium-204 were found in a source holder case
8	during routine surveys of the waste storage area.
9	They have these episodes throughout
10	here. We have a bunch listed. There's a 150-page
11	document that we went through to look for anything
12	that would have contributed large exposures that
13	we would need to have found to make sure that we
14	had covered in our methodology.
15	And we continue to look for and ask the
16	site for records of incidents. And we've not found
17	something that appeared to us to be such a large
18	extraordinary dose that we could not bound for this
19	SEC.
20	So that's I just wanted to remind us
21	that we have that issue where we've looked at all
22	these things.
23	CHAIR BEACH: I was going to bring that

1	up.
2	MR. MCCLOSKEY: And as far as the
3	promethium getting to homes, in our ER we talked
4	about it getting to one home offsite and they
5	deconned that home for that employee.
6	I'm not aware of promethium-147 going
7	anywhere else offsite other than one person's
8	house.
9	MR. KNOX: I believe the report said
LO	they surveyed five homes
L1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Oh, they surveyed.
L2	CHAIR BEACH: They did survey.
L3	MR. KNOX: And contamination was found
L4	
L5	MR. DARNELL: In one.
L6	MR. KNOX: No.
L7	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. But let's not
L8	argue.
L9	MR. KNOX: I can show you that. It was
20	found in other people's homes.
21	CHAIR BEACH: That's well documented.
22	Let's not argue that, the specifics of it.
23	I don't want you to use all your time

1	on that because I know you had a whole list.
2	So this list that I made a copy for you,
3	are you done with this list? Is there something
4	on it that you're interested in us pursuing or
5	discussing?
6	MR. KNOX: Yes, there are several
7	things that I would like
8	CHAIR BEACH: Why don't you start at
9	the top and we'll mark them off.
10	Some of them that's later, yes.
11	This is the one that he gave us in January.
12	But I keep directing him to the other
13	one. This one he's sending to President Obama, so
14	he just gave us a copy of it.
15	MR. DARNELL: Well, maybe President
16	Obama will read it.
17	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so Wayne, I'm going
18	to let you just go down your list, or go down this
19	list that you gave us in January.
20	Is there anything?
21	MR. KNOX: We can run down this list.
22	If we want to hit my highlights.
23	Since we've talked about incidents, can

1	we finish incidents?
2	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
3	MR. KNOX: We still have the huge
4	problem from my perspective with the Dottie
5	Troxell.
6	CHAIR BEACH: That is a
7	MR. KNOX: At least
8	CHAIR BEACH: case that we cannot
9	we can't retry that.
10	MR. KNOX: I'm not talking about
11	retrying it. I'm saying what were the exposures
12	of people that were on the roof and all of the
13	passersby. What were those exposures? That was
14	a legitimate incident.
15	CHAIR BEACH: And that was from the
16	sources?
17	MR. KNOX: This lady ended up with
18	cataracts in both eyes, so I would expect her to
19	have at least a 500 rem dose.
20	What about the people that were working
21	on the rooftop? What about scattered radiation,
22	even outside of that facility?
23	And I bet you would have seen skyshine

1	to those buildings around there from those sources.
2	MR. DARNELL: Okay, first part of the
3	answer is the Troxell case did not find what you're
4	stating.
5	So, there's no way that we can address
6	what you're stating for Ms. Troxell.
7	We can't retry the case. We can't talk
8	about the case.
9	We've already explained to you before
10	that the practice in the nineteen fifties was to
11	establish radiation areas when they used the
12	radiography sources.
13	And that if they were up working on the
14	roof and it was part of a radiation area they were
15	either badged or they were removed.
16	We've explained this to you time and
17	time again, okay? I don't know what more you want.
18	MR. KNOX: But they were not.
19	MR. DARNELL: That's not what we found
20	when we asked.
21	MR. KNOX: Have you bound the radiation
22	dose that an individual would receive, or could
23	possibly have received that ended up with cataracts

1	in both eyes?
2	MR. DARNELL: No. We didn't even
3	attempt to. That's not part of what we do.
4	MR. KNOX: Because it was a legitimate
5	incident.
6	MR. DARNELL: It is part of a case that
7	has been closed. It is not part of our Evaluation
8	Report. It's not needed to be part of the
9	Evaluation Report. Okay?
LO	The more that you bring it up, and the
L1	more that you argue it, the more time you waste.
L2	You're not going to get anywhere.
L3	I'm trying to be helpful to you, Mr.
L4	Knox.
L5	MR. KNOX: Was Dottie Troxell exposed?
L6	MR. DARNELL: I have no comment. It's
L7	a case that has been closed. I have no comment.
L8	MR. KNOX: So, you are you
L9	evaluating the exposures of the workers from
20	incidents that occurred? This was
21	MR. DARNELL: Yes, we do. We do
22	evaluate incidents.
) 2	MP KNOY: What was the bounding

1	exposures associated with her case?
2	CHAIR BEACH: Are you working for her?
3	How does she figure into this conversation?
4	MR. KNOX: She defines a certain
5	threshold level of exposures.
6	If she had cataracts in both eyes that
7	means
8	CHAIR BEACH: Are you her
9	representative though?
10	MR. KNOX: No.
11	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
12	MR. KNOX: I'm not. The only thing I'm
13	trying to do is to say that based upon her having
14	cataracts in both eyes, based upon her blood
15	vessels being broken as a result of these
16	exposures, the people on the roof should have
17	gotten a lot of exposures.
18	People that were passing by should have
19	gotten a lot of exposures.
20	And surrounding buildings. If you
21	have a cloudy day you would have had skyshine.
22	CHAIR BEACH: But we wouldn't look at
23	the only way to discover that is if people had

1	dosimetry on that picked up those doses.
2	And that is what we've done is we've
3	gone in and we've looked at the records, we've
4	looked at people's records.
5	We've looked at what's available on
6	site sources to try to determine what the doses were
7	and what people were exposed to.
8	I mean, somebody say it better than I
9	can say it, but that's what we're trying to do.
10	Going back to that specific incident,
11	we can't.
12	MR. DARNELL: The best answer that we
13	can give you is that in the nineteen fifties when
14	the Troxell case was going on, all the stuff was
15	going on, it was standard practice to establish
16	radiation areas around, below and above
17	radiography sources. That's what the site did.
18	We have evidence that workers that were
19	in radiation areas were monitored for radiation
20	dose as well as medically monitored to be in that
21	program.
22	Whether or not those workers on the roof
23	during the use of that source is immaterial.

1	Whether or not
2	MR. KNOX: It is not immaterial if
3	you're standing on the roof getting exposed.
4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We looked at all the
5	exposures and didn't see anything.
6	MR. DARNELL: We've got nothing, okay?
7	We've got no dose that says there was anything that
8	was even close to a credible exposure that would
9	have been on an incident level.
LO	You've got to get to an incident level
L1	before you ever get anywhere close enough to get
L2	dose to get cataracts. Okay?
L3	The bottom line is the workers were in
L4	a program. The program was established.
L5	The program has them either monitored
L6	or out of the area. That's the answer we have for
L7	you. There is nothing else.
L8	MEMBER LOCKEY: Let me make a
L9	suggestion.
20	We have this list that we need to get
21	through. Do you have this with you?
22	MR. KATZ: Yes, he has it right there.
23	MEMBER LOCKEY: Okay. So, can we

1	start at the top and run down through here and say
2	answered, not answered?
3	CHAIR BEACH: The N's are NIOSH.
4	MEMBER LOCKEY: Okay. The N's are
5	NIOSH, okay.
6	So this list is I think because
7	we have a limited amount of time today, and we have
8	I think we should try to get through this.
9	(Simultaneous speaking)
10	MEMBER LOCKEY: Do you have that with
11	you?
12	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, I gave him a copy of
13	it this morning.
14	MR. DARNELL: We'll just go by the copy
15	that you have.
16	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
17	MEMBER LOCKEY: So the first one is
18	what?
19	CHAIR BEACH: Criminal violations
20	relative to knowing false statements by civil
21	servants and contractors, and violations, knowing
22	endangerment laws, including conspiracy,
23	racketeering, violations of the Atomic Energy Act.

1	I X'd that because that's not something
2	we can answer here.
3	MR. KNOX: No.
4	CHAIR BEACH: The next one, didn't
5	understand what you were looking for there, number
6	2 - '73-'84 finding, sense of Congress.
7	MR. KNOX: This is
8	CHAIR BEACH: So we can X that out?
9	MR. KNOX: Yes. I didn't know I
10	don't believe those were my numbers there.
11	CHAIR BEACH: This is your list.
12	MEMBER LOCKEY: Well, we'll do the best
13	we can do, but the second one we
14	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
15	MEMBER LOCKEY: Okay. So, what's the
16	third one?
17	CHAIR BEACH: The third one - applied
18	meaning and use of worst case requirements, worst
19	case versus average versus 99 percent confidence
20	level versus survey data, sufficient accuracy
21	versus full research related to case study of a
22	machinist and coworkers machining and processing
23	DU uniformed, unprotected and unmonitored.

1	I put NIOSH's name on that. This is one
2	that we've been addressing throughout our Work
3	Group meetings.
4	MEMBER LOCKEY: Is it on the agenda for
5	tomorrow? Sort of halfway covered tomorrow, I
6	think.
7	CHAIR BEACH: Anything on that one?
8	That was NIOSH. I gave it to you guys.
9	MR. KNOX: Well, if this is my show, why
LO	don't we finish my opinion.
L1	As far as promethium is concerned you
L2	have nuclear fleas. I was the one that helped
L3	clean up building 325. We had nuclear fleas over
L4	there. At Hanford.
L5	But you would have had nuclear fleas
L6	here.
L7	MR. DARNELL: It's immaterial. This
L8	is Kansas City.
L9	MR. KNOX: But they found nuclear fleas
20	here. And nuclear fleas represent
21	MR. DARNELL: nuclear fleas.
22	MR. KNOX: A nuclear flea is a glob, if
23	you will, of promethium.

1	MR. DARNELL: At what activity level?
2	MR. KNOX: They have one with 13 mics.
3	They found one in that report. Thirteen mics.
4	If you look at inhaling that, that flea,
5	see what kind of dose you get out of that flea.
6	MR. DARNELL: If it was small enough to
7	get into the lower part of your lungs where it would
8	cause dose it would be quite a bit.
9	And from what I remember of the report
LO	I believe it was about 108, you know, it was a rather
L1	huge particle. It was not a respirable particle.
L2	MR. KNOX: No, they I don't recall
L3	
L4	MEMBER LOCKEY: How big?
L5	MR. DARNELL: I think it was 100
L6	microns.
L7	CHAIR BEACH: This is Kansas City we're
L8	talking.
L9	MR. DARNELL: Kansas City.
20	MR. KNOX: I don't remember them saying
21	the problem
22	MR. DARNELL: I don't remember them
23	finding anything respirable in a large activity

1	particle.
2	MR. KNOX: They found it on the air
3	filtration systems.
4	MR. DARNELL: Where?
5	MR. KNOX: At the Kansas City Plant.
6	MR. DARNELL: What document?
7	MR. KNOX: In the documents that I gave
8	you. That were
9	MR. DARNELL: You don't have it?
10	MR. KNOX: I didn't know that I was
11	coming to defend this.
12	CHAIR BEACH: You know what? This
13	isn't the drop-dead. If you have it, make yourself
14	a note. And if you can provide it to us, or let
15	us know where we can find the copy.
16	MR. KNOX: And if you have found the 13
17	mic nuclear flea that could possibly mean, since
18	we're doing worst case analysis, that higher levels
19	existed out there.
20	And I would have expected when you do
21	your analysis to consider the worst case situation.
22	So, nuclear fleas are an issue. And I
23	don't think they were

1	MEMBER LOCKEY: So, that could be an
2	action item. We need a document. Can you provide
3	us, again, the documentation where nuclear fleas
4	were found on the filtration systems within the
5	plant?
6	MR. KNOX: I did it.
7	MEMBER LOCKEY: I guess I don't have
8	it. I might have missed it. Can you provide it
9	again? Is that possible?
10	MR. KNOX: Yes, I will be happy to.
11	MEMBER LOCKEY: All right, so that's an
12	action item, okay? We have something we need to
13	look at.
14	If it is on the filtration system then
15	I guess that's something we need to at least look
16	at, look at the size and exposure potential. Okay?
17	MR. KNOX: Okay.
18	MEMBER LOCKEY: So, what's another
19	action item for us?
20	MR. KNOX: When you use we're
21	supposed to be doing worst case assessments.
22	But I see all of the time where we use
23	95 percent data. You can't get to a 99 percent

1	confidence level using 95 percent data.
2	MR. DARNELL: Okay, first thing we have
3	to do is understand that we're not using confidence
4	intervals and statistics from data quality
5	objectives to do the math that we're doing for the
6	health physics.
7	You appear to have data quality
8	objective math, EPA math, and different quality
9	assurance factors mixed together trying to apply
10	to what we're doing.
11	We're using the 95th percentile of all
12	the dose when we're calculating the 95th
13	percentile.
14	It's we don't go to the 99th
15	percentile. Number one, the program is not built
16	that way.
17	Number two, it's not a data quality
18	objective. The two things are different programs.
19	MR. KNOX: If you're required to use
20	worst case
21	MR. DARNELL: Estimates. Remember it
22	is saying worst case estimates. What I remember
23	is we're supposed to adequately bound the dose for

1	the Special Exposure Cohort.
2	It doesn't say use worst case
3	estimates. Although we do use worst case
4	estimates in some cases. We don't always because
5	we don't have to. We have data to support the
6	methods that we use.
7	It's not always a worst case estimate.
8	It's not always a best case estimate. It varies
9	depending on how we're doing what we're doing
10	with the data and how we're using it.
11	MR. KNOX: So, you're telling me you
12	can use 95 percentile data and come up with 99?
13	MR. DARNELL: No. What I'm telling
14	you is that we use 95th percentile data for the
15	statistical approach that we use it for.
16	MR. KNOX: So you define worst case as
17	95 percent.
18	MR. DARNELL: I never said that.
19	MR. KNOX: Well, how do you define
20	worst case?
21	MR. DARNELL: You're stuck on that we
22	have to use worst case.
23	MR KNOX: That's what the regulations

1	say, that you'll use worst case.
2	MR. DARNELL: No, they do not.
3	MR. KNOX: I will give you the
4	regulations, worst case regulations.
5	MR. DARNELL: I would be glad to learn
6	that if I am in error. I would appreciate the
7	correction.
8	MR. KNOX: Okay.
9	MR. DARNELL: Okay.
10	MR. KNOX: You identified another
11	incident concerning a hood in the paint shop that
12	had contamination in it, strontium-90.
13	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Who identified this
14	again?
15	MR. KNOX: In your report you
16	identified that as an incident. Strontium-90.
17	MR. DARNELL: Joe, do you remember any
18	strontium-90?
19	MR. FITZGERALD: Are you referring to
20	the Evaluation Report? The ER?
21	MR. KNOX: I don't remember which one.
22	I remember reading
23	MR. FITZGERALD: I don't recall

1	MR. KNOX: it was the paint. And
2	they only looked at strontium-90. And I will agree
3	that
4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I don't think that's
5	Kansas City.
6	MR. KNOX: Well, we can look it up and
7	see. But I'm sure it was there.
8	But in that assessment did you consider
9	yttrium-90 also? Because it would have
10	(Simultaneous speaking)
11	MR. DARNELL: First of all, we don't
12	want to talk about strontium that nobody here
13	remembers being in the ER or any of the reports.
14	Strontium and yttrium are ingrown
15	together as you well know when they are in
16	equilibrium.
17	So we'll talk about strontium and
18	yttrium if and when we find the incident that you're
19	speaking of. Otherwise, we need to move on.
20	MR. KNOX: Okay.
21	CHAIR BEACH: I don't see strontium.
22	MR. FITZGERALD: talking about
23	cesium, cobalt and plutonium-beryllium sources is

1	pretty much the extent of KCP. I don't see
2	strontium.
3	CHAIR BEACH: I don't see it either in
4	the ER.
5	MR. KNOX: It's in the incident report
6	where you have some explosion inside of a paint
7	hood.
8	MR. DARNELL: That's not this site.
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: You might be thinking
10	of another site.
11	MR. KNOX: Well, I'll find it.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay.
13	MR. DARNELL: Sure. If you can find it
14	we'll be glad to address it, but until then we need
15	to move on.
16	CHAIR BEACH: Well, I'm keeping track
17	of some of them. That one I don't believe was at
18	this site.
19	MR. KATZ: What's next on the list?
20	CHAIR BEACH: Well
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I think we already
22	covered
23	CHAIR BEACH: Well, we talked about

1	number 3, but the survey, the DU information is
2	un-uniform. So, I guess I need a little more
3	clarification of what that was about. For number
4	3 of your list, Wayne.
5	MR. KNOX: Number 3.
6	CHAIR BEACH: Yes. Applied meaning of
7	the worst case requirements, worst case versus
8	MR. KNOX: Okay.
9	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, we kind of
10	talked about the 99 percent.
11	Is there anything more on that? We're
12	looking into what the machining of uranium was
13	quite extensively in our issues matrix.
14	MR. KNOX: But this we'll just move
15	on to number 5.
16	CHAIR BEACH: And your bottom part was
17	unprotected and unmonitored. And we are
18	discussing potentially unmonitored workers. It
19	will be part of our discussion tomorrow. The
20	laborers, the janitors.
21	So, you're okay? Is there anything
22	more on that? You're ready to go to number 4?
23	MR. KNOX: Yes.

1	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
2	MR. KNOX: Number 4, I guess we've
3	beaten that to death.
4	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. Number 5, health
5	physics. Okay, so KCP health physics and
6	radiological monitoring capabilities and
7	practices.
8	MR. KNOX: We've talked about that.
9	Again, they had industrial hygienists
LO	and not health physicists.
L1	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Up until the
L2	promethium-137. That was a discovery there, that
L3	we need to bring in some more HPs. And so from '90
L4	on
L5	MR. DARNELL: May I add something to
L6	this discussion specifically about the -
L7	[identifying information redacted] did it.
L8	I'm sorry, I probably shouldn't mention
L9	his name, but he's the doctor who wrote the final
20	report on the review of the Bendix Radiation
21	Program in December of 1987.
22	And in Part 6 of his overview he talks
23	about the adequateness of the rad protection

1	program.
2	And what it basically said was that the
3	program is adequate for the size and complexity of
4	the site.
5	MR. KNOX: But that is not what they
6	said in the audit reports that I provided to you.
7	The audit reports painted a different
8	picture.
9	MR. DARNELL: Okay. You've also said
10	that the criminals hold the key. They're going to
11	say what they want to say, and the whole bit.
12	So, here is the independent reviewer
13	from a university. He's not part of the criminals
14	that are holding the key. He's not part of their
15	organization.
16	He doesn't hire them. He doesn't fire
17	them. He doesn't run the contract.
18	And he's saying that the radiation
19	protection program is adequate for the size and
20	complexity of the Kansas City Plant.
21	That's in the promethium
22	documentation. That is in the Site Research
23	Database number 40.

1	MR. KNOX: You let him see what you want
2	to see. And just because you have a college degree
3	does not make you an operational health physicist.
4	MR. DARNELL: Really.
5	MR. KNOX: And you do not know all of
6	the details of what goes on in the real world.
7	MR. DARNELL: There's no way to answer
8	your question. There's no way to give you an
9	adequate response.
10	MR. KNOX: If you get a college
11	professor that they are making contributions to the
12	institution to come in and give you a report.
13	Why don't you have someone like me
14	that's independent to come in and do it?
15	But the other problem
16	MEMBER POSTON: I'm a college
17	professor, Wayne.
18	MR. KNOX: I know you.
19	MEMBER POSTON: I would do a good job.
20	I'd make my own decisions. You know that.
21	MR. KNOX: I know you. But we still
22	have people out there that are dependent upon
23	contributions.

1	MEMBER POSTON: You're impugning
2	somebody you don't even know. I think that's a
3	very unfair statement, for you just to make a
4	blanket statement about that when you don't know
5	the person.
6	And if you want to look at what they
7	wrote, and if you want to look at their background
8	and come back and say you think he bought the farm
9	that's another thing.
LO	But you're making a judgment which is
L1	inappropriate at this point.
L2	MR. KNOX: I cannot know what they told
L3	him. But anyway, moving on.
L4	MEMBER POSTON: So, that's my point.
L5	MR. KNOX: I don't know.
L6	MR. DARNELL: Mr. Knox, you see, what
L7	you're doing is you are introducing unspoken and
L8	unseen conspiracies into whatever response is
L9	being given to you.
20	There's no way to give you an adequate
21	response. You won't accept the documents that
22	we've given you. You won't accept the
23	MR. KNOX: You won't accept the

1	documents I've given you.
2	MR. DARNELL: So far you've given us
3	nothing.
4	MR. KNOX: I have given you many
5	documents.
6	MR. DARNELL: You gave me a piece of
7	paper once that said from the president of Bendix
8	was talking about a reactor built at the Bendix
9	facility in Michigan.
LO	And in the next sentence mentioned the
L1	Bendix facility in Kansas City.
L2	And because the word "reactor" and
L3	"Bendix" were in the same paragraph you assumed the
L4	reactor was in Kansas City.
L5	You read the paper wrong, you gave it
L6	to us wrong and it's incorrect data.
L7	MR. KNOX: No.
L8	MR. DARNELL: Unfortunately, yes.
L9	MR. KNOX: What you're telling me is
20	the you stated that Bendix built the reactor that
21	went over to Burt Hall at the University of Kansas.
22	MR. DARNELL: I didn't say that. I
23	said there was never a reactor at the Kansas City

1	Bendix plant.
2	MR. KNOX: But you said one was built
3	in Detroit.
4	MR. DARNELL: That article was the one
5	they were talking about, the Pioneer Division in
6	Detroit.
7	MR. KNOX: Okay. Do you have the
8	license that allowed them to build
9	MR. DARNELL: I don't need a license.
10	I don't want the license. It's not the Kansas City
11	Plant.
12	MR. MCCLOSKEY: As soon as we found out
13	it was another division of Bendix doing this work
14	and it didn't affect the site that we're here to
15	talk about we there's a lot of stuff we could
16	go study, but we didn't study that.
17	MR. KNOX: If you look at all of the
18	materials that Bendix had onsite based upon the DOL
19	SIMS, they had reactor fuel there.
20	MR. DARNELL: No. Actually, the
21	problem is you're misreading the sentence.
22	When the Department of Labor puts a
23	material on that site and states that it was at the

1	Kansas City Plant it gives you all of the aliases
2	for that material.
3	So, when they listed uranium they
4	listed U-233, they listed they listed
5	yellowcake, they listed U-235, the whole thing.
6	You are misunderstanding the SIMS.
7	MR. KNOX: No.
8	MR. DARNELL: Yes.
9	MR. KNOX: The SIMS, what is in the SIMS
10	is taken to be fact.
11	MR. DARNELL: Sure. It said uranium
12	was at the site and it gave you all the names
13	MR. KNOX: But they don't give you all
14	of the isotopes, do they?
15	MR. DARNELL: They gave you all of the
16	names that were in common use for uranium.
17	What I suggest is you go back and read
18	it more carefully. You are incorrect in your
19	assumption.
20	MR. KNOX: I am not.
21	MR. DARNELL: Yes, you are, sir. I'm
22	sorry.
23	MR. KNOX: What is in the SIMS is

1	supposed to be accepted as fact.
2	Now, you've gone
3	MR. DARNELL: I'm not arguing with that
4	part.
5	MR. KNOX: But the interesting thing is
6	after I presented you all of this information that
7	says that they had yellowcake there, they had the
8	depleted uranium.
9	We don't know whether that contained
10	plutonium or not.
11	They had weapons-grade material there.
12	All of this is in the SIMS.
13	Once I told you guys that what you did
14	was to go in and somebody, I shouldn't say who, but
15	someone went in and removed all of the radioactive
16	material indications from the SIMS.
17	Even those people, the industrial
18	hygienists that were surveying around, were not
19	even exposed to radioactive material. It was
20	deleted.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: That's not our
22	database, that's DOL, right?
23	MR. KNOX: So, why would DOL it was

1	interesting to me. After I presented to you all
2	of this information that was in the DOL SIMS that
3	suggested these workers were working with these
4	radioactive materials they were all deleted.
5	MR. DARNELL: Mr. Knox, can I ask you
6	to come around and take a look at my computer
7	screen?
8	I have brought up the United States
9	Department of Labor Site Exposure Matrix.
10	I've brought up the toxic substance
11	uranium. Identification. HAZMAT name.
12	Uranium, uranium and compounds. CAS number.
13	Aliases - U-232 tracer, U-232 tracer,
14	U-233, uranium 233, uranium 234. Okay? Those are
15	aliases.
16	MR. KNOX: They do not put okay,
17	well, which ones were there then? Which ones were
18	there?
19	MR. DARNELL: We had depleted uranium
20	at the site.
21	MR. KNOX: But it doesn't say that. It
22	just says uranium, and then it says aliases.
23	MR. DARNELL: That's correct.

1	MR. KNOX: Okay. So, what was there?
2	MR. DARNELL: We told you in the
3	Special Exposure Cohort Evaluation Report.
4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We have other ways to
5	verify what's there.
6	We have NMMSS, right? They're
7	required to log their inventory with that database.
8	CHAIR BEACH: Correct.
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: And so we don't just
10	take one piece of information and say we're done.
11	We go off and we validate it.
12	MR. DARNELL: Do you understand now
13	that those are just aliases that are listed?
14	MR. KNOX: No, because I do not have
15	you deleted, someone, I could say who. Someone
16	deleted all of those references to the use of
17	radioactive materials
18	MR. DARNELL: Again, you're
19	conspiracy
20	(Simultaneous speaking)
21	MR. DARNELL: When you're facing a fact
22	you're introducing a conspiracy to try to undermine
23	it.

1	There is no conspiracy. Nothing was
2	deleted. This is what the website has always said.
3	MR. KNOX: No, it wasn't. It was
4	changed. That's not true.
5	MR. KATZ: Okay, but we don't need to
6	argue about SIMS because SIMS is a database
7	maintained by the Department of Labor.
8	We have no role in SIMS. We don't
9	delete, we don't add to SIMS. So, it's really,
10	it's not germane to the Work Group.
11	MR. DARNELL: It is germane
12	MR. KATZ: Whatever might have
13	happened it's not germane to what this Work Group
14	does though because this Work Group doesn't
15	maintain SIMS.
16	MR. DARNELL: It's germane to Mr.
17	Knox's belief in what radioactive materials were
18	at the site.
19	He's looking at the aliases and saying
20	that fissionable and fissile materials were on the
21	site when they were not.
22	MR. KATZ: I understand what you're
23	saying, but it's not useful is what I'm saying for

1	this Work Group.
2	MR. DARNELL: You're absolutely right.
3	MR. KATZ: Because the Work Group has
4	gone into depth about what materials actually were
5	there. And that's what all this several years of
6	work has been involved in.
7	So, the SIMS which is a very superficial
8	database by comparison to what's been done by the
9	Work Group, and by NIOSH, by SC&A, is it's just
10	not germane to this discussion. It's not a primary
11	source, or even it's not even a source for this
12	Work Group's work.
13	MR. KNOX: The SIMS indicates, for
14	example, the lathe operators were using
15	nickel-163.
16	What were they doing with it? That's
17	what the SIMS says for that work category.
18	CHAIR BEACH: So, we have
19	MR. DARNELL: published. That's
20	going to be discussed
21	CHAIR BEACH: And it will be
22	tomorrow.
23	(Simultaneous speaking)

1	CHAIR BEACH: And it's very clear what
2	the site was doing with it.
3	And if you're here tomorrow you'll see
4	that report.
5	MR. KNOX: It mentions
6	CHAIR BEACH: In fact, Wayne, just for
7	the record it is on Wayne, it is on the website
8	available for you to take off the public website
9	the report on nickel-63.
10	MR. DARNELL: I believe also that Josh
11	Kinman mailed you a copy of it.
12	CHAIR BEACH: So, we're aware of what
13	they did with it and we'll talk about it tomorrow.
14	But you have access to that report.
15	MR. KNOX: Yes, but now we delete all
16	of those materials that
17	CHAIR BEACH: We didn't delete.
18	MR. KNOX: Someone deleted them.
19	CHAIR BEACH: But, Wayne, here's the
20	deal.
21	MR. KNOX: And
22	CHAIR BEACH: Wayne, we are trying to
23	help you.

1	You have to understand when we tell you
2	that it's not something that we have control over
3	we can't do anything about it.
4	So, that is something you can take up
5	with DOE or DOL. But it's not part of what we're
6	discussing here, or shouldn't be.
7	MR. KNOX: Okay. I've got to hit the
8	john. I'm an old man.
9	CHAIR BEACH: So, you know what?
LO	Let's see. It is
L1	MR. KATZ: It's about 3.
L2	CHAIR BEACH: almost 3. So, come
L3	back at 10 after? Five after?
L4	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
L5	went off the record at 2:52 p.m. and resumed at 3:10
L6	p.m.)
L7	MR. KATZ: Welcome back. We just had
L8	a short break.
L9	This is the Kansas City Plant Work Group
20	and we're working on Mr. Knox's list of issues from
21	back in March, I believe. January, sorry.
22	CHAIR BEACH: January. I want to
23	check did [identifying information redacted] join

1	us?
2	(No response)
3	CHAIR BEACH: No, okay. Carry on.
4	MR. KNOX: Okay. Number 6. All I
5	wanted to see were some licenses for the Kansas City
6	Plant to possess and use radioactive material in
7	radiation-generating machines.
8	MR. DARNELL: There was no license
9	required. They were contractors.
10	MR. KNOX: Even if they did work that
11	was not associated with there is no license
12	required?
13	MR. DARNELL: No license required.
14	MR. KNOX: Okay. I saw an indication
15	that fuel was shipped from Mallinckrodt there in
16	St. Louis to Bendix. And I gave that as an exhibit.
17	MR. DARNELL: Are we on number 7?
18	CHAIR BEACH: Yes.
19	MR. KNOX: Number 7.
20	MR. DARNELL: Okay.
21	MR. KNOX: Did anyone run that down to
22	see if they have actual shipping records?
23	MR. DARNELL: We actually talked about

1	this in the 2014 Work Group.
2	And it's on page 317 of that transcript
3	where we discuss that there was metal handling at
4	the Kansas City Plant. It came from Bethlehem
5	Steel and Lackawanna.
6	And they were slugs. They were natural
7	uranium. They were not reactor components.
8	MR. KNOX: If you were to look in the
9	Mallinckrodt Site Profile, it indicates that
10	Bendix was a material a uranium handler
11	facility.
12	It also gives the name and I've
13	forgotten the codename for the fuel that they sent.
14	And I provided that, the codename that was shipped.
15	MR. DARNELL: Okay. In our response
16	to you in 2014 and our response to you today is that
17	we did not handle the Kansas City Plant did not
18	handle reactor fuel.
19	They did natural uranium meaning some
20	slugs. They got stuff from Lackawanna and
21	Bethlehem Steel which were DU and U materials that
22	were done for different projects.
23	There was no reactor fuel handled on the

1	site. That was the response in 2014. That's the
2	response now.
3	MR. KNOX: Did you look for any
4	shipping records of material to that facility?
5	MR. DARNELL: To Mallinckrodt or from
6	Mallinckrodt?
7	MR. KNOX: From Mallinckrodt to the
8	Kansas City Plant.
9	MR. DARNELL: No. The reason why we
LO	didn't have to was we had the Nuclear Materials
L1	Database that would have shown whether we had
L2	fissile or fissionable material onsite.
L3	There was none. There has not been
L4	any. It's not in the database.
L5	So again, our answer is this was never
L6	here.
L7	CHAIR BEACH: And that's back to NMMSS,
L8	correct?
L9	MR. DARNELL: NMMSS.
20	CHAIR BEACH: The NMMSS database, yes.
21	MR. MCCLOSKEY: If Mallinckrodt
22	shipped uranium to Bendix, it was not the Kansas
23	City division of Bendix. It was another Bendix

1	division.
2	MR. KNOX: I have to find out where it
3	went then because it was shipped to Bendix. And
4	they designated Bendix as a fuel-handling
5	facility.
6	MR. DARNELL: Remember, the Pioneer
7	Division had a reactor in Michigan.
8	MEMBER LOCKEY: Detroit.
9	MR. DARNELL: Okay, so just because it
10	says Bendix doesn't mean it came to Kansas City
11	Plant.
12	MR. KNOX: I agree and that's what I
13	wanted to run down to see. There are leads, there
14	are indications that they were processing
15	radioactive material.
16	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so you're
17	satisfied with that one?
18	MR. KNOX: No, I have work to do on it.
19	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, but for this Work
20	Group.
21	MR. KNOX: Number 8 we can move on.
22	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, number 8?
23	MR. KNOX: Yes, we can move on.

1	CHAIR BEACH: So you feel like thorium
2	dose reconstruction has been covered?
3	MR. KNOX: There are some issues but I
4	don't want to even get into that.
5	I'm not prepared. I don't have my
6	documentation to show you.
7	It's difficult for me to speak without
8	having a piece of paper to say, look at this.
9	And that's what I had before. I had all
10	my documentation, but I have no documentation now.
11	Okay. The period of number 9, the
12	period of coverage of SEC
13	CHAIR BEACH: So the Evaluation
14	Report. You're questioning the years that are
15	covered?
16	MR. KNOX: Yes. Why stop at '93?
17	MEMBER LOCKEY: That was an issue.
18	It's on our issues matrix, why we stopped there.
19	And we've gone back and forth to the
20	site getting documents about where we should stop
21	this evaluation.
22	You know, initially we decided it was
23	'93 in our Evaluation Report. And we looked at a

1	lot of the DOE audits of the facility, and a lot
2	of the statements that independent organizations
3	made about the facility.
4	And we convinced ourselves I can find
5	the issue number but I think we've closed that
6	one.
7	MR. DARNELL: Yes, it's one of the ones
8	that's closed.
9	Basically, the implementation of the
LO	DOE Radiological Control Manual and 10 CFR 835 with
L1	associated Price-Anderson Amendment acts leads the
L2	Working Group to believe that at that point in 1993
L3	that was dated I don't remember what that date
L4	was that the program was adequate and monitoring
L5	everything that it should be monitoring for the
L6	Kansas City site.
L7	There was nothing more to be discovered
L8	by searching later than 1993.
L9	MR. KNOX: Did you get any reports,
20	audit reports after 1993?
21	MR. DARNELL: Oh yes. That's part of
22	our Site Research Database.
23	MR. KNOX: But based upon my evaluation

1	of many facilities, they still had problems after
2	1993. It didn't go away just by us writing better
3	regulations and better requirements.
4	MR. DARNELL: They don't just appear by
5	saying that they're there either. What we need is
6	documentation.
7	MR. KNOX: Monitoring
8	MEMBER LOCKEY: So, we're okay with
9	number 9 then?
LO	CHAIR BEACH: Well, there's nothing to
L1	say that the years can't go if there's a petition
L2	put in and the petition is accepted for the years
L3	beyond what we're looking at here.
L4	There's nothing to say that that can't
L5	in the future happen. It's just not part of the
L6	business of this Working Group at this time.
L7	MR. KNOX: And tritium monitoring
L8	equipment that they were using, the training that
L9	they had.
20	And all of us recognized specialized
21	equipment is needed, and specialized training and
22	techniques are necessary to control tritium.
23	MR. DARNELL: Maybe you haven't been

1	informed. I thought you were mailed the tritium
2	White Papers that have gone out.
3	MEMBER LOCKEY: Can you speak a little
4	louder?
5	MR. DARNELL: Oh, I'm sorry. I
6	thought you had been mailed the tritium White
7	Papers that have gone out. We'll be discussing
8	tritium tomorrow for the bounding exposures and
9	everything that we found with tritium.
10	So if you're here tomorrow, that's when
11	we'll be discussing recovering tritium.
12	CHAIR BEACH: It's also part of the
13	documents that are on NIOSH's website that are
14	available to the public or to petitioners. So
15	those have been posted, and have been for a couple
16	of weeks now, I believe.
17	MR. DARNELL: Actually, it's been
18	quite a while.
19	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, it's been posted for
20	a while.
21	MR. KNOX: I believe you were
22	mentioning that people were pouring tritium into
23	a glass container. And I was wondering how

1	MR. DARNELL: When was that mentioned?
2	MR. KNOX: You mentioned it at a
3	meeting.
4	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, we've discussed it.
5	MR. DARNELL: We've discussed it. I'm
6	just trying to figure out where you're coming from.
7	MR. KNOX: And how was that controlled?
8	I've worked
9	CHAIR BEACH: It's all part of that
10	document.
11	MR. DARNELL: It's part of the paper.
12	We'll be talking about it tomorrow.
13	CHAIR BEACH: Yes. Okay. Number 4,
14	spread of uranium and other unknown number 11,
15	sorry. It's matrix issue number 4.
16	MR. KNOX: We've touched on that.
17	CHAIR BEACH: Yes. That's part of our
18	matrix so we have looked at that.
19	MR. KATZ: Can you just name it for the
20	record so that we know what we're talking about?
21	CHAIR BEACH: Oh, what it was? The
22	issue - spread of uranium and other unknown,
23	undetected contaminants.

1	And so you're okay with that at this
2	time?
3	MR. KNOX: Yes. The only comment that
4	I would like to make relative to that, and I have
5	just read the table that you provided of uranium
6	contamination that showed that it was in clean
7	areas.
8	And they were average values. And
9	average values don't mean a lot to me as a
10	dirty-hands health physicist.
11	You need to know what the raw data looks
12	like in these cases in order to determine the actual
13	levels of the contamination.
14	And average data has very little
15	meaning because we are supposed to be making
16	worst-case assessments.
17	MR. DARNELL: Now we're going back to
18	something that we've told you before, that is not
19	what we're supposed to do.
20	It is part of a process. It may or may
21	not be done depending on how we're using the numbers
22	and what part of dose we're reconstructing.
23	You can never say a blanket statement

1	that we have to use worst-case because it's not
2	true.
3	MR. KNOX: But average data doesn't
4	tell me anything.
5	MR. DARNELL: Well, I'm sorry that you
6	have you're objecting to the way the data was
7	presented.
8	Is there something that we can do for
9	you?
LO	MR. KNOX: Looking at the raw data.
L1	That's what I'm asking for.
L2	Now, I know you can't give it to me.
L3	MR. DARNELL: Sure. Send us a written
L4	request and we will be glad to send you copies of
L5	our data. Whatever that we can provide, we will
L6	provide you. But you have to ask for it in writing
L7	as part of a Freedom of Information Act.
L8	MR. KNOX: That's what I'm doing. And
L9	I've gathered my little team now and we're going
20	to go through all of this stuff.
21	MR. DARNELL: Okay.
22	MR. KNOX: Number 12, the HVAC system.
23	You had, good grief, maybe 100

1	different short stacks on that roof. You have
2	people that were continuously working on the
3	rooftop. And
4	MR. DARNELL: We've got pictures of the
5	roof in the Site Research Database.
6	There were a lot of stacks. It wasn't
7	hundreds. There was an office on the roof and
8	people assigned to do work on the roof.
9	When they were in radiation areas, as
LO	we discussed and repeatedly said, they had to be
L1	monitored. They had to be part of the medical
L2	monitoring. They had to have special training to
L3	do it.
L4	The rest of the workers up there had
L5	basic industrial hygiene requirements that had to
L6	be made for the environmental health programs that
L7	they had.
L8	I don't understand what your issue is.
L9	MR. KNOX: The issue is that
20	radioactive material was being released through
21	those vents.
22	From what I understand in talking to
23	workers they had no HEPA filtration on the systems

1	and they were short vents at breathing height.
2	MR. DARNELL: When you were speaking
3	with these workers, did you ascertain whether they
4	had a need to know about the classified systems that
5	were being used, and whether they had knowledge of
6	what you were asking them about?
7	MR. KNOX: I asked them about the
8	configuration of the HVAC system and the venting
9	system. And that's what I was told.
10	I looked at the picture, and you can go
11	in Google and you can see the top of the Building
12	1 there.
13	MR. DARNELL: Yes, and you certainly
14	MR. KNOX: And they smelled a lot of
15	odors up on the roof. So, any kind of radioactive
16	material release through those vents could have
17	been inhaled by those workers.
18	In addition to that you had many
19	different
20	MR. DARNELL: view if you had a site
21	that was doing a lot of radioactive material work.
22	That's not the case here. You had some
23	discrete projects that weren't going all the time.

The uranium was the worst stuff that 1 They had filtration. We saw the places 2 they had. 3 where they did the work. We saw the controls that they had in place because the remnants of them are 4 still there. 5 We see that there's no survey data 6 7 showing uranium still being there and still spread outside of the work area. 8 Because, you know, uranium half-life is 9 10 very long. If it was spread a lot it would still 11 be there. We would see it today. We're not seeing it today. 12 They're not seeing it on the roof. 13 other radioactive materials that could have gotten 14 15 to the roof are extremely low exposure potentials. 16 You're talking nickel-63, tritium. You basically had to have your snout up 17 against the vent to get an appreciable dose to begin 18 with for those radioactive materials. 19 20 So, I'm trying to figure out why is this 21 an issue to you. We've got workers in a program. 22 We've got workers that were monitored. We have 23 systems for the bad actors that had the filtration.

1	I don't even know whether the off-tritium work had
2	filtrations every time, but we have a dose bounding
3	for it and it's on the order of millirem per year
4	if they took the entire amount of tritium that was
5	used. So where's your problem?
6	MR. KNOX: I don't know. There is an
7	issue with monitoring.
8	I think there is an issue associated
9	with monitoring for tritium, based upon the quality
10	of health physicists you had there.
11	And the facility controlling tritium
12	is very hard. Filtering it, hey. It doesn't work
13	that way.
14	CHAIR BEACH: So, is that an item that
15	you can listen to the discussion on tritium
16	tomorrow during our Work Group session? And read
17	the report that's out.
18	MR. KNOX: Yes.
19	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. And then the HVAC
20	system, that covers that, correct?
21	MR. KNOX: Yes.
22	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. How about 13,
23	assay of the reported DU?

1	MR. KNOX: Yes. We spread around a lot
2	of recycled uranium.
3	And the question I have is, was any of
4	that recycled depleted uranium?
5	MR. DARNELL: I'm not sure I understand
6	what you're asking. I'm sorry.
7	MR. KNOX: You had uranium. Did you
8	have any recycled depleted uranium?
9	MR. MCCLOSKEY: What we fall back on
10	here is we use TBD-6000 in the Site Profile.
11	And so we use that in our ER to bound
12	doses.
13	And it makes an assumption that if
14	there's
15	MR. KNOX: I hate to do this, but I did
16	not take my old man's pill this morning.
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay. You want me to
18	pause while you
19	MR. KNOX: Would you like to pause?
20	MR. KATZ: Okay, we're just on a brief
21	break here for folks on the phone.
22	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
23	went off the record at 3:28 p.m. and resumed at 3:31

1	p.m.)
2	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so we're back.
3	(Simultaneous speaking)
4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Okay, so you make a
5	good point with DU. After a certain point in time
6	there's other contaminants in there.
7	And it actually came up as an issue that
8	this Work Group has been working on. We call it
9	issue number 5 on our issues matrix. We titled it
10	Recycled Uranium.
11	And what we relied upon in our
12	Evaluation Report for this SEC was a Site Profile
13	known as TBD-6000 written by Battelle. You can go
14	to the NIOSH website and find it and pull it up.
15	CHAIR BEACH: I was going to say the
16	matrix is listed for tomorrow's meeting. So you
17	can pull the full document and see the work that's
18	been done on all these issues.
19	MR. MCCLOSKEY: So you make a good
20	point. I mean, that is something that we were
21	concerned about.
22	And when you get to Battelle 6000 you'll
23	find Table 3.2 and it shows all the other nuclides

1	that we would consider were included in those
2	exposures after 1952 and we included all these with
3	the DU exposures.
4	CHAIR BEACH: And we concluded our work
5	on that and agreed that what's been done for that
6	particular incident has been well thought out and
7	closed.
8	The agenda that we gave you that's
9	listed the different issues, those are the ones
LO	that are still open of the 21 that we are still
L1	working on to come to some conclusion and
L2	resolution on.
L3	Everything else that's not listed on
L4	here from 1 to 21 has been closed by the Work Group,
L5	or put on what we call a TBD. And that will be
L6	worked through a TBD Site Profile. That will be
L7	changed in that process.
L8	So, just for a little more
L9	understanding there.
20	Okay, so where are we at? So, 13 we're
21	done with. Fourteen.
22	MR. KNOX: Fourteen.
23	CHAIR BEACH: Is there anything more to

1	say?
2	MR. KNOX: We're back to that. And I
3	have to do some more investigation in that.
4	I'll go over to Burt Hall and do some
5	research on that.
6	CHAIR BEACH: So, for those of you on
7	the phone, if you don't have this list, number 14
8	was on the nuclear reactor development testing and
9	indicators, and Burt Hall nuclear reactor.
10	It is our understanding there was not
11	a nuclear reactor ever at KCP. So, that's our
12	stand on that.
13	And Wayne, you said you want to do some
14	more research on that. And that's fine. Okay.
15	So, 15, the Ferguson Bendix president
16	testimony before congressional hearing committee.
17	What was your issue with that for us?
18	MR. KNOX: Well, if you read the now,
19	I understand you have a different interpretation
20	of what he said in his testimony.
21	But it indicated that they had hired 100
22	nuclear workers from the failed airplane reactor
23	and indicated that they were developing nuclear

1	technology.
2	And there were indications that it was
3	being done at the Kansas City Plant, at least part
4	of it. Not all of it, but part of it was being done
5	at the Kansas City Plant.
6	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. And we have found
7	no proof of that and have no documentation on that.
8	So this, from where we're at we, don't believe there
9	was one, correct? Okay. So that one we're done
10	with also.
11	MR. DARNELL: Malcolm P. Ferguson was
12	the president of Bendix Detroit.
13	CHAIR BEACH: Right. He was the
14	president of Bendix Detroit. So, okay.
15	So, it may have happened, but it was not
16	at the Kansas City Plant. That's our
17	understanding so that's the stand we'll take on
18	that, okay?
19	So, number 16, use and monitoring of
20	special nuclear materials.
21	MR. KNOX: With this one, you didn't
22	have any.
23	CHAIR BEACH: There was none. Yes,

1	that follows with the okay. So, at this time
2	we have found no proof or documentation of any
3	nuclear material sources, no reason for it to be
4	there. They weren't doing anything with special
5	nuclear materials at Kansas City.
6	MR. KNOX: And that the DOL SIMS is
7	incorrect.
8	CHAIR BEACH: I think you're
9	misinterpreting the way that is being used. So,
10	that's just my view of that.
11	MR. MCCLOSKEY: They keep listing on
12	there their PuBe source, right? It's a
13	plutonium-beryllium source, plutonium-239.
14	And plutonium-239 is a special nuclear
15	material. But in this case it's used as a tool,
16	right? It's just a source. They liked the way
17	that it emits neutrons. They used that for that
18	purpose.
19	CHAIR BEACH: And we have a list of all
20	the sources that were used from the beginning of
21	time at Kansas City Plant.
22	I mean, we've seen it, we've all looked
23	at it. Okay.

1	So that one so the next one is number
2	17, Mallinckrodt versus Battelle.
3	Okay, so this is back to the TBD-6000.
4	What was your issue there, Wayne? That was not
5	clear.
6	MR. KNOX: The issue was that in this
7	Mallinckrodt document, it listed Battelle as a
8	I mean it listed Bendix as a fuel-handling
9	facility.
10	And I felt that that was the one that
11	should be used in characterizing the exposure.
12	But even if you use Battelle's 6000 you
13	get some reasonable doses. So, they're not that
14	far apart.
15	CHAIR BEACH: So, Joe, excuse me for a
16	second. Joe, that was one that SC&A looked at. I
17	think you had Ron look at it. I have a paragraph
18	on it but I don't know.
19	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, we have a
20	discussion tomorrow too. So, I don't know how you
21	want to handle that.
22	Ron will be on the phone tomorrow for
23	some detailed discussion. He can answer

1	questions. That might be a better way to do it.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, save some of
3	that
4	MR. FITZGERALD: I would save it, since
5	he's going to be right available.
6	CHAIR BEACH: Okay.
7	MR. KNOX: The only argument that I had
8	was that since this document, the Mallinckrodt
9	document listed Bendix as the fuel-handling
LO	facility. That one should be used versus
L1	Battelle.
L2	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Oh, I see.
L3	MR. DARNELL: I'm sorry, we can't do
L4	that.
L5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Yes, we have strict
L6	rules about what can apply to a work site.
L7	We're allowed to use TBD-6000 for
L8	MR. DARNELL: But we can't unless
L9	there is a technical position stating why a method
20	contained within the technical basis calculation
21	for Mallinckrodt would apply to Kansas City, then
22	we can't use it. It's against our rules.
23	MR. KNOX: Well, the general rule was

1	that the regulations that exist at the time of the
2	incident are the ones that should be used. The
3	regulations that exist at the time of the event are
4	the ones that should be used.
5	MR. DARNELL: That's absolutely wrong.
6	What we do is go back in and recalculate the doses
7	according to the best methods and procedures we
8	have today.
9	If I went back and did it the way they
LO	did it in the 1950s, you'd have no doses, you'd have
L1	no SECs, you'd have no problems.
L2	MR. KNOX: That's true.
L3	MR. DARNELL: Okay? So what you're
L4	saying is absolutely incorrect.
L5	MR. KNOX: But from the fact that they
L6	were designated as a fuel-handling facility.
L7	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Well, first of all
L8	MR. KNOX: The problem is that
L9	MR. DARNELL: It's not a fuel-handling
20	Kansas City Plant is not a fuel-handling
21	facility. It never has been, never will be, never
22	going to be.
23	MR. MCCLOSKEY: I believe that Bendix

1	reference in that Mallinckrodt document is not the
2	Bendix in Kansas City.
3	And a lot of thought goes into the
4	development of these procedures to make sure they
5	apply to each facility we use.
6	CHAIR BEACH: So, on that particular
7	one, Joe had asked Ron to do some work on it.
8	I just gave him that paragraph.
9	MR. FITZGERALD: I guess we had the
10	same reaction. It didn't seem like there was
11	anything in the TBD that referenced Mallinckrodt
12	so much.
13	There was a reference to an MDA value
14	which the Kansas City TBD uses the greater of any
15	of the values for the uranium, 10 micrograms per
16	liter.
17	And it's not clear what your issue is
18	I guess is the real problem here.
19	MR. KNOX: The main concern was that
20	that document, that is, the Mallinckrodt document
21	identified Bendix as a fuel-handling facility.
22	CHAIR BEACH: Bendix Kansas City?
23	MR. FITZGERALD: See, that's the

1	problem. I don't think it's Bendix Kansas City.
2	I think we're back into the issue of which Bendix
3	because Bendix is a large company, has all these
4	different facilities.
5	And we've gone into this issue before,
6	that it's not the Kansas City division. It's
7	probably another division that you're referring
8	to.
9	I think one thing we need to do is
10	clarify which division of Bendix is being
11	referenced in the Mallinckrodt document.
12	I suspect in fact, we confirmed it,
13	that they did not receive any fuel from anywhere
14	at Kansas City.
15	We checked the classified inventory to
16	make sure there was nothing in the way of enriched
17	uranium or plutonium or anything of that sort and
18	confirmed that was the case.
19	And these are classified records, and
20	found nothing. So, if there would have been
21	anything, any fissile material, any fuel, that
22	would have been very clear from that.
23	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We don't just trust one

1	document. We go and we get all
2	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, I think we
3	wanted to go and look at the classified database
4	just to really make sure there was nothing that was
5	going on.
6	MR. DARNELL: And we were also looking
7	for other things that were classified.
8	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, yes, just to make
9	sure there was nothing that we wouldn't expect to
10	see at Kansas City.
11	We did not find anything that we didn't
12	expect to see at Kansas City.
13	And a lot of that was from, I think, the
14	original concerns that were expressed. We wanted
15	to confirm that even though nothing in the
16	unclassified documents spoke to it, nothing in the
17	classified did either.
18	CHAIR BEACH: All right. So then next
19	one, 18 is not applicable to what we're doing.
20	It's chemical. We're just talking radiological
21	exposure.
22	So, just for the record 18 is
23	synergistic effects of simultaneous chemical and

1	radiological exposure by multiple pathways.
2	So, I don't know, I guess you can talk
3	about the radiological. We pretty much covered.
4	Is there something
5	MR. DARNELL: What are you missing?
6	MR. KATZ: Wayne just left the room for
7	a moment so we're just going to break again.
8	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
9	went off the record at 3:44 p.m. and resumed at 3:49
LO	p.m.)
L1	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so we were talking
L2	about 18, radiological exposure by multiple
L3	pathways.
L4	We eliminated the first part because
L5	we're not here to discuss chemicals.
L6	Is there anything more that we need to
L7	talk about on that one, Wayne?
L8	MR. KNOX: No, no. But that chemical
L9	damage to the lungs can impact the uptake of
20	radioactive retention factors associated with the
21	lungs.
22	CHAIR BEACH: I understand, but it's
23	not something we can cover here. So that one is

1	off the table then? All right.
2	So the next one, absorption/injection
3	pathways, DR.
4	MR. KNOX: A lot of those workers have
5	cuts. If you look at their records they have a lot
6	of cuts and scrapes.
7	And you will have the injection
8	particles of radioactive material into their skin,
9	especially those who work with the lathe.
10	And I know that produces a lot of skin
11	cancers which are not really covered under this
12	act.
13	CHAIR BEACH: Well, I think most rad
14	workers are trained that if they have open wounds
15	they are supposed to have them covered.
16	Whether they did or not I can't say, but
17	I know that that's pretty ABC training.
18	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Early on at the Kansas
19	City Plant, this is that same document I showed you
20	earlier with the procedures that were in place.
21	And so this began in 1951 is the date
22	on this one.
23	And Section 1.06 says, First aid and

1	treatment following accidents.
2	Minor lacerations. Any minor
3	laceration received on the hands or body as a result
4	of contact with the uranium-238 will be treated in
5	the following manner.
6	Wash the hand affected area. Wash
7	the affected area thoroughly with soap and water.
8	Check the affected area for contamination with an
9	alpha counter.
LO	Report to first aid where the wound will
L1	be examined thoroughly with a high-powered
L2	magnifying glass and all foreign bodies removed.
L3	So, I mean they had procedures in place
L4	to address, and it goes on.
L5	A periodic recheck will be made by the
L6	medical department until the wound is completely
L7	healed.
L8	It is permissible to continue working
L9	with uranium with very small lacerations on the
20	hand provided they are bandaged and gloves are
21	worn.
22	So if you show up to medical with one
23	of these cuts, they're going to make sure you get

1	a bandage on it.
2	And you have to wear additional PPE,
3	i.e., gloves. So they had at the very beginning,
4	the very onset of their radioactive work there
5	procedures in place to address cuts, wounds.
6	MR. KNOX: Okay.
7	MR. MCCLOSKEY: That was SRDB 128346.
8	MR. KNOX: I'm going to request a copy
9	of that too.
10	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Sure. And that's just
11	one iteration of the health and safety procedures
12	required to enter the radioactive areas where they
13	did the radioactive work.
14	I have many iterations of those
15	procedures over the years as they were revised as
16	you would expect.
17	MR. KNOX: Did you find, number 20, did
18	they do a lot of radiography work there with
19	sources?
20	MR. DARNELL: As far as finding records
21	of radiography work, I don't remember finding that
22	much.
23	It was an industrial plant, so I would

1	assume yes, they did.
2	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, they had a lot
3	of sealed sources. They did some radiography.
4	We did check on iridium and on cobalt.
5	We didn't find any iridium, but certainly found
6	references to cobalt-60 use at the plant for that
7	purpose.
8	So yes, they did do those kind of
9	procedures using cobalt-60.
10	And it's an industrial plant so it's not
11	too surprising they would be using gauge sources
12	to do that.
13	MR. KNOX: What about the procedures
14	established in the boundaries?
15	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. I mean, we saw
16	the documentation for use of those sources. And
17	they certainly had a program for that. And they
18	were sealed sources.
19	In terms of radiography they had
20	radiography procedures. And those were
21	documented. We certainly can make those
22	available. I mean, that's part of the record.
23	Now, granted it was part of this

1	integrated safety program including industrial
2	hygiene, health physics and industrial safety was
3	all together until I guess it was was it '87?
4	Something like that.
5	So, it was managed that way. But
6	nonetheless the plant had experience and did, in
7	fact, manage a radiography program, sealed source
8	program, did those kinds of procedures.
9	Had a fairly good record. They had a
10	couple of incidents the worst of which was the
11	promethium incident and you're familiar with that.
12	But other than that there's a pretty
13	documented history of that. That's fairly well
14	documented.
15	MR. MCCLOSKEY: You can look in the SEC
16	Evaluation Report. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show all the
17	different types of sources that were used at the
18	site and how they were used.
19	MR. FITZGERALD: As I recall it's also
20	cesium and cobalt are the two that seem to be the
21	prominent sources.
22	They did have plutonium-beryllium
23	sources, but they were not very they were only

1	I think used sparingly. It was mostly cobalt and
2	cesium.
3	MR. KNOX: But I was also concerned
4	about the exposure of people on the roof.
5	Because when you set up those
6	boundaries, and I've seen this where they set up
7	the boundaries downstairs and they forget about the
8	exposure to people that are on the roof.
9	MR. FITZGERALD: We looked at
10	incidents and we actually did not find any
11	experience with exposures like that.
12	They did inadvertently expose
13	individuals in an adjacent room. We did look at
14	that incident. And certainly there were some
15	exposure to those individuals, but it wasn't very
16	high.
17	But it was an accident. It was written
18	up as an accident.
19	So, over the history of radiography use
20	it was fairly good except they did have, in fact,
21	that one.
22	It was an incident where they had
23	individuals who were not part of the radiography

1	operation in an adjacent room.
2	And the way the beam was set up they were
3	exposed.
4	And that was written up pretty much as
5	an incident.
6	We did investigate that because that
7	would have been a potential if it weren't
8	investigated and the doses weren't estimated that
9	could have been an unmonitored exposure.
10	So, we chased that one down because that
11	certainly could have been potentially a high
12	exposure.
13	It turned out it was not in terms of
14	where the individuals were.
15	The potential was there. But the
16	individuals were not positioned so that they were
17	exposed.
18	So, we did look at the incident record
19	primarily because of the way the program was set
20	up.
21	When you have radiography like that
22	it's not you don't have a routine exposure
23	monitor. You have external badging, but you don't

1	have routine exposure monitors.
2	We looked at what the history of
3	inadvertent exposures might have been and whether
4	or not there was a history of that thing going on.
5	But they had set it up where the
6	radiography was being done in a very controlled
7	environment in a certain room.
8	They had indicated where the shielding
9	would have been, where the workers would have been
10	positioned.
11	And they were pretty careful about it.
12	They slipped up once that we can find. We didn't
13	find any other experiences where they had slipped
14	up.
15	And certainly in terms of the beam going
16	up, that would have been a major issue since they
17	were doing beams horizontally.
18	So, there was no evidence that they, in
19	fact, had an inadvertent beam going up to the roof.
20	But if you're interested we can
21	certainly get the document. We did look at that
22	one that we did turn up.
23	MR. KNOX: Okay. Related to that is

1	the exposure from all of these
2	radiation-generating machines.
3	Did they use NCRP 49 or some other
4	method of procedure for determining the exposure
5	of people?
6	MR. FITZGERALD: I'd have to go back
7	and see what the actual standard referenced. They
8	did have a proceduralized program.
9	Now, that changed over time. They
10	started fairly far back, in the sixties using
11	radiography. So, as they moved forward those
12	standards shifted and were updated.
13	So, whether it was NCRP 49 at some point
14	in that continuum of time I'm not positive.
15	But I certainly one thing we can do
16	as an action is make sure you have that timeline
17	of which radiography procedures would have been at
18	any time from the early sixties through almost
19	current time, actually.
20	CHAIR BEACH: Excuse me. Sorry,
21	Wayne. Timeline for when
22	MR. FITZGERALD: If that's of
23	interest, radiography used at the plant and what

1	the basis of the procedures would have been at the
2	time.
3	Now, a lot of these were based on DOE
4	orders that were, in fact, based on standards. So,
5	you could certainly paint the picture it was DOE
6	order XXY that had this particular standard
7	referenced as the standard of practice for
8	radiography.
9	But I'll tell you from history that
10	radiography was pretty, you know, it was used
11	almost everywhere at DOE and AEC before that.
12	So, there was a pretty standardized
13	procedure on how one does that and how you design
14	facilities so you do it safely.
15	So, that's something that I think we
16	would certainly we did look at that. And like
17	I said, it was pretty much consistent with practice
18	elsewhere.
19	MR. KNOX: So, they did the shielding
20	design studies.
21	MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, you had the
22	when you're using cobalt-60 in this kind of
23	radiography, obviously, you have to have the

1	engineering right, have the beam and the target in
2	the right locations.
3	You have to have even occupancy in
4	rooms. That's where they slipped up. They had
5	occupancy in a room that shouldn't have been
6	occupied when they were shooting the beam.
7	So, those kind of things needed to be
8	proceduralized.
9	CHAIR BEACH: Is that your action or
10	NIOSH?
11	MR. FITZGERALD: I'll give it to NIOSH.
12	No.
13	(Laughter)
14	MR. FITZGERALD: Whatever the Work
15	Group wants to do.
16	CHAIR BEACH: What do you say, NIOSH?
17	Do you want that action?
18	MR. DARNELL: Not really.
19	CHAIR BEACH: It sounds like you have
20	it pretty well covered.
21	MR. FITZGERALD: We can do it.
22	MR. KATZ: Wayne just stepped out so
23	we'll break again.

1	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
2	went off the record at 4:00 p.m. and resumed at 4:02
3	p.m.)
4	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, there's one
5	more item on our list, 21, radiation generating
6	machine exposure and shielding design study.
7	Wayne, what was your thought on that?
8	MR. KNOX: We just basically talked
9	about that.
10	CHAIR BEACH: I thought so but I wanted
11	to make sure.
12	So, anything else then?
13	MR. KNOX: No. No, not today.
14	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, from this list I've
15	got a couple of actions. The one we just talked
16	about on the timeline for the radiography and
17	procedures in place. SC&A is going to take that.
18	For Mr. Knox, if you want the raw data,
19	you'll have to FOIA NIOSH.
20	And the nuclear fleas on the filtration
21	system, that's also for you to provide
22	documentation to us.
23	As far as the equipment that was sold

1	to the public and you asked if we had survey reports
2	for them, I'm not clear on what would be an action
3	there, or if there would be one.
4	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We can show you
5	examples of surveys of equipment. I don't know
6	that anything got to the public based on what Josie
7	just said there equipment-wise.
8	CHAIR BEACH: So, would you be content
9	with a memo on that? Or what are you looking for
10	there? Do you want to see the actual survey?
11	MR. KNOX: That's what I would
12	ideally I would like to see the actual survey
13	results.
14	CHAIR BEACH: Is that a FOIA request
15	then?
16	MR. DARNELL: Yes, it has to be.
17	That's a FOIA request to Kansas City.
18	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. Because we can
19	provide you with a memo, but if you want the actual
20	surveys you'll have to FOIA that.
21	MR. KNOX: Okay.
22	CHAIR BEACH: And then the exit
23	surveys, you talked about that, from the rad areas.

1	We showed you a procedure. Does that
2	take care of that? Or is there something more that
3	we need to do?
4	The procedures in place that said what
5	the procedure was for people to do when they exited
6	the areas, when they were injured.
7	Are you okay with that, or do you need
8	more?
9	MR. KNOX: Well, I'm not based upon
LO	what I have been told they did not do it.
L1	The people that came over there from
L2	when they went out to lunch, they did not perform
L3	an exit survey. When they brought tools over there
L4	from GSA and they worked on contaminated systems,
L5	they said they did not survey the equipment.
L6	CHAIR BEACH: There's no way for us to
L7	prove they did or didn't other than what procedures
L8	were in place at the time, unless you can think of
L9	something else that would help you there.
20	MR. DARNELL: The other thing you
21	really need to remember when you're talking to
22	these workers. You have to ascertain whether they
23	know what they were actually working on or not.

1	In a lot of cases because of the way
2	security was set up at Kansas City, these workers
3	had no idea.
4	So it would be for more than my guess
5	would be that more than 95 percent of them would
6	never survey in or out of anywhere because they
7	weren't working with radioactive materials.
8	But they never knew whether they were
9	or were not to begin with.
LO	That's the only thing I can tell you.
L1	It doesn't surprise me that you hear from the
L2	workers that they didn't survey. Because it would
L3	be my venture to guess they weren't working with
L4	it anyway.
L5	Like I said, very small footprint of
L6	where the actual radioactive work took place on
L7	that site.
L8	One little corner of a huge upper level
L9	of the Bendix facility was where the work was done
20	in the 1950s.
21	And it was no bigger than, what, 40
22	feet?
23	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, it was a pretty

1	small area.
2	MR. DARNELL: Very small area compared
3	to the rest.
4	Department 20. Metal walls. HEPA
5	filters. Filtration in place. You can still see
6	it. You can still see the boxes where the filters
7	were in the facility.
8	You can we had the rad tech people
9	standing there telling us we did these surveys.
LO	And then we're explaining to him how he
L1	needs to do some more. You need MARSSIM.
L2	But they're not finding any
L3	contamination. They're not finding uranium.
L4	We go to one small area that's about 6
L5	by 12 and they're finding some contamination 6
L6	inches down in the cement.
L7	But they're looking for it. It's just
L8	not being found, okay?
L9	So your workers telling you they didn't
20	get surveyed, they didn't do their surveying, I
21	believe them. I believe you.
22	But I also know and believe that they
23	probably weren't ever working with the radioactive

1	material simply because of not only what we've
2	seen, but what we know about how the radioactive
3	material was used at the plant.
4	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so that is the list
5	that you gave us prior to the January 20 meeting.
6	You still have time but I wanted to
7	check again to see if Mister [identifying
8	information redacted], if you're on the phone?
9	(No response)
10	CHAIR BEACH: Okay. So, Wayne, the
11	floor is yours.
12	MR. KNOX: Okay. There were I don't
13	know how much time you want to spend with this, but
14	there were some other issues.
15	I have to do some more research on this,
16	but looking at air flow characterization studies
17	and air balance.
18	Looking at the met data and looking at
19	the intakes of facilities around that.
20	CHAIR BEACH: For facilities outside
21	of Kansas City Plant? Is that what you just said?
22	MR. KNOX: Yes, facilities you had
23	a number of buildings around the Kansas City Plant.

1	Some were owned by DOE.
2	It wasn't just the main building.
3	There were others.
4	So, I was just looking at what is the
5	possibilities of the releases occurring there from
6	the main building and moving into another facility.
7	CHAIR BEACH: Based on the sources that
8	we've been looking at, I would say it's very small
9	if nonexistent possibility.
10	MR. DARNELL: Again, we've not found
11	the spread of contamination. We've not found
12	contamination anywhere that it wasn't supposed to
13	be.
14	MR. MCCLOSKEY: We have a blurb in our
15	ER about their environmental monitoring program,
16	about their staff monitoring and stuff. I'll see
17	if I can find it.
18	MR. DARNELL: What is it you're trying
19	to say in this regard?
20	MR. KNOX: The people at Hanford when
21	I came there, and just like at this plant here, you
22	had we had actual health physicists there.
23	But the HAMTC workers, we got the

1	radiation technicians from HAMTC. And they were
2	the lowest qualified people at HAMTC.
3	They did not do a good job because they
4	were not qualified to do it. They were not
5	trained. They didn't have the education to do it.
6	And I'm saying what I think happened at
7	Kansas City. You don't give people the equipment
8	to do their job. You don't give them the training
9	to do their job.
LO	And therefore you don't see the
L1	radiation. You don't see the radiation exposure
L2	because you're not measuring it. You don't give
L3	them the proper equipment to do it.
L4	MR. DARNELL: What is the half-life of
L5	uranium?
L6	MR. KNOX: Long. I should say it
L7	depends upon which isotope you're talking about.
L8	MR. DARNELL: Depleted uranium,
L9	natural uranium, very long half-life.
20	MEMBER LOCKEY: Four and a half billion
21	years.
22	MR. DARNELL: Yes, okay. Very long
23	half-life.

1	We can agree that the Kansas City Plant
2	has not been there longer than one half-life.
3	Okay?
4	So, if I have a release of uranium
5	through a stack onto a roof with thick tarring
6	material like any other roof that's built, I
7	release uranium up there. It's been less than 4
8	and a half billion years. I should still find it.
9	MR. KNOX: My basic concern is that I'm
10	not associating with people who are being honest,
11	and actually made appropriate surveys.
12	MR. DARNELL: I can't help you with
13	that. That's your feeling.
14	MR. KNOX: That's my honest opinion.
15	MR. DARNELL: Okay. Thank you for
16	your opinion, but that really has no bearing on what
17	we're doing here.
18	MR. KNOX: Anyway, let's just end it.
19	I apologize, but this is unexpected.
20	MR. DARNELL: Are you sure I can't take
21	you to the hospital or to a pharmacy?
22	MR. KNOX: We can go to Costco because
23	that's where I have the

1	MR. KATZ: We're breaking again.
2	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
3	went off the record at 4:13 p.m. and resumed at 4:21
4	p.m.)
5	MR. KATZ: Pat wants to report out some
6	of the work he did in response to petitioner issues.
7	So if you could that, then we'll close.
8	MR. MCCLOSKEY: At the January meeting
9	we were taking notes on some of the things that you
10	and [identifying information redacted] brought up.
11	You gave us a list of names of people
12	to interview. I don't remember if it was you or
13	[identifying information redacted], but we went
14	and interviewed those folks. And we're going to
15	talk about some of that tomorrow.
16	I know it was [identifying information
17	redacted] said to go look for these documents
18	called Engineering Process Controls documents
19	because they'll have some of the procedures there.
20	We sent a list of keywords to the site,
21	to Kansas City Plant. The Work Group and NIOSH all
22	worked together on generating these lists.
23	And the site pulled out boxes that were

responsive to those keywords. And we pored over 1 thousands of pages there in March. I didn't 2 3 actually make the trip. A number of people in this room did, and others. 4 We did all those interviews for you 5 6 guys. 7 And one of the things also that [identifying information redacted] brought up was 8 this place that he referred to as the lab. I don't 9 know if you remember that conversation. 10 11 it was underneath the -- I was hoping he would be 12 here to hear this as we're showing what I found. He said it was in the basement south of 13 the cafeteria. And he said, I had to go down there 14 15 and clean that area out, and I want you guys to learn what was in there and find out what I was handling 16 when I was in that area. 17 And so we sent them the keywords and 18 19 they pulled all the documents. And one document I found, and we're 20 21 pretty sure we have the area because at that 22 meeting, I don't know if you remember, but I walked over to [identifying information redacted] and I 23

1	had him point to where it was on the map.
2	And I gave the site, the Kansas City
3	Plant the actual post numbers. I said look for
4	anything within this area, any documents you can
5	find.
6	And so this document confirmed that we
7	were talking about the same area.
8	And they referred to it as the lap shop,
9	L-A-P. And I was going to ask [identifying
10	information redacted] if there was any chance he
11	over the years got it remembered wrong or
12	something.
13	But it was a machining area. And it was
14	pretty secure. They were working on one of the
15	weapons programs down there, but there was no
16	radioactive material.
17	Now, there could have been a source
18	taken down there to be used to take measurements.
19	I didn't find any record of that. But there was
20	no machining of radioactive material down there,
21	but they did clean it out and convert it over to
22	a different purpose.
23	And for anyone that wants to read this

1	report it's SRDB reference 142000.
2	MR. KNOX: SRDB
3	MR. MCCLOSKEY: One four two.
4	MR. KNOX: One four two.
5	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Zero zero. It's
6	one of the ones we retrieved from the site in March
7	of this year.
8	So they cleaned out this area. I think
9	I can tell you some of the machines they had there
10	it would have been best for [identifying
11	information redacted] to hear.
12	So, the above lap shop support items
13	could be removed to the southwest corner of the lap
14	shop and provided the southeast corner a partition
15	to prevent contamination of the main lap shop area.
16	Adequate space is made.
17	So they talk about, you know, can they
18	give up part of the cafeteria area down there in
19	the basement to make room for this machine.
20	And so several people went down there.
21	And there's maps that show what they were taking
22	out.
23	So maybe [identifying information

1	redacted] can get hold of that document, confirm
2	what he remembers from that time period.
3	MR. KATZ: Sounds like it's right on
4	target from that discussion.
5	CHAIR BEACH: Yes, it does.
6	MR. KNOX: Yes, it does.
7	CHAIR BEACH: Thank you. Okay, Work
8	Group Members. Any questions, comments? Any
9	issues you have or topics you want more information
10	on?
11	[Identifying information redacted],
12	sorry you feel like you were caught off guard and
13	are not feeling well. I mean Wayne, I'm sorry. I
14	was just writing [identifying information
15	redacted] down here.
16	So, Wayne, any other issues you'd like
17	to cover? It's not quite 5.
18	MR. KNOX: Well, there's always my
19	when I got trapped in was thoriated rods crapping
20	up my plutonium facility.
21	They have those rods and they do welding
22	that releases radioactive material to the air.
23	CHAIR BEACH: Did KCP have thoriated

1	rods? I think we looked at that issue.
2	MR. KNOX: I don't know. I don't know
3	if they had it.
4	MR. FITZGERALD: I don't recall. You
5	know, that would have been, if they did any welding
6	it would have
7	CHAIR BEACH: Right, of course.
8	MR. FITZGERALD: We didn't notice
9	anything, obviously.
10	MR. KNOX: Yes. And I'm still
11	confused at why they label this a non-nuclear
12	facility when clearly it was not.
13	MR. FITZGERALD: Well, this gets into
14	the nomenclature DOE and AEC used. They had
15	different classifications and they based it on a
16	facility safety assessment.
17	And they had nuclear facilities. But
18	to be a nuclear facility in the DOE-AEC world you
19	had to have certain sources of nuclear material.
20	And plants like Kansas City, Pinellas
21	and some others did have some radiological sources,
22	but not to the extent and scope that they would have
23	classified them as nuclear.

Nuclear meaning that you would have had 1 to have engineered safeguards. You would have had 2 3 certain facilities like they had at Rocky Flats, Los Alamos that were rigorous enough to control 4 radiation. 5 Places like Kansas City, they had 6 7 radioactive sources, but they were incidental to a non-nuclear mission. 8 They actually -- Kansas City built the 9 10 non-nuclear components of weapons. So thev 11 focused on that. But to do that they needed to have some 12 sources because they had to have, as we point out, 13 radiography to make sure that the metals were 14 15 joined the right way, the welds were correct and 16 all the rest. They had -- in the very early days 17 before they got into the regular mission they, like 18 19 most of the other atomic energy facilities, participated in producing rods. 20 Because back in the early Cold War, 21 22 a rush to produce plutonium. So was everybody practically did uranium slugs and sent 23

1	them over to be irradiated in Savannah River. So
2	that was just a sign of the times.
3	But their mission after that rush in the
4	early fifties was basically non-nuclear.
5	But when they classify a complex, a site
6	as non-nuclear that doesn't mean they had nothing
7	on the site that had something to do with
8	radiological.
9	They had some radiological. Not to the
10	extent that you would have a nuclear classification
11	and everything that goes with it.
12	It comes down to the facility safety
13	analysis. That's where the classification comes
14	from.
15	So they were classified as a
16	non-nuclear facility. And there were others that
17	were non-nuclear facilities as well in DOE.
18	But again, all those had some
19	radiological sources. They just weren't as
20	they weren't designed to be as rigorous with
21	controlling the plutonium, the uranium.
22	They weren't fabrication facilities
23	like Portsmouth and Paducah. They weren't testing

1	facilities like Nevada Test Site. They weren't
2	laboratories like Lawrence Livermore and Los
3	Alamos.
4	So, they didn't have that.
5	MR. KNOX: What really maybe I
6	shouldn't get into that.
7	MR. DARNELL: No, please. This is
8	what we're here for.
9	MR. KNOX: Well, back in the good old
10	days we retrieved materials from our friends as
11	well as our enemies. And I was a part of that
12	process.
13	And you didn't know the whole pathway.
14	You knew that the materials were obtained, and they
15	went back to the U.S. Where they went you didn't
16	know.
17	And that the Kansas City Plant to me
18	would have been a great cover facility. It's
19	designated as a non-nuclear. It has all of these
20	it has a railroad that goes by it and has tunnels
21	underground, all these big facilities.
22	And it's located in the city. No one
23	would ever suspect that we were doing all of this

work there.

Well, this is just me.

MR. FITZGERALD: Let me just answer you your concern this way. Because certainly one of the reasons we spent a great deal of time looking at the classified information, what would be considered Secret information and documents at each of the sites is to be absolutely sure that there weren't any programs that weren't public, but were nonetheless involving radioactive materials that would have presented some exposure to the workers.

And for Kansas City, and I can tell you directly because I actually went through those files, I went and looked at the total nuclear inventory, classified nuclear inventory for Kansas City over the years, just to be sure in my own mind as well as for the Work Group that there weren't any materials that was somehow surreptitiously or maybe in a military program that was classified that was coming onsite and being applied.

To be absolutely sure of that. Because we can look at the public record. But I think that

for some of the concerns you have, that back in the 1 Cold War there weren't any instances where this 2 3 material was somehow finding its way on the site. And I can say for Kansas City we did look 4 very, very closely at the classified database and 5 did not see anything that would lead us to believe 6 7 that there were any sources of material coming on the site that way. 8 Now, that's not to say that there were 9 10 not programs that brought back things like Russian 11 plutonium, what have you, as part non-nuclear program as one of those programs that 12 did that. 13 But there were other places in DOE that 14 15 And they were engineered in a way that 16 could receive that material safely. DOE's system, and we'll just mention 17 that, had a facility safety system where you could 18 19 not receive materials unless your facility was classified as one as being engineered to safely 20 receive it. 21 22 You just could not possess or keep that 23 material there unless you had that kind

1	assessment that was already done.
2	And if nothing else, that system got
3	more and more rigorous over the years.
4	So, a lot of our attention is to make
5	sure going back in time that when things were looser
6	that some of this material, whether it was fissile
7	material or it was something else, didn't get
8	onsite in some form or some program that would have
9	led to an exposure that wasn't a public exposure
10	wasn't publicly known.
11	So, that's how I would answer your
12	question.
13	We didn't take it for granted that
14	Kansas City never received anything just because
15	the public record said it did not. We went and
16	looked at a lot of these records that aren't public
17	to be absolutely sure about that.
18	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Prior to you guys
19	filing a petition in 2013 and [identifying
20	information redacted], none of our documents, our
21	Site Profile, noted machining of natural uranium.
22	That wasn't listed anywhere, and
23	neither was the mag-thorium machining. It wasn't

1	listed.
2	Because you guys filed that petition,
3	we went to the site and said tell us again about
4	all of these materials.
5	And we discovered something they had
6	forgotten about, or maybe from need to know, you
7	know, they just didn't include it in their
8	documents that they had machined uranium or
9	mag-thorium.
10	And now we know about that because we
11	went through this process.
12	MR. FITZGERALD: I would even add to
13	that, and you'll hear about this tomorrow with
14	tritium and nickel-63.
15	That was identified and pursued based
16	on our going through weekly activity reports that
17	were written in the 1960s week by week in
18	microfilm.
19	That's how we picked that up. Because
20	we went through reels and reels and
21	happened upon a mention that tritium was being
22	handled in 1963.

And that led to, frankly, uncovering a

23

1	program that everybody had really forgotten about.
2	You know, this was 50 years ago.
3	And that's kind of the investigation
4	that we go through. We go through the records.
5	Even if nobody says anything about any of these
6	programs, what records exist, even if they're 50
7	or 60 years old, if there's any mention that opens
8	up an investigation into that particular program.
9	So, that's how tritium came about. And
10	we're just mentioning how these others were
11	identified, mag-thorium and the uranium cores.
12	I mean, that's all based on the
13	investigation going through these documents.
14	Many of the people who would have been
15	familiar with those are no longer available. So,
16	really that's the process you have to go through.
17	MR. MCCLOSKEY: There's a lot of work
18	that goes on behind the scenes when you guys give
19	us something like the lab, or a name of a person
20	to interview.
21	There's a lot of work that goes on for
22	us to get that information from that site or from
23	that person.

1	MR. KNOX: By my nature as an auditor
2	and my intelligence training and experience, I'm
3	suspicious.
4	MR. FITZGERALD: As am I. I was an
5	auditor for almost 30 years.
6	MR. KNOX: And I still have some things
7	that I'll work on, but I think we should if you
8	could run me by Costco.
9	MR. DARNELL: Costco is about 40
10	minutes from here.
11	MR. MCCLOSKEY: Anything else that
12	will work?
13	CHAIR BEACH: Okay, so wait, before we
14	get onto that discussion, is there anything from
15	anybody on the line?
16	We're talking about closing the session
17	out today. Does anybody have anything to add or
18	say?
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: No. This is Brad.
20	CHAIR BEACH: Thank you, Brad.
21	Hearing none, then I will call this meeting
22	adjourned. Thank you, everybody.
23	MR. KATZ: Thanks, everybody, and

1	we'll speak to you all tomorrow.
2	CHAIR BEACH: Nine o'clock tomorrow.
3	MR. KATZ: Eastern time.
4	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
5	went off the record at 4:36 p.m.)
6	

7