UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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86th MEETING

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TUESDAY
SEPTEMBER 18, 2012

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The meeting convened at 8:30 a.m., Mountain Daylight Time, in the Denver Marriott Tech Center, 4900 South Syracuse, Denver, Colorado, James M. Melius, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT:

JAMES M. MELIUS, Chairman
HENRY ANDERSON, Member
JOSIE BEACH, Member
BRADLEY P. CLAWSON, Member
R. WILLIAM FIELD, Member
MARK GRIFFON, Member
DAVID KOTELCHUCK, Member
RICHARD LEMEN, Member
JAMES E. LOCKEY, Member
WANDA I. MUNN, Member
DAVID B. RICHARDSON, Member

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GENEVIEVE S. ROESSLER, Member

PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, Member

LORETTA R. VALERIO, Member

PAUL L. ZIEMER, Member

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official

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ADAMS, NANCY, NIOSH Contractor

ADAMS, WANDA

ADKINS, MILA

ALBONICO, LISA

BARRIE, TERRIE

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BURGOS, ZAIDA, NIOSH

CARROLL, STEPHANIE

CONTRERAS, RITA

COOK, JANET

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DELFORGE, MEMORY

DEVAN, ERNEST

DOBROVOLNY, MICHELLE

DOBROVOLNY, MARK

EVASKOVICH, ANDREW

FEINHOR, STUART, Office of Congressman Jared Polis, $2^{\rm nd}$ Congressional District of

Colorado

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FENNELL, DOUG

FITZGERALD, JOE, SC&A

FREIBERG, KEN

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KROL, KATHRYN

LAUGHLIN, LYLE

LEREW, TIM

LEWIS, GREG, DOE

LIN, JENNY, HHS

LOGAN, MIKE

LUJAN, BEN, Representative, 3rd

Congressional District of New Mexico

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MCCABE, JIM

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NABB, BARBARA

NABB, RAYMOND

NETON, JIM, DCAS

OAKLIEF, HEIDI

PADILLA, JUDY

PALACIOS, MARIA

PALIZZI, THOMAS

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

8:34 a.m.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: This is meeting number 86 of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health. And, Ted?

MR. KATZ: Thank you, Jim. Welcome to everyone in the room and on the line. We're happy to be here in Denver for this.

Let's just run through a few things. Materials for this meeting, all the presentations and background materials that are available for the public, they're both in the room on the back tables and they're online on the NIOSH website under the meeting page. If you go for this date and open that page you'll find all the presentations posted there.

Public comment session. Today and tomorrow there are public comment sessions that begin at 6, end at 7, but if you plan to comment please register. If you're here, you

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can register in the books. If you're on the line, if you're on the phone you can't register but please plan to attend at the beginning of that session because it runs from 6 to 7, but if we get through early we'll end. So please don't wait till later in the session to join us.

And the last thing, for people on the line, please mute your phones. Do not leave your phones open. If you don't have a mute button on your phone press *6, that'll mute your phone. And if you are a petitioner, for example, who's going to be addressing the Board, at the point you address us, press *6 again to come off of mute. But please keep your phones muted and please do not put the call on hold at any point. Hang up and dial back in. Thank you.

(Roll call.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Thank you, Ted, and we'll start with our program.

And first up, Stu, there you are. Stu

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Hinnefeld for the NIOSH program update.

MR. HINNEFELD: Thank you, Dr. Melius. Am I close enough to the mic? Okay.

Just a real brief run-through of mainly news items. The presentation on the back table and in the package includes our normal report on statistics on how we're doing on dose reconstructions and SECs, but I had not planned to go through that in the interest of brevity. But I'll be glad to try to answer any questions anyone may have about those items.

A few program news items. One is personnel on detail. I think most of you will remember several months ago Chris Ellison, who is our communications team lead, served a detail deputy director for as the the division, so I think maybe a number of you had interactions with Chris during that time or maybe as communications team lead. She did that because our own deputy director, Dave Sundin, was on detail to another organization.

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Well, Chris went back to being communications team leader and decided, I guess she is a detail-oriented person, because she's gone on another detail. This is to the World Trade Center program. It's not a full-time detail, though, so we still have some portion of her time available to us, but the majority of her time is being spent on the World Trade Center program where NIOSH has a large and well-publicized role in a program that's in its formative stages, much like this program was 10 years ago.

One other personnel item that I think may affect a few things for a few of you who have interest in particular sites, [identifying information redacted].

The next piece of news I have on here is about a dose reconstruction workshop.

This may be of interest to the Board. We run this workshop with our outreach contractor,

ATL International. ATL International does the groundwork, sets it up. They identify people

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that we consider claimant advocates, and these are usually site-specific personnel. Often they are union officers or representatives of the union at the covered facilities, or a union or unions at the covered facilities. And we invite them to Cincinnati for a workshop.

And our feeling being is we're trying to get to people who are a resource or can be a resource for the workers at those facilities, in order to assist them with the program, answer questions about the program, assist them with paperwork if need be and things like that, and also be able to answer some questions, rudimentary questions about the program for claimants and attempt to provide better information to -- and easy access to information for the claimant community.

We bring the people to Cincinnati and run through a couple of days of dose reconstruction activities, SEC. There's some

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activities, you know, hands-on activities where they actually watch a fake interview, what we used to call a CATI, a claimant interview where we have our actual -- an actual claimant interviewer call one of the attendees and that attendee goes through the interview process. So they understand more what's that -- they get to see that.

We also have an activity to navigate them around our website. Our website has quite a lot of information on it, but unless you know where to look or know to look there it may not be really apparent. So activities like that. And it provides an opportunity for them to get to know several DCAS staff members as people rather than names on a page. And so it seems to have done that.

We've done that for a number of years now. We generally, we are doing one of these per year. We do similar type of workshops on an abbreviated basis at facilities where we can get a broader audience

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for a particular facility to attend. We do that about two or three times a year and we abbreviate that workshop down to about one day to do those.

And then my final piece of news is that recently the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement has published its Report No. 171, "Uncertainties in the Estimation of Radiation Risks and Probability of Disease Causation."

And I brought a copy and left it in my room so I'll bring it down at the break if anyone is interested to look through it. I'll bring it down at the break and give it to Ted, so you can look through it at your leisure, just so I can take it home with me at the end of the week.

The release or I believe it's a press release from the NCRP about this report describes the topics addressed in this report include uncertainties associated with extrapolation of dose response relationships

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observed in primary epidemiological studies to estimate the risk-per-unit dose, i.e., organ whole body dose, in the U.S. dose or population and other exposed population. Applications of meta-analyses pooled oranalyses to increase the statistical power in evaluating uncertainties in dose response relationships for exposed human populations.

Uncertainties associated with extrapolation of dose response relationships observed for populations exposed to acute doses of high-energy gamma rays to estimate the risk-per-unit dose in populations exposed to fractionated or low-dose rate chronic exposures.

Uncertainties associated with extrapolation of the dose response relationship observed for populations exposed to high-energy gamma rays to estimate the risk-per-unit dose in populations exposed to low-energy photons, low-energy electrons, alpha particles and neutrons with various

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energies.

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Comparison of uncertainties associated with risk estimated for individual tissues or organ sites with the uncertainties associated with estimating risk of all tumors combined due to whole body exposure, opportunities evaluation of for using additional epidemiological and laboratorybiological based information modify to estimates of uncertainty in risk estimates for effects non-cancer and cancer, severe heritable disorders.

Procedures for accounting for dose uncertainty in epidemiological dose response analyses and evaluation of the combined effect of uncertainty in dose estimation with the uncertainty in estimation of risk-per-unit dose in estimating the overall risk.

So I'll leave, I don't want to expose anybody -- I certainly can't remember that. I'll leave the press release with Ted this morning and then I will go get the report

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at the break and leave that with Ted as well, if anyone wants to look through it.

I believe that's the extent of the news I was going to provide. Normally, since we're at the end of the fiscal year I try to provide some budget news at this time. There's not a lot of budget news.

I believe we have a continuing resolution that will run for 6 months. It certainly seemed like it was a foregone conclusion. I don't know if it's actually been passed and signed yet, but it seems like we will have a continuing resolution for a 6-month period, which will allow for spending at approximately the previous year's rate for that period of time.

There's of course the open question of sequestration and what does that do at the end of the calendar year? I don't know. I've heard various things. Mainly you hear percentages. You hear percentages applied to discretionary spending, which our

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program is not considered discretionary spending. We're considered mandatory spending.

So that's just one big question mark if it comes to that. I think most people think it's not going to come to that. So unfortunately, I don't have any budget news except that it seems like at least for the next few months at least or couple of months things should proceed apace as they have this past year.

So that kind of ends, I believe that is the end of the news I had. I still have a few more minutes. I might just show one of the slides. I don't want to go through all these.

Our numbers have been pretty similar for quite some time. We are pretty much keeping up with the input. We're getting to the point now where it's hard to reduce the backlog. We have maybe 1,000, 800 to 1,000 cases in-house that we have to do that are not

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in the hands of claimants, as with a draft dose reconstruction, are not complete and done already.

At this level, given the amount of time it takes to go through a case including getting the information, exposure history requests and things like that we're pretty much staying even. We're not really focusing on reducing the backlog. We're trying to get cases out within 9 months, actually quicker than that once we have all the information available to us. And we're doing a pretty good job of getting cases out 9 months from the time we get the initial referral to us. And of course we always try to do better than that.

Probability of Causation The fraction hasn't changed very much. still at about third of the reconstruction cases boy, this backwards. That's backwards. We're about a third of the cases are compensable, not two-

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thirds.

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Now, those dose reconstruction numbers, of course, do not include cases that were compensated through the SEC process. So the actual total percent compensated is somewhat higher, because there have been quite a number of cases compensated through the SEC process.

And distribution, you know, at this point this probably isn't going to change. The shape of the this graph isn't going to change anymore.

You can see our production kind of moves along, has a relatively steady pace. These are, let's see, these are I believe quarterly numbers because we get about 200 a month. And there's some variation in that but it's been moving that way for quite a long time now.

Our first 5,000 claims. The reason there are claims in the first 5,000, the first 10,000 aren't done is that they keep

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coming back, you know, get reopened for additional cancers or things like that.

One complicating factor now is the addition of chronic lymphocytic leukemia as a covered cancer, that rule change occurred awhile ago, has resulted in some CLL cases being referred. These were some cases that were closed. The person had CLL in addition to other cancers. And so they've come back for new things.

And the CLL model, which is finalized and developed and the risk model is chosen are -- the model has a fair amount of probabilistic calculation in it. And so the actual programming of the arithmetic to do that is causing a bit of consternation. We're moving along but it's not moved as quickly as possible. So as of yet, we have not turned out dose reconstructions for CLL cases. That should happen later on this year, I believe.

Department of Energy's response to exposure request I believe is not considered,

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we don't consider problematic. They seem to be responding in most cases promptly. I think Bomber will give you more information on the SEC whenever we get to his update.

And the fraction of cases, at one point we were pretty even between 83.13 and 83.14. 83.13 is pulling ahead, largely finished the research of because we unresearched sites. We had a big push of 83.14s a couple of years ago. As we finished researching sites that we had not researched up to that point, these were sites with not a lot of claims and would reach we we didn't have all the determination that information needed so we would go down the 83.14 SEC pathway. We've kind of finished the 83.13s are that process, and so now pulling ahead a little bit.

And that's the end. Yes, Jim?

MEMBER LOCKEY: The 4,000

potential claims, is that those denied and approved?

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MR. HINNEFELD: No, those would be the claims that from the information available to us in our database looked like they would be approved. So those are ones we would pull and send to the Department of Labor.

I'm sorry. Whether we pulled them or not, these were the cases that looked to us as if they would be compensated via SEC. I say it that way because, once these claims go back to DOL for adjudication, they may take another look at the cancer or the employment period or things like that. So there may be a that handful don't exactly match by and large that's expectation, but the expectation. And that's regardless of whether we pulled them.

What I mean by, if we have a case in our house when the SEC Class is added we pull that -- and if it looks like an SEC-payable case we pull that case and send it back to the Department of Labor. And it shows up as pulled as its status on our database.

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If we've completed the dose reconstruction and it's already back at the Department of Labor and then an SEC Class is added that includes that case and it has what appears to be -- or it has an SEC-payable cancer, that case will get paid but we won't consider that a pull. It won't change the status in our database.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I have just sort of a question/comment on the issue of the sequestering of the funds. My understanding is that unless the program was specifically exempted, even though it's mandatory spending it is subject to sequestering. So for example, the World Trade Center funding is.

And so I don't know the status of EEOICPA but it would be helpful, since this goes into effect relatively soon and could likely trickle down to this program. And my understanding, there was a report from the administration outlining at least the broad categories that were included, not all the

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specific programs. But if someone could look
into this and inform the Board I think it
would be information in terms of how we're
thinking.
MR. HINNEFELD: Well, certainly if
I hear anything, I can just inform the Board.
And we'll certainly give an update in
December if nothing is resolved about it by
the December Board meeting.
But I have heard essentially
nothing about sequestration planning within
the Agency. Ted, do you have an opinion?
MR. KATZ: No, I was just going to
say we can look into it.
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: That's all I'm
asking.
MR. KATZ: We'll do that. Right.
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any other Board
Members with questions for Stu? Okay, thank
you.
MR. KATZ: Just while DOL is
getting ready, let me register. We had a

teleconference in August, so I'm registering votes for that. So, at teleconference, the Board voted in favor of a motion to add a Class at Ventron Corporation. And Mr. Gibson, Dr. Lockey and Dr. Poston were absent, but they voted, completed their voting on September 6th and all voted in favor. So that motion passed unanimously and that SEC will be on its way to the Secretary. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Is it on its way? A little early. MR. KATZ: Will be on its way. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Will be, okay. Okay, welcome. Our next is a program update from the Department of Labor. And Jeff, welcome back. Good morning. MR. KOTSCH: I'm Jeff Kotsch with the Department of Labor and this is the routine update for the program. brief overview а οf the enactment of the Act. was enacted in

Part B

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October of 2000.

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a mandatory

federal entitlement by the Department of Labor. Part D is a state workers comp assistance which was initially, well, at that time it was a Department of Energy program.

In October 2004 it was amended.

Part D was abolished and Part E was created,

transferred and transferred to the Department

of Labor.

As of, and I think most of these slides, if not all, are October 26th, 2012. We had 1,056 -- I mean, 156,026 cases were filed with over 8.4 billion in total compensation. And obviously the actors or the agencies involved are Labor, Energy, Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice for the RECA program.

Just a quick note to the locations of the DOL offices. There's the national office in Washington, and we have district offices in Jacksonville, Cleveland, Seattle and here in Denver.

Referring to the cases that have

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gone to NIOSH, there are 38,147 cases that have been referred for dose reconstruction. Of those 35,604 were returned by NIOSH, a little over 30,100 with dose reconstructions little under 5,500 without and reconstructions. The latter ones were generally pulled, either they were in an SEC Class and they were pulled or perhaps there information that Labor found that was longer allowed that case to be viable.

There are 2,543 cases currently at NIOSH by our count. 1,313 are initial referrals and 1,230 are reworks or returns. Again, these are things, cases that primarily involve new cancers, new employment and there could be other minor issues.

The general overview of the dose reconstruction status is that we have 30,106 cases that have been returned by NIOSH with a dose reconstruction and 25,107 of those with dose reconstructions have a final decision from the Department of Labor. 8,911 of those

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are final approvals with -- based on a dose reconstruction and a Probability of Causation of 50 percent or greater. And 16,196 are final denials, that is, a PoC less than 50. So you see the breakdown percentage-wise, essentially 35 percent approval.

This is the breakdown of the Part B cancer cases with a final decision to accept. First bullet, 8,339 accepted cases with dose reconstructions which encompasses 11,730 payees or claimants. Again, there's always more claimants than cases because of the cases that have survivors. That totals out to \$1.23 billion in compensation.

For the SEC Classes that have resulted in accepted cases there are 16,989 cases paid to 28,015 payees for a total compensation of \$2.5 billion.

And the next bullet is ones accepted for both SEC and the PoC greater than 50. There's 572 of those, which totals out to all accepted SEC and dose reconstructed cases,

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25,900. That's 40,446 payees or \$3.8 billion in compensation.

This is just a bar chart for the Part B cases where there are final decisions for all the applications under the program. The left are final decisions approved, there's 38,201. On the right side the denied 23,479. And you see the breakdowns for cases as well are survivors that where there are not eligible, where there are PoCs which is, the bulk of those PoCs, less than 50 percent and the other block, or the other bar are the medical information -- where there is medical information that is insufficient to support the claim.

Just an update. This is a summary over basically the last year of the SEC outreach events that Department of Labor has conducted starting with November 1st, 2011 with Sandia National Labs for that SEC. There's actually two of them recently, this was the first.

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There's a column there with attendance, 385, and just a notation that at that meeting we, the Department of Labor, worked with people to file 48 additional claims, new claims.

GE Evendale had a meeting on November 2nd of 2011. There were about 80 people in attendance and we had 13 new claims at that meeting.

On January 18th of this year we had the Y-12 plant SEC meeting, 133 attendees and 30 new claims at that point. And the Pantex plant meeting was on March 14th, where we had 283 attendees and 28 new claims filed.

Then on April 17th, there was a Savannah River Site SEC. There was a sizable crowd of about 500 attended, and we had 40 new claims at that point.

Linde Ceramics meeting was on April 25th. There were 19 attendees and one new claim for that meeting.

Brookhaven National Lab was a

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Joint Outreach Task Group event that was held on July 17th of this year. There were 200 people in attendance and 19 new claims were gathered.

The Sandia National Labs, this is the other SEC Class. That meeting was August 22nd. There were 60 attendees and 16 new claims.

And some of the things that are coming up, the Fernald SEC town hall meeting is -- I'm not sure of the exact date but that's -- Tuesday of next week.

Then we -- Labor is also doing some home healthcare training outreach for physicians and home healthcare providers in the Denver area, that's also next week. And I know they have other ones. I don't know when they're scheduled. I know there's at least one scheduled in New Mexico, or to be scheduled in New Mexico and one in I think around Oak Ridge, Tennessee at least.

There's the Hanford SEC town hall

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meeting in October, Clarksville SEC town hall meeting in October, a Medina SEC traveling resource center, because it's a smaller population there of claims. That's also in October. And as noted, in cases of even smaller SECs the Department of Labor releases information through press releases or notifications.

I think Greg will probably talk more about this so I'll just touch on the Joint Outreach Task Group quickly. It's composed of our division in Labor, NIOSH, DOE, the ombudsmen from both Labor and NIOSH and the DOE Former Worker Medical Screening Program. And they have monthly conference calls.

And then there's a series of slides here, I won't go through all the numbers, where we basically provide data on cases and compensation, both Part B and Part E for the facilities that are either local to the meeting or that are due to be discussed

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during the meeting. Obviously, in this location we have the Rocky Flats plant where we've had a total of 6,310 Part B and E cases with 1,485 with dose reconstructions that have been returned by NIOSH. There have been 2,908 final decisions for Part B. There are 1,557 Part B approvals, 1,553 Part E approvals and total compensation of \$277 million.

I'm not going to really go through the rest of the numbers. They are in the handout. But there is information there for Hanford, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, General Steel, Weldon Springs, Mound, United Nuclear, Nuclear Metals, the Pantex plant.

And then behind that in the handout is information, and again I'll just quickly go through this. It's primarily information on employee eligibility for Part B and Part E. We've done this, I think, at every meeting. It's primarily there for if there are any new people in the audience that may not have seen this.

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Other things that are covered the program beyond under the NIOSH dose reconstructions, there's CBD, there's beryllium sensitivity, chronic silicosis or toxic exposure on the Part E side. And then you see the differences in survivor the definitions, the survivor benefits between the two parts as Congress wrote that information in the statute. And that's it.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you.
Yes, Brad.

Jeff, MEMBER CLAWSON: I looking on here and you were talking about home healthcare and stuff. One of the questions that I had is when we have a SEC go in, do we do anything for the local physicians around there? The reason being, at Pantex I know that there was a lot of comments coming back that the doctors and stuff in that area did not recognize the card and said that it was for only beryllium.

I was wondering, I know it may be

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out of your realm or whatever, if we can do anything to make sure the physicians in those areas understand the change when an SEC comes in.

MR. KOTSCH: As far as the cards, again I'm not that familiar with that part of the program. I know that is worked through the auspices of some of the contacts for the home healthcare as well as our outreach portion of our program.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Well, this was brought to my attention. I told them to bring it to your ombudsman and make sure, because there was, especially in towns like that that have already dealt with some of this, it becomes, I guess, quite a problem. So I thought I'd just make sure that you were aware of it.

MR. KOTSCH: I'll pass that along, Brad.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Can you explain, Brad, what you're --

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MEMBER CLAWSON: What came in, when the SEC came in at Pantex and the people started going to the doctors, they were not recognizing the medical card that was given to them. They said, that's not good for any medical expenses, it's only for beryllium sensitivity. You guys don't understand what you're talking about. And it was quite chaotic. And the physicians didn't understand what had changed at Pantex.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Okay, I was getting that confused with the home healthcare issue. It's a little bit different.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, that's why I was wondering if maybe they were doing a little bit more kind of in these outreaches if the local medical profession that would be dealing with a lot of this were involved with it a little bit more.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: What I think is happening is that you're now dealing with

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cancer care rather than, you know, pulmonary physicians and so forth with the beryllium. So it's a different set of physicians.

Usually, I mean, there may be some

-- people aren't used to dealing with the

reimbursement rates and procedures within the

Department of Labor, though it's a pretty

standard set. It's my understanding in most

part a very reasonable reimbursement rate. So

it may take some explanation but that would be

-- do you do that through outreach centers or

through DOL central, I think, wouldn't it be?

MR. KOTSCH: It's more DOL. I mean obviously the claimants get their, you know, in their letters they're provided with the necessary information to work with those cards.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes. Okay. David, go ahead.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Going back two slides, I think, where you had the covered conditions for Part B and Part E.

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MR. KOTSCH: Oh, in the back. MEMBER RICHARDSON: I was trying to get in my head an understanding of, for example, for Rocky Flats there are 1,557 Part B approvals and there's a smaller number of Part E approvals, 1,553. If I was looking at this table, I would see that Part В covers set of conditions and all those Part \mathbf{E} covers 10 conditions plus other conditions related to So could you help me to 11 toxic exposure. understand, under what conditions would you 12 13 get a Part B approval and not get a Part E? MR. KOTSCH: Well, Part B would be 14 15 only if you had a cancer. 16 MEMBER RICHARDSON: If you have 1,557 who were covered under Part B and a 17 18 smaller number who were covered under Part E, 19 why weren't they covered under both, I guess is the question? 20

have to check that number because usually I

MR. KOTSCH: Yes, I mean, and I'd

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think you're right, the Part E number is higher than the Part B number.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: But if we look at the table, it seems that across all the facilities the number is lower that have been approved under Part E than under Part B. I would be expecting radiation plus all other toxic hazards, there should be more people compensated.

MR. KOTSCH: And I agree. I'll have to check that. You also notice there was an absence of some of the other slides we normally had. We were having a problem with our tracking system so I'll have to actually check those numbers because that generally is the trend is that the Part E is higher because that includes both the cancer which you would have under Part B and any additional toxic exposures.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Like at Hanford, it looks like 2,000 claimants fewer have been approved under Part E than under

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Part B. I realize that we're not focused here
on that, but I'm still trying to understand
what's going on.
MR. KOTSCH: Right, I'll have to
check that because you're right, usually the
Part E number is higher than the Part B number
because it would include both the cancer and
medical conditions related to toxic exposure.
So I'll check on that and we'll correct that
if that's incorrect.
MEMBER RICHARDSON: Can we flip
back just one more slide so I can look at it
just for a question and then ask you about
does Department of Labor there.
MR. KOTSCH: I'm sorry. No, not
there.
MEMBER RICHARDSON: Go up to the
table that shows Rocky Flats, Hanford.
MR. KOTSCH: Oh, that way. I'm
sorry. I'm going the wrong way, hang on.
MEMBER RICHARDSON: There. So
like for Rocky Flats or for Hanford does

Department of Labor help the claimants to move their claims simultaneously through Part B and through Part E?

MR. KOTSCH: Yes. Actually right now when a claim comes in it's basically filed as a -- if it has a cancer and a toxic exposure it's basically started as a Part B and an E. Initially, in the earlier days they were actually separated as Part B and Part E but now they're actually combined and worked together.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: And so the major categories are ways in which you would be compensated under Part B, those being an SEC. If an SEC was granted under Part B, then the claimant should move through Part E as well.

MR. KOTSCH: Yes. And the effort was also made since they're both treated essentially simultaneously is to figure the best path forward. So if there's an SEC, that obviously will progress quickly to get that

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1	compensation paid as the rest of those
2	essentially Part E piece follows that.
3	MEMBER RICHARDSON: So if these
4	numbers were right, I would be left very
5	confused how thousands of people at Hanford,
6	for example, who were compensated under Part B
7	weren't receiving approvals under Part E.
8	MR. KOTSCH: Right. And again,
9	like I said, I'll have to check that because
10	looking at that now those numbers don't look
11	quite right.
12	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay, thank
13	you.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any other
15	Brad, you have another question? Okay. Yes,
16	Wanda.
17	MEMBER MUNN: I have a question.
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Can you use the
19	microphone, please?
20	MEMBER MUNN: Is the Board going
21	to have electronic downloads of our status
22	reports? We usually have the slides for

ourselves. MEMBER ZIEMER: I have the flash drive and I've not been successful in downloading anything from it. MEMBER MUNN: I hadn't seen the flash drive. That was my question. MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, it doesn't want me to take it out yet either. It gives me bad language, messages if I try to remove 10 it. MEMBER MUNN: May we all use your 11 computer? 12 13 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And the last time it destroyed the computer. If you 14 15 remember, right, remember? 16 MEMBER ZIEMER: I have not been able to download anything but it doesn't want 17 me to remove the flash drive either. So I'll 18 19 need some tech help here. 20 KATZ: Wanda, the MR. majority of these, with very few exceptions, 21

I've emailed you everything. So you should

have just about everything. MEMBER LEMEN: Actually, Ted, you sent around an email of all this stuff. And just to our regular emails too. MR. KATZ: Yes. But I don't CHAIRMAN MELIUS: think all of it's included. MEMBER BEACH: They're all available on the NIOSH website as well. 10 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We're looking 11 for a computer flash drive surgeon to help. MEMBER RICHARDSON: And Henry, the 12 13 password is all lowercase. Even though it's written as mixed upper and lower, it's all 14 15 lowercase. So that may help you. 16 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We have extra levels of security for these things. 17 Any other questions for Jeff? Okay, thank you 18 19 very much. 20 MR. KOTSCH: Okay, thank you. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And by the way, 21 just a comment. I'm glad you're doing the SEC 22

outreach. Those sessions are good. It looks like you're getting good attendance there.

MR. KOTSCH: Yes, it's pretty good.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Our next update is Greg Lewis from Department of Energy and he'll give the DOE program update.

MR. LEWIS: Good morning, everyone. I'm Greg Lewis from the Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety and Security. My office is the Office of Worker Screening and Compensation Support and we support both EEOICPA activities as well as our Former Worker Medical Screening Program.

Okay, so first I'll go through a couple of news items. Before I get to the National Day of Remembrance, we have a new staff member that's joined our team that's here today. Cecelia Kenney is in the back and she's been with DOE and with HHS for probably close to 10 years or so, but she's been working in the front office and now she's

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transitioned into our office to get some experience on the program side.

So she's going to be working with lot of our sites, you know, troubleshooting issues responding to individual requests as well as the NIOSH projects. She's also going to be getting involved in the budget and financial end of things. So I think it's going to be, I think, a tremendous help to our office. So please welcome her to the program.

And then to the National Day of Remembrance. On July 16th of this year the United States Senate designated October 30th - - that says 2010. That's because we didn't update it from previous years. That's October 30th, 2012 as the National Day of Remembrance for Nuclear Weapons Workers.

It's the fourth year in a row that the Senate has chosen to do so. In past years there's been various events and ceremonies around the complex and there will be again

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this year.

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I know the Office of Health, Safety and Security is partnering with the Atomic Testing Museum and a non-profit, the Cold War Patriots, to promote an event out in Nevada at the Atomic Testing Museum. That event's going to be on October 26th.

And in addition to that, I know going various ceremonies there's to be throughout the complex which we will putting on our website in advance of the day. Probably in the next couple of weeks, we'll be putting up an item on the National Day of Remembrance. So if you're interested if there are events in your local community you can check in on our website.

So our core mandate which I read every time, is to work on behalf of program claimants to ensure that all available worker and facility records and data are provided to DOL, NIOSH and the Advisory Board. So basically our primary role in the program is

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to provide records.

Our three main responsibilities are to respond to individual records requests for individual claims. So that's the employment verification, the exposure records and then the dosimetry information for NIOSH.

The second major responsibility is to work with DOL and NIOSH on large-scale records research projects like the Special Exposure Cohort research projects.

And then the third, which is smaller but equally important, is to work with DOL and NIOSH to conduct research on covered facility issues, whether years should be added or deleted or whether additional facilities should be included in the program.

So for our role within the program, we at DOE rely heavily on our site contacts out in the field. Our site POCs as we call them, our point of contacts, they coordinate all large-scale research activities with NIOSH, the Advisory Board and their

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contractors.

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They set up site visits and tours. They arrange for worker interviews and identify subject matter experts on the various topics that NIOSH or DOL might be interested in. And they also manage the day-to-day activities at the site, responding to the individual records requests that we They're the backbone of our program they're probably the most important part at terms of getting things done and DOE in responding in a timely manner.

So, for individual records requests at DOE we respond to about 16,000 records requests a year and those are split between employment verification through DOL, the dose records for NIOSH and then what we call a DAR, which is a Document Acquisition Request, which essentially is all other exposure information that might be relevant to a party claim.

And again, it was about 16,000

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records requests in 2011. We haven't done our final numbers this year, we close the books at the end of September, but we're anticipating about 16,000 again this year. And, you know, we have no reason to believe that that's going to change significantly next year, so we're planning for about the same number next year.

So, our numbers are not going to match exactly with NIOSH or DOL. And the main reason for that is that claimants often worked at multiple DOE sites, particularly at a place like Oak Ridge, your average worker -- you know, we consider kind of the Oak Ridge sites to be the three gaseous diffusion plants as well the National Lab as and the Y-12 facility.

And I think we've found that on average a worker would typically have worked in three of those sites, especially if they had a long career. Maybe for a couple of years that might not be the case, but if they were, you know, in those Oak Ridge sites for

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an extended period of time they probably got around to multiple sites at one point or another. So, even though it's one EEOICPA claim, we have to go to three different sites and at each of those sites we'll have to fully develop the request and search all of their databases and resources. So that would count as three different requests for us.

And the responses to these records requests can be hundreds of pages long, even thousands of pages for those with an extended history at the site who may have worked in various areas. So we have sent boxes of records on single individuals in the past.

multiple So we have go to to different departments and various records sources and databases for your typical claim. One DOE site here I listed goes to about 40 different sources for responsive records including hard copy paper records, microfilm, microfiche, databases and scanned electronic records.

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And, you know, while that like quite a bit for one individual, a lot of that has to do with if there was contract changeover at the site the site might have, you know, the new contractor would have a new database for dosimetry records or new database for medical records. These databases or sources were not always migrated into the next source, so if an individual worked for, say, 20 years we might have to go to one location for the first 5 years for dosimetry information, then a separate database for the next 5 years and so on.

little bit So it gets a complicated but we've developed procedures and we have, as I said before, our site POCs each site at that manage coordinate that response and make sure there's some QA/QC to make sure that we're going to all of the places that we should and we're providing a complete records package.

So the second major responsibility

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that we have in the EEOICPA program is for large-scale records research projects. These are with Department of Labor. We did the Site Exposure Matrix a few years back and I think they're looking to do an update of that in the next year or so, so we're preparing for that.

And then currently, the major one is the Special Exposure Cohort projects or the Site Profile reviews that are done by NIOSH and the Board and their contractor.

We do have to review much of this information for classification especially at the NNSA and the weapons sites. So we have protocols in place to do that. We've reviewed millions of pages. We try to do so in a timely manner. In certain cases, brought back retirees additional we've or staff to augment the current classification staff. We try to get those back in a manner that allows NIOSH and their contractors to hit their deadlines and targets.

We're often supporting four to

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five projects at once, although some will be right in the thick of it and others will be just starting or just concluding. So as an example, you know, here's about six sites that we're working with now. We're probably supporting smaller-scale research at other sites. I notice I think I didn't put the Oak Ridge National Lab on there, so there's another one. And, as you see, Rocky Flats is the first one on there as the local DOE site.

And as far as classification reviews and our requirements there, we've come up with a DOE EEOICPA Security Plan, which can be found at the link on the page, and there's copies in back if anyone wants to go take a look at that. It provides the requirements and protocols that we go through and that NIOSH and the Advisory Board have to adhere to as well.

For headquarters reviews, I guess 50 documents have been submitted since the last Advisory Board meeting. The average

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turnaround time was about 8 working days. In certain cases, we've returned documents in 1 to 2 days. And actually, before this meeting with the Rocky Flats SEC Evaluation Report we were able to return that in 1 day or even, I think it was less than 1 day, to make sure that NIOSH could get it out to everyone in advance of this meeting.

Actually, and to go back to the previous slide, I also mention this every time. The headquarters reviews are what we have direct control of in our office. with our Office of Classification, which is within the Office of Health, Safety and Security. So all final NIOSH-generated reports or the Board-generated reports will go through DOE headquarters. And those are the documents that, you know, we turn around in an average of 8 working days and sometimes less.

At the DOE sites we do run into difficulty sometimes, one because we have less direct control over the DOE sites, but two,

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because these are often the source documents. While the reports are typically, you know, 40, 50, 60, 100 pages long, some of these source documents that NIOSH and the Board are requesting to actually use for the research can be hundreds of pages long and they can be requesting reams of documents. So they can have, you know, thousands of pages in front of them. So it does take them a little bit longer and they have competing resources, or, you know, competing projects, I guess, onsite.

So we do the best we can to work with those sites to get these out in a timely manner. In some cases we use our EEOICPA funding to augment their staff or bring back retired classification officers or contractors from other sites. But it is a more difficult proposition than these headquarters reviews.

And then the third main responsibility that DOE has under the program is the facility research. Currently there are over 300 facilities covered under the EEOICPA

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including the DOE facilities, Atomic Weapons Employers and beryllium vendors. The full listing is on our DOE website.

And then just wanted to talk about a few of the initiatives we have at DOE. always have an ongoing effort to identify additional records collections that are useful for EEOICPA. You know, because many of these sites are huge in terms of large footprint, many buildings, a lot of different projects, particularly at the labs. So on occasion we will discover additional records collections, or records collections that we think are wellidentified we may find some records in there that we didn't realize were in there, were not in the index. So in those cases we will try to go through those collections, index them, get them into a format that we can access and use for this program.

Currently, at the Sandia National Lab we identified a database actually that the Nevada Test Site had that Sandia had sent some

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source records to Nevada back in the eighties and Nevada put them in a database and had done some things to index and make it more accessible. Until about a year ago we didn't realize that Nevada had that collection.

Once -- through some of the we NIOSH SEC work they realized that there was some Sandia records at Nevada. trying to work between the two sites to see if there is some overlap or if these are new records and better organized. And if so we'll get that into the mix down at Sandia and have them use that for both their individual and for their records records requests research, the SEC research.

And then the other really big project we have going on now is the SERT, the Secure Electronic Records Transfer System, is about to go live. We're hoping within the next about 2 weeks. Sometime this week, we should be selecting a go-live date.

This is a web-based records

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transfer system that's going to allow DOE, NIOSH and DOL to securely and electronically send these case files back and forth. So NIOSH and DOL can request the records from DOE and DOE can upload and send them back to NIOSH electronically.

will allow Ιt for more transparency. So, you know, as soon as it's uploaded DOE will see it. There will be no FedEx issues, there won't be a couple of days loss there. There will be no "we sent it"/"we get it"/"did you send it" kind of didn't thing. It'll be all up there on the website. We'll be able to answer real-time. There will easy reporting far be very as timeliness and responsiveness.

It's also going to enhance the protection of data. Currently, we're using encrypted thumb drives but they are sent over the mail. So on occasion things are lost in the mail or envelopes are ripped open. We believe these thumb drives, because of the

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encryption, cannot be accessed even if they were to fall into the wrong hands. But nevertheless, this system here should enhance the protection of this information.

We have two-factor а authentication system on there. So you need both -- every user who accesses the system needs both something that only they know, a.k.a., a password, and then they also need a piece of hardware that has randomly generated number or they can use their -- or they will be able to use in the future their HSPD-12 badge which is particularly coded to them. So they'll need both of those pieces to access the system. So we think it'll be a really great system. We're very excited to get that rolled out.

And then Jeff mentioned it briefly and I'll just mention it again. The Joint Outreach Task Group was created a few years ago to combine resources between DOL, DOE, NIOSH and then the DOE Former Worker Medical

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Screening Programs. They're all trying to reach the same individuals for slightly different purposes but with the same audience.

We felt that by combining resources, we could reach more individuals and provide more comprehensive information.

Instead of having three separate meetings, an individual could attend one and get all of the information.

Also, something we're preparing to roll out hopefully within the next month is a JOTG, Joint Outreach Task Group, video where members of NIOSH, DOE, DOL, the ombudsman's offices and we have a very brief introduction from the directors of the three offices at DOL, NIOSH and DOE.

It provides basically the same information that we would give at a live Joint Outreach Task Group meeting, but this is aimed at areas where there might not be enough individuals to facilitate a meeting. You know, we don't want to have more people

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presenting than listening, so in situations like that we can set up a viewing for this video. We could also have -- we're planning to do kind of question and answers after the video through video teleconference, and then we're also going to have it on the respective websites so people can access at home.

And then I just want to mention our Former Worker Medical Screening Program which provides free screenings to former DOE workers anywhere throughout the complex, any DOE site.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record for a fire alarm at 9:35 a.m. and resumed at 9:47 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: If everyone will get seated, we'll get started again. So for those of you on the phone, we believe the fire alarm has been taken care of. We still have flashing lights but not noise. We're going to reconvene. Sorry for the interruption.

So I believe that Greg was just --

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were you about at the end of your presentation?

MR. LEWIS: Yes, there's one more slide.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay.

MR. LEWIS: So I'll be quick.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Go ahead.

MR. LEWIS: Okay. I think -- yes, the Former Worker Program serves all former workers from all DOE sites and we do it in locations close to their residence. We have some clinics very near the DOE sites but the alternative is, if you've retired to Florida or moved to an area where there's no DOE presence, we contract with clinics all over the country. So we can typically get a screening done within 40 to 50 miles of your residence max, and most times much closer.

For the local site, for Rocky Flats there's two Former Worker Programs that cover the Rocky Flats workers. One is for production workers and that's through our

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National Supplemental Screening Program. And the principal investigators are Donna Cragle, John McInerney and Lee Newman. And I've provided a number there to contact them.

And then for construction and trade workers, we've got the Building Trades Medical Screening Program and the principal investigator there is Knut Ringen. And we've provided his number. And again those are also on the slides that are in the back of the room and that will be posted online if anyone wants that contact info.

And with that are there any questions?

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, David.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: This is just one question. One of the activities that you described was facility research. And I know over time the database that you maintain, the facility list has continued to grow.

And I was wondering if you could describe -- I mean, I don't know how closely

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you work with this, but for example, the last three or four facilities that have been added, what was the process by which those facilities were encountered and got into the database?

So, a lot of times MR. LEWIS: honestly, what causes it -- it can be for any number of factors. An individual can submit some information, say, I think this is wrong. You know, it really should be 2 years before or you know, it should be a year after. know we were doing work, we were doing this type of work. And it can be started just with a request. Typically we'd prefer if they had any kind of documentation, something they found online or anything that could point us in the right direction that gives us a leg up. But even if they just say, you know, we think that work was done at a particular site 2 years earlier than it's listed there we'll forward it.

We have a primary researcher, a gentleman with the Office of Legacy Management

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who formerly involved in the program, which was our cleanup program. program they did a lot of that site on characterization work with research into the So he has a fairly good knowledge of site. site history, things like that. And so he'll research the facility, he'll coordinate with NIOSH and DOL. A lot of the NIOSH folks with these SEC projects have been out and about at the sites and have a pretty good knowledge as well.

And actually, that's probably -individuals will submit the request some of
the time, but the majority of these things are
initiated when NIOSH in their research out at
a site will come across information that
suggests a facility designation is incorrect.
Whether it's the site they're doing research
on, or they've even come across information.

I think we had a question about, it was either the Medina or Clarksville facility. We resolved it, but that came out

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of research into the Pantex plant, I believe.

They were looking at documents there and happened to come across something else.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: And those concern modifications to the dates that bound a given site. But when a new site is added to the list, I guess is what I was wondering. And is this kind of the origin --

MR. LEWIS: It's basically the same, it's the same process. It's more rare because we think -- I'm trying to remember the last time a brand new site was added. I think some of the uranium mills and mines were added and that was DOL who came across information that suggested they should be added.

But it's basically the same process. You know, we'll do research, we'll also float it by NIOSH and DOL to see if they have anything to add because they have a fairly extensive records collection. SME, subject matter experts as well. And once all of the groups have gotten a chance to look at

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Now, the split is that DOE will add new Atomic Weapons Employers and DOL will add new DOE sites, and DOL will also amend the time frame for both DOE sites and AWE sites. So it's a little odd, this split, but that's the way it was worked out under the law.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay. I mean, and my impression could be wrong. My recollection when the program started was that there were in the ballpark of 200 covered facilities and that there's now more than 300 but, I mean, maybe that's not correct. So the number of --

MR. LEWIS: I thought --

MEMBER RICHARDSON: -- facilities that have been added are less than that. Much less, or?

MR. LEWIS: I don't have an exact number but my impression is that the majority, the vast majority of the sites were part of it initially and then there's been a few added

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here and there. Stu?

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, I'm working from memory here, but I'm pretty sure there's not been 100 additions. There was a bulk addition of uranium mills recently, so there were a number of them added recently, but I don't recall a lot of additions of new sites. I don't remember any specific examples.

There have been cases we've run across researching that looked like AWE work happened that we would forward when we were researching something else. It looked like hey, maybe this other site should be on there. And so there may be a few, but I don't remember any large-scale additions except for the uranium mills and I don't remember how many there were. It seems like on the order of a dozen, I think.

MR. LEWIS: Yes, I think recently it was about 16 maybe is what I had, something like that.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: And right now

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1	the process by which
2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We have a
3	petition, an SEC petition we need to address
4	and we've scheduled that for 5 minutes ago.
5	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay, I'm
6	sorry.
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: The questions
8	are fine, but I just somebody is on the
9	line. We've already had trouble with somebody
10	putting us on hold and I don't want to
11	MEMBER RICHARDSON: That's fine.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: have that
13	person
14	MR. LEWIS: And David, I'd be glad
15	to I can get to the specifics of exactly
16	what was added when if you're interested. We
17	can talk about this offline.
18	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Just my final
19	point was that right now it's external forces
20	that are leading to changes to the facilities
21	list, not internal research that's going on.
	1

MR. LEWIS: I would actually say

the bulk of the changes have been initiated by NIOSH.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay.

MR. LEWIS: I mean, there's a few that have come from outside but many more that have come from NIOSH, I would say.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Thank you, Greg. Okay, we are going to move onto the Oak Ridge.

Do you want to do your reminder about the phone thing?

MR. KATZ: While we're at it, we had -- while we were on break, someone put the call on hold and then everyone else on the call had to listen to that and couldn't hear us. So please, just a reminder, I know some people have joined the call since we've started, but don't ever put the call on hold. Please just hang up and dial back in if you need to leave the call at any piece.

And again, another reminder, please mute your phone. Use *6 if you don't

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have a mute button, but your phone should be muted while you're listening to this call. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Ted.

Okay, we're going to move onto Oak Ridge

National Laboratory and SEC petition. And

presenting for NIOSH will be Tim Taulbee.

Welcome back, we haven't seen you for awhile.

DR. TAULBEE: Thank you, Dr. Melius. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen of the Board. I'll be presenting today the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Special Exposure Cohort Petition Evaluation Report. This would be SEC 189.

Before I get started, let me recognize the team that did the lion's share of this work. The SEC lead from the Oak Ridge Associated Universities was Mike Kubiak. The lead technical evaluator was Mike Domal. He's the one who really pulled this whole thing together and was responsible for drafting the report and organizing the team. And he was

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assisted by Roger Halsey, Keith Varnado and Ray Clark. I just have the privilege of presenting their work today, so thank you very much.

The petition overview: on July 18th, 2011 we received an 83.13 petition for Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The petition qualified on October 11th, 2011. On January 6th, we notified the Advisory Board that we would not be meeting the 180-day time limit due to data retrieval difficulties that we were experiencing around the Thanksgiving/Christmas holiday time frame.

And then in August of this year, we submitted the Evaluation Report here to the Board and the petitioner received the Evaluation Report on August 31st, 2012.

The petitioner requested a Class of employees of all contractor employees, subcontractor employees and AEC employees who were monitored or should have been monitored for any of the various radionuclides and

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fission products present at the X-10 plant while working in all areas of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory X-10 from January 1st, 1943 through December 31st, 1952.

the December Now, notice 31st, 1952. The Class we evaluated was all employees at the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies and their contractors and subcontractors who worked in any area of X-10 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee from January 1st, 1943 through July 31st, 1955. We extended this particular evaluation due to known work that Savannah River was doing with irradiating thorium from another petition that we had, and we had evidence that they were sending that irradiated thorium back to Oak Ridge processing for separation of uranium-233. we took the initiative, if you will, to extend the evaluation Class out into 1955 so we could look specifically at that work.

Today the proposed Class that we are going to be recommending to you all is

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that all employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies and their contractors and subcontractors who worked in any area -- pardon me just a second, but I've got to turn off the auto-slide on here that is advancing these slides on me.

Again I apologize for this, folks. So the Class we're recommending is for all employees at the Department of Energy, predecessor agencies and their contractors and subcontractors who worked in any area at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory X-10 Ridge, Tennessee from June 17th, 1943 through July 31st, 1955 for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days occurring either solely under this employment or combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other Classes of employees in the Special Exposure Cohort.

So how did we come to this recommendation? That's what I want to focus

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my presentation on today. I'm going to go through a little bit of the historical background of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, talk about the critical exposure issues that we looked at, the monitoring data and then the feasibility for dose reconstruction.

So a little bit of background.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the construction of X-10 site started in February of 1943. And here I've got a couple of photographs of -- one of Building 205, this would be the separations building, in May of 1943 where they're pouring the foundation of that particular facility.

And then Building 105 would be the graphite pile in June of 1943. And you can see they're still pouring the foundation and beginning to set the steel.

The reactor itself went critical on November 4th, 1943. And in this photograph you can see a few months later, October 1943, both Building 105 and 205 are nearly complete.

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The separations building is there behind it and the graphite reactor is the structure there toward the center. And you can see it doesn't even have the siding around the building just yet as of 1943. But within that month they put the siding on and they actually started the operation.

So for our evaluation, the start of radiological operations we've determined to be June 17th, 1943. As I mentioned, groundbreaking in February. The was photographic evidence indicates construction still underway in June of 1943. But we found records from the Aluminum Company of America, Alcoa, where they shipped the first uranium slugs to the Clinton Laboratories on June 17th of 1943. So somewhere onsite began receiving the uranium from Alcoa after June 17th and then around October 31st, around Halloween of 1943 they started loading the uranium into the So it was somewhere onsite during reactor. that time period.

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As I mentioned the reactor went critical on November 4th. The first discharge of irradiated uranium targets was at the end of that month in November of 1943. By December 31st, 1.54 milligrams of plutonium had been separated and sent to the University of Chicago. So within the first 2 months of operation you have exposure to uranium, you have exposure to mixed fission products and exposure to plutonium. So it was a very rapid startup of the facility.

The first shipment of plutonium to Los Alamos occurred in February of 1944 and by the end of the war Oak Ridge National Laboratory had created 326 grams of plutonium.

This is a map of the X-10 facility. And in the upper right-hand corner is where you'll see the graphite pile along with the separations facility behind it. And then there's a couple other areas that I wanted to mention.

So up here is the graphite reactor

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and then right behind it is the separations building. Here's a couple other reactors that I'll be talking about, the low-intensity test reactor and bulk shielding reactor.

This area right here is called isotopes alley. This is where a lot of exotic radionuclides were separated and I'll be talking about those. Then here you have the main radiochemistry building from the 1944 -- 1943-1949 time period. These were al new facilities that were being built there in 1955 time frame.

So to talk a little bit about the reactor development. As I mentioned, the graphite reactor, 1943. They did some critical experiments in Building 205. This would be the separations building and the hot cells. But then the next big reactor that was started was in 1949 and that would be the low-intensity test reactor. This was a full-scale mockup of the MTR reactor at Idaho for fluid hydraulics testing. And then in 1950, the

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bulk shielding reactor. This was a swimming pool-style reactor. 1952, the homogenous reactor experiment. Then also in `52 the tower shielding experiment and then the aircraft reactor experiment in 1953.

And here's some photographs of the different reactors. This would be the core of it was published in the LITR reactor as Scientific American in October 1951. This is the tower shielding reactor facility and you here where they would raise the reactor up between the two towers and take radiation measurements around it. Off to the lower left here is the homogenous reactor vessel. This was an aqueous fuel solution that they brought to criticality for a test demonstration. And then the bulk shielding reactor here. And this is a swimming pool with the small reactor core down there about 20 feet under the water.

Another component of work that ORNL did was isotope production. In addition

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to the polonium-210 that they produced for the Dayton Laboratories and the radioactive lanthanum for Los Alamos they began to produce radionuclides for medical research.

The first of these was in August of 1946. The picture that I've shown here is when they were taking the first radionuclides out of the reactor for medical research in August of 1946.

In the first year of production they shipped 60 different radionuclides that were produced in that time period. The main isotopes produced were carbon-14, phosphorus-32 and I-131.

There's an interesting Y-12 connection that I'll go into in more detail a little bit later where materials made in the calutron as well as the cyclotron at Y-12 were sent back to X-10 for further separations before shipping offsite. And the buildings here I've shown is from isotopes circled there with the different hot cell type of facility

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structures that were used in that time period.

Another operation that they did at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was uranium-233 production. In 1944 they did some lab-scale preparation and testing of thorium carbonate.

1946 you've got research and development work for U-233 extraction. And remember, thorium is the target material here, it's irradiated inner reactor, thorium-232. And it becomes uranium-233 through neutron absorption and then you separate out the uranium-233.

By 1948, there's a temporary pilot plant for thorium extraction was built behind the radiochemistry lab in 706HB. In 1949, the main thorium extraction runs began. Then by 1954, the Thorex Pilot Plant up in Building 205 which is now Building 3019 was installed and that's where the bulk of the thorium extraction occurred.

So the critical exposures that we evaluated from internal dose is plutonium, uranium, mixed fission products, thorium and

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exotic radionuclides. For external dose, beta/gamma and then neutrons.

So let me focus first on the internal dose monitoring. And within NIOSH for dose reconstruction, we have a hierarchy of data that we use for dose reconstruction. The first, our preference is to use personal bioassay. This would be urine samples, fecal samples, whole body counts or chest counts.

Our second main source that we'd like to use is personal breathing zone sampling. This is where a person wears an individual lapel sampler on their collar.

Another represented breathing is zone sampling. And this might be where health physics has positioned an air sampler amongst where the workers were working in front of a fume hood at head height to try and estimate what their air sampling was. This different than general air monitoring from the standpoint of a sampler on the wall. This is where they physically went around

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positioned an air sampler on a stand.

Also, surface contamination measurements. If it's a stable environment and you know what the re-suspension is, you can estimate dose that way. And then finally from source term data. So this is our hierarchy that we go for. And so I'll be trying to talk about these as I go through the individual radionuclides.

So let me start with plutonium. When we started the Evaluation Report, the first plutonium bioassay that we had was really 1949 that we were able to locate. Through this evaluation we were able to locate additional plutonium bioassay. And so the first plutonium bioassay that we've been able to locate was dated back to February of 1945. The urine samples were collected at Clinton Laboratories and they were sent to Argonne National Laboratory for analysis, and then the results were sent back to Clinton Labs.

Some of these results were

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positive, indicating some fairly significant plutonium doses. The lab was concerned about this and so the lab began to investigate more as to what was causing this. And one of the potentials for it although it wasn't the only reason for the high results was that there was some impure lanthanum carrier that was used that had some alpha contamination in it and so it was resulting in some more false positives if you will, although it didn't fully explain all of the exposures that we were seeing.

As a result of this the sampling and analysis continued to improve over a 6-month period from February through August of 1945 and then the bioassay results began to come down.

The plutonium production operations actually ended in 1945. However, the research continued. They continued to do work in the radiochemistry laboratories but the main production operations ended at the end of the war.

What you see here in the graph is the plutonium bioassay that we have. And you can see the 1945, we have nearly 200 bioassay samples that were taken. 1946, there's virtually none at the end of the war. And then 1947, as research began to continue and pick up again, the plutonium bioassay began to increase again as one would expect.

In addition to the bioassay we have approximately 1,500 air samples available from 1944 through 1947. The sample description of many of these samples is that they were taken 6 inches in front of the fume hood, or 6 inches in front of a glove box in room 220 in front of glove box 2A or something like that.

We interviewed former workers who indicated that these air samples were on a stanchion and they were positioned at head height with the intent of measuring the breathing zone of an individual worker.

Most of the samples were from the

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706 radiochemistry building. In other words, these were for research purposes, not in the separations building or in the graphite reactor building.

So with plutonium, based on the availability of the plutonium bioassay results in conjunction with these alpha air sample data from the research facilities, dose reconstruction from plutonium exposures is believed to be feasible for this cohort.

Uranium on the other hand, NIOSH has not located any uranium bioassay results until 1949. In 1949, plutonium bioassay logbook shows results for uranium where the samples were split and a co-analysis for gross alpha -- they called it uranium-233 -- was conducted. And here you can see the number of samples that we have by year from this data set.

Now, according to a 1954 review of their urinalysis program that was conducted internally, we found this memo in the central

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files, ORNL began processing plutonium and uranium urinalysis onsite in 1947. But we've not located any results until 1949.

majority of the air sample from 1944 1947 is for data t.o the radiochemistry building. Only limited data, only about 8 percent is for the separations facility 205 where the plutonium was separated and the uranium the mixed fission from products.

We did find a few air sample log sheets attached to some correspondence. It was a standard form with a number dated at the bottom of it that would indicate there was a routine air monitoring program going on post-1947. Interviews with former workers in that time period post-1947 confirmed that there was a routine air monitoring program. Our review of monthly reports also indicate a routine monitoring program that actually lists the number of air samples that were collected, about 60 samples per week in 1948 totaling to

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about 3,000 per year.

But to date neither NIOSH nor DOE has been able to locate these air sample results even though we've done an exhaustive records search. We've looked for those forms, we've looked for all the keywords on the forms in the databases and we've not been able to find them.

So as a result NIOSH finds that reconstruction of internal doses to uranium is infeasible from June 17th, 1943 through December 31st, 1948. Starting in 1949, is when we have the bioassay results during that time period.

Mixed fission products follows a very similar path as the uranium did. There's no mixed fission product bioassay until 1950.

Again, that 1954 review of the urinalysis program indicated that there is a capability to monitor mixed fission products, and that capability was developed in 1949.

This was confirmed in August 1949. ORNL 368,

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a procedure for radiochemical analysis of barium, strontium and rare earths in urine was published.

We do have some limited incident-based sampling that was conducted in 1949. We've been able to see this from the weekly and monthly reports when an incident occurred. They would list the small number of workers to be sent for analysis.

The difficulties in obtaining fission product sampling was noted in the 1954 This resulted in a change in their monitoring methodology. In 1951, they really had a more robust monitoring program. It was a problem they identified with how to identify which workers were exposed to mixed fission products. When they changed their sampling they started getting a lot more samples. People were participating more and so post-1950, `51 time frame is when we have a lot of data for mixed fission products that we feel is pretty robust.

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Most of the air sampling data that we have is for alpha. It was product contamination in air, meaning plutonium or uranium-233, not for beta/gamma emitters.

Only limited sampling was for beta/gamma emitters.

And again, as I mentioned, there's limited data for the separations facility in Building 205. Most of the sampling was from the 706 building.

The evidence indicates that there's no bioassay program for mixed fission products till 1949, limited air sampling in the separations facility. Therefore, NIOSH finds that the reconstruction of internal doses to mixed fission products is infeasible from June 17th, 1943 through December 31st, 1949. NIOSH believes that dose reconstruction from January 1st, 1950 through July 31st, 1955 may be feasible for mixed fission products.

So with thorium, ORNL began conducting the research involving thorium in

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1944. Most of the early research was conducted in the radiochemistry building 706 where we've located extensive alpha air sampling results.

As I indicated earlier we've confirmed through the records and interviews with former workers that these were representative of breathing zone samples in the chemistry laboratory environment.

However, we've only been able to locate the air sampling data from 1944 to 1947. Coincidentally, 1947 is when Monsanto left and Union Carbide took over, so there was a change most likely in the records, the way the records were kept, and we've lost the trail as to where these records are.

We've not been able to locate any air sample data post-1947. And as discussed in the uranium section, we know they were conducting air samples, we know there was a routine monitoring program, but we haven't been able to find the records.

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As I indicated, NIOSH has not been able to locate any thorium bioassay prior to August 1955. In August 1955 they began a bioassay program for thorium specifically. Generally, urinalysis for thorium results in a dose that's been characterized as insufficiently accurate. It results in so high of a dose that it's infeasible.

However, ORNL didn't monitor via urinalysis, they monitored via fecal analysis of these workers. We've obtained the thorium fecal results from ORNL starting in 1955. Uranium-233 separations increased significantly the receipt of upon the irradiated thorium from Savannah River in 1956 and 1957. As you see here in this graph this is the number of thorium fecal bioassay that And you can see in `56-`57 it is we have. somewhere around 100 samples or so per year, and then in 1958 it jumps up to 800 following the completion of those initial separations.

So due to the extensive

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representative air samples available from 1944 to 1947, NIOSH believes dose reconstruction for thorium may be feasible. Due to the lack of air sample data from `48 through July of `55, NIOSH finds the dose reconstruction of thorium is infeasible. Due to the availability of the thorium fecal samples in August of 1955, NIOSH believes that dose reconstruction for thorium exposures may be feasible again. So what we have is the early time periods covered, the middle we don't have any data, and the latter time period we have fecal analysis.

So exotic radionuclides. Starting in 1944 ORNL began producing the polonium-210 and lanthanum-140. By 1946 is when they really began a commercial production operation radionuclides for various for medical research. And here you see they produced carbon-14, P-32, I-131, yttrium-90. By 1948, hundreds of isotopes were being produced.

There was a special isotopes

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production division at ORNL. Based upon our research to date, this division appears to have operated not only the graphite reactor columns where they were irradiating samples to make some of these radionuclides, they were also operating the calutrons and the 86-inch cyclotron at Y-12. So it's a separate facility, but it was the same ORNL division that was operating both of them.

This is our best impression to date as to how the movement of materials would have been between X-10 and Y-12. Across the top line you've got the three main production sources of the graphite reactor, the cyclotron and the calutron. Next you've got chemical separations or purification of some of these radionuclides. Some isotopes produced in the graphite reactor could have been separated in the ORNL labs and then shipped offsite or used samples irradiated onsite. Some graphite reactor are actually sent directly offsite, no processing onsite.

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You've got some that were produced in the cyclotron at Y-12 that could have been sent over or were sent over to the ORNL labs, further separated and then sent offsite or used onsite at ORNL. And the same with the calutrons. So this is rather complex, and with an SEC we look at one facility, X-10.

And so the good news here is that in March of 2012 NIOSH initiated an 83.14 to evaluate the isotope productions at the cyclotron and calutrons at the Y-12 facility.

As the 83.14 team began to do this research and my team was working on this, began to evaluate radionuclides, we discovered that there was a significant overlap between our two research efforts. We were requesting the same documents and looking for things that were very similar but with a different twist to them.

Table 5-3 and 5-4 in the Evaluation Report lists the isotope production that we've found to date. We know that that

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table is incomplete at this time due to what was produced at Y-12. That table was generated just upon what we knew was produced at X-10. So we need to supplement that.

But due to the resource overlap, NIOSH decided to reserve the exotic radionuclide evaluation at ORNL and combine it with the Y-12 83.14 effort once this SEC was completed and presented. And I can report to you on that. August 30th, 2012 we had our kickoff meeting of these two joint teams and it was very nice to hear the two team leaders talking and sharing information back forth. And gaps that had been identified under both efforts already were already beginning to be filled where there were some Y-12 reports that my team didn't know about and vice versa. And we'll continue to keep the Board updated as we progress in this evaluation.

So in summary of the internal dose monitoring, going down here line by line with

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plutonium you can see 1944, we have the air sample data, 1945 we have bioassay, 1946 we have air sample data, and then `47 forward we have bioassay for plutonium.

The uranium we have no data up until 1948 -- or up through 1948. For thorium we have the air sample data in the 706 radiochemistry building where the thorium work was being conducted from `44 to `47. Starting in `48, we don't have any more of that air sample data or have not been able to locate it. However, by August of 1955 we have the thorium fecal bioassay, so we feel we can do dose reconstruction again.

Fission products, again, no data up through 1949. Starting in 1950, we have fission product bioassay. And then we've reserved the exotic radionuclides. Overall, the internal dose reconstruction due to different parts and pieces is infeasible from June 17th, 1943 through July 31st, 1955.

External monitoring. From the

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beginning Y-12 did a tremendous amount of external monitoring, film badges and pocket ionization chambers. To give an example, for the month of December 1943, this would be the second month of operation, they read over 12,000 pocket ionization chambers for individual doses for workers. 1944, they started film badge dosimeters.

And then for neutrons, 1944, there's neutron and photon surveys. 1947 is a special fine-grain alpha film, a predecessor to NTA that I'll discuss shortly. And then 1949 you have NTA film.

This is an example of the beta and gamma monitoring data that we have from 1943-1945. And you can see it's a number of names, there's thousands of workers listed there, so we feel the development of a coworker model here is feasible for dose reconstruction for people who were not monitored. But a large fraction of the people were actually monitored.

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Neutron monitoring. In doing this research, we stumbled across something that I had not run into at any other facility and this was the ability of a neutron badge to measure both the thermal and fast neutrons.

And the capability comes out of using a neutron-proton reaction on nitrogen-14 that's embedded in the fine-grain alpha films as well as in NTA film. It produces a 584 keV proton which looks like a 1.1 MeV neutron from a track standpoint. So it would be 607 grains when you're looking at it under a microscope. It's very easy to see.

actually calibrated this They dosimeter in the thermal column of the And so with the cadmium graphite reactor. filter on it, the cadmium would absorb the thermal neutrons and so there would be a lower number of tracks behind the cadmium filter in the open window portion. They would have both the thermal and the fast and the delta between the two would give them the thermal neutron

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response. This was unusual compared to what we've seen at virtually every other site throughout the entire complex.

was all done And this by Dr. Joseph Checka from a very long time ago. And interestingly, these early fine-grain alpha films in 1947, we've also located a fading study that he conducted, never published but it was there in the central files, a very well-done study of how much these tracks would fade over time. So it was a very beautiful for neutron program that he running was monitoring.

Other neutron monitoring data that we have for the graphite reactor, there's neutron and photon surveys. Low-intensity test reactor as I mentioned was a full-scale mockup of the MTR reactor. And we have neutron-photon measurements from that one indicating a ratio of about 0.58.

The bulk shielding reactor, typically the neutron dose is zero. As

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Admiral Rickover once wrote, "Water has no cracks," so once you get to 20 feet below water the shielding of the neutrons is pretty good.

The experiments were generally lowered into the pool. In some instances they lowered the pool level to conduct experiments.

And we actually have neutron and photon surveys of when they did that what those dose rates were.

The homogenous reactor experiment. We've looked at workers that were working with that particular reactor. We've confirmed that they wore that special neutron dosimeter that could measure both thermal and fast. The aircraft reactor experiment, we have neutron and photon surveys. For the tower shielding reactor, neutron and photon surveys as well as neutron spectra. The whole purpose of that reactor was for radiation shielding. They were very interested in what the spectra would look like.

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So in summary, beta/gamma exposures, pocket ionization chambers and film badge data, neutron exposures. We've got the neutron-photon surveys as well as the neutron dosimeter with fast and thermal capability. Due to the availability of these pocket ionization chambers, film badge dosimeters, neutron surveys and the neutron dosimetry, we believe that external dose reconstruction is feasible.

So the conclusion of our research: we've evaluated the available information and determined that we do not have access to sufficient personnel monitoring, workplace monitoring or source term data to estimate the potential internal exposures to uranium from 17th, 1943 to December 31st, 1948, June fission products from June 17th, 1943 to December 31st, 1949, thorium from January 1st, 1948 through July 31st, 1955. Combined infeasibility, again, is June 17th, through July 31st, 1955.

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So why are we recommending everyone in this Class? Unlike other large facilities such as Savannah River, Idaho, ORNL has a relatively small main campus. The main campus is actually about the same size as the 700/300 area combined at Savannah River.

The facility was largely open. Once you enter through the guard checkpoints, you could pretty much go wherever you wanted NIOSH could not find any practical way to identify uranium, mixed fission product and thorium-exposed workers. We could go through organizational charts and find those that were likely exposed to these, the people that did the hands-on work per se, but other people, construction trades or others who might have and been exposed, come into that area didn't have any way to identify who those people were.

So what about employees not included in the SEC? We intend to use any internal and external monitoring data, medical

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doses that may become available in an individual's claim and that can be interpreted using existing dose reconstruction processes procedures. And this includes that plutonium bioassay that we found from 1945. We had several people who were claimants from that data set that we located and the response back from DOE did not have those records in But we would add those in and we would use that data for their dose reconstruction.

Therefore partial dose reconstructions for individuals employed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory during the period from June 17th, 1943 through July 31st, 1955 but who do not qualify for inclusion in the Special Exposure Cohort may be performed using these data as appropriate.

Health endangerment. The evidence reviewed in this evaluation indicates that some workers in the Class may have accumulated chronic radiation exposures through intakes of radionuclides and direct exposure to

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radioactive materials. Consequently, NIOSH is specifying that health may have been endangered for those workers covered by this evaluation who were employed for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days within the parameters established for this Class or in combination with work days — within the parameters established for one or more other Classes of employees in the SEC.

Again, our proposed Class is all employees of the Department of Energy, predecessor agencies and their contractors and subcontractors who worked in any area of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory X-10 in 0ak Ridge, Tennessee from June 17th, 1943 through July 31st, 1955 for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days occurring either solely under this employment or in combination with work days within parameters established for one or more other Classes of employees in the Special Exposure Cohort.

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This is just a summary of our feasibility table indicating that we believe plutonium dose reconstruction may be feasible, uranium is feasible post-1949, or post-January '49, thorium from '44 to '47, and then after July of '55. Fission products is feasible January '50 through '55. Exotic radionuclides is reserved, due to that complexity that I talked about. Beta/gamma, neutron and occupational medical X-rays we believe to be feasible.

And that's that same table. I just wanted to pop it up there again so you can see. The red is where the infeasibility occurs.

Claimant statistics. Total number of ORNL claims submitted as of July 10th this year, 2,036. Total number of claims with employment in the proposed Class, 1,302. Number of dose reconstructions we've completed is 1,074. Number with internal dosimetry is only about 25 percent or 20 percent of this

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really, 236. Number with external dosimetry, 668 or about 67 percent were monitored for external dose.

And with that I'll be happy to answer any questions that you may have. Thank you.

MR. KATZ: Thanks, Tim. Just before Tim goes to questions, let me just note for the record for the deliberative part of this session, Dr. Ziemer and Dr. Lockey both had conflicts and they recused themselves from this session.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you.

Questions for Tim? Yes, Wanda.

MEMBER MUNN: Tim, I didn't go back and check the original documents. Is there any evidence with respect to the thorium issue, is there any evidence that there was a change in the activities onsite that would be in any way affected by thorium? During that period from `48 through `55, when we know the irradiated material began to come in and the

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program picked up, is there any reason to assume that the air data that was taken in the four preceding years would not be a viable surrogate for thorium exposures during that period of time?

DR. TAULBEE: Yes. And the reason here is -- I've jumped back to this slide for the U-233 production. In 1948 is when they built the temporary pilot plant for thorium extraction. And so 1944 to 1947 laboratory radiochemistry type of work that They expanded going on. this effectively a semi-works with this 706HB building. And then by 1949, they began largescale extraction runs. In `54 it was moved up to the separations area.

MEMBER MUNN: I didn't correlate that when I was looking at it. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Other questions?
Bill, yes.

MEMBER FIELD: I'm looking at the internal dose monitoring chart that you have.

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And you said that plutonium dose reconstruction is feasible through that period. And that's based primarily on the bioassay results you have?

DR. TAULBEE: Correct.

MEMBER FIELD: But in `44 and `46 you don't have bioassay. You're going to just

MEMBER FIELD: But in `44 and `46 you don't have bioassay. You're going to just be depending on air monitoring at that point for those two years?

DR. TAULBEE: That's correct.

MEMBER FIELD: I was just wondering if you'd looked -- do you have air monitoring data for `45?

DR. TAULBEE: We do, yes.

MEMBER FIELD: And I just wondered if you looked to see if that air monitoring was reflective of the bioassay results that you received or that the workers received.

DR. TAULBEE: I don't know that we have looked specifically at that because of the late identification of this bioassay. However, that would be a very interesting

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review to do.

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MEMBER FIELD: I think it would be helpful to help validate the utility of `44 and `46 if in fact it is predictive of the bioassay results for `45.

DR. TAULBEE: Okay. It is probably more predictive of the 1946. The `44 might be a little more questionable because `44 and `45 is when they were still producing plutonium. 1946 is when it switched more to the research scale.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Gen.

MEMBER ROESSLER: It was a good presentation, Tim. This is a fascinating story and I think you put it together very well so that we can all understand it.

My conclusion is that it's pretty clear that they had really good health physics practices across the board considering the time period and all, but unfortunately there are big gaps, as you presented. So it seems to me that this is the type of situation that

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this program is designed for. That's the end of my comment, then I have a question.

You showed the gap in the uranium air monitoring data that apparently they did it, but you can't find the records. And I assume you talked to old-timers and talked to, you know, tried to explore that as to what could have happened to all of the data that apparently had been taken but is just gone.

DR. TAULBEE: Thank you very much. And you're absolutely right, we did talk to former workers and many who were health physicists, and yes, they were concerned with where did this data go because they knew they took it. And you know, we asked where might it have been filed, might it have been sent off to a federal records center or something like that. And nobody could really identify They were very puzzled, just like we it. to the indications and monthly As reports this data was taken, but we have not been able to lay our hands on it whatsoever.

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1	So they were very concerned, just like we
2	were.
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Dick.
4	MEMBER LEMEN: Have you gone to
5	the Atlanta Federal Records Center to look at
6	their data?
7	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, sir, we have.
8	MEMBER LEMEN: Okay, because I
9	know there's a lot of Oak Ridge stuff there,
10	because I used some of it about 18 years ago.
11	DR. TAULBEE: You don't happen to
12	know how they filed the air sample results, do
13	you?
14	(Laughter.)
15	MEMBER LEMEN: I wasn't looking
16	for that. I was trying to set up a cohort,
17	but I didn't look for the air samples. There
18	are hundreds of boxes there so if you want to
19	go back and look.
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Let's go to
21	Dick's garage and see what's there.
22	MEMBER LEMEN: I don't have

anything in my files. (Laughter.) CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any other yes, Bill. I had a question. MEMBER FIELD: like this table because Ι think it's interesting. So, the air sampling that was done for plutonium, is that alpha then? All the air TAULBEE: DR. Yes. 10 samples in the early years were gross alpha. Okay, so how do you 11 MEMBER FIELD: differentiate between the thoron or the alpha 12 13 from that versus the alpha from the plutonium? DR. TAULBEE: Good question. 14 Some 15 of the air samples actually had been decayed 16 out that we have. So that these should be alpha of 17 just the gross the product contamination. 18 19 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Seeing no more at least immediate questions, I know it's a 20 lot to absorb in a short time but -- and I 21

think some of these, I mean,

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one of the

thoughts I had was that certainly for some of the issues related to what's considered to be feasible and what is still ongoing research, it may be very well worthwhile setting up a Work Group to follow through on this.

But I guess the question would be how do you want to deal with sort of the immediate infeasibility issues? I think the question is those, do we agree with NIOSH on those and want to take action today or how does, how do people feel? Yes, Brad.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Personally, I'd like to -- you know, NIOSH has already told us that it's unfeasible to be able to do it. I think that we ought to accept that today and continue on. And I don't know if we've got a Work Group.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We don't. We'd need to set one up.

MEMBER CLAWSON: I propose that we accept NIOSH's 83.14, I believe it is.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: It's 83.13.

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DR. TAULBEE: 83.13. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Can you go to the definition slide, Tim? There we go, thanks. So I think we have a motion. I'll take that as a motion from Brad to accept NIOSH's -- do I have a second for that? MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Second. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, from Phil. Any other further discussion on that portion I will add, just for the record, that 10 the petitioner did not wish to comment. He or 11 she may well be listening in, but they are not 12 13 wishing to comment. I'm not trying to ignore them. Okay. No further questions? Ted, do 14 you want to do the roll call? 15 16 MR. KATZ: Absolutely. CHAIRMAN 17 MELIUS: Sorry to surprise you. 18 19 MR. KATZ: No, no surprise. That was just a dramatic pause. Very good. 20 Dr. Anderson? 21

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MEMBER ANDERSON:

1	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach?
2	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
3	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
4	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
5	MR. KATZ: Dr. Field?
6	MEMBER FIELD: Yes.
7	MR. KATZ: Mike Gibson, are you on
8	the line? And if you are, you might be muted.
9	Okay, I assume he's absent. And we collect
10	Board Members' votes who are absent after the
11	meeting. Mr. Griffon?
12	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
13	MR. KATZ: Dr. Kotelchuck?
14	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Yes.
15	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lemen?
16	MEMBER LEMEN: Yes.
17	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey is recused.
18	Dr. Melius?
19	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
20	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
21	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
22	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston is absent

and would be recused in any event. Dr. Richardson? MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes. MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler? MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes. MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield? MEMBER SCHOFIELD: MR. KATZ: And Ms. Valerio. MEMBER VALERIO: Yes. 10 MR. KATZ: Okay. And Dr. Ziemer 11 is recused, so that's 13 ayes, no nays. 12 motion passes. Thank you. 13 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Good. And thank you, Tim, and the people, whoever put together 14 15 the report and worked on it. I thought it was 16 -- for a very complicated situation I thought you did a very good job of pulling that 17 together. 18 19 DR. TAULBEE: Thank you very much. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We are scheduled 20 for a break now, which we will take and 21

reconvene at 11:00. Please try to get back

here sharply at 11 because we do have another SEC petition to discuss. And a petitioner may be on the line, so I'd like to try to stay on schedule.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 10:44 a.m. and resumed at 11:05 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, we're now going to have an update on the Hanford SEC Petition Number 155. We'll have a presentation from Arjun in just a second. But I just want to introduce this by pointing out just to the Board the Work Group on this met last week to go through this presentation and review the SC&A review of the NIOSH Evaluation Report.

And at this point the Board is not recommending any -- excuse me, the Work Group is not recommending any Board actions, but rather we'll be scheduling another Work Group meeting. There's another issue that is not contained in these slides so I think Arjun

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1	will probably mention it that we felt we
2	needed to address before bringing a final
3	recommendation to the Board. So, that is our
4	plan.
5	So this will probably be sort of
6	the major part of our review of this SEC
7	Evaluation Report but we are not prepared to
8	make a recommendation yet, so view this
9	accordingly. And why don't you go ahead,
10	Arjun?
11	MR. KATZ: And while Arjun is
12	getting ready just let me note for the record
13	that Ms. Munn and Ms. Beach are recused from
14	this session. Thanks.
15	DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you, Dr.
16	Melius.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And Ms. Munn
18	says she'll see us all after lunch.
19	(Laughter.)
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: So just to give
21	you a little background. SEC Petition 155 is
22	for a very limited period and very specific to

a certain issue. It covers 1987 to `89 for the 200 area Plutonium Finishing Plant.

And it was specifically related to the question of the bioassay data generated by US Testing Company and said that they were not trustworthy and should not be used for dose reconstruction because of fraud and mishandling of data by the company, and cited EPA investigations into this issue among other things. There's a fair amount of documentation to that effect.

The NIOSH Evaluation Report of 2011 found that fraud did not affect bioassay data and that it could be used for dose reconstruction in that period. And the Board asked SC&A to review the matter. So it's a sensitive and complex issue as you imagine and we went into it in considerable detail.

And these are the things we did.

We reviewed the petition and the Evaluation

Report, of course. We reviewed documents

related to the EPA investigation of US

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Testing. We reviewed the internal self-assessments by US Testing and the PNL audits of bioassay data. And as I'll explain the PNL audits were not really full audits but double-checks of what US Testing was doing.

After the 1989 EPA investigations there were two external reviews of the US Testing program in 1990 and '91. We reviewed those. We reviewed documents supplied by the petitioner and petitioner's representative, and we also -- there were a lot of non-public documents that were not public because of various issues I understand, whistleblower and other issues. There was a joint review of these documents between NIOSH and Board Member Brad Clawson and an SC&A representative.

We also did a lot of other work besides document reviews. We interviewed the petitioner and the petitioner's representative. We looked at the external -- we interviewed the external bioassay expert who was there during the May 1990 review, one

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of the two external experts who participated in that review on behalf of DOE, and two of the external experts who conducted the 1991 retrospective review.

Board Member Brad Clawson participated in the interviews. Sam Glover from NIOSH was present as was a DOE classification officer who reviewed all the interviews.

All the interviews were also reviewed by the interviewees and approved. We made the necessary corrections. You have them in your report.

We also sent questions to two PNL personnel who were familiar with the bioassay program who responded and you have their responses as well.

Finally, we reviewed data quality issues extensively, including minimum detectable activities and we reviewed bioassay data of plutonium, uranium, americium, strontium-90 and neptunium specifically. And

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because of an issue raised by the petitioner we also reviewed four completed dose reconstructions to examine the use of a certain kind of bioassay data, specifically fecal data.

So, the biggest question was did fraud affect the US Testing bioassay data. we conducted extensive research to locate any evidence of fraud or mishandling of data in the bioassay program similar to what had been discovered by EPA in their findings. We asked the petitioner provide specific to information, direct documentation of fraud and none was forthcoming. Petitioner did provide documents but they did not contain direct evidence of fraud in the bioassay program. conducted the interviews.

There were two issues that could have potentially been related to fraud or data mishandling that were mentioned in the reviews. One was an edit to a quality control file which had been changed without a paper

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trail, but it had been mentioned that there had been a change. And one, there was a report, the 1991 review stated that data had been withheld. And so we investigated both of those issues.

did not find any motive for You know, the EPA discussed motives for fraud in its investigation of chemicals. We did not -- the reviews in `90-`91 concluded that they could have detected crude levels of fraud and did not find any. They also were very, very specific that they were not set up to detect sophisticated fraud. And as mentioned the PNLaudits were also not designed to detect fraud.

So, while we didn't find evidence of fraud and to all available evidence, US Testing bioassay data were not affected by But the all available evidence should underlined because of be none the investigations that were done at the time of bioassay data structured find were to

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sophisticated fraud.

And we went into this during the interviews of the people who did the reviews and asked them again and they reaffirmed that they could not have found sophisticated fraud, but crude fraud they could have discovered. So no definitive conclusion but all evidence points to the conclusion that there was no fraud in the bioassay program.

So, the bottom line on this is there are two views relating to how evidence about fraud should be handled. was some evidence about fraud with US Testing. It was discussed extensively by EPA and the implications of that for the bioassay program were also discussed and there were two views. petitioner's view The and supported documentation from the time by DOE, the DOE manager specifically, Pacific National Lab and EPA all indicated that, because some part of the data had been affected by knowing and willful manipulation of data, none of the data

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could be trusted and so all of the data should be regarded as suspect.

This reasoning explained. was There was а lawsuit subsequent to termination of contract of US Testing and the manager of DOE testified in that lawsuit. he explained this reasoning very explicitly, that if there were -- any of the data were affected by this willful manipulation then none could be trusted and so the contract was terminated.

In the bottom bullet you can see that the court that reviewed this concluded that PNL's termination of the contract for default was not warranted. The termination for convenience was permissible, and the court referred this, the unease by various to parties with accepting any of the data and so thought that termination for convenience was I'm not a legal expert so I permissible. can't tell you the difference between those two things but I at least wanted to put that

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record before you.

in to Now, contrast the petitioner's view and these views of the various agencies and their representatives in 1990, I think it was, `91, the external oversight and retrospective reviews in 1990 and `91 found the bioassay data to be usable. They found problems in quality assurance, they found some problems of various kinds, but they didn't think that the data should be thrown out.

During one of the interviews one expert interviewee qualified his -- the qualification was not there in the review itself but he said that he would give a qualified yes to the usability of the data, so.

There were quality assurance issues with US Testing's bioassay work stretching back to the nineteen sixties. The report does mention therefore, you know, that this raises some questions about the nature of

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the oversight. They're not directly related to the 1987-89 questions. We did review the latter quality assurance. We didn't go back to the 1960s data and review the quality assurance problems from that time since they were not related to this particular period.

Some of the problems related to the failure to achieve contractual minimum detectable activities. In some cases the problem was that the contract was -- seemed to us to be more stringent than prevailing norms for minimum detectable activities. And in any case there were problems with MDAs and some other problems in quality.

As regards the two issues where there could have been potential for mishandling or fraud, we investigated them. The editing of the quality control file appears to have a reasonable explanation based on a memory of one of the experts.

There's no paper trail so again we can't give you any definitive conclusion but

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it appears that there was a name change of the person in the quality control header but no data had actually been changed. The fact of the change had been flagged in the file itself so that provides some evidence that there wasn't an intent to manipulate the information since, by common sense, if you were trying to manipulate information you wouldn't flag the file as having been changed.

So, the overall evidence is that there's a reasonable evidence for the change. There was no intent to do fraud and data was not manipulated. But again, some caveats to that conclusion, no auditable paper trail. And the review actually recommended that —quite strongly that there should be a paper trail whenever data were changed and the old data should be appended and so on.

We also investigated whether data were withheld from the 1991 review. We could not make a definitive conclusion about this. There is some uncertainty about what data were

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available to the review team in 1991. It does appear that not all the data were in the possession of Pacific National Lab.

The way the review team worked was it went through the records of what PNL had and requested records from that. And they were able to get everything they wanted from that set. And they were satisfied that they had what they needed to arrive at valid conclusions but they did note that data were withheld in their report.

We interviewed two of the reviewers and it wasn't quite a very clear resolution of this, which is why we went to one of the PNL people who were present at the time who informed us that the reason that there may not have been complete data in possession of PNL was not a US Testing issue. It was a policy of PNL to request the data, the transfer of the data at the convenience of PNL. So that may have been the main reason why not all the data was in the possession of

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PNL at the time of the review.

Based on the interviews and the report we didn't think that the review team had any contact with US Testing. So they didn't directly request any data from US Testing and US Testing said no, we're not going to give you that.

So the central conclusion of the team in the report and during the interview was that overall the program was sound and there was no evidence of fraud, again with the caveat that I mentioned earlier.

So in our review we concluded that there is kind of a -- there's not a technical question so much, the technical questions have some caveats which I have mentioned to you, but it's really basically the fraud issue is a policy question.

If a company has, there's evidence of fraud in one set of data, not bioassay data, should the petitioner's view and the view of PNL and others in 1990 or 1989 be

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taken as the reasonable view that none of the data should be trusted? Or should you say well, there's no evidence of fraud in the bioassay data and they are unaffected by fraud and they should be trusted for use in dose reconstruction? We felt that this was really an issue for the Board to resolve.

There are a couple of other issues I'd like to mention. There were some problems with quality assurance including the failure to detect minimum detectable activity. One of the other problems for instance was in the reviews by PNL, in the quality assurance reviews by PNL of US Testing work there were supposedly blind samples. The blind samples were often not truly blind so US Testing knew which were the blind samples. Of course that defeats the purpose. The fecal data which are being used in dose reconstruction were never subjected to quality assurance sampling, so that is an issue.

And we concluded that these

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problems didn't invalidate the data, we also raised these in the interviews with the experts from the time, but that NIOSH did need to make appropriate adjustments in a dose reconstruction. This was the issue that came up that Dr. Melius was mentioning came up during the Work Group meeting and that will be the subject of NIOSH's presentation as to how they're going to take it into account.

We had two findings. We had a number of observations which I have detailed to you in regard to the matters of fraud and data manipulation, but we also had two findings.

I mentioned we reviewed four cases to -- not a statistically valid sample to see how NIOSH was using fecal data in dose In one of the four cases our reconstruction. conclusion was that fecal data were not used in accordance with the established procedure that this failure to adhere and procedure appears resulted in to have

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underestimate of the plutonium intake, significant underestimate of the plutonium intake I think it says in the report.

Our second finding is that there's less confidence in the fecal sample result since no QA samples were ever analyzed in the period under review. And as one of the May 1990 oversight experts noted, QA samples are needed to assure that results are credible. It does not necessarily mean the results are not credible, but it certainly is a weakness of the program. We think that some way should be found for NIOSH to look at this issue and if necessary adjust the fecal sampling data. We didn't investigate how that might be done and left that question open for the Board or for NIOSH to address.

Thank you. I think that was my last slide.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes. I wanted you to get to the question slide here so I can ask if anybody has questions for Arjun.

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This is not something we've done commonly in this program and I would credit both NIOSH and SC&A for very thorough reviews of an issue, going back in time and trying to evaluate this, the fraud issue.

I would add that I think our perspective is a little different than sort of PNL's was at the time. I think our question is more technical, did the fraud in some way affect the -- fraud in the other programs potentially affect the quality of the data that was being used for dose reconstruction. And so a little different. I think we still needed to do due diligence in reviewing this overall issue and I think Arjun's laid out a very good and very thorough review of this which I think it required.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Board Members with questions on this? Yes, Bill and then David.

MEMBER FIELD: I guess I had a

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question with your finding number 1. It appears out of the small sample size that you used there was just one that had a deficiency as far as an underestimate.

Were the other three cases reviewed, were they -- did they not have that or was it a totally different procedure that would have to use the method that was faulty for the fourth case?

The question the DR. MAKHIJANI: petitioner raised, Dr. Field, was whether the being followed. procedure was And the petitioner raised it in relation to their own claim but we couldn't do that because it's under litigation. We were advised by CDC that should investigate other dose we reconstructions that already had been completed and were not in question or process so far as NIOSH was concerned.

And so we picked four cases in which fecal data had been used and we only -- we did not review the whole dose

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reconstruction. We only reviewed that aspect
and specifically to see whether the procedure
was followed. And so in three of the four
cases we concluded the procedure was followed.
And in one case we concluded procedure was
not followed.
We also found other technical
defects in that that are detailed in the
report, interpolating between a urine sample
and a fecal sample and some other problems.
We didn't feel that the dose reconstruction
method was correct.
MEMBER FIELD: I think the
question was for these four was the procedure
the same for all of them.
DR. MAKHIJANI: The procedure that
NIOSH adopted or that we adopted?
MEMBER FIELD: The procedure that
was followed.
DR. MAKHIJANI: By whom?
MEMBER FIELD: US Testing.
DR MAKHTJANT: By IIS Testing? We

didn't look at the origins of -- so we didn't
go into US Testing's files. We looked at the
DOE records of course that had been supplied
to NIOSH but they are the DOE records that are
supplied when NIOSH requests data for dose
reconstruction. We didn't try to go back -
MEMBER FIELD: No, I was just
trying --

DR. MAKHIJANI: I'm not understanding your question.

MEMBER FIELD: Yes, I guess -- I guess I'm trying to figure out if there's a systematic bias that affects all the samples, all four of the samples, or if this one was a special case where it required another procedure that the other three didn't have to utilize.

DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no, we treated all the data as equal. We didn't address the issue of bias. We couldn't actually because there were no QA data on fecal sampling. We took the data at face value in all cases and

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examined whether the NIOSH-specified procedure for dose reconstruction was followed.

And that was the limited -- that was the question raised by the petitioner. We felt we should examine a few cases and see if there were any issues and then leave it up to the Work Group to instruct us so we weren't expending a whole lot of resources. And we did find one problem.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think Jim has a comment.

this is DR. NETON: Yes, Jim Neton. I think the specific dose reconstruction method that was evaluated was the application of the Super S methodology for plutonium. And I think in three of the cases Super S methodology was appropriately the And I think in this other case it employed. was not or it appears to have not been and therefore the dose would have been underestimated.

So that's an internal NIOSH

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procedure. It has nothing to do with the quality of the bioassay data that we received from US Testing. It's a separate issue. DR. MAKHIJANI: Correct. I agree with that. MEMBER FIELD: The representativeness of these findings, like you say, it's not a very big sample. It's just hard to gather much from it or form an impression with such a limited sampling. I mean you could do 100 -- there could be 1 that was faulty out of the 100, or you could do 100 and there could be 25 percent based on this. It's just hard to say. DR. MAKHIJANI: Right. Obviously difficult to extrapolate this, yes. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, David. MEMBER RICHARDSON: You had laid out a question about whether sophisticated types of fraud could or could not be detected through the evaluation. And I was wondering

about in places where, in those scenarios

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where the conclusion has been that there was some sort of manipulation of recorded information from test results for chemicals, was that grossly apparent on examination of the records or did it appear to be that that manipulation was in some sense sophisticated?

DR. MAKHIJANI: I've not examined the original records. That was done by Bob Bistline, another member of our team. But I have read the investigation report.

I don't think the fraud was very sophisticated in my judgment. It seemed to have been -- there were a number of different problems.

One of the most evident problems was they were not supposed to send samples from one lab to another for analysis. They were supposed to be analyzed where they were assigned.

Another was chemical samples in some cases where the volatile chemicals involved needed to be tested within the dates

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and then the dates had been changed, and the change was apparently not very sophisticated so it was discovered. So it seemed that the kind of data manipulation that was done and document manipulation that was done was fairly easily detectable. You had to look.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think -- Sam I think has some comments.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, Sam has looked at the documentation.

DR. GLOVER: So there were several different pieces of fraud. I think we detailed some of that but some of it's protected under criminal investigation and that's why -- anyway.

They actually modified the spectrographs and actually changed data. Some of it again as you said was where it was conducted. They misinformed DOE about how it was done and what equipment was used. So there were numerous pieces that were fabricated or modified as part of this, and

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that is all part of a separate laboratory.

There's a laboratory in Hoboken and then there's a laboratory in Richland, Washington which is where all the rad chem was done.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: And so those sound like the types of processes or manipulations that occur irrespective of the true magnitude of the measured value. is some sort of manipulation which leads to a distortion of the recorded value in the record and -- because there's other sources of fraud in which you say high values are recorded low. Given the true value you're going to distort it in some direction.

These are -- yes, these aren't lab error I guess I would say, but these have the flavor of being another type of measurement error problem that's not dependent on the true value for a given worker.

I mean -- so I'm imagining this as layering on the types of measurement error problems which we have with internal

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uncertainty and this becomes another important and difficult one to tease out. This is just helping me understand what was meant by fraud and manipulation here and what kind of processes. DR. MAKHIJANI: Actually the data data in question were not worker They were I think pretty much chemicals. 10 exclusively environmental data. Am I wrong about that? 11 DR. GLOVER: It was environmental 12 13 sampling. And a lot of it is -- reminded me that it was changing the time to make sure 14 15 that they met contract specs. 16 MEMBER RICHARDSON: Right. 17 DR. GLOVER: So they were trying to change things so they met their contractual 18 19 obligation regarding that. 20 DR. MAKHIJANI: But that could also have resulted in the case of volatile 21 chemicals in a distortion of the true value. 22

dosimetry. There's lots of sources

I mean, there was a reason that there were time limits. As I understand it. Again, you know, it's not my area of expertise, chemical laboratory work, but as I read the documents there was some reason why these time limits were put.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any other Board Member questions? I don't know if the petitioner is on the line. If the petitioner is on the line, wishes to speak they may. It wasn't clear. Okay, apparently not.

Any other comments? If not -- yes, Phil?

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Just one comment and that's the fact that I'm still uncomfortable with how valid the data is. And I -- this conversation hasn't really given me a great deal of assurance about what it is if they're not QA-ing their equipment.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, I think it's a separate question and I think the Work

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Group is going to have another meeting to discuss that specific issue. The original issue in the petition that was brought up in the evaluation petition for the most part related to the fraud issue. So we asked SC&A to review that.

We're going to have a follow-up Work Group meeting to talk about the QA issues and then -- which is why we -- the Work Group has not reached a recommendation yet and will coming back the Board with be to recommendation. Because we felt it needed to address both issues but we had to get the fraud issue out of the -- deal with that That was the more complicated one and one that would take more time and effort. if that answers your concern. Yes, Bill.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: I just thought of something. You said that these two groups were at two different locations. So the chemical analysis was done at one site and the radionuclide analysis was done at another

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site.

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DR. MAKHIJANI: The bioassay was done at Richland. As I understand it, chemical analysis was supposed to be done in both places and they were supposed to -- I think Sam can give you more detail about that.

The chemical analysis was done at Hoboken and a lot of the problems arose there. But I think Richland also collected samples and they were not supposed to transfer them to Hoboken. Sam, and I saying that correctly? And so that was one of the problems that arose in terms of Richland not being true to its contract because they were not supposed to be transferring samples from one facility to another and they did that. And that's to the best of my memory.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any other questions? Okay. If not we will be back -- yes, Brad.

MEMBER CLAWSON: This isn't really a question. Being involved with this I would

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members realize with NIOSH and SC&A of what level of detail that they have gone into this has been very exemplary. I mean, they've done a superior job on what they've done. I'd really like to compliment both Arjun and Sam on this because this has been a very, very difficult -- to go through and deal with all these different agencies and they've really done a tremendous job.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Could I just?

Yes.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Since my name was
-- I had a team I worked with.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS:

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: You can object now. He disagrees.

DR. MAKHIJANI: I do take some credit for this work. I really appreciate the compliments but I worked with Joyce Lipsztein and Bob Bistline and Lynn Ayers who facilitated a lot of the interviews. And we

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really, you know, we had a wonderful team. And so thank you. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So you stand corrected, Brad. Withdraw. Okay. I believe that finishes up our discussion on this issue. Since we're missing at least one Board Member, I think we will take our break for 1:30. lunch now, return at And we're 8 expecting Representative Lujan to be here at 9 10 1:30 to speak to us so try to be back on time. We've got plenty of time for lunch and follow 11 up then. Thank you. 12 above-entitled 13 (Whereupon, the matter went off the record at 11:39 a.m. and 14 15 resumed at 1:33 p.m.) 16 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Ted, do you want to? 17 18 MR. KATZ: Just one thing. Can 19 you un-mute the line for a second? Let me just check on the line. Mike Gibson, are you 20 on the line? Board Member Mike Gibson, are 21

you on the line?

(No response.)

Okay, then.

Let me just remind people on the line to mute your phones. Press *6 if you don't have a mute button. Keep your phone on mute. And please do not put this call on hold at any point. If you need to leave the call, hang up and dial back in because if you put the call on hold it will disrupt the meeting and especially the people trying to listen in on the phone. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. The first item on our agenda for this afternoon is the LANL SEC petition. And we have a number of people that will be speaking on this in follow-up. And I think we've all received a revised Evaluation Report from NIOSH issued, what, about a month ago. Maybe a little bit longer on that.

But before we hear about the Evaluation Report Representative Lujan is here and would like to speak. Remember he was

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talking to us from Washington last time so now we get to see him and hear him. And we welcome you, Congressman, and go ahead.

CONGRESSMAN LUJAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It's an honor to be with you today and all of the Board Members. Good afternoon and thank you for allowing me to share a few words with you on this important matter that impacts many of my constituents in northern New Mexico.

And before I begin I also want to acknowledge Michele Jacquez-Ortiz who is with United States Senator Tom Udall's office who is present today as well.

And Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned thank you for allowing me to share my thoughts with you back in June. That was very kind and gracious of the Board to allow me to share words with you then.

I again reiterate my strong support for Special Exposure Cohort Petition 00109 regarding Los Alamos National Laboratory

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support services workers from January 1st, 1976 through December 31st, 2005. Many of my constituents have been negatively affected by the inaction of NIOSH on this petition and I am hopeful that a favorable decision by the Board today will move this process forward and result in an important step toward compensation for workers who have suffered from an illness that was caused by their work at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

With hundreds of LANL employees that have come forward thus far who appear likely to qualify for compensation under an SEC Class who have and been negatively affected by long periods of inaction have hurt them and their families which is why appreciate everyone being here today to being to address this wrong.

Many people from New Mexico made this important trek to be with you today to share some important words. While I hope the Board will enable workers up to 2005 to

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receive compensation the recently revised NIOSH Evaluation Report recommending the addition of a Class of LANL workers to the SEC for the years 1975 through 1995 should make it abundantly clear the need to help the people and families who worked at LANL and were impacted during this time frame.

I will also be corresponding with the director of Los Alamos National Laboratory seeking assurance that they are monitoring and keeping accurate data and records for current and future employees, and that there is 100 percent cooperation and timely availability of requested information by and to the NIOSH team in respect to the remainder of this petition through 2005 and others that may occur into t.he again, future. Once thank you allowing me to address you today and I urge swift action in favor of SEC 00109.

Again, Mr. Chairman, to you and the Board and to everyone present today not only on the petition from LANL but other

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petitions across the United States, we appreciate them making the time to be with us today, many of them paying right out of pocket because of their passion to be with us today.

And just in closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to acknowledge Andrew for having the courage to follow through with his petition. It's not easy on employees and people across the United States to do this and they should be commended for that courage in moving this forward. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman of the Board, for your indulgence and I appreciate your work here today.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. And we also appreciate the effort that petitioners and others make to support this. Andrew has been very persistent and we've gotten to know him quite well as well as other people both at LANL and other sites. But we also appreciate your interest and involvement in this. It also helps. Thank you.

I believe, Michele, you have a

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statement from Senator Udall also?

MS. JACQUEZ-ORTIZ: Thank you, Chairman Melius.

I don't know of too many United States congressmen who travel to another state for one of these Advisory Board meetings and I just want to for the record and on behalf of my boss Senator Udall commend Congressman Ben Ray Lujan for appearing in person today and making that statement on behalf of these workers. He just does such an incredible job for his constituents in northern New Mexico.

I have a short statement that I'd like to read on behalf of United States Senator Tom Udall. Thank you, Chairman Melius, and Members of the Advisory Board for allowing me to speak today on behalf of Senator Tom Udall and his constituents from New Mexico.

As you know, Senator Udall has closely followed the post-1975 LANL SEC petition since it was introduced in April of

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2008. The Senator commends LANL petitioner Andrew Evaskovich for his courage and his tireless efforts in support of the petition and for his advocacy on behalf of so many sick workers who have been hoping and praying that this petition is approved.

The Senator is especially grateful to the Advisory Board's LANL Work Group, its Chair Mark Griffon and the Board's contractor SC&A. They have been thoughtful and conscientious in their review of the petition and have navigated through the complicated issues unique to LANL with just the right mix of scientific scrutiny and adherence to the law while also exercising fairness and good common sense.

The Senator is delighted with the decision by NIOSH to revise its Evaluation Report and recommend the additional Class of LANL workers for the years 1975 through 1995. He hopes that the Advisory Board will support the recommendation and approve the petition

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while reserving the right to continue evaluating the years 1995 through 2005.

Approval of this petition will bring closure for many of the Senator's constituents who are sick and dying while awaiting a determination on their claims. He urges the Board to recognize the need to compensate these Cold War heroes for their efforts on behalf of our nation. And if the Board grants approval, Senator Udall will urge Secretary Sebelius to promptly approve the SEC so that LANL claimants can be paid without further delay.

Thank you for allowing me to share this statement on behalf of the Senator.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Michele. And again, thanks to the Senator. Certainly his interest and involvement has also been appreciated and helpful through this and earlier petitions at LANL also. Your efforts, we appreciate also.

Okay. We'll now turn it over to

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Jim Neton from NIOSH who will now do a presentation on the NIOSH new Evaluation Report.

MR. KATZ: Right. And as Jim is setting up, just let me note that Phil Schofield and Loretta Valerio have recused themselves for this session.

DR. NETON: Thank you, Dr. Melius.

It's been my experience that presenting right after lunch, I can have an anesthetizing effect on people.

(Laughter.)

DR. NETON: So I'll do my best to keep everyone awake during my presentation. Thank you.

I am here to talk about NIOSH's latest revision to the Special Exposure Cohort Petition Evaluation Report for SEC 00109. This is something we took up a while ago but we've taken a critical look at the data that we have available and why we thought we could do it and looked at it particularly through

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the lens of what's occurred at a number of national laboratories with similar types of diverse source terms and what decisions we made there.

So I just wanted to give you a little bit of our thinking behind that. But I'd also like to go back and sort of make sure we're all on the same page and rehash some of the background information before we get going.

There are previous NIOSH evaluations that have established an SEC Class at Los Alamos and right now that extends for all employees from March 15th, 1943 through December 31st, 1975. So those Classes are there, it has happened through a number of SEC petition evaluations.

If you remember we had SEC 51 that added a Class but that was for all workers who were monitored or should have been monitored.

We realize -- and it was for specific technical areas. We revised the technical

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areas and then eventually we came to the position that it had to be all workers because the technical areas were not controlled in a manner that one could establish with certainty who was engaged in work activities in each of those different areas. So right now based on those three SEC Classes you see listed in that first bullet we have a Class from `43 to `75.

The basis for that Class was the infeasibility of internal dose reconstruction which is pretty much true for a lot of the SECs that are added. But in particular at Los Alamos there were a number of radionuclides that were not adequately monitored, at least in our opinion, during that period. These included americium, curium, neptunium, thorium and strontium, and in addition mixed fission and activation products.

These are sort of what have come to be called in EEOICPA the exotic radionuclides, that is radionuclides other than uranium and thorium that were sort of

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part and parcel to the weapons complex in the early years. These primarily existed at the national lab type facilities where they were doing research. So that Class was added for those reasons.

And in that report, in SEC 51 we recognized that these issues may persist beyond 1975. We thought that, based on the introduction of whole body counting, would add a lot of technical merit to the program, make it more robust and we could reconstruct doses. But on this however, that is, on the basis that we reserve the right to go back and look after `75 for the exotics, it was one of the reasons that the current petition, SEC 00109, was qualified for evaluation.

So, I don't want to dwell too much on this but we all know Los Alamos was involved in weapons development and testing in the early years. Starting in `43 of course weapons, particularly plutonium and uranium

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were quite prevalent. But their mission morphed over time into various other activities including reactors, reactor development, critical assemblies, accelerators were established.

Along with that a lot of variety of X-ray equipment, radiography sources, biomedical research. Project Sherwood and fusion research which is the use of controlled fusion to create energy sources presumably down the line was there. And of course the waste treatment and disposal of all miscellaneous materials that handled were during operations. So quite a variety of potential for source terms at the laboratory.

Just to list these, the internal sources of exposure which I'd like to talk primarily about today included cesium, tritium, plutonium-238, -239 and uranium. These are what we call the primary nuclides, or I probably should have said the primary and the routinely monitored nuclides.

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We literally have tens thousands of bioassay samples for plutonium and uranium at Los Alamos, tens of thousands of tritium samples, а lot of cesium measurements, a lot of data. And in fact NIOSH has established a TIB, OTIB-62 or -6? always forget. I think it's -62 prescribes how one could use all that abundant data to create coworker models for plutonium and uranium, tritium and cesium.

Again, these exotic radionuclides, the ones that were present in much lesser quantities, I mean in many cases we're talking kilogram-type quantities, existed at the site.

And as defined in the original SEC 51 these included mixed fission activation products.

Those could exist from one of two sources, one, either from a reactor or from an accelerator-type facility. So the combination of the various fission activation products could be different at those two facilities.

And also these other ones I've

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listed here. And it's not exhaustive but it's pretty inclusive, actinium-227, americium-241, curium-244, neptunium-239, protactinium-231, strontium-90, yttrium-90, thorium-230 and thorium-232. Not all of these persisted to a large extent beyond 1975 but they were there, many of them were there as legacy sources that were there as contamination.

In particular, strontium-90 was there as a fission activation product but also as an individual source term because it was used in the radium lanthanum program early on at the Los Alamos facility. And there were still pockets of contamination that needed to be cleaned up.

And external sources of exposures, fairly what you would expect, photon, beta, neutron exposures from the various accelerators, reactors, X-ray machines and the various radionuclides that were present at the facility.

Just a little bit about, we always

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like to talk about the number of potential claims affected by our actions just so you get a sense for the magnitude of what this means. There's 1,361 as of August 8th claims submitted to NIOSH and there are 863 claims that have employment during the period 1976 through 2005. And 73 percent of those dose reconstructions have been completed.

But it's a little misleading because, remember, we have a Class already before 1975. So if one looks at only the claims with start dates of employment after December 31st, 1975, there's 386 claims. So that's not a hard and fast way to look at it but it does indicate that there are many fewer claims probably affected than the 863 that have employment, at least some portion of their employment between `76 and 2005.

Okay, just as we do in most of these I'll just give a brief overview of the petition. It was an 83.13 petition received. It qualified May 2008 and we issued our

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original Evaluation Report January 22nd, 2009. It was some years ago. And since that time there's been a number of Working Groups that have met to hash out and discuss NIOSH's approach.

The Class evaluated was the service support workers from January 1st, `76 2005. And we concluded in through original Evaluation Report, that is Rev 0 of SEC the ER for SEC 109 that information sufficient to do dose reconstructions and no additional Class was recommended at that time.

been indicated earlier As has gone through and looked that we've at information and we now find that we do lack sufficient information for certain radionuclides, in particular those compounds I talked about, the mixed fission activation products and the exotic radionuclides.

So we did issue Revision 1 which you all have a copy of to revise our decision

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to recommend a Class -- or revise our decision now to say that we want to recommend a Class and it will be all workers from 1976 through 1995. The 1995 end date is based on our presumption that Los Alamos would have been in compliance with 10 CFR 835 by that date and some other things that hint to us that the program is in much better shape to monitor workers.

There was a Tiger Team evaluation in 1990. This 1995 date would allow time for those recommendations to have been implemented.

I believe a site Technical Basis

Document for internal dosimetry was written

and issued in 1993 which would go a long ways

towards describing who was monitored and why.

There were upgrades to the air monitoring

program.

Various things have come together by 1995 that leads us to believe that that's a date that we believe we're fairly comfortable

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with although we're not done with that part of the analysis and we continue to evaluate what we have in hand to see if we stick with this 1995 date or whether the Class may be extended beyond that. But we're not opining on that today. Today we're just talking about `76 through `95.

I want to talk a little bit about why we changed our position and to do that I'd like to talk about what we proposed in the original ER. As I mentioned we had extensive monitoring data available for the routinely handled nuclides, uranium, plutonium, cesium, tritium. And we have coworker models in TIB 62.

There is a very sparse amount of information available for what we've called the exotics. For example, strontium-90, I think there's a total of 200 samples over the entire operating history of the facility, even less, fewer samples when you talk about curiums and neptuniums and those type of

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In fact, one thing that gives us some concern is there are some at the site that believe that curium data was taken for some programs but we have not been able to find them and no one seems to know where they are.

And that's sort of what happened when we took over reviewing Los Alamos. are a lot of data that were collected but it took us a long time to get the data sets assembled even for the routinely monitored ones, the plutoniums and the uraniums. actually had to provide a fair amount of assistance to the site to collect consolidate all of the available information for those nuclides into a single database. we're not even sure we, you know, even though some data may have been collected beyond the sparse data that we have for the exotics, right now we don't know where it is.

So what we did propose was, given

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that have this large amount of data available for uranium, plutonium and cesium, could we use those as surrogates for not exposures to these non-routinely handled radionuclides. That is, since the program seemed to be fairly robust in place to monitor for uranium and plutonium, why would believe they would handle protection and exposure to workers to other radionuclides any differently?

In other words, if one took the 50th percentile value for plutonium that was being excreted in the urine, why couldn't you use that value to reconstruct how much thorium people would have been exposed to? It sounded like a great idea when we proposed it, after still has merit probably but deliberation with the Working Group thinking this through it really just didn't pass the reasonableness test in our mind.

There's a couple of reasons for that. One is that the original assumption

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that the exotics were handled and controlled in a similar manner we haven't been able to establish. Since these were smaller bench-top operations, the controls would not necessarily have been the same as if you had a production environment with engineering controls in standardized place, you know, pretty procedures, that sort of thing. Having worked national laboratory myself at a can understand how small-type operations sometimes are not as rigorously designed and handled as a routine operation.

The other issue is the exotics might -- exposure to the exotics were more than likely on an intermittent experimental basis leading to episodic exposures that are not well represented by a chronic exposure model. I mean, we would take a chronic exposure model for plutonium and say okay, this person worked with curium and so we're going to assume that they inhaled curium over this entire 10-year time period which is

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probably not true. I mean they would have worked with curium in limited amounts for limited periods of time. So it just didn't seem to fit that criteria either.

The comparability of operations I kind of touched on, you know, the experimental bench-top type operations. And again the short duration exposures. So there are a number of significant differences that at the end of the day made us feel uncomfortable with the approach that we had prescribed.

So after looking at all this and thinking it through we now say that the available monitoring records and process information source term data are inadequate to complete dose reconstructions for the period January 1st, `76 through December 31st, `95.

As I said earlier, based on a presumption of compliance with 10 CFR 835 we find that dose reconstructions is likely feasible by the first of January 1976 but we will continue to evaluate that to make sure

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that the data are there to support that opinion.

Т don't ignore the want to external dose reconstructions, of that's a major part of it. We haven't changed our position on that. We believed we could do it in Rev 0 of the Evaluation Report. still continue to believe we can do it in Revision 1. And I've listed some bullets as to why we believe that to be true.

The majority of workers were monitored after 1976 for external exposures. I forgot the number but it's in the 70-75 percent range of all workers wore some sort of an external monitoring device.

They were capable of measuring photons as well as beta exposures and that can be supplemented with a significant amount of field beta measurements that were taken in conjunction with a photon survey so you can generate photon to beta -- beta/photon ratios.

Neutrons are always a sticky issue

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national laboratory but they prior monitored neutrons that monitored prior to 1988 can be assessed using appropriate have sufficient we neutron/photon ratios the various at facilities to establish neutron exposure levels. After 1980 there was a combination we can use of the albedo and the NTA film. And as far as medical dose reconstruction goes I think as like many other facilities we believe we can use dose reconstruction using one of our TIBs.

So the summary of the feasibility findings are listed here. As you see internal reconstruction is not feasible for the exotic nuclides that I had mentioned.

I will correct a minor error, maybe not so minor. It says tritium there in the second box under "Internal." What that really should have said was stable metal tritides. We have a lot, 10,000, 20,000 tritium samples, I forgot how many.

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But as you are probably well aware when you start complexing tritium with various metals the dose reconstructions become difficult. And we're not -- pretty reasonably sure we can't reconstruct some specific forms of stable metal tritide exposures, but we can do tritium. And also it says that we can reconstruct the external dose.

Just to complete this, health endangerment. We believe that these were based on chronic exposures, not high exposures similar to criticality. So the 250-day criteria for membership in the Class would apply here.

And we did recommend that it's all employees from 1976 through 1995 the reason being that we've gone through this before. With the technical areas you just can't establish who frequented which technical areas and did work at what times. So we didn't feel comfortable restricting it to anything less than all employees. And that's pretty much

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what that bullet says.

And again, for those not included in the SEC we'll use any available monitoring information we have to do partial dose reconstructions.

And I think that concludes my presentation.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Thank you, Jim. Questions for Jim from the Board? Paul.

Jim, if MEMBER ZIEMER: memory serves me correctly 10 CFR 835 was pretty much in place in the DOE by January `93. And I'm wondering if there's sort of a solid basis for selecting January of `96 as the date when was achieved. compliance Is this more intuitive or is there something specific in the Los Alamos records that would substantiate that as a good start date?

DR. NETON: I don't have the facts in my head right now but I don't think all facilities were in compliance by `93 and I'm

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pretty sure Los Alamos wasn't. And guessing that that `95 date represents that. MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, let me clarify. I said that 10 CFR 835 was in place. DR. NETON: Oh, yes. MEMBER ZIEMER: Actually that was basically when it was put into -- it became a requirement. DR. NETON: Requirement, right. 10 MEMBER ZIEMER: So I'd certainly agree there's some time frame for compliance. 11 I'm wondering if there's any basis for saying 12 13 it would have been 3 years which -- seems a little long. 14 15 DR. NETON: I can't offer you any 16 specifics as to why that is but I'm pretty sure that's the reason here. 17 Sites implementation plans in place and I think in 18 19 Los Alamos it wouldn't have been until this time frame. 20 Well, that's sort MEMBER ZIEMER: 21

of what I was asking. Do you know if there

was such a plan? DR. NETON: I wish I could answer that question. I don't think there's anyone here that can answer that but I'm pretty sure that's true. I'd certainly feel MEMBER ZIEMER: more comfortable if there was something like that versus just a gut feeling, well, they should have been in compliance by then because 10 then you could pick --11 DR. NETON: Yes. MEMBER ZIEMER: -- you know, `96, 12 `97, `93. 13 DR. NETON: Yes. 14 15 MEMBER GRIFFON: I was going to 16 put Joe Fitzgerald on the spot. I'm not sure if he knows the date. I thought that Los 17 Alamos got their accreditation a little later. 18 19 I thought -- I don't know the date either. 20 DR. NETON: Yes, it's the implementation plan and whether 21

implementation plan -- how far -- I'm pretty

1	sure that, I'm surprised I don't know that but
2	I can't put my finger on it. I don't want to
3	claim I know it if I don't for sure.
4	MEMBER ZIEMER: I just wanted to -
5	_
6	DR. NETON: Tim Taulbee may have
7	it.
8	MEMBER ZIEMER: if there was a
9	basis for it.
10	DR. TAULBEE: As I recall from
11	working at DOE sites in that time period all
12	DOE sites had to be in compliance by January
13	1st, 1996. So that would take it up to they
14	could have been doing implementation up
15	through 1995. But January 1st was the date
16	all sites had to be in compliance.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I'm sorry, Gen
18	and then Dave.
19	MEMBER ROESSLER: My question
20	probably doesn't have an answer but I still
21	DR. NETON: Well, we'll just skip
22	it then.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER ROESSLER: No, I want to bring it up. Earlier in your presentation you mentioned that these sources that are questionable with regard to dose now reconstruction were probably during this time period legacy sources. And you mentioned, I took it as very small quantities of them.

I think about that And as because somebody is exposed doesn't necessarily there's health mean That's where we of course get endangerment. into a problem situation if you believe the linear non-threshold model. But I'm just, you everything else, all these know, biq exposures, if you had any gaps there I wouldn't have any problem with going with this but the fact that these amounts that the exposures were probably very low, it bothers me that we think there could be health endangerment.

DR. NETON: Right. Well, this is

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situation. We've taken this up Brookhaven National Laboratory, Livermore, the early years at Los Alamos. There's no good answer to that. The fact that they were there, they were worked with, they were manipulated. I think there was some actual machining involved in some of these We're not talking about trivial type cases. of exposures. And the fact is that we can't put a reasonable upper bound on it.

I mean there's no way to -- our approach originally well, was to say certainly would have been no less than the plutonium exposures because they handle a lot of it, but you really can't say. That's just putting a high number and saying okay, we'll assume that everybody was exposed to -- they were excreting the 50th percentile of plutonium concentration and just pretended curium and then we can bound that So that would be just sort of exposure. putting a high number on it just to put a high

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number on it to say we could do it. I don't think, you know, it comes down to sufficient accuracy I guess.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: If we don't know who did what work, what type of work. Because we could focus on certain types of jobs but I don't think the records support that either. And I think that's also a ways into it. So you don't --

DR. NETON: As far health endangerment goes I do know that for some of these exotics there were some incidents that occurred that created some significant doses. They weren't trivial. As you know, working anything that's long-lived alpha with a emitter of transuranic type material, it doesn't take much. A very small quantity can result in a fairly large long-term dose which I know in our program would you put you into some Probability of Causation values that are not trivial.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Dave Kotelchuck?

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MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Yes. As a new Member of the Board who came in I would say in the midst of this discussion although as I look back probably toward the end of the discussion your presentation was clear and very helpful in terms of helping to explain how your opinion changed and on what basis. It was convincing.

DR. NETON: Okay, thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, Bill.

MEMBER FIELD: Yes, I just had a question about the 250 days. It sounds like the quantity was fairly low for these but there were these incidents that occurred. I just wonder if you could just speak to that a little bit more because I thought during your presentation you mentioned that there weren't any accidents.

DR. NETON: Well, yes. When you speak about the 250 days versus present you get into a whole different ball game than just saying an incident occurred. It has to be

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something that is extremely high and we've been down this path talking about something of a dose of a magnitude similar to a criticality is I believe what the regulation states. So you get to some pretty high, high exposures that were not in line with what we've seen in the incidents. The incident levels were not nearly that high to where you -- instantaneous exposure would have put you in the Class.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any other Board Member questions at this point? If not then Mark, you had some comments. We'll hear from Mark. Then we'll hear from the petitioner.

MEMBER GRIFFON: I did a couple of slides. I don't know if Zaida emailed them.

Okay, it just came through. And since I ran out of power on my computer I'm not even going to use the slides.

But four of them were actually from the last presentation I made I just included them in there to give context to what the Work Group has gone through, especially on

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the two main issues that come up in NIOSH's Evaluation Report which are the mixed activation, mixed fission products and the exotics. And it gives a little bit of a time line of -- and I think Jim went over this very well so I'm not going to repeat it, but it's just in there from the last update I gave.

Yes, so if you have the slides. And I mean, for the audience there's not much Jim did a very this. Ι think But just in terms of what the Work overview. I think since 2009 if I track Group has done. this correctly we have four Work meetings related to this issue. And that doesn't include last week's. We had a brief phone call meeting so that would be five total.

And if you look back at our notes

I think constantly the top two SEC issues as

we were tracking them were the mixed

activation product, mixed fission products and

the exotics. So we've looked at it and

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certainly NIOSH has looked into many different possible ways to use surrogate data, other possible means of bounding this.

And I think over the course of 2 years I think NIOSH sort of came to a position which SC&A was questioning all along. And I think we -- it wasn't for lack of trying is my point.

And then the, like I said the next six slides in what I just handed out to you were from the previous meeting. So they just give a breakdown of those two issues, mixed activation products and fission products and the Work Group's work on this.

And it leads up to the last slide which is from our phone call last week. The Work Group is coming to the Board today with a motion and we voted on -- it was a 3-to-1 vote from the Work Group voting to make a motion to the full Board to accept the proposed Class as identified in NIOSH's Revision 1 of their Evaluation Report. And that would effectively

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add a Class of all workers from `76 to `95 as Jim laid it out nicely.

The last point I would make is that the Work Group will continue to work on
- the original petition goes through 12/31/2005. And we do have some issues that certainly would still be relevant for that later time period. So we're not just going to close up shop so to speak. We will continue our work. But this motion we bring before the Board.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any questions for Mark? Yes, Wanda.

MEMBER MUNN: No, I don't have a question for Mark but I have a comment. I was the opposing vote. What a surprise for everyone I know.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I'm shocked.

MEMBER MUNN: Yes, I know everyone is. I don't believe anybody wants to deny benefits to workers who were injured by their work for the federal government in these

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programs. Everyone feels very strongly about that.

But all the people that moved through the LANL workforce during that 20-year period were not injured. And the few that were -- the probability that people who were not badged were as likely to be harmed as people who were badged doesn't appear to be feasible.

I feel that this SEC is too broad.

I understand the difficulties involved in placing more limits on it but I can't agree to it simply for the reasons I've just stated.

And those are the only reasons.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Wanda. Okay. Now we'd like to hear from the petitioner. Andrew, welcome. Welcome back I should say.

MR. EVASKOVICH: Well thank you, Dr. Melius and the Board, thank you for taking the time to listen to me.

I don't have too much to say today

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because I've been working on this for 6 years and I think I've said everything that I can say. I've presented my arguments and NIOSH has agreed to -- you know, add a Class till 1995 with the caveat to investigate later years and I'm happy with that.

I appreciate all the hard work that NIOSH has done, SC&A has done, the Work Group and the Board and I'm very grateful for that. And at the last meeting I was told there should be some entertainment so I'm going to tell a joke.

(Laughter.)

MR. EVASKOVICH: An accountant, a lawyer and a physicist were talking at a party about the benefits of having a girlfriend or a wife. The accountant says well, you should have a wife. You have double the income and you get a tax benefit. The lawyer says well no, you should have a girlfriend because if you get divorced then you have divorce issues with alimony and child support so a girlfriend

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is better. The physicist says well no, you're both wrong. You should have a girlfriend and a wife. The girlfriend thinks you're with the wife, the wife thinks you're with the girlfriend and you've got all that time to spend in a laboratory doing research.

(Laughter.)

MR. EVASKOVICH: And that concludes my presentation.

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We understand what goes on down at Los Alamos more now.

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. And more seriously thank you, Andrew, for you and others from the area and Danny also that got people together to do presentations, bring information in because I think it's really been informative for everybody involved. And I think that's --

MR. EVASKOVICH: If I could just address that, I did have a lot of help on

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this. Danny's here, Michele is here. Jennifer from Congressman Lujan's office. The the Senator. Jeff Congressman, Senator Bingaman's office, they were also instrumental. Some of the research was done by other persons.

Actually there have been a number of people that have been involved. My union has been involved with this, the Firefighter's Union. So I am here but I represent a large group of people, that's all I want to say, and I've had a lot of help on this.

And I've had a lot of help from SC&A and NIOSH on this as well. So thank you, everybody, for all the work that you've done on my behalf and the people that I represent.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you.

Okay. Back to the issue at hand. Additional comments or questions? Yes, Bill.

MEMBER FIELD: If you don't mind, given Wanda's comment just for the record could you speak to her concern as far as the

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Class itself?

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DR. NETON: This puts me in kind of a funny position, but. I believe that this merited under the provisions Class is The law is written in such a way EEOICPA. that if you can't reconstruct a dose to one member of a Class of workers then that Class should be added. We have workers who we truly believe have exposures that can't be reconstructed.

The unfortunate thing is like at most of these large sites you can't limit it to just laboratory workers or people that are handling the highly radioactive materials because it's just not possible. And so in the -- for fairness purposes we end up saying all workers.

I do agree that there is evidence that Los Alamos had a fairly robust monitoring program through those years. If you look through the Evaluation Report it talks about RWPs and monitoring statutes and such. But

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the fact is we just have no monitoring data with which to determine the exposure for the workers who handled laundry list а οf radionuclides. different There's no monitoring data at all that we can hang our hat on to put some bounding value on it. And at the end of the day we believe that using plutonium and uranium as surrogates did not plausibly bound their exposures.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Jim. Yes, Josie?

MEMBER BEACH: I'd like to make a recommendation that we accept NIOSH's proposal to add a Class for Los Alamos for the dates indicated.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. The Work Group has already made the motion so it's -- doesn't require a second according to our parliamentarian. And grammarian. Any further comments or discussion on this?

Can we just get the slide up that actually has the Class so we're clear on what

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1	we're oka	ay, thank you, Jim. Okay. So if
2	there's no	further comments or questions I'll
3	ask Ted to d	do the roll call.
4	I .	MR. KATZ: Thank you, Jim. Okay,
5	Dr. Anderson	1.
6	I	MEMBER ANDERSON: Yes.
7	I	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach?
8	I	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
9	ı	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
10	ı	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
11	ı	MR. KATZ: Dr. Field?
12	r	MEMBER FIELD: Yes.
13	r	MR. KATZ: Mike Gibson, are you on
14	the line?	Okay, I register him as absent.
15	Mr. Griffon?	
16	r	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
17	r	MR. KATZ: Dr. Kotelchuck?
18	r	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Yes.
19	r	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lemen?
20	ı	MEMBER LEMEN: Yes.
21	l I	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey?
22	ı	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes.

1	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius?
2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
3	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
4	MEMBER MUNN: No.
5	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston is absent
6	but is also recused from this so no vote
7	needed. Dr. Richardson?
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes.
9	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?
10	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
11	MR. KATZ: And then we have
12	recusals for Schofield and Valerio. Dr.
13	Ziemer?
14	MEMBER ZIEMER: Yes.
15	MR. KATZ: So there's 12 in favor,
16	it's unanimous. No, there's one I'm sorry,
17	12 in favor, 1 opposed and 1 absent vote but
18	the motion passes. Thank you.
19	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We weren't going
20	to let you get away with that one. Anyway,
21	thank you. So we'll move on.
22	I think the Work Group still has

some follow-up to do with NIOSH on the later time period. Yes. And I think it might be helpful, it may be because I don't completely understand it but the issue that was brought up and Bill asked some questions about which was the short-term exposure incidents and so forth. I think if those might be clarified because that's still an issue we need to deal with as a Board. Okay, thank you.

We now have a Board work session.

We are running ahead of schedule. And what I would propose doing is we go through the Board work session. We will then do a break after the Board work session but before the Rocky Flats petition. We'll see, we may want to just continue from the Rocky Flats right into the public comment period there if we have a significant number of people already in the audience wishing to do public comment. I think that might be a better way of handling the break for this afternoon if no one objects and so forth.

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The first issue for the work session that I would like to bring up is just a request. I think we have one Work Group that we need to form that is ORNL and that we talked about this morning. And so I would be looking for volunteers for that Work Group. And let me know.

And then the other one that not all of us may have noticed because it wasn't on the agenda this time but Ted brought it to my attention was SC&A recently completed a Site Profile review of the Kansas City site which is something that we've not dealt with. There's not been an SEC there. But certainly the SC&A report raises a number of issues. it's probably I think appropriate that we set up a Work Group for that also. So I would be looking for volunteers for that also. like to try to do those appointments before everybody leaves either late tomorrow or Thursday. So again, I'd be looking for people willing to volunteer on that side also.

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again, there may be others that will come up but at least think about those two.

Ted has some scheduling issues and we should try to get them going.

MR. KATZ: Okay, so we are scheduled through -- just to remind everyone the last meetings we have scheduled are a February 7th teleconference and a March 12th through 14th Board Meeting and that is planned for Augusta.

So we need to plan out another teleconference and another meeting beyond that. And the approximate date frame for the teleconference is the week of May 1st or 8th. I think those are -- I'm not sure. Let me check my calendar. I think those are Wednesdays but I'm not sure. Are those?

MR. KATZ: Right because we often try to do this on a Wednesday but it doesn't really matter. It could be any day of the week. The week of May 1st or May 8th, those

Yes.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS:

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1	are Wednesdays.
2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: The 1st isn't
3	good for me.
4	MR. KATZ: But any days that week
5	or are you saying the whole week?
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Which week?
7	MR. KATZ: The week of May 8th.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, no.
9	MR. KATZ: How about during the
10	week of May 1st, is that whole week?
11	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I can do the 2nd
12	or 3rd.
13	MR. KATZ: Yes, any day.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: The only day
15	that's bad for me is the 1st.
16	MR. KATZ: Right. So, how about
17	May 2nd? Is that good for everyone? Very
18	good. That was quick. That's a Thursday,
19	right
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: 11 a.m.
21	MR. KATZ: 11 a.m. Eastern time.
22	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: May 2nd.

MR. KATZ: Second. Very then for the actual in-person And Meeting we have either -- a number of dates I've given because we have a period in between where I'm without Zaida and I'm lost without her so we have to work around that. So slightly on the early side would be the week of June 3rd or June 10th. And what I mean "early" it's just a little bit closer than we often do Board meetings. Excuse me? Eleven a.m. So the week of June 3rd to 10th and I've already heard June 10th week is out. And on the late side, the week of July 8th or 15th.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I can't do the 3rd.

Okay. So let's look at MR. KATZ: the July dates then. July 8th or 15th, those So does anyone have a problem with the week of July 8th? I mean, we'll wait on the Health Physics but other than that does anyone

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1	have a calendar problem with that week?
2	MEMBER ROESSLER: The annual
3	meeting of the Health Physics Society, you're
4	talking about 2013, right?
5	MR. KATZ: Yes.
6	MEMBER ROESSLER: Is July 7th
7	through 11th.
8	MR. KATZ: Figures.
9	MEMBER ROESSLER: And I think we
10	have a number of people who are
11	MR. KATZ: Yes, no, that's a
12	problem.
13	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Where is it
14	being held?
15	MEMBER ROESSLER: Madison,
16	Wisconsin. Henry could make it but
17	MR. KATZ: How about July 15th
18	week then? Anyone have trouble with July 15th
19	week?
20	MEMBER LEMEN: Starting which day?
21	MR. KATZ: We're flexible. So we
22	like to try to start on Tuesday so people

1	don't have to travel on their weekend but.
2	That's good with everyone? Okay. So that's
3	the week of July 15th and we'll 16, 17, 18.
4	That's we don't have to settle that now I
5	think. It's pretty far out.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: What about
7	Kansas City? Since we've never been there
8	though I'm not sure July in Kansas City is
9	MR. KATZ: Is it beastly hot
10	there? Yes?
11	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Fairbanks.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We've been to
13	St. Louis.
14	MR. KATZ: Okay, so to be serious
15	Kansas City is one possibility at least even
16	though we don't like the weather. We'll
17	ponder that. We've got some time.
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We'll take
19	reasonable suggestions.
19 20	reasonable suggestions. MR. KATZ: From reasonable people.

1	the outlandish claim that the snow will be
2	melted in Idaho.
3	MR. KATZ: That's actually a real
4	possibility I think, INL.
5	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And we have,
6	what, 3 years ago?
7	MR. KATZ: It's 2 years ago but
8	that's a good idea.
9	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Are the
10	previous Board Meeting locations online? If
11	not I'd love to see like the last 10 meetings.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: They're all
13	online. It's a little bit of a chore to find
14	them because you have to go back through the
15	years.
16	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: You've got to
17	go through all 85 meetings.
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And so forth.
19	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Okay. Take a
20	look.
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We use our bad
22	memories.

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: What we usually try to do is we try to schedule for the week hoping we have an active site review of some sort going on. And since we've really been through almost all of the major sites visit at least once and then what's important. We do our best to guess what would be good timing in terms of an SEC evaluation or something. We don't always do that as well as we should.

We try to get input on what's active and so forth. So it's -- we try and take into account the weather so we don't get snowed in in certain places.

Okay. The DRs. I don't know -Mark has to leave tomorrow morning, right? So
if possible I think we'd like to try to do
this now. I think everybody should have
received it I'm hoping. I don't know when it
was.

MR. KATZ: Just a reminder, I mean Mark, you probably said this yourself but we

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try not to reveal too much information when we discuss these cases. MEMBER GRIFFON: This is something I'd rather discuss in a sidebar but can you list tell us all, this from was our Subcommittee? Because I don't remember it being this big. MR. KATZ: Yes, it's -- so it's the full list but the ones that you're 10 proposing to select have their own column 11 showing that those were ones you're 12 recommending. 13 MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay. So as you're looking at this in the second column it 14 15 says selected by Subcommittee and the yeses 16 are the only ones that we've selected off this. Ted, do you remember the total that we 17 18 came up with? It was -- without sorting by 19 yeses. MR. KATZ: I believe we ended up 20

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MEMBER GRIFFON:

with 20.

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Yes, I think it

1	was around 20. Yes. I knew we didn't come up
2	with 70.
3	MR. KATZ: We started with 70.
4	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes. So we did
5	our first normal process of the DR
6	Subcommittee and we took this full listing and
7	we triaged and came up with this sub-listing
8	of the yeses and that's what we're bringing,
9	we're recommending as a Subcommittee to the
10	Board to task SC&A with reviewing these cases,
11	the yeses.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So do you want
13	to start going through them then?
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: You want to go
15	through them one by one?
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: How do you want
17	to?
18	MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean, I would
19	say
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: You can sort of
21	give us some background.
22	MEMBER GRIFFON: Right, okay.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think that's the key, what are the criteria.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, okay.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And then if there are questions and if we have to have questions on specific.

MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean, I think our criteria was consistent with what we've done for the past several sets of cases in that we looked at a PoC that was near the 50 percentile mark looking for more best estimate type cases although not always. Also looking at the site. And in this listing you'll see several sites that we still have not done any dose reconstructions for, or reviews for. So there's a few of the small AWE sites that came up.

And then we, in the final columns at the end we certainly looked at the external/internal dose methods, again normally looking for best estimate cases although sometimes it's, as we found out, when we dig

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down sometimes it's a partial best estimate. They might use a coworker model for the internal but a full estimate for the external, something like that. So those are the general criteria.

And when we looked at our overall tracking of the cases that we've reviewed to this point we had the notion in the beginning of the program that we'd do 2.5 percent of all cases. And then we looked at a distribution by site to sort of determine how many cases on each site that we'd like to see. And we were nowhere near approaching the 2.5 percent for any of the sites, even the ones that we thought we had a lot of cases on like Savannah River and Hanford. So we were still well short of that percentage mark. So that was the general criteria.

I mean I guess I would say if you looked at the yeses and had your doubts on any of those maybe we can discuss them.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any questions on

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1	the general approach? I'll give you a few
2	minutes to look through it.
3	MEMBER ZIEMER: Ted, did you say -
4	- this is Ziemer. Did you say there were 20?
5	I'm only seeing 19 yeses. Am I missing one?
6	MEMBER GRIFFON: I don't recall
7	the final numbers.
8	MR. KATZ: Dave, did you also come
9	up with 19?
10	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: But I don't
11	remember. I mean, I have to check my notes.
12	MEMBER BEACH: Mark, just a quick
13	question. There's a couple on there that are
14	for Oak Ridge that we just passed the SEC on.
15	Some of them are in that year and some of
16	them aren't. Twenty-two is one.
17	MEMBER GRIFFON: I think we said
18	that we would try to drop cases.
19	MEMBER BEACH: Oh, so you would.
20	Okay.
21	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes. Sometimes
22	we've missed that but we would try to we'll

work with Stu on that to, you know, if we
identify cases that were just added to an SEC
we'll try to not put them through the cycle so
that would be dropped off the list.
MR. KATZ: Generally speaking but
keep in mind also that cases may deal with
elements of dose reconstruction that are not
precluded by the SEC Class.
MEMBER GRIFFON: Right. Well, I
mean the case has to be
MR. KATZ: Right. You need to
look at the case specifically. Right.
MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
MEMBER ANDERSON: Just, do we go
over the past ones? How many were in the
overestimate? Because 12 of these are
overestimate groups. I'm just wondering. Has
it generally been that high a percentage?
MEMBER GRIFFON: I don't know the
answer to that. I'm not sure. I mean it is
difficult to

MEMBER ANDERSON:

Because it's a

different methodology.

MEMBER MUNN: And it changes depending on which group --

MEMBER ANDERSON: Yes.

MR. KATZ: Excuse me, can you make that mike live?

MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, I quess I am live. believe for the last Ι selections looked at things that we categorized here as best internal and This time our instructions didn't external. include that. They included recent ones no matter which category was sorted there.

That field, data best or overestimate is a data field that's completed by our reviewing health physicists. And our health physicists might reviewing make different judgments in a particular Now, some of these their overestimates may be clear overestimates. We haven't looked at them to see. So while we have shot for best internal and external best estimates in the

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last few selections even in those cases I think that may have been not necessarily a best.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, Paul.

This is sort of a MEMBER ZIEMER: philosophical question on how we select. we pretty well have been trying to stay below 50 percent here, isn't that correct? of interesting cases that are lot barely over and I'm just wondering because they're over does not necessarily mean there might not have been some procedural Because there's a number of these errors. that are full internal and external that seems to me could be informative and they I think have been eliminated simply because they're just over. So you say well it doesn't matter if find something, they've we compensated.

But the issue is not so much that, it has to do with whether procedures are properly carried out. I'm just wondering if

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rather than all these overestimates if it might be more informative to pick a few more full internal/externals. Just sort of a philosophic --MEMBER GRIFFON: The first two. ZIEMER: Right, yes, the MEMBER first two are the ones I was looking at. There's a Los Alamos one there and there's a Portsmouth one there that both look kind of interesting. MEMBER GRIFFON: No, I agree with In the past, I don't know the breakdown but we've certainly selected some over 50 for sure. But those two in particular look very interesting. So I would -- this is Board's call so if we want to add some. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Can we do a specific proposal? MEMBER GRIFFON: A specific proposal? Paul, do you want to propose to add

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MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, I don't know

those two?

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if those are the right two even. I just looked at those because they're at the front end of the list. Maybe there's some other interesting ones. I was just asking it sort of philosophically and I haven't had a chance to digest all these. I certainly would suggest at least one of those be looked at. I don't know that they both need to be.

MEMBER GRIFFON: I think also an interesting thing happened in the course of making this set, didn't it Ted? That we skipped a step. In other words I don't think the Subcommittee had the information on full internal/external this time. Stu, am I wrong on that or did we have all this, the whole spreadsheet?

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, this was the spreadsheet presented to the Subcommittee. You have just the one column added.

MEMBER GRIFFON: I was trying to make an excuse for missing those two that Paul pointed out.

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(Laughter.) MEMBER ANDERSON: Well, number 31 and number 33 are also over. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Try again, Mark. MEMBER RICHARDSON: I think what we did do was pay less attention to that column because as Stu pointed out having just gone through the previous set it was clear that those terms are loose. 10 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Can I try and move this along? I mean I think we have a 11 proposal, a motion from the Subcommittee. 12 13 think we have what I'll say is an amendment, proposed amendment from Paul to add the first 14 15 two cases. 16 MEMBER ZIEMER: Or at least one of them. 17 One of the 18 MEMBER RICHARDSON: 19 first two and one from the second batch. I thought the Los 20 MEMBER ZIEMER: Alamos one looked interesting which is the 21

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second one on the list.

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Right.
2	MEMBER GRIFFON: Ted, you're
3	capturing these right?
4	MR. KATZ: I am as soon as you
5	guys decide.
6	MEMBER GRIFFON: So far we have
7	the Los Alamos one.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We have the Los
9	Alamos one.
10	MEMBER GRIFFON: And then David
11	did you have another one?
12	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: I was looking
13	at the Dow Chemical but I don't just
14	between that and the Ames Lab.
15	MEMBER GRIFFON: And where is the
16	Dow Chemical?
17	MEMBER ANDERSON: Thirty-one and
18	thirty-three.
19	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Thirty-three,
20	number thirty-three, Dow Chemical.
21	MEMBER GRIFFON: Thirty-three on
22	the spreadsheet which is number 624.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: To step back from the specifics to Dr. Ziemer's general philosophical question about why we would look at those that are near the boundary but have either exceeded the threshold or not exceeded the threshold for compensation from kind of a high-altitude perspective one of the things that's been interesting in the recent batches of reviews has been types of problems which have been found that in some cases involve omission of information opposed as inclusion of information.

So, I mean if -- and again, we've had a series of discussions about QA/QC issues or quality assurance/quality control issues with the dose reconstructions. And so I was thinking about why are we interested in these cases that are near the boundary. I mean in a general sense I at first thought the best way to sample cases was just random sampling of a 2.5 percent sample. And I still think there's merit to that proposal because you can't -- I

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mean if you could implement that in some sort of systematic way you've got an audit of the information collection process. But the types of errors that I think have been coming out so far through this, and in part it could be a consequence of how we're sampling the data right now have been situations where there have been what appear to be omissions. And so that, I would expect those sorts of problems to be flagged out more on the lower side than on the upper side of the Probability of Causation distribution because it's causing loss of dose and therefore lower Probabilities Causation than of had those errors not occurred.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: At the same time I think you're trying to get people with -- excuse me, Wanda -- a robust dose reconstruction in the sense that they've had enough years of work and enough exposure that, you know, as opposed to someone who's been there for a short time period, had a very low

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Probability of Causation because, just because of that essentially and so there's relatively little to review. So you're trying to move it up the scale that way also. So, I mean I think that was essentially behind --MEMBER RICHARDSON: So auditing the kind of cases that are compensated very quickly through some underestimating approach and then it comes back, those -- there's not a lot of to work with there. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Right. MEMBER RICHARDSON: And it's these that are near the boundary that seem to be. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes. MEMBER ZIEMER: And if Ι add, my point is those that are just under I don't think are any more likely to have seen those errors than those that are barely over. They're sort of in the same group. MEMBER RICHARDSON: That's true. MEMBER GRIFFON: Well, just to get

back to the specific the Dow case, the only

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question I usually well, it doesn't
eliminate that whole QA discussion though.
But oftentimes another factor that we consider
is it does say full internal/external model.
These kind of tend to be, you know, one size
fits all reconstruction. So I don't know if
anyone can speak to Dow Chemical of Madison,
whether it's a, you know, did they have
individual data or is it actually just a model
for internal and external.
MR. HINNEFELD: My recollection
from Dow Chemical is we don't have individual
dosimetry data and it's a dose model from the
Site Profile.
MEMBER GRIFFON: But Paul's point
still stands. But I just thought yes, that's
another factor we consider.
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So we have a
partial amendment
(Laughter.)
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: and I'm
waiting for the rest of the amendment which

1	was down to those, the Dow.
2	MEMBER GRIFFON: I wouldn't have a
3	problem adding the Dow.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So has the
5	Subcommittee modified its proposal to the
6	Board to include?
7	MEMBER GRIFFON: To include. I'm
8	trying to understand.
9	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: LANL and Dow?
10	MEMBER GRIFFON: Six twenty-four
11	and, what is LANL? Six thirty-six? Oh, 655.
12	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: But LANL we
	MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: But LANL we just acted on today.
12	
12 13	just acted on today.
12 13 14	just acted on today. MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, but
12 13 14 15	just acted on today. MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, but MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Okay.
12 13 14 15	just acted on today. MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, but MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Okay. MEMBER GRIFFON: Is that all
12 13 14 15 16	<pre>just acted on today. MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, but MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Okay. MEMBER GRIFFON: Is that all right?</pre>
12 13 14 15 16 17	<pre>just acted on today. MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, but MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Okay. MEMBER GRIFFON: Is that all right? CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.</pre>
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	<pre>just acted on today. MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, but MEMBER KOTELCHUCK: Okay. MEMBER GRIFFON: Is that all right? CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes. MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.</pre>

1	other suggestions can we all in favor of
2	that proposal say aye.
3	(Chorus of ayes.)
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Opposed?
5	(No response.)
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Abstain?
7	(No response.)
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Are we okay,
9	Mark?
10	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
11	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Thanks.
12	MEMBER GRIFFON: So that gives a
13	set of 22 now, right?
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
15	MEMBER GRIFFON: My math is
16	correct. Except on Paul's list it's 21.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We'll give you
18	the extra. We'll fool you. Okay, again
19	because Mark has to leave I'd like to do a few
20	of the Subcommittee Work Group reports.
21	MEMBER GRIFFON: Blame it all on
22	me.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We're blaming this all on you. We're going to -- let the record show. So, Subcommittee?

MEMBER GRIFFON: Sure.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: You've just given part of your report.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes. Okay, we had a meeting on August 6th of the Dose Reconstruction Subcommittee Group. And I'll just go over, some of the bigger issues we've been discussing lately have been the QA/QC actions that we've been questions. Some dealing with on the Subcommittee are a result of the NIOSH 10-year review so we've got a few of those to give some updates on. And also we had just a question from the full Board to sort of reflect on our original protocol for doing the dose reconstruction reviews.

Those of you that have been around the Board for awhile remember the original protocol had a basic, advanced and blind review. Actually I don't know if I emailed

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that to the full Board but I did find a draft of the original protocol that was actually included in the proposal package I believe that SC&A did. So anyway, we just wanted to reflect back on where are we now and do we need to modify in any way sort of our approach to reviewing these cases.

And so the first item from the last meeting, we had a presentation from ORAU on their QA/QC program, ORAU's QA/QC program.

And out of that we got sort of -- I mean I think we went a step further than we did the first time when we discussed this with them but we had some remaining questions. It was an overarching presentation of what they're doing. And out of that the Subcommittee asked for a little more information.

For instance, they're using a peer review checklist and now they have a new -- hope I get this correct -- a peer review feedback form I believe is what they're calling it. So they have these two separate

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things. And we got sort of some overarching information but it -- several things were not apparent in the presentation that we had.

Number one, what exactly were -what were on these checklists or these
feedback forms. So sort of what categories
were involved in the forms.

The second question we asked them to come back to the committee with was were they tracking these and if so when did they start tracking. I think based on what we heard at least the feedback forms are a fairly new thing. I think they started implementing these within the last 2 years but they have had the checklist for a longer time so we wondered if they were tracking this information.

And then the final question was if you were tracking it can you sort of give us an aggregate report. Do you see any trends or see any -- what are you finding out of your internal tracking of this data. So, after the

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presentation by ORAU we asked them for feedback on those -- I guess a little more specificity to exactly what they were tracking internally.

The second item we looked at was in response to -- I believe in response to the 10-year review NIOSH has implemented internal QA/QC process where they're actually doing blind reviews from a certain percentage of cases that come through the door. don't want to misstate the mechanics of how this happens but basically NIOSH is doing a separate dose reconstruction from ORAU, from the contractor on the same case. So it's another way to -- another quality control assurance.

And we got an update that to this

-- to the day when we met they had selected 57

cases. I believe you take two cases a week,

Stu, is that accurate? Maybe I'm getting too

much in the weeds here.

MR. HINNEFELD: It's gone back and

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forth between two and one. It was two a week and then maybe it was one a week. So I'm not exactly sure what we're selecting now.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay. So it's somewhere --

MR. HINNEFELD: It's been a relatively low number. It's one or two a week.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay. Anyway, a small number per week. And what we've asked is that once they get, you know, a fair number of cases together where they've done their review and they have something to compare it to then they report back on the aggregate, what they found in aggregate. We're not going to re-review each case obviously but we sort of want to see what they're finding.

And then also, you know, how we can use this going forward -- how we can work that process with our review process on the Subcommittee. So we really don't have any aggregate results yet but it is ongoing.

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The third item that we discussed was the 10-year review actions, the follow-up. The first one was the -- I guess there was a question in the 10-year review of what was the cost of -- looking at the cost-effectiveness of doing best estimate versus overestimating.

And you know, because of the concerns of doing overestimating dose reconstructions and then having to come back if a person got another cancer, having to come back and actually lower the Probability of Causation, it looks very strange to the outside world. So, this sort of arose as what were you gaining.

And last meeting they came to us with a pretty detailed report of what they've looked at. And even looking at possible subcategories of where they could do best estimate for certain groupings of cases like skin cancer cases that they thought were likely to have secondary cancers.

And basically, you know, the basic

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conclusion is that they are still gaining quite a bit with the overestimating approach. They don't want to drop the approach because it would be too costly to do best estimate on all cases. I think they've left an opening for some possible subcategories but the basic notion is that they're not going to drop the overestimating approach.

And I should say that I think the Subcommittee overall was supportive of that.

I mean, I think we agree with that.

Let me just see here. Another 10year review question was the question of
claimant favorability with regard to the dose
reconstruction. We had a discussion about
this. Evaluation of claimant favorability
must sort of have some knowledge of what the
correct answer is. So you know, if you're
trying to judge how favorable or not favorable
NIOSH is being you have to know the truth.

And we didn't get -- basically this is a placeholder. NIOSH indicates that

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they are going to come back to us with a report on this issue. I think this is in Jim Neton's hands. Yes, he's nodding. Looks like we're waiting for this report. It should be interesting. But it's definitely a tough issue to crack. And I think those are the primary things on the 10-year review.

Then we had a longer discussion. We had some invited guests for a discussion on sort of re-looking at our dose reconstruction process. And Jim joined us on the phone and I think Paul never was able to join us that day. But anyway, this had come up on the Board and we thought it was worth examining.

And you know, the fundamental reason we want to do this is we wanted to reflect back on the main mission of the Board with respect to dose reconstructions. In other words, are they scientifically defensible, you know, and the validity of the dose reconstructions, and are we on the Subcommittee getting to that question.

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And out of this we ended up with two actions. One was to sort of bring back the blind reviews. We've had SC&A do a couple of blind reviews. They brought them back to the Subcommittee at one point but we really haven't deliberated on them as a Subcommittee so we need to do that further, and with a lens sort of focused on the idea of what can we gain out of these. What's the efficacy of having more blind reviews. Is it worthwhile? What are we gaining that's different than the regular reviews? So that's sort of what we're proposing for next meeting actually, for SC&A to bring those cases back and decide whether we want to select some more blind reviews.

The second action was to ask SC&A to do what I'm calling a look-back. And this is the idea of looking back in aggregate. And we think the best way to break it out is by site. So to look at all the cases out of the ones we've reviewed already from a certain site -- and I think we did assign, we selected

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Rocky Flats actually and SC&A is already quite far along in that process -- to look at the past case reviews that we've done and then to compare that with the final disposition of those cases or with what's happened subsequent to those cases being reviewed with regard to Site Profile changes or procedural changes.

So the idea is that if we checked off something basically as on scientifically valid or adequate in terms of that particular looking at or aggregate and then later on many of those cases end up adding into, getting added into an SEC Class it sort of sends a mixed message. So we wanted to be able to sort that out as to what happened to the cases after we did the initial review and were procedures drastically modified after we got through the review and we never picked up on that in our So that's sort of a question that we're looking at by doing that.

And then again, we're doing this -

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- we picked Rocky Flats. We don't expect that we can extrapolate the results that we find from Rocky Flats to the whole complex, but we think we might shed some light on the idea of what is the best thing going forward.

And thing we've already one discussed is that clearly we think that a lot doing currently of what we're on Subcommittee is what I would call more basic reviews, and we're looking more -- and we're ending finding quality up more of assurance/quality control type of findings which is not -- which certainly adds value. The question is do we get at the science questions. Do we get at the adequacy of the underlying science questions.

And we think we do in the Site Profile reviews but we're also concerned that are things falling through the cracks or are we, you know, as a full Board are we capturing all these things. And then who is sort of pulling all those things together. That's

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another discussion we had.

So the first step we thought was to take a look at Rocky, see what we find out with one example and maybe make -- clarify our proposal going forward.

And I think that's it, Jim.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Comments or questions from Board Members? So, just -- I have a sort of procedural question. So, you'll have the Rocky Flats report and the blind reviews done at your next meeting which is again? No, I know you have it scheduled. So we should have a report at our next Board Meeting which is December.

And I'd like to put aside some significant time at that meeting for a full Board discussion on where do we go with dose reconstruction reviews. It's a primary task that Congress gave us and I think we -- which is NIOSH's 10-Year Review. We ought to do our own sort of 10-Year Review and discussion on that. And I think the work that your

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Subcommittee is doing will lay the basis for that. So appreciate that.

Any other Board Members with questions or comments for Mark?

MEMBER ZIEMER: Just one comment on the issue of whether or not you're addressing the science issues. there's a lot of times where you can't really address them in terms of the individual cases. I do notice that SC&A helpfully points out, for example, in each case that it may be particular dependent upon a science which has not been resolved. Let's say it's the resuspension factors, for example, in this they've yes, case used the resuspension factors that are in the Profile or something, or that may be an open issue, but it's not one that you can solve with the individual case because there may be many cases that use that.

So I think there's a sense in which certain science issues have to be looked

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at in the broader scale of the Site Profiles as opposed to the individual cases because these individual cases indeed are often reliant on the bigger science picture issues. So I hope we don't get to the point where we're trying to solve those through individual cases. I think they're normally pointed out in the SC&A reviews wherever they do occur, at least they recite for that site what the issues were.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, but they tend to do it in a very perfunctory way.

MEMBER ZIEMER: Yes, it's boilerplate right now.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, and I think it's misleading about sort of what work goes on within other Work Groups and what goes on in terms of the scientific review for the overall dose reconstruction part of the program.

We tend to think of the site reviews, Site Profile reviews, we tend to

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focus more on the SEC aspects of those and I think we need to think back how are approaching our review of dose reconstruction. How are we capturing all the other work we do in the Procedures Subcommittee, all the work we do in the Site Profile Work Groups which -and sometimes as part of the SEC evaluation reviews where we actually lead to what we refer to as Site Profile issues which then lead to changes in the NIOSH procedures for doing dose reconstruction, which you know, my quess is that those have had much more impact than on the NIOSH, on the overall than have the reconstruction program individual dose reconstruction reviews date. Not that those -- they've had impact, but that picture has.

And one is sort of how do we capture that in terms of what we report back to the Secretary. And secondly, it's I think how are we going about doing these in a way that gets those all to work together better

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and coordinate them.

MEMBER ZIEMER: I agree with that.

I think it is true though that the audits tend to look more like quality control types of things than they do addressing those issues.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: That should be one element of them but there are other elements also that I think looked at. And for various reasons we've never really pursued the blind reviews and so we've been so busy. Meanwhile NIOSH has made lots of very positive changes in both dose reconstructions and their procedures and so forth and how they approach different sites and there's new information so it's a complicated picture.

But I think we just need to relook. Maybe we'll continue to do what we're doing but I think we need to at least evaluate that.

Okay, Mark, I believe you have at least one other Work Group report. Savannah.

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I'm just trying to cross you off the list.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Oh, okay. short on Savannah. We did get a report very recently, an update with a lot of information. And I think Tim and the group at NIOSH have advanced their research quite a bit. And I think at this point -- well actually I know we're trying to coordinate and schedule for a possible Work Group meeting sometime in October because I think we've got enough on the deck. But I don't know if Tim had heard that before but sometime in the very near future we expect to have a Work Group meeting, but there hasn't been any Work Group meeting between the last meeting and now. there's not much to report now, but we are scheduling a future meeting.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Unless someone's absolutely really anxious to give their report I think we'll sort of go through in alphabetical order. So Brookhaven. And I don't mind

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people, if you want to -- we do have an updated -- amongst the stuff, the material that Ted has sent out was an update on when the -- where NIOSH is with various reports to various Work Groups as part of SEC evaluations and Site Profile reviews. So now is the time to sort of, you know, if everyone can look at And we also have an SC&A update also but are there surprises there or are you expecting something sooner. Is something missing there that you're expecting to be receiving a report from, haven't heard about in awhile.

Now is the time. Jim and Stu and LaVon are all here and John and the SC&A group so now is the time to pin them down and find out what's going on.

MEMBER BEACH: Good lead-in, Jim. For Brookhaven, our last Work Group meeting was in February and we had a list of action items for both SC&A and NIOSH. SC&A completed theirs and we are waiting on NIOSH.

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I heard from Grady a couple of days ago. He apparently hasn't started working on them at this time, so I actually sent out an email asking him to get started. So I guess I'm looking for something from Jim or Stu on possible dates for that, if you know.

DR. NETON: Well, since Stu's out of the room I guess I'll field that question. I honestly can't give you any more update than what you already know. I will certainly take that back, talk to Grady and see if we can get something out to you shortly. But I have no additional information to offer at this time.

MEMBER BEACH: Okay, thank you.

And then looking at the report, Brookhaven doesn't have a date listed. I don't remember exactly what the wording is, but "to be determined" comes to mind.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: It says "not yet scheduled."

MEMBER BEACH: There you go, "not

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1	yet scheduled." And it should have been,
2	actually.
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Not helpful.
4	Jim. Okay. Any questions for Josie?
5	Okay. Fernald.
6	MEMBER CLAWSON: We haven't got a
7	Work Group scheduled this last week. SC&A had
8	two action items that they needed to get back
9	to us which they have got in their process.
10	NIOSH has one and I just got a note from Stu
11	this week that it would be possibly pushed out
12	a little bit further, and that's the
12	a little bit further, and that's the construction workers data for Fernald.
	construction workers data for Fernald.
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13 14	construction workers data for Fernald. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So which is
13 14 15	construction workers data for Fernald. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So which is that? I'm looking at their report. It says
13 14 15 16	construction workers data for Fernald. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So which is that? I'm looking at their report. It says OTIB-78. Is that the construction workers
13 14 15 16	construction workers data for Fernald. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So which is that? I'm looking at their report. It says OTIB-78. Is that the construction workers one?
13 14 15 16 17	construction workers data for Fernald. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So which is that? I'm looking at their report. It says OTIB-78. Is that the construction workers one? MR. KATZ: They traded emails, I
13 14 15 16 17 18	construction workers data for Fernald. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So which is that? I'm looking at their report. It says OTIB-78. Is that the construction workers one? MR. KATZ: They traded emails, I think.

this correct? Until something like December.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, he was looking at sometime in December.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And SC&A -- I don't have SC&A's report in front of me, but John, could you update us on what you all --

MR. STIVER: Yes, we had -- this is John Stiver, SC&A. We had two taskings, really. One was to look at the in vivo thorium data for the post-1978 period in terms of adequacy and completeness. And we have a final report on that in the works going through internal review at SC&A. It should be delivered to the Work Group within a week or two.

Also, we were tasked to follow up on looking at the granularity in the DWE data that were used for the model from 1953 to 1967. As you recall the NIOSH coworker model assumes that workers can be allocated or assigned by year and building. And so we were looking at that particular issue as well.

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CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. And schedule on that?

MR. STIVER: That one, too, is in internal review. I would expect within a couple of weeks.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Thank you, John. So Brad, there you've got some dates.

MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any questions or comments to Brad on Fernald? Good.

I'm up next. Hanford, I think you've heard an update on the 155. We're going to schedule another Work Group meeting shortly to follow up on that. And then otherwise we're really sort of waiting for some further data work and so forth that's going on, data capture at Fernald which is going on actually this month and into the next, into October also, I believe, if I remember the schedule right. So I think we're caught up and I don't think we have anything

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outstanding in terms of reports or anything on that.

Any questions for me?
Okay. Phil, Idaho.

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: They've been doing a rather large data capture. Last I understand is there were about 4,000 documents so that's been pushed back till after the first of the year since we don't have a current SEC for them. I understand there is one in the works but there is not an SEC for Idaho that's qualified yet.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So Stu, someone update us? Because all it has in our report here is that data capture documents coming in the new year, early in the new year. trying And understand I'm to what's happening. This is something that's been dragging along for quite some time. we've had SC&A an review nothing's ever been resolved.

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. Quite

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frankly, since there is not an active SEC from the site, it's had somewhat of a lower priority than some of the other sites we've worked on. We have been there to do what we call a data recon, see what's there and what do we want to see, what do we want to capture. So we've done that. And that resulted in a lot of capture requests, as Phil indicated.

We have a handful of what we think are the issues. Some may be more immediate than others, but it's not clear to me at this time that we can go back, look back through our data request and essentially put this document with that issue. So it's not real clear to me that we can say, hey, can you hurry up with these documents because they relate to this subset of the issues and give us a subset of the documents. I've not given up on that yet, but I'm not 100 percent sure we can do that.

It would be our preference to sort of prioritize. You know, rather than wait and

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give us all these documents at one time, send us these first because we want to deal with those issues more rapidly. I'm not 100 percent sure we can do that, but I haven't given up on it yet.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Well, if we can continue to look at that because we are now planning to go there in July. Again, we're going to check the weather this winter, make sure we can get there. But we'll put some pressure on. I'd like to have some progress to report.

Lawrence Berkeley. Paul.

MEMBER ZIEMER: The only thing to report on Lawrence Berkeley, and it's on your NIOSH sheet, there's a revised TBD and a number of new documents being generated by Lara Hughes. They were to come out this month, although I wasn't aware of the [identifying information redacted] part of this so maybe they have been delayed. But the Work Group has not yet met but once these

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documents are out we'll have a chance to look at them together with SC&A's previous reviews and schedule a Work Group meeting. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Jim or Stu, can you update us? LaVon, somebody? MR. RUTHERFORD: Update us on exactly the status of the Site Profiles coming out? MEMBER ZIEMER: Lara had a number of documents that were on the schedule sheet 10 identified as coming out August 1st. I don't 11 know if those already came out or not. 12 13 MR. RUTHERFORD: I will have to look at that. I will get back with you either 14 15 later this afternoon or first thing in the 16 morning on that. 17 MEMBER ZIEMER: Okay. 18 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes. 19 from reading it it looks like this was the August 1st report and it looks like some of 20 these may still be in the works and weren't 21

exactly scheduled for August 1st.

know when she left on leave but it might have been around that time. Linde, I think? Do we have anything left on Linde? I thought So we should retire the Work completed. Group. Can we retire your Work Group, Linde? MEMBER ROESSLER: I assume we're done, that's why I wasn't paying attention. (Laughter.) 10 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: The answer is yes, okay. Very good. I think Jim retired 11 it, it says retired too. He holds the record. 12 13 The hospital and the petition review. you hold the record, we remember. 14 I think we got a good 15 LANL. 16 update from this morning. Mound, I believe we will get an 17 18 update from tomorrow so no need to talk about 19 that. Nevada Test Site? 20 MEMBER CLAWSON: Actually, right 21 22 now SC&A is recompiling. As you know we had an SEC for Nevada Test Site, but we had numerous Site Profile issues that have not been put through there. So SC&A has been tasked to go through the matrix and reconstruct so we can finish out the Site Profile issues that were lingering with Nevada Test Site.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And then can I ask John Stiver where SC&A stands with that?

MR. STIVER: Arjun has been working on that, I'll let him go ahead.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, I'm responsible for that, Dr. Melius. It's a long record but I hope that we'll have an internal draft for review by November and then the Work Group will have something by late November, early December.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Good. Pantex we will be talking about tomorrow. I'd just indicate through I think some efforts from Stu we were able to get that moved along and be able to get that back on the agenda. And I

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think some progress after waiting, so that was good. And why don't we finish up with Pinellas. SCHOFIELD: MEMBER We're scheduling a Work Group Meeting for sometime in November. I don't think we have an exact set date yet. Try and get everybody on the same page. There are the interviews, the were 10 classified interviews as indicated I guess. 11 They're now on the O: drive for people to look So that way we kind of see what we can 12 13 whittle down to finish this up. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. I think 14 15 we can do a few more before we take a break. 16 Portsmouth, Paducah, K-25? 17 MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Okay. On those, right now we are going to propose a 18 19 short telephone work meeting on December 3rd.

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There's been a number of issues closed, a

number of issues that SC&A has now agreed with

NIOSH on. So we're trying to get it narrowed

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down to what still -- reaction remains, the highly enriched uranium is one the big things still outstanding. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Questions on those three? And if not, then LaVon I think has an update. MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, I wanted to get back to you. I went back and looked at the Work Coordination Document. Those 8/1 10 dates were actually dates that were left in there from the previous Work Coordination 11 Document. 12 13 The actual -- the notes that follow, and you'll notice the estimated 14 15 completion date, end of October. That is 16 actually the driver for all the items, because we're waiting on that. So that's really the 17 18 update. 19 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, LaVon. 20 Okay, Rocky we will be dealing 21

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with in a little bit.

Sandia?

MEMBER LEMEN: Sam Glover and I talked about this and he's going to be sending out an email. Sam, correct me if I'm wrong, but they have discovered some more boxes and they're going through those. His email will update us on that.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay.

MEMBER LEMEN: Do you want to say anything?

DR. GLOVER: So we'll make sure we give Dr. Lemen an update on the activities in the early years for Sandia as well as the activities of Sandia-Livermore and Sandia as we close up.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, great.
Thank you, Sam.

Santa Susana?

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Okay. Stu already touched on some of it but there's also a -- received quite extensive radiation exposure database. And that could be used for

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coworker models that have to be still coded.

And that right now, because of the Fernald Savannah River Site, will probably be January before that's completed. Hopefully we can have a Work Group Meeting right around the time of the March Board Meeting. Probably more than likely it will be just a little bit after that.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Questions for Phil on that?

Savannah River we've done.

Science Issues.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: The Work Group on Science Issues met in April. At the time, the topic of discussion was dose and dose rate effectiveness factors, what's called a DDREF that's used in the IREP program. The DDREF, it's an adjustment factor that you would typically use to reduce the level of risk that would be associated with a given radiation exposure in situations where it's hypothesized that there would be less risk at low doses or

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low dose rates. It's not used for leukemia but it's used for the rest of the solid cancers.

So the Work Group has reviewed the current use of the DDREF in the IREP model and we've had presentations from SENES, which is a consulting group that NIOSH has asked to prepare a report on the topic. The Working Group kind of appreciates that there's a lot of new information that's out there that SENES is helping to evaluate.

And SENES is preparing a report. We've seen parts of that report but NIOSH hasn't yet released the full report and so we're sort of in a holding pattern on this. The projection was that in 3 to 6 months from when we had met there would be a finalized report that would be put out.

NIOSH is, as I understand, soliciting subject matter experts, and once they get that input they can open the report and the recommendations that are made within

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it for public comment.

So I think, in general, the Work Group agreed that the direction being taken by NIOSH was appropriate, that there's a lot of new information out there that should be reviewed, and once we have the full report and the recommendations that are outlined in that report we'll be able to come back and discuss, provide comments on it. And I don't know if there's an update on when we would be able to see the report.

DR. NETON: Yes, this is Jim Neton. If you recall, SENES had indicated at the last meeting that they had a few minor changes that they're going to make to the report before the final was released, that we could release it for peer review.

It's imminent. The report is still being tweaked. Unfortunately, scientists like to have the latest and greatest information in there. So I've been told that it's within a matter of weeks, next

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week or two, that I'll have the report in my hand. In the meantime, I've gone and solicited subject matter experts that I have available now that have agreed to do reviews. And I think I have six or seven that have agreed to do this, a fairly wide distribution of, I think, opinions. So we'll wait to see how that comes out. 10 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So I guess the check's in the slow mail. 11 DR. NETON: Yes. 12 13 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Gen, you had a question? 14 15 MEMBER ROESSLER: Не probably 16 answered it. I was going to ask if it's too late to suggest a name for a subject matter 17 review person. 18 19 DR. NETON: Never too late until it goes out, and even when it goes out we are 20 always willing to add new names if they make 21 sense and complement the distribution. 22

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Good.

SEC Issues? I think the main thing with that Work Group is we're actually waiting on a -- it's a 10-Year Review issue and it was the -- NIOSH was doing a report on sufficient accuracy. I'm not sure where that is.

MR. RUTHERFORD: Yes, we had actually hoped to have that a little while back, actually after the last Board Meeting.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I wasn't going to say that.

MR. RUTHERFORD: I know. Unfortunately, we were overcome by all the other items, SEC items we've been working on.

But we did get a draft internal report. We had some comments on it and we went back and kind of sent the people working on that report back to the drawing board to add some additional information. I should have a new report to provide to the Work Group sometime in early October.

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CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Make sure that's in the transcript, early October. Now, September 18th. Early is early in October. Thank you.

I think the last one that we'll do today before we take a break, last but not least. Wanda?

MEMBER MUNN: We really have nothing new to report from Procedures. We gave you a report during our teleconference. We last met in July, the last day of July, and we will meet next again the first of November.

What I had hoped to be able to do for you today is give you a little bit of an overview by way of taking a minute to show you how to get to our continually updated and always appropriate summaries so that you can take a look at where Procedures is.

I don't know if this is going to work. I'm going to try to throw it up on the screen so that you can see what we do when we go in to get our reports, because you too can

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have access to this information without any problem at all. I'll ask Stu to give me a little help. MEMBER BEACH: Well, Wanda, while you're making your way up there, it's also a tool that other Work Groups could use, is that correct? MEMBER MUNN: Yes, it is. So just something MEMBER BEACH: 10 to think about. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We will give it 11 one more try. I don't want to hold everybody 12 13 up here. It looks like we're not connecting. MEMBER MUNN: If you'd like, we 14 15 can do this tomorrow. It's not going to take 16 very long once we get it up. Sorry, I didn't realize we wouldn't have a connection. I sort 17 of sprang this on Stu. 18 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think we'll --19 why don't we break. We'll do it tomorrow. 20 MEMBER MUNN: I'll do it tomorrow. 21 I'll be ready for it. 22

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Nobody's fault. Okay, we will take a break. We will reconvene at 4:15. We'll start with the Rocky Flats petition, 4:15.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 3:41 p.m. and went back on the record at 4:16 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, if I could have your attention we'll get started now. Again, a reminder, if anybody wishes to give any public comment period -- comments a little bit later we would prefer, it helps if you can sign up because we go in the order that people sign up generally.

The plan is, and we've changed this a little bit which I think will be helpful actually, is that we will first have some presentations and so forth and then we'll go directly into the public comment period, rather than taking a break. So the public comment period could very well start before 6 o'clock. I'm not sure of the exact time but

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as soon as we're done with the presentations and so forth.

First, we'll hear from NIOSH who will review their -- present their SEC Evaluation Report on Rocky Flats on the new petition, and then we'll hear from the -- there will be maybe some questions and so forth from the Board Members. Then we'll hear from the petitioners. And again there may be some questions for them from the Board. And then we would go into a public comment period.

And we'll explain more on sort of the rules and so forth in the public comment at the time. They're pretty straightforward and so forth.

And so we'll start and Stu Hinnefeld will make the presentation on the Rocky Flats.

MR. HINNEFELD: Thank you, Dr. Melius. I'm here to present the findings of our Evaluation Report on this SEC I think it's 192, our latest petition from the Rocky Flats

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An overview of the history here of the petition. We received the petition a little over a year ago. And the petition was for the period of April 1952 through December 21st, 2005. It wasn't a petition strictly for tritium exposures but the Evaluation Report went that way and I'll get to that in a little bit.

You can see from the dates on here that this had been a bit of a difficult process for us. It took almost 6 months just to qualify the petition. It took some additional information-gathering and some internal discussions.

And part of the issue here was that the previous petition and SEC Classes that resulted from, I believe that was SEC number 30, involved a pretty extensive discussion of quite a large number of technical issues.

Of course, those of you who have

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been on the Board for a while certainly recall that. I'm sure many in the audience recall kind of a long discussion of a lot of difficult technical issues.

And so we were looking for a basis to qualify that had not been pretty thoroughly discussed already by the Board. And we felt like the potential for tritium exposures fell in that category so we did in fact qualify the petition in February.

then the completion the Evaluation Report relatively was before this meeting, much closer to the meeting than we would prefer to do. were some, shall we say, difficulties arriving at position to put in the а Evaluation Report that we would talk about.

One of the difficulties in the course of events was the loss of a key staff member. Dr. Brant Ulsh, who had been our lead spokesman in the previous Rocky Flats Petition Evaluation Report and who was involved in the

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qualification process for this found a different place to work during this period and so we had some switches internally. And let's just say we had a variety of opinions on how this was going to go and how it should proceed.

We arrived at the conclusion that we -- at this time it looks, we believe we have sufficient information to reconstruct doses with a bounding dose with sufficient accuracy for the Class. Now, there will be I'm sure quite a lot of discussion about that as we go along.

A little background about Rocky Flats. I don't know that anyone needs to hear this since we've been through all this before. It was of course primarily a plutonium plant. But when we looked back at the transcript from the discussions of SEC 30 we found that while the potential of tritium exposures did come up at some of the Work Group meetings there wasn't really a resolution of the issue

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in terms of what did it mean. I think, at least not that we could find in the transcripts of the meeting. It seemed that there wasn't a resolution.

And it was clear to us that there were some special return materials and maybe some pits that involved some potential exposure to tritium. The petitioner-proposed Class was all workers employed at Rocky Flats from April 1st, 1952 through December 31st, 2005. Our evaluated Class was that same time period but looking at the tritium exposures because that was the issue we had identified that we felt had some investigation yet to be done.

So rather than -- and that was the proposed basis that -- the petitioner proposed some other bases as well. This was the one we felt probably we could make the best case that it hadn't been thoroughly explored and so that we should go ahead and qualify the petition based on that basis. And so then our

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Evaluation Report speaks to tritium exposures.

I don't think that the Board, if the Board deliberates this further I don't know that there is any particular constraint on the Board to remain only with tritium exposures, for instance, if it goes further through this further evaluation.

Now, the petition basis was the petitioner provided information, affidavits, statements in support of petitioner's position that there were times when petitioner was not monitored specifically as it related to tritium.

And we do have some tritium monitoring data particularly as it relates to a 1973 incident which I'll speak about here in a little bit. And so we looked back at the records. We think that maybe we can bound tritium doses based on the information we have.

The whole -- this is rather a difficult issue, a difficult one to deal with

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for a number of issues. One is that Rocky Flats really wasn't a tritium plant per se. I mean, there was tritium there at times, but it was mainly a plutonium plant.

The 1973 tritium incident which really forms the bulk of our investigation, the tritium event and then the investigations that were done associated with that, following up from that event involved the receipt at Rocky Flats of some pieces, I think they were called returns or special items, that were contaminated with tritium.

And they were not identified to Rocky Flats when they came here. They came from Lawrence Livermore. here Lawrence Livermore didn't hey, say these are contaminated with tritium because Lawrence Livermore didn't think they were contaminated with tritium.

So, as they were being reclaimed at Rocky Flats the state of Colorado was monitoring the environs around the plant and

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had been for awhile. And in 1973 they started noticing tritium far in excess of background levels. They had been monitoring background levels of tritium for a while and then all of a sudden they were getting what you would consider in the environment pretty significant levels of tritium.

And Rocky Flats said well, don't have any tritium. It's not us. don't have tritium that -- we couldn't be the So that discussion went on for source. It was probably between April several months. -- well, I think the state identified it in the environment in June and it wasn't really until September that Rocky Flats started looking internally and found that they did in fact have tritium in the plant in a number of places where they didn't think they were going to have it.

So what set this event off was these special pieces were being -- the plutonium was being reclaimed by a process

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called a hydriding process where they're reacted with hydrogen. And then following the hydration process, or the hydriding process they were then oxidized.

Now, in both instances, both in the hydriding reaction where you're using the hydrogen to react with the plutonium and in the oxidation process later on where the hydrogen is essentially driven off as you switch it to oxide, the exhaust stack had a hydrogen burner on it so that you wouldn't be putting hydrogen out the stack. It was a burner essentially. It would oxidize the hydrogen so you'd make tritiated -- you make water.

in those And steps you hydrated -- now it's tritium -tritiumcontaminated plutonium. Of course tritium's hydrogen behave chemically like hydrogen so there's probably some exchange during hydriding process and some of it went out and got turned into tritiated that water at

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And then in the oxidation process which the plant concluded was probably the main source of the tritium where most of the rest of the hydrogen and therefore most of the rest of the tritium came off the product. It was burned also and so -- the remainder of the tritiated water. So once you make it into tritiated water it reacts much more quickly with the environment than elemental hydrogen or elemental tritium if it were a hydrogen gas.

And so it got to several places in the plant kind of throughout the wastewater treatment processes of the plant and into the environment as well. So that's the short version of the event.

So it's a little, it complicates the fact that you have this event at a plutonium facility. Another complication here is, I have to be a little careful about what I say because you can get into national security

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information at this site relatively easily.

And so I want to be a little careful about how
I proceed.

A number of the documents we've looked at are classified. There are documents that have unclassified versions and classified versions. In other words, there will be an investigation report that is unclassified that is generally available and then there's an investigation report that is not generally available. So we've been looking into those.

And those kinds of investigations oftentimes will take longer than other data investigations don't because we get classified documents. We go review them at a place that's okay to hold classified documents.

Sources of information that we used in evaluating the petition were of course the existing Rocky Flats Plant Site Profile, TBDs, the Site Profile document.

Those as a result of the last SEC

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there have been a number of revisions to those documents that came about as part of that discussion from the last SEC. We also looked at our NIOSH Site Research Database documents. We have pretty extensive holdings on Rocky Flats.

technical documents we've Other written looked in our own claim files for We've interviewed former workers claimants. including a couple of specific outreach meetings we held for the purposes of this Evaluation Report. We gathered workers with the assistance of our outreach contractor and had short group meetings to discuss, try to get information to help with this.

And we have done records reviews including classified records reviews. There are classified records holdings here in Denver, and there were also some classified records holdings at the Office of Scientific and Technical Information in Oak Ridge. So we've been looking at those kinds of

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Just a little bit about this dose reconstruction claims statistics from Rocky This is the total. Flats. These totals include cases that are now in at the SEC due to SEC 30. So some of these dose reconstructions would have been completed before SEC 30 was granted. And so there were some dose reconstructions I'm sure that were done that were not compensable that when the SEC Class came out those cases then became compensable.

So these are the numbers we have.

Most of the cases, most of the claims we have

from Rocky Flats have internal dosimetry data

but only 122 contain tritium bioassay data.

Now, there are some other potential -- there are several potential tritium exposure sources -- plutonium at Rocky Flats. In the one case they do periodically get containers of tritium. I'll just say it that way. And they don't do anything with

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those. They come in, they go back out. And so that's not the subject of the main event in `73 although I will describe one event with that in a little bit.

The particular pieces that the containers, well, the particular pieces that were contaminated when they came into Rocky Flats were not tritium containers, they were contaminated pieces of plutonium. There was some special work done on those that resulted in that contamination that's not done to all pieces that are returned.

it's a little difficult to But conclude that there wasn't some potential to introduce tritium into plutonium at other times as well prior to this, and perhaps have contaminated plutonium, had some Ι contaminated with tritium come back to the plant earlier than this, even back to the very early days, even before thermonuclear designs So there is a possibility that were common. of the materials might have been some

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contaminated to some extent. We certainly don't believe to the same extent as this batch of material, but to some extent.

There are a series of neutron generators at Rocky Flats. I think maybe, I forget, five different locations, I think it might be five tritium generators but I won't swear on that -- or neutron generators. A neutron generator frequently has a tritiated target and you shoot a deuteron from -- with an accelerator, hit a tritium target and you get a neutron and I think, I guess you get helium then if I'm doing the arithmetic right.

And there's the potential for some radiation interactions with light elements that can in fact cause tritium. There's -- with beryllium there's both an N reaction meaning a neutron capture reaction and an alpha reaction with beryllium that can create tritium.

These are pretty uncommon, low cross-section interactions. For those of you

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who don't know what a cross-section is it's the probability of the neutron or alpha particle interacting with that nucleus and causing that reaction. Those are pretty low cross-sections, not very probable. And so it doesn't seem to be a particularly credible source of significant tritium exposure.

Similarly, the neutron generators, some of the targets — some of the tritiated targets were essentially available for handling. Some of the tritiated targets were sealed in a tube along with apparently the source that boiled off the deuterons or whatever. And so they really didn't represent an exposure potential at all. The other type where they were not sealed up, there was some potential tritium exposure there. Again, it seems like that would be pretty modest though.

And so it seems like from the investigation the site did and we don't have any reason to conclude differently, it seems like their logic was relatively sound that the

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potential sources for tritium of significant exposure would be contaminated returns such as these that were identified on the chance that there may have been others contaminated similarly or to a certain degree but not to this degree it doesn't seem.

contaminated returns said, this is the final type of potential neutron exposure, probably a significant one. It's not entirely clear when they could have started coming back. It's possible they weren't there until the sixties but it's a little hard to conclude that definitively because there's not any particular data that would tell you that had there been tritium there we would have found it. And there wasn't any so there's no data like that. no data that says there's tritium There's There's none of the other excluding there. kind of data either.

We've got some statistics here about total amount of tritium in these

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targets, and again that's the total amount of tritium that was ever purchased. This amount of tritium wasn't necessarily in the neutron generators at any particular time.

There's some estimates about what the tritium generated might have been. 3.2 curies has been described as unrealistic, you know, a maximum but unrealistic case. seen the really details of haven't the estimates so I'm not really prepared to say. The contaminated returns to be the seem significant exposure risk.

So, like I said, the `73 incident involved contaminated returns and they produced certainly the highest recorded tritium levels on the site. But like I said, Rocky Flats didn't record the tritium when they came in, they didn't find out about the tritium until the state of Colorado told them about the tritium. So they had -- up until September Rocky Flats still didn't have any recorded any records of this tritium

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contamination even though the items arrived and were starting to be processed I believe in April.

Now, in the investigation of this Rocky started asking places that sent them returns, hey, what could you have done that was similar to this. And Lawrence Livermore who had sent the one that caused the issue, the shipment that caused the issue said well, you know, we've got these three other shipments that we sent in the last few years that maybe they could have been contaminated too.

when Livermore See, Lawrence shipped the one in March of 1973 they didn't think it was contaminated. And so they -- so they don't know if these other shipments were contaminated or not, but based apparently upon the treatment of these pieces at Lawrence Livermore before they returned was perhaps analogous enough to March -- their treatment March. mean, talking about their in

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treatment at Lawrence Livermore before they were returned to Rocky. Apparently they were analogous enough that they said well maybe those were contaminated too, but there would have been quite less activity.

Estimates of the activity are on the screen. They range from 50 or 60 curies or less for the earlier ones, and between 500 and 2,000 curies for the 1973 event.

Now, we did continue and look at after 1973 with later because this on discovery that these items could come in Rocky Flats then took a series of steps essentially to protect itself from having this happen to them again, having stuff delivered to them that was contaminated and the shipper not telling them that knowing or it was contaminated.

And so we did -- they did a number of things. These are just some excerpts, this is not an entire list, excerpts of the kinds of things that were done later on that makes

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it seem like after the recovery -investigation of the `73 event that they
probably had some things in place that helped
them out.

One has to do with the evaluation of a lot of returns, site return pits from LANL, Los Alamos. And those showed very little contamination.

you'll notice that Now, these tritium numbers are concentration numbers where the last numbers total curie were These were measurements taken with numbers. an air monitoring device, probably a tritium sniffer or a Triton, something like that, radon gas monitoring device.

And we also know that they were doing radiography pits to look at problems, things that might be problems when they started to reprocess these elements and they found a suspected structural integrity issue with let's call it the tritium container. And so they didn't bother to process that. Their

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radiographical examination was good enough that they didn't process that and send it back.

Now, that's really different from receiving contaminated plutonium. You know, radiography won't show you contaminated plutonium but it may show you a structural integrity issue with a container. So, those are just examples of the kinds of things that they were doing in later years.

The particular incident here, like I said, the special returns, these were called special returns. Those were hydrided. Any off-gas was burned so that you made the tritiated water.

The normal site returns apparently were processed by acid dissolution. Now, there may not be this pure dichotomy, and I'm not sure what's normal and what's special, what puts them in the hydrided line and what puts them in the nitric acid line.

But there's some thought that if

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you dissolve it in acid you won't necessarily generate the same amount of tritiated water. You might generate more tritiated gas. I'm not so sure I subscribe to that since you've got all this hydrogen in the acid. You know, why is the tritium going to stick together as gas and go along leaving the rest of the tritium alone? That just doesn't seem right to me. But I am not a chemist, I will tell you that up front. I am certainly not a chemist.

In 1968 there was another thing identified as a special project. This one I have not seen much about. I have not been involved in the classified research, and I have not seen a lot about this event.

In this particular event there was a release of about 600 curies of tritium to the environment out the stack. Now, as I understand it they knew about this because I believe they were monitoring the stack. So they knew that there might be something going

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on with this particular piece.

This was elemental tritium so it doesn't react well with the environment and this didn't really -- I don't think they found this in the environment following that.

The `73 incident of course was the one I just described. And then in `74 there was a much smaller incident where a contaminated shipping container I guess upon being cracked or opened or left someplace gave off some tritium, they estimated about 1.5 curies. Again, this was after the `73 event. If I'm not mistaken that was found with the stack monitor as well.

So, monitoring. Prior to 1973
Rocky Flats didn't collect bioassay sample for tritium. There are a handful of tritium samples in the SRDB. We found records of them prior to 1973. These are, I believe they were found in what's called a special bioassay logbook where they would show non-plutonium type bioassays. And they're in there, but in

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that particular logbook there's no particular reason why they were collected.

So, since we needed to get this together and presented here we haven't quite run to ground whether or not we can determine why those samples were taken.

And they were not taken uniformly in the years before `73. There was a cluster of them in one year and a cluster of them in another year and that was about it.

Following the 1973 incident once they identified they had tritium in the plant there was quite a large number of workers were monitored, the people they thought were likely to be exposed. And there were five of those who deemed to have potentially were significant exposures. Remember these samples were taken in September and exposures could have been in April, they could have been throughout the period from April through They didn't really know September. exposure scenario once they got these bioassay

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And then after 1973 they put in a sampling program that for a couple of years was a random analysis of people who were on the plutonium bioassay monitoring program because you figure it's going to be contaminated plutonium that is likely going to be the pathway so we'll take a certain percentage of our plutonium bioassays we'll run those for uranium as well.

They did that for a couple of years. They didn't have any positive results on that. And then about `75 they felt like they had a handle on -- had sorted out things well enough that they knew what might have tritium potential and they based their sampling based on who was potentially exposed rather than just randomly from the plutonium monitored people.

So, you can see that there were very limited tritium results that we've been able to find. We do find descriptions of

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instruments called tritium sniffers which I believe are ionization chambers, flow-through ionization chambers of one sort or another.

The Triton portable monitors or fixed monitors are in fact flow-through ionization chambers. And there is some swipe-and-smear survey data, but most of that is `73 and later. There wasn't a lot of that being done before `73.

So, here, post-`73 there were some criteria for putting people in the bioassay program. And we have lists of people identified as these people should be bioassayed.

There's also a report that we have that says that when they did this sampling post-1973 they would decide what groups needed to be sampled but they wouldn't sample 100 percent. They would sample a proportion of the group each month. So there's not an overwhelming number of bioassay samples even after 1973.

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Now, our approach to dose reconstruction, what we feel might bound the doses for tritium at Rocky Flats, is that there was the one event that we know about and there seems to be some reason to believe it was the most significant. Certainly it was found in the environment.

You'll notice those other Lawrence Livermore receipts were from like `69 through `71, the ones Lawrence Livermore talked about.

During certainly the major portion -- during a portion of that time, I'm pretty sure no later than 1970 was when Colorado started monitoring the environment. And Colorado didn't find anything in the environment until the `73 event.

So, arguably that would indicate that there wasn't -- well, there wasn't anything similar, certainly nothing of similar magnitude. Whether there was anything to the contamination -- earlier Lawrence Livermore, whether they were really contaminated or nor,

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doesn't really say they weren't but it certainly doesn't seem to have been at the magnitude or anywhere close to the magnitude of the `73 event.

And because of the size and the magnitude tritiated water versus elemental tritium which is the other release I talked about, `68, the 600 curies of elemental tritium, tritiated water is a much more significant dosimetric exposure. And so we believe this to be the bounding scenario.

Now, so here's a little more of the history of how we got to this point. I think I've covered this already. Rocky Flats started processing the contaminated returns in April. They didn't know they were contaminated. In June Colorado found tritium in the environment. In September Rocky Flats then started investigating and found tritium in their own workplace.

And there were a lot of bioassay samples taken. I mentioned the five people

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earlier on who seemed to be significantly -potential significant exposures. They had
bioassay results over some action level. They
were collected in September.

I think they chose an action level of 10,000 picocuries per liter. That's pretty low for an action level for tritium if you were doing routine tritium monitoring, but if you were sampling months after the potential exposure it might be meaningful. So that's the number they chose as their follow-up, essentially their action level and their follow-up case.

And they did dose assessments for those five cases with a number of possible exposure scenarios. What if they were exposed then, what if they were exposed here.

And they took a lot of bioassay sample from these people. They collected the bioassay samples so they have measures of the excretion rate of the tritium for some weeks in the September/October time frame. And that

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tells you something. The pattern at which the tritium is being excreted those months gives you some idea about potential exposure times and exposure avenues. It doesn't tell you exactly -- you can't pin it down exactly, but it puts some parameters on it.

And in many cases it sort of rules out a huge exposure on the first day of processing and then no more exposure until the sampling date because the bioassay data, since you have a sequence of bioassay data the bioassay data would be behaving differently at that time had that been the exposure scenario.

So it seems to be some other kind of exposure scenario, meaning exposures later in the period. Maybe there were some exposures in April, but also some exposures later in the exposure period in order for the bioassay to behave the way it did September.

So, and the other thing that is considered, another conclusion that we reached

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for this exposure situation is that while we call it an incident or event, it really went on from April to September. So, let's see, that's what, 5 months' worth or so. And there were some kinds of exposures, likely recurring exposures to these people during that 5-month period, something like а chronic episodic which is often, you know, you can often approximate by a chronic exposure. So this is something of а chronic situation as opposed to your typical classical incident where there's 1 day of the incident and people are exposed 1 day.

So, based on that -- let me go back one more. Based on this we feel then that an acute exposure -- or this situation, this chronic exposure is -- the situation we have here is essentially a chronic exposure.

We're not -- you know, we don't really know for sure if there were other tritium exposures earlier than this. The indication is that there was likely some

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contaminated plutonium that came back before this. We don't really know when. But we believe that to be bounding by assigning this the maximizing dose which is in here, the worst case interpretation. This is in our Evaluation Report, worst case interpretation, about 753 millirem a year as the bounding internal dose for this chronic exposure from April through September of 1973. We feel like that would be bounding for these earlier sort of presumed tritium exposures that occurred on other plutonium receipts.

And since we can't rule out entirely that some of the earliest returns during the earliest operation may have been contaminated in some fashion we're proposing to reconstruct doses back to the earliest days with that 753 millirem per year for each person.

So, that is our proposed method for the tritium exposures for the years up through `73. After 1973 we would propose to

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use the tritium data that's available for people who have tritium data. And probably build a coworker model for people who don't have tritium data. Because again this was in the plant, it was pretty widespread in the plant so we don't know that we would exclude people from having a dose assessment following '73 just because they weren't one of the people sampled.

Okay, our two-prong test, is it feasible to estimate the radiation dose with sufficient accuracy or -- which includes a bounding estimate, and is there a reasonable likelihood that such radiation doses may have caused harm. Well, in this case we've concluded that it's feasible to provide a bounding dose estimate for the exposures to tritium at Rocky Flats, and that therefore it doesn't take you to that second part. The potential harm question doesn't come up.

And so this is our abbreviated feasibility since we only assessed the tritium

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exposure potential. There's we feel like
it is, reconstruction is feasible by using a
bounding approach back to the start. And it's
proposed actually from January `55 which we
believe is a credible first date for a
contaminated return to come in.
Those dates are wrong, I'm sorry.
It's 1953 through 1973. Those are the wrong
dates, `53 through `73. Okay, sorry about
that. Comic relief at the end.
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Keep us on our
toes. Okay. Questions for Stu from Board
Members? Jim Lockey, you were first.
MEMBER LOCKEY: Stu, when did
Colorado start monitoring?
MR. HINNEFELD: I believe it was
1970, but I'll have to go back and verify
that. I believe Colorado started monitoring
in 1970.
MEMBER LOCKEY: And they continued
until when?

MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know when

they stopped. They were monitoring in `73, I don't know when they stopped.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Phil?

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Were you able to identify the personnel who were involved in handling these special pieces coming in?

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. Certainly some. One of them was one of the -- some of the people were on that five list, the five highest exposed people. At least I believe two of them were. I don't know that we identified everybody who was involved in it. Or I don't know that we did. That information may be available, I just don't know if it is or not.

I think it quite likely is. Rocky Flats did a pretty thorough investigation of the event at the time. I suspect that they did collect that; I just haven't seen it.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I have a question, and that's how confident are you that the `73 incident was the one that would

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have caused the highest exposure for any particular group of individuals? Sort of following up on Phil's question.

We know that it caused the most widespread contamination and certainly was a significant source of exposure, but are we as confident that the earlier ones might not have exposed certain people higher and particularly given the uncertainty about which, you know, where was that contamination. Was it just, you know, which batches and so forth coming in would have had that contamination? Who would have been exposed in terms of handling it? Sort of the questions that would go in terms of trying to identify those that had the highest exposures or the worst case.

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I think to have much confidence in a conclusion would require additional research that we did not get to in order to be able to present here today.

For instance, I was not part of

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the classified document capture, classified document research. It's not clear to me right now 100 percent what the treatment was to these contaminated pieces. How were they treated that got them plutonium-contaminated in the first place?

The second piece of that is once you know what that is, I'm sure there are people who do know what that is, how much investigation, you know, how much was that process or a process like that done by the weapons labs or other sites that would have resulted in similar kinds of items before 1973. So there would be -- there's investigation yet to do, I think, to have much confidence in that.

Given the amount of tritium here and the amount that was seen in the environment I would think this would be a pretty -- this is a big event. I don't know that I have 100 percent confidence it is the biggest event though.

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1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Or the biggest
2	event for it may be the biggest event in
3	terms of widespread contamination but not
4	necessarily the most significant event in
5	terms of individual exposures given how it
6	might have occurred and so forth.
7	MR. HINNEFELD: That's a good
8	point. And I think the one thing that speaks
9	in the favor of the exposure significance of
10	this one is the tritiated water nature of the
11	event. So you would be looking for some other
12	exposure event that would lead to probably a
13	tritiated water kind of event.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: But it would
15	have had to occur after `70 and lead to
16	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I don't know
17	when it would have occurred
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: In order to be
19	detected in the way, I guess.
20	MR. HINNEFELD: In order to be
21	detected it would have had to have really

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was

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monitoring the environment. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Right, yes. HINNEFELD: So, before 1970 MR. there wasn't any -- they weren't looking for They weren't really looking for it that much. much in plutonium returns. They did have ways, you know, like they had sniffers and things before 1970. I think those were largely used to monitor tritium containers, let's say, to make sure 10 11 that their integrity was okay. That's the flavor I got. As I said I'm not the most 12 13 knowledgeable person about this. Phil, you had 14 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: 15 another? And then Henry. 16 MEMBER SCHOFIELD: the Were personnel involved in the receiving 17 handling of these shipments, were they -- was 18 19 this a large group, a small select group? The only numbers 20 MR. HINNEFELD: I've seen were of the people who did the first 21

processing, the hydriding facility, and that

seems to have been a pretty small group. I don't know the total numbers but that seems to have been a pretty small group. And I don't really know if there was exposure potential before it got hydrided or not. It doesn't seem like there would have been the same potential beforehand as to when they started turning it into tritiated water.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Henry?

MEMBER ANDERSON: Do you know why Colorado started testing? Was that available technology or did they have some sense that there would have been leakage to the environment? I mean, what triggered their -- I mean, it's not inexpensive to do.

MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know why the state decided to. There may be some people here who do. Tim, do you know?

DR. TAULBEE: Based on what I've been able to see from the environmental monitoring --

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Can you identify

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DR. TAULBEE: I'm sorry. I'm Tim Taulbee with NIOSH. In 1970 Colorado Department of Health started monitoring the environment to compare their results to Rocky Flats's environmental monitoring.

And in addition to the standard alpha and beta analysis and plutonium that Rocky Flats was doing Colorado Department of Health added tritium. And there's no explanation in the records why they added it but they did.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Tim.

DR. TAULBEE: That would be February 1970 is the earliest date I've seen from Colorado Department of Health. It continues on past the 1973 event. The latest data that I've seen personally is November of `74, but there's likely data beyond that. I just haven't seen that data.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you.

Loretta?

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MEMBER VALERIO: You mentioned here that multiple unexpected locations tritium was found. Can you elaborate on the locations? Were they offices? Were they all production areas?

MR. HINNEFELD: No, they were production areas that followed the material. You know, the material that came in once it was turned into plutonium oxide, it kind of followed that material through the plant, and it also followed the wastewater treatment systems.

You know, whatever water every plant there's wastewater generation. It's collected and it goes various places. Some of this goes -- there's an evaporation pond that some of it went to. Some of it went to the sewer. So there were various -- and then there were some apparently went to -in various some went to tanks buildings presumably for holdup for reclaiming or something in it. So, there were various

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places where the wastewater went. So it kind of followed the wastewater streams, and it also followed this plutonium material as it moved through the plant, as near as I can tell. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Paul? MEMBER ZIEMER: So, Stu, is your understanding that the tritium was surface contaminant? Tritium absorbed occluded on the surface of the pits? 10 11 MR. HINNEFELD: That's as nearly as I can understand it, yes. 12 13 MEMBER ZIEMER: Because if that's the case I'm trying to understand in slide 13 14 15 what radiography would tell you relative to 16 the idea that a pit with some sort of defect would inherently have tritium. 17 18 MR. HINNEFELD: Radiography 19 wouldn't help with that at all. Radiography, that was added as an example of some of the 20 steps that were taken after the `73 event to 21

only at potentially contaminated

look

not

returns but also at other potential tritium issues that might arise like a container that might have suspect integrity. So that would - - the actual radiography of units coming in wouldn't tell you anything about the contaminated state of the plutonium.

MEMBER ZIEMER: What I'm reading is the radiography of pits was a routine aspect and was sufficient to determine likely tritium contamination. Am I reading that wrong?

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, not tritium contamination. It's sufficient to determine - in that particular instance, in one particular instance it was sufficient to identify that there is an integrity issue with this tritium container which could, if it went on through the process, have resulted in tritium contamination of the plant.

MEMBER ZIEMER: As opposed to a pit.

MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.

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MEMBER ZIEMER: Okay. This says it was radiography of a pit. MR. HINNEFELD: Well --MEMBER ZIEMER: Okay. Maybe I won't ask any further questions. MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes. Dick? MEMBER LEMEN: Out of the total potential exposed group, how many bioassay 10 samples do you have of tritium? I thought I had 11 HINNEFELD: that number in here. For the -- I've really 12 13 only seen, in my memory I can remember the five cases that were above the action level. 14 And in each of those cases -- well, some of 15 16 those cases I'm going to say there were between maybe 20, 10 to 20 in some of them. 17 Some of them had fewer. 18 19 MEMBER LEMEN: Well, the on monitoring slide you have out of `73 20 the incident five that had significant exposure. 21

Is that what you're talking about?

1	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
2	MEMBER LEMEN: But I'm asking out
3	of the total Rocky Flats population. How many
4	bioassay samples do you have of those out of
5	that whole population to represent the
6	population?
7	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, there were -
8	_
9	MEMBER LEMEN: You know what I'm
10	saying?
11	MR. HINNEFELD: I think so. There
12	were 145 employees sampled following the
13	event, and I guess right now I don't know the
14	total number of samples.
15	MEMBER LEMEN: So you could really
16	have out of the total population very few
17	samples.
18	MR. HINNEFELD: There are
19	relatively few samples for tritium compared to
20	the Rocky Flats population. That's apparent
21	in the slide I presented that showed internal
22	monitoring data for the claims we have and

that only 122 of them have bioassay data.

MEMBER LEMEN: Okay.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Thank you. Yes, David.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Could we see the next slide for the approach to dose reconstruction? This is one I was puzzling over for a bit. Because I'm used to thinking about monitoring for tritium, the necessity of collecting samples relatively close in time to the intake. And if you collect a sample after months an intake it be may difficult to detect or understand the magnitude of the intake.

And if I was understanding the time line here there was material received in March, processed in April. In June it was detected environmentally, and in September they began a monitoring program, and they report that by October they had monitored 250 workers.

And that would be the sort of

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scenario where if you're finding tritium then you might ask a question about whether the tritium that you found then has any relationship at all to the exposures that happened in March and April.

And so how have you SO described that, yes, there was tritium detected, and it seems like the tritium that you detected is perhaps evidence of some sort repeated or chronic exposure which happening on the site. And you described other sources of tritium potentially at the site other than this one bad batch.

But how is using the findings from the monitoring that happened in September and October bounding that potential peak exposure which happened at the end of March and the start of April? That's what, you know, I can picture the excretion sort of function, but once you're down at that tail of that excretion function it's not the way usually I think tritium bioassay programs are

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conducted in order to understand the magnitude of exposure, to look 6 months afterwards and hope to detect it. So how is that happening?

MR. HINNEFELD: What was done was current models for take the tritium to excretion, you know, the current ICRP models for how is tritium excreted. And there is a long-term component in there. It's small, but there is a long-term component. And saying based on the behavior of the bioassay that we from repetitive sampling from see the September into October from these most highly exposed people, based on how the bioassay is behaving at that point what kind of an intake is scenario earlier on consistent bioassay behaving at that point.

So certainly if you knew you had tritium and you were having tritium monitoring program you'd probably monitor it weekly or more often. But in this instance it doesn't preclude -- when you have detectable tritium some period of time afterwards it doesn't

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preclude making some judgments about potential exposures and exposure avenues during the exposure period. MEMBER RICHARDSON: I guess this is -- are there other examples of this going it's like 18 half lives afterwards projecting and hoping that you've got --HINNEFELD: Well, MR. it's first of all there is the long-term component. 10 It's 18 half lives is the short-term 11 component. And because of the way it was behaving it appeared that 12 there 13 short-term component still disappearing. so that was what the argument was for saying 14 15 some exposure later in this there is on 16 period. It wasn't an exposure in April. MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, so that's 17 18 whole other layer of complexity, 19 there's something else being added in as a chronic component --20 Well, HINNEFELD: this 21 MR. material --22

MEMBER RICHARDSON: -- trying to separate out --

MR. HINNEFELD: This material is in several places. It was found in several places in the workplace. And these people were working in this workplace all this time from April to September without knowing it. And so it's pretty reasonable to assume that they weren't exposed on one day, they were exposed throughout that period.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: But the noise, the kind of, the estimation problem I guess is trying to take a two-parameter model, extrapolate back 180 days recognizing there's also some other background component that's causing disturbances in those kinetics and think that you could get back to -- I mean --

MR. HINNEFELD: There are a variety of different fits you can use, I mean a variety of different scenarios. And then there's also what you call the quality of the fit. How well does the bioassay data fit this

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scenario. How high a quality fit do you need to say that's okay. So there are a number of questions.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: So it would be like -- I'm trying to imagine something else.

Trying to look for doing drug testing using urine and taking a urine sample 6 months later and making a judgment or something like that.

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, if you smoked a joint 6 months ago that's one thing, but if you've been smoking joints for 4 months that's something else.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: And one and both, and saying how much did you smoke 6 months ago. That seems fantastic.

MR. HINNEFELD: Well --

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Just, I mean, you know, and this is again completely naive but I'm imagining, you know, the short retention time in the body and that there's some very simple model about the complexity of the human body and how it excretes things.

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And	that'	S	what	we're	

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I'll just go back to the point I made earlier. Because of the way the bioassay was behaving when they had repeated bioassay samples from September through October, and it was declining, would indicate that there was some of the short-term component still being excreted and so there was an exposure that didn't occur only in April. It occurred over a period of time. And there was still some short-term.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Right, and I agree with that totally, but we're trying to bound what happened in April.

MR. HINNEFELD: Right. Well, we're trying to bound what happened from April through September.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: But it's the worst case scenario, so we're talking about what's the worst case exposure from what we're positing as the worst incident.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Correct, but

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then the question is how does that compare with other incidents. That was my question sort of following up on Phil's. And so those two tie together, and I think all that needs to be looked at and so forth. Phil, you had a question? I'd like to hear from the petitioners.

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Yes, just a quick one.

So it's obviously they have found this contamination where it shouldn't have been. Is this well documented as to whether this is in like the breathing zones of those workers, or is this like on top of the equipment?

MR. HINNEFELD: Well, it was in the wastewater. They found it in some of the equipment like certain -- like glove boxes. They'd put a tritium monitor in there and it was elevated in certain glove boxes.

I don't remember room measurements right now. I'm not exactly sure what all the

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1	measurements were and what places they found
2	it, but I believe they may have found it with
3	some contamination surveys as well.
4	So I don't really have a thorough
5	grasp on when they say they found it in
6	several buildings, I don't really have a
7	thorough grasp about the measurements that
8	were done.
9	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thanks.
10	Thank you, Stu, and we'll probably may have a
11	few more questions. But first I'd like to
12	hear from the petitioners.
13	Terrie? You can either use it
14	there or however you would like to do it.
15	MS. BARRIE: I think I'm going to
16	do it right here.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, that's
18	fine. However you would like is fine.
19	MR. SAUNDERS: Good afternoon. My
20	name is Charles Saunders. I worked at Rocky
21	Flats. I am the Rocky Flats SEC petitioner.

Thank you for scheduling this

meeting to be held in Denver. Before Terrie and I begin our presentation we want to turn the floor over to Michelle and her address the Board.

MS. DOBROVOLNY: Good evening, everyone. Thank you for your attention.

I am Michelle Dobrovolny, and I worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant Site from July of 1985 through February of 2001.

I had many titles during my employment including engineering specialist, secretary, administrative assistant, et cetera. On many of my duties I was to run engineering packages in and out of every production building on plant site. I also worked for safeguards and security in which I was in charge of all Top Secret documents, films, prints, et cetera, that were scheduled for destruction due to the decommissioning.

On one specific duty I was to cover for secretaries in Building 111 when

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they were away on vacation, appointments or leave. This included working directly for Bob Card, general manager of the entire plant site during decommissioning.

During that time I was asked to destroy records, and what I mean by destroy, mean shredding, such as ΙH processing dose evaluation reports, external data, radiation dose assessment reports, dosimetry results of bioassay, medical history questionnaires, TLD detailed reports, bioassay and analytical reports, as well as many other documents. This included employees from the Dow Chemical time all the way through Kaiser-Hill.

I apologize, I've known this information, and I'm a little nervous doing this. I have not wanted to come forward. I have been at these SEC petitions and the meetings prior, but I feel it's time that this information comes out because I do not believe that dose reconstruction can be done with

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records I know that I destroyed, so what records are they using and where did they come up with them.

My statement today in no way will benefit in the designation of the site as an SEC petitioner. I am not going to get -- I have no claim against the SEC if this passes, so this doesn't really benefit me. It benefits employees.

Attached is a copy which I am going to hand to Dr. Melius from my Franklin planner as I was very faithful at note-taking while working in Building 130. I had become ill and filed many safety concerns only to have that building labeled as a sick building. Therefore I was very meticulous in my note-taking.

Building 111 was also labeled a sick building and yet I was directed to work in that without restriction. I feared that sometime down the road I might end up sick and I might need to file for assistance because of

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the buildings that I worked on on plant site.

In February of 2001 I ended up being permanently disabled due to my work. I filed a claim and had been subsequently denied. You tell me how my claim can be legitimately denied since I've been medically established through the plant site that I've become permanently disabled.

I will not go on to tell you about how my life has been changed because of my working at Rocky Flats. My story has been told through the "Deadly Denial" series published in the Rocky Mountain News as well as many other media outlets. If you want to learn more all you have to do is Google my name, you'll find a bunch.

In conclusion, I know that the facts are you need to make your decision regarding the designation of the Rocky Flats Plant site as an SEC, and I'm willing to tell you including medical reports, vital established legitimate workplace injuries were

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knowing and purposely destroyed by the order of Bob Card on plant site. And I know that I'm not the only one who was administered to do the same. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you.

MR. SAUNDERS: Thank you, Michelle, for your bravery in coming forward with your testimony. Members of the Board, Michelle's testimony should relieve any doubt that records were destroyed at Rocky Flats.

I worked at Rocky Flats from September of `78 to October of `93. See the guy in the middle up there? That's me. This was in Building 707, and the other two workers and I were in repairing this equipment, a bridge crane and a telescoping arm.

I want to start with this because all of my work in supplied air, my dosimeter hardly ever had any readings to show that I had been in the middle of all that plutonium.

Very little radiation showed up on my dosimeter. I spent hours on end working in

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this environment. And again I say no TLD badge increase. I got the report. Those records, were they destroyed?

My original petition asked that the employees be selected -- be included in the SEC worked between 1952 to 2005.

I filed this petition on August the 23rd, 2011. We had two meetings with NIOSH to clarify some of the things that provided NIOSH with additional information and affidavits they needed. They were submitted on October the 25th, 2011.

It was until March the 1st, 2012, more than 5 months later, 7 months after the petition was submitted that NIOSH officially qualified the petition.

But what am I really upset about is the late delivery of the Evaluation Report to the petitioners and you, the Board. I think we deserve an explanation.

In February of 2012 NIOSH narrowed the Class because they determined that they

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did not fully address tritium exposure to the workers during the first SEC petition. This petition was filed by the United Steelworkers Local 8031 at Rocky Flats.

Let me tell you firsthand my experience with tritium when I worked at Rocky Flats. My job took me all over the plant, in every building. While doing this, one of the rooms that I had to go in on a monthly basis was Building 779 and also 777 and 776.

First time I was in that lab while looking for my equipment this alarm went off. I had never heard it before. So not knowing what it was I left the building. Later I found an RCT and asked what kind of alarm that was. He told me it was a tritium alarm and that I had done the proper thing by leaving. With not needing to know, I did not ask too many questions while I worked at Rocky Flats.

I did the proper procedure, and many other times while I was in that room that alarm would go off. I don't recall training

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for this alarm nor do the records show any tritium bioassay.

In these last few years I have learned a lot more than I knew when I worked there. I thought it was something that made the bomb more dirty. Now that is not the case.

I have learned that the tritium pumps were down in February the 5th, 1988, March the 14th, 1988, April the 27th, 1988. Once four men were in gloves in the white boxes making a cut and there was an air reversal which pushed all the lead-lined gloves to the glove box -- out of the glove box. And four men were to wait until an RCT could come and get them out. Two have passed away. Only two are left. Now I know that they were dealing with tritium in their work.

MS. BARRIE: Good evening, everyone, I guess it's close to evening anyway, and thank you again. Charles and I worked very closely on this petition together,

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and we decided that each of us would present the different aspects to you separately that we were most familiar with.

After reading the Evaluation Report I sensed a real reluctance by NIOSH to take another look at their conclusions and dose reconstruction models for Rocky Flats. Although NIOSH has historically asserted that their Site Profiles and methodologies are living documents and that they will be willing to update them if new evidence and science arose, it doesn't appear they are really, truly willing to do so.

They have had over 7 years to revise their Site Profile, and they have not.

NIOSH has failed to adequately address all the issues raised in this petition.

As you know, the Board approved a small Class, a Special Exposure Cohort for Rocky Flats in 2007. However, the evaluation for that Class was incomplete. NIOSH failed to provide all the information you needed to

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make an informed decision.

Today we will provide evidence that pertinent information was withheld from the Board during the first SEC debates as well as from this Evaluation Report. There is new information concerning tritium production and processes that NIOSH has not considered.

NIOSH failed to inform the Board of all the thorium processes at Rocky Flats. Rocky Flats also had neptunium and other exotic radionuclides, yet NIOSH as far as my opinion lacks sufficient information to reconstruct dose for these exotics. We will also provide examples of how workers' comments and affidavits are still ignored.

A few years ago I filed a Freedom of Information Act request for all emails from NIOSH that discussed the Rocky Flats first SEC petition. I found some interesting and concerning discussions. Those are posted to the EECAP website and I have the link in the presentation there. I urge all of you to read

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them, it's very informative.

But what I found -- okay. NIOSH has stated that they can bound dose for tritium exposure because they have bioassay for the 1973 tritium release. But take a look at slide number 3. It's dated -- and it's not very clear, that's why we have given you a hard copy -- dated March 21st, 2006.

It says, "Notes to Jim," and I quote. "They did not have information of tritium stripping on Building 444 except that it began in 1987."

The Evaluation Report does From what I mention this process at all. gathered in the little bit of time that I've had to research tritium stripping is separating tritium from other sources. Why on Building this happened in or 444unknown. Perhaps it was a classified process.

When NIOSH was preparing for the focus group meeting in May one former worker who wanted to participate was concerned that

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the information he wanted to relate to NIOSH was classified. The ER does mention this interview but not the non-classified substance of the testimony.

The interviewee asked that I read this into the record on his behalf, and I quote. "We were exposed to site returns still loaded with tritium that completely vented into the workplace in May of 1992 and went completely unmonitored. This was an embarrassment and extreme financial disaster if the public was ever to become aware of it so the contractor destroyed the records to the point this never occurred," end quote.

One of NIOSH's citations refers to the Colorado Department of Health report. This report written was based on the assumption that there was tritium no production at Rocky Flats.

However, according to the bibliography in the book "The Ambush Grand Jury" in slide 4 this assumption, and I quote

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from the bibliography, "was contradicted in a 7 June 1991 interview by Special Agent John Lipsky with a retired Rocky Flats chemical engineer. The engineer stated, quote, "Due to the ongoing practice of conducting classified projects at Rocky Flats tritium was produced and disposed of at the plant in the area of the 207 ponds," end quote.

While NIOSH admits to reviewing classified documents on page 25 of their ER, the documents appear only to be related to the 1973 incident and nothing else.

MR. SAUNDERS: The Evaluation Report raises more questions than it answers on tritium exposures. NIOSH says their model is based on tritiated water, yet the report mentions that there was tritium gas and some tritiated plutonium at the site.

During the focus group meeting in May a document was delivered showing that a piece of equipment was found that was contaminated with tritium. Does their method

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of HTO bound for the other types of tritium exposures? I didn't see anything in the report about the former workers' account of the tritium alarms going off. Did NIOSH investigate the accounts? Did they look for incident reports?

NIOSH says that after 1973 Rocky Flats took a more serious approach, monitoring the tritium releases and exposure. Did NIOSH locate where the alarms, bubblers, sniffers were located in various buildings?

NIOSH mentioned that they reviewed shipments that arrived from Rocky Flats from Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos. Did they review the shipments from other such sites as Pantex?

The report states that the Tiger
Team report on Building 123 only addressed
environmental issues. Building 123 was the
health physics lab. Did NIOSH determine if
there was a scintillation machine that was
dedicated solely to worker bioassay? Slide 5

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shows a Tiger Team observation which found the environmental testing deficient.

Has NIOSH determined if the personnel tritium bioassay program had a different procedure than the deficient one or for the environmental monitoring?

NIOSH mentions they've reviewed smears. How many? What were the dates? Which buildings? What were the readings? Did NIOSH review classified documents that went beyond 1974?

on the bottom of page 35 NIOSH says they intend to evaluate available monitoring data and establish a method to assign an appropriate bounding dose for workers from 1974 to 1989. They intend to develop a model. They haven't done so yet and this is 13 months after the petition was filed, 7 years after the first SEC petition was voted on.

What have they been doing? NIOSH says they do address information supplied to

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them in affidavits. They forgot one: mine. I supplied it with the SEC petition. Slide 6 shows one of the emails that Terrie's Freedom of Information Act -- that there is a discussion on the stacker/retriever.

The email starts in part, "Dose rates right up against the bird cages could have been as high as a couple of hundred millirems an hour." I was that worker. Those bird cages backboned to the conveyor line, and had to do this many times till we replaced the chain.

During these times my dosimeter said I received very low readings. I was told that they used coworker readings. I worked on the bird cages for at least 8 hours every day during the shutdown with minimal breaks — time for breaks. This means I could have easily received 6 rems in one week. Had a note — I had just a little over 6 rems in 16 years.

My records show that I did not

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receive dose close to that amount yet NIOSH says it was quite possible. This poses -this proves in my mind that my records do not
reflect the actual dose I received. Were the
readings lost, misplaced or falsified? I
don't know, but they definitely weren't
reflective of what I got.

And why did NIOSH didn't discuss this in the ER? They have put me through dose reconstructions more times than I can remember. The first time they came up with a 22-and-a-half percent possibility of causation. Second, 12 and a half percent. Third, 37 percent with more I know not about because of the things changing, new evidence and so on.

For this, my thyroid, I have none.

After two surgeries I have no thyroid. In one discussion with Josh Brant -- Brant Ulsh said it didn't matter what was in a specific building as long as it included -- NIOSH had the stacker and the XY in the same building

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which was 707.

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I said if you can't get that right how can you do an accurate dose reconstruction? More than likely, the ones that are doing these evaluations have never set foot on any part of Rocky Flats.

They also ignored part of another affidavit where the former worker supplied documents which showed crossed out and whiteout on two of his dosimetry records.

MS. BARRIE: The next few slides will show the Board what the Board wasn't aware of during the first SEC petition.

I alerted the Board and NIOSH to some of these issues beginning in 2009. Slide 7 shows the glove box located in Building 440. NIOSH's Site Profile does not reflect this operation. The description in the Site Profile is, and I quote, "Building 440 was a fabrication facility in which rebuild and rework operations to modify and maintain DOE vehicles and railcars were performed. No

radioactive material is known to have been present." End quote.

Yet it's obvious from this photo that Building 440 did indeed have radioactive materials in the latter years. NIOSH does not address this in the Evaluation Report.

Slide 8 shows a printout of the Department of Labor Site Exposure Matrix which shows that plutonium was present in Building 460. 460 is supposedly a cold building but Department of Labor had that on their SEM.

NIOSH admits that a former worker from Rocky Flats submitted an affidavit attesting that when Idaho closed its borders to Rocky Flats waste, drums containing contaminated waste were temporarily stored in Building 460. NIOSH admits that it found records for the RCT that shows monitoring for plutonium. Since the RCT's normal assignment was in the uranium areas, NIOSH asserts that because there was monitoring for plutonium for her this shows how good the health physics

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program was at Rocky Flats.

However, once again NIOSH's Site Profile states that there was no radioactive materials in this building. Nor has NIOSH posted a new methodology for assigning dose for workers in that building during that time period.

And now onto my favorite topic, thorium use at Rocky Flats Plant. NIOSH has accepted an unsworn statement from a supervisor for the thorium strikes as the basis for their methodology for reconstructing dose for thorium exposure.

This unsworn statement -- next slide, please -- this unsworn statement contradicts a DOE document RFP5331 which states that thorium was present in Buildings 559, 771, 774, 777, 777A, 779A and 883. This document was reviewed by NIOSH and rejected.

Additionally, a former representative from SC&A uncovered two NIOSH interviews with the same individual. These

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interviews are also contradictory about where the thorium strikes were performed at Rocky Flats.

Additionally, I found in the FOIA documents emails that I found very concerning.

A former NIOSH employee, Brant Ulsh, in an email dated May 15th, 2007 -- this is shown on slide 9 -- stated five thorium strikes were performed at Rocky Flats, two in 1965, possibly one in 1966, one in 1967 and one in 1976/77. I could not find mention of the 1976/77 strike in DCAS's technical documents, but I may have missed them.

However, what I'm truly concerned about is the email dated May 25th, 2007. And this is shown on slide 10. Dr. Ulsh summarizes a teleconference he had with a Board Member and SC&A.

Dr. Ulsh was asked if there were other thorium strikes besides the one other in January 13th, 1967. Dr. Ulsh replied, and I quote, "I told them there was one other in

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January 13th, 1967," yet 10 days earlier he identified a total of five thorium strikes. I am concerned that he did not advise the Board thoroughly and completely of what went on with thorium at Rocky Flats.

There are other issues in the ER that time will not allow us to address, but I want to bring one to the Board's attention.

Rocky Flats work included neptunium tracer recovery. The ER says that the exotics were discussed during the first SEC debate. I could not find any discussions of neptunium in the Work Group meetings that were referenced in the Evaluation Report. All I found was one word, "neptunium." No discussion by the Board. Next slide.

SC&A did address it to a degree. But neptunium was handled and processed in Buildings 559, 371, 707, 771 and 776. The last four slides shows a little bit of the research that I was able to do with some help from other advocates that shows kilogram

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quantities of neptunium were present at Rocky Flats.

Did Rocky Flats have a bioassay program for neptunium or other exotics?

Didn't the Board just approve LANL for the SEC because NIOSH cannot reconstruct dose for neptunium and the exotics?

MR. SAUNDERS: Before I sign off I want to raise one more issue and that is the Class definitions for the SEC for neutron radiation exposure. Department of Labor made a mess of the SEC. A claimant needs to prove that he was monitored for at least 100 millirem of neutrons. But the Board decided that in monitoring records were not adequate so how can DOL say that a claimant needs to prove the amount of monitoring?

I asked at this meeting that you discuss and possibly rewrite the classification definition to make it easier for DOL to administer the Class. Perhaps something as simple as employee of DOE, its

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predecessor agencies, DOE contractors or subcontractors who were monitored or should have been monitored while working at the Rocky Flats Plant in Golden, Colorado.

In conclusion, Terrie and I have presented ample evidence of the type of information that the Board did not have during the first SEC debate and what is missing from NIOSH's evaluation of the current petition.

Because of the time limitations and the late arrival of the ER we did not address each and every issue, but we have shown that NIOSH was aware of information but never presented it to the Board. We have shown also certain affidavits of workers' comments were ignored.

We thank you for coming to Denver and hearing this petition. I was hoping that NIOSH had submitted the ER in June or July like promised. That would have given all you Board Members ample time to digest the information. With only being delivered to you

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10 days before this meeting you're not able to make an informed vote today.

But I asked you to press NIOSH for a prompt response. They had over 7 years to figure this out and they still haven't. I do ask that you seriously consider our evidence in the affidavits that we presented today. I ask you to consider what NIOSH failed to supply to the Board in 2006 and 2007. I ask that you consider what NIOSH left out of the ER report. I ask that you pay close attention to the people making public comments. Thank you again. We'd be happy to answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you very much and thank you for making the effort to come here also. Appreciate that. Any Board Members have questions for the petitioners at this point? It's a lot of information and a lot of useful information.

Okay. If not, we have one -- somebody from Representative Polis's -- I'm

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not sure how to pronounce that. Is that -okay. Stuart Feinhor wanted to make a comment also. I'll keep MR. FEINHOR: this brief. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. MR. FEINHOR: Thank you. It's Polis, Congressman Polis. 8 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Polis, okay. 10 apologize. FEINHOR: I wanted to thank 11 you all for coming and listening to these 12

MR. FEINHOR: I wanted to thank you all for coming and listening to these people. I always get personally a little overwhelmed when I see the people who worked at Rocky Flats, which is currently in our district -- I know there are other plants in the country but to have to listen to this sometimes it's overwhelming to see that people are still fighting for this so many years later.

We would like to support any effort that would streamline the process,

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provide compensation where it's possible. reducing costs by eliminating that means programs or agencies, NIOSH for example, we would certainly -- we are looking considering that as a possibility. I mean, we're looking at everything that's а possibility because the suffering that going on, it's hard to deal with.

I personally work with a lot of veterans in my case work and you know, it took a long time to get boots on the ground for Agent Orange and maybe that's something that we can consider regarding the nuclear workers as well.

I just really want to say that we support the efforts, Terrie, of you and everybody, Charles, who's here, everybody. You know, we know we have to work with statutes as well, and rules and following regulations and stuff like that. It makes things very difficult.

But I just -- I don't need to say

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this really but I am going to anyway. These are real people here dealing with real problems and anything we can do, anything we can do to support efforts to streamline the process and support the people and the survivors and their families who gave so much to our country, that's what we're here to say today. And thank you all for everything you've done.

We're all so used to thanking the vets when we see them coming back or any vet that we meet, but these are veterans as well.

And I just want to say on behalf of my boss,

Congressman Polis, thank you for your service as well to our country and good luck with the rest of your meeting.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you.

MR. SAUNDERS: I brought an affidavit with me, but I didn't want to take up any time from these other people back here. It's a stand-alone document, very easy to understand and I'll leave it with you.

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CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay.

MR. SAUNDERS: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. Okay.

Before we open for other public comments I

think the Board needs to take some actions

here -- any reactions to the Board?

Questions, comments at this point?

I think, as you pointed out, we received the report the same time you did. And so we're still in the process of digesting it also. And as I think you can see we have lots of questions about it also and about parts, some of which were addressed to Stu Hinnefeld's presentation, but I think there are other issues including many of the issues that you raised, petitioners raised in your presentation that we continue to have questions on.

And we certainly think it needs to be addressed and I think -- at least I personally think it needs further evaluation

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but we also recognize we want to expedite this also and not have this go on any longer than is needed to reach some closure on this.

So do I hear a suggestion, proposal from the Board? Mark, from -- you had the Work Group.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, I mean, I think it's pretty clear we have to task this back to the Work Group to have the Work Group consider the petition and the NIOSH evaluation of that petition, I think.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: As our contractor I think --

MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, and then to task SC&A to review it as well in preparation for the Work Group.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So what I would like to do is, I think, appropriate if we can -- general agreement on that from the Board is to, one, we will obviously get the Work Group following up on it. Number two, get SC&A involved in a review of the Petition

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Evaluation Report and see if we can get that expedited as much as possible.

Also, think I need we to with coordinate NIOSH on further data Stu, I sort of lost you in the retrieval. crowd here. There you are, okay. But are you planning additional interviews and follow-up? I'm trying to understand your timetable also, because I gather from your presentation that you're still essentially gathering -- still gathering information on this.

MR. HINNEFELD: We are, on our side. The first step we need to do is to sit with our contractor personnel, who have been doing classified research, in a place where we can talk and decide essentially what is fruitful to pursue among the various possible issues here to sort of form the strategy.

I don't envision anyone having the stomach for this going years and years, believe it or not, least of all me. We need to decide pretty quickly what we can decide,

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what is fruitful to pursue.

I think we need to carefully look at additional issues. I mean, we addressed the one issue in the Evaluation Report. There were others raised tonight. I think we need to decide what can be done about those, if anything, if anything needs to be done about those, in our view.

So our first action will be essentially look at what's going to be fruitful, based on discussions with the people who have looked at the classified records, and have some serious internal discussions about that in terms of is there something to go look at and something else that will help us understand this better.

So, I would say to the Board that before very long we should be able to say, you know, I'd be able to give you a better answer.

And if SC&A is going to be reviewing the Evaluation Report there would be some amount of time for us to get that together and to

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make some judgments about whether there are other things to pursue or not in terms of our research.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: One thought I would have is that after you've had this meeting with your contractor is maybe you could set up a coordination call with the Work Group to sort of plan out a schedule and so forth.

I'll just let -- for people here, we recognize there are classified information involved. We have Members on our Work Group on the Board that are cleared for reviewing that information believe and we it obviously comes up at many sites and I think we can do this in a way that's as fair and as transparent as possible, and good cooperation from the Department of Energy on that issue also. So, at times makes it a little awkward to talk about things, especially when they're in process, but I think we can -- we have procedures in place to handle that.

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1	So does that make sense to you,
2	Mark?
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes. I was just
4	going to offer that I'd like to coordinate
5	with Stu also. I do have clearance and I
6	think the Work Group should probably be
7	represented if you're going to have
8	possibly after your initial conversations with
9	your contractor.
10	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay. I mean,
11	it'll have to be in-person at a federal
12	building.
13	MEMBER GRIFFON: Right.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes. Okay.
15	Very good. So next steps will be, I think you
16	heard, coordination and so forth. Yes, Josie,
17	I'm sorry. Josie and Brad.
18	MEMBER BEACH: Can you just remind
19	us who's on the Work Group? I looked on the
20	website and it's not updated. And I know you
21	appointed new people.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Let's talk about

that tomorrow because I want to talk to a few people and figure out some of the clearance information myself. I'm not sure who is and who isn't. I am not up to date on that. To make sure we have a balance there.

Yes, Brad.

MEMBER CLAWSON: I just want to make sure that, if they go after any more classified documentation, that our contractor be involved in that to make it a little bit more expedient so that we're all looking at the same information.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: That's one of the purposes of getting some coordination early on and doing this. Okay. So I think that will be the plan. Obviously, we'll keep the petitioners fully informed on what's going on and updated and move forward.

Now I'd like to move into public comment. I know we have a number of people here who want to speak about Rocky Flats. Ted, do you want to do the background?

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MR. KATZ: Sure. Just to be brief, before you get started with your comments, understand that we have a transcript that's made of each of these Board meetings. It's a full verbatim transcript. Everything you say will be captured and will be posted in that transcript for public consumption. So anything you say about your private life, that'll all be public.

The only thing that we do protect, which won't be public, in other words if you say it we'll redact, it is information about other individuals, other than yourself in other words. And that information, because the other person has a right to privacy, will be redacted. But everything you say about yourself will be in the record.

And if you want the full-blown, what's called Redaction Policy so you can know more about this, although I've basically told you everything I think you'd be interested in, it's on the NIOSH website under the Board

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section. And it may be also on the back table there. So there's a lot more words to it but I've pretty much told you what it all means. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. So I'm going to go through the list of people signed up for public comment. I'm going to do that in the order that they signed up. And so the first person I have on the list is Carla McCabe. And when I call you, if you still wish to speak, please come up to the microphone.

MS. MCCABE: Hi. I'm here to talk about how faulty my dose reconstruction was.

Basically, in September of 2004 I was driving my car and I had a seizure. It was the first time I knew I had a problem. My husband was in the car with me and took me over to Lutheran Hospital. Through a series of testings, my doctors found that I had a brain tumor.

Based on the size of the tumor, my

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neurologist told me that I'd had the tumor from 12 to 15 years. That would mean I was working in Building 776-777 at that time.

During this time I also had a head injury where I ran into a steel pipe. Later my primary care physician told me the accident caused a buildup of fluid on my brain. That general spot was where the doctors later found the tumor and where I had it removed.

My office area in Building 776-777 at that time had a common wall with Pyro Chem. Placed on that common wall, which was a cinder block wall with nothing else to stop radiation, was storage racks for nuclear material such as plutonium, uranium and americium.

Our first hint that there was a radiation problem was that all of our walls, all along our walls in our office were lined with dosimeters.

Our second hint there was a radiation problem was that one of the

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coworkers mistakenly left his badge in his desk drawer. Now, keep in mind, I don't know if you all know this, but when EG&G took over the plant, instead of having your badge and your dosimeter together we separated them and we put our dosimeters on a rack in the courtyard before you went into any of the processing buildings.

So when this coworker's dosimeter reading came back, management asked the employee why his reading was so high and he told the manager that he had left his badge in his metal desk. The manager told him to be sure and leave his badge in the courtyard on the rack and never bring it back into the office and leave it in his desk.

In my job as a trainer/procedure writer I also worked in the area with the chemical operators, training them to operate a new piece of equipment called the supercompactor.

So I received exposure while in

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the process area where there was special nuclear material, while working in my office and while entering the building and walking through other process areas to get way back in the back where my office was.

This makes my dose reconstruction performed by NIOSH inaccurate and unacceptable because -- also I should bring up I was missing the 3 years that I was in this area when they did my dose reconstruction. So basically I had missing records and undocumented exposure.

I also want to point out that the lady that sat behind me in this office died of cancer and later -- I mean, she died of cancer.

The 3 years where my records are missing cannot be duplicated by dose reconstruction based on a 40-hour work week. During this time the Department of Energy managers were under a tight schedule to get the supercompactor installed and running. We

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worked many hours of overtime to train the chemical operators and write procedures which meant we were out in the area with the operators.

Also, my job description cannot be used to recreate an exposure rate since I was really working with chemical operators. Each employee has a different reading even though they had the same job title. If DOE knew exactly what each job category would receive and they could recreate that throughout the DOE complex then there would be no need for a dosimeter program. The fact is we all got different readings even though we had the same job title.

I was not always made aware of the hazardous nature of toxins, including ionizing radiation, that I was routinely exposed to/encountered in the course of my duties. These facts to a reasonable degree support my repeated occupational exposure to toxins that can cause, contribute to, or aggravate my

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diagnosis of brain cancer.

After working in Building 776 for two years our department was moved to Building 778. In January of 2011, I found out that the office I worked in for two years, according to our building engineer [identifying information redacted], was roped off as a radiation area and remained that way until all the material was removed from Pyro Chem.

In my opinion, the decision rendering my claim was erroneous. The SEC is the only fair way for me and others to be compensated for our suffering and pain.

The dose reconstruction isn't adequate and contained many errors. The denial showed lack of fundamental а understanding of the routine and non-routine operations at the Rocky Flats Plant and a lack of fundamental scientific understanding of how ionizing radiation can cause brain cancer.

And thank you very much for listening.

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CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you for your comments. The next person I have on the list, and I apologize, I'm having a little trouble with the name, Mike Dobrovolny? Dobrovolny, okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ DOBROVOLNY: It's Dobrovolny, and this is my wife.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay.

MR. DOBROVOLNY: We both worked out at Rocky Flats and we were out there quite awhile. I started in 1984 through 1995. I was a production painter out there, so we did a lot of maintenance and things like that.

So this is just a typical day, when I read you this affidavit that I will drop off to you that you can keep. So a typical day for us was we were sitting in our back area and when production had a problem that there was a contamination anywhere on plant site, because I was in all of the production buildings, they would call the painters out and say we've got an area that's

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too hot and because it's too hot we need to paint over it with a magenta or purple paint.

So our job was to determine how much we were going to need, go back there and actually paint over that.

So what the RCTs or radiation monitors or whatever you want to call them would do, is they would put the yellow tape around the area and typically turn off the SAM alarm in that area or the closest one to it so it wouldn't continue to go off while we were in there painting the floor, the glove box or things like that. It was a joke out there that radiation can't cross a yellow tape line. That is not true.

Most of the time -- and once we painted that particular area it would take 8 to 24 hours to dry, depending on how much air was in the area, if it was a confined space or something like that. So that SAM alarm would be turned off up until -- usually the next shift would come in there and then they would

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check it to make sure that it was dry, there was no contamination coming up through there.

Then all the yellow tape would come down and I'm assuming that they would turn on the SAM alarm at that time.

Most of the time when we were in there we were in half-face. So we always had our personal protective gear. We were in half-face respirator. Mostly, not so much for the radiation because once again they had everything turned off. You didn't know if you were getting exposed, but because we used epoxy paint when we painted these particular areas. So that's why we had the half-face respirators.

This is probably -- what would happen is -- I don't know if you've ever painted against stuff like that and you've got something attached to your pocket and then you start putting on your protective clothing and things like that. There's no place to hook that. So a lot of times that was in your

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pocket so that you'd didn't lose it, it didn't fall in paint or anything like that. So it's hard to get a true accurate dose reading when it's in your pocket maybe 6 or 8 hours out of a 12-hour day.

I know there was procedures out there but we didn't always follow procedure because production was running and we had to support production. So when production needed something, we dropped what we were doing, we went in there, we did the job and then we would get out. If we were exposed when we were coming out of there, when we were painting on the floor, doing a glove box, whatever we were doing and we were exposed, number one, if it got any reading at all or it wouldn't probably hit our dosimetry badge if it was alpha or beta. The gamma and stuff like that, I'm sure it was nailing all of us.

But more importantly we wouldn't report it if we came out and we were found to be hot if they could wipe us clean. And if

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you got wiped clean one time, or it didn't work then the next time the guy might wash you and then you'd be clean and then you'd walk out of there and it was never reported that you had any exposure at that time.

And remember, this was on a day-in and day-out basis because we were there all the time. We had day shifts and night shifts.

knowing of Now, some the procedures, as you get a little bit older and you don't bypass a lot of that stuff, we should have probably reported it every single time to our manager. But we were there, we were trying to do our part to keep this nation So we would just -- if they needed safe. something we'd get in there and do it, we'd clean ourselves and we'd go on about our business. And we might be in that area two or three times in a day.

Then we would do our urine test.

And my urine test, you know, I was out there,

I was in every production building, I was

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crawling all over this stuff all the time. I never had a problem. Never had a single problem where my urine or my dosimetry came up high. Why is that? You can't crawl around on this stuff and not have some type of exposure. And then to find out my wife is destroying medical documents. That's not always nice to hear because it could have been mine. I don't know.

The lung counter. Well, you know, once you had an exposure or something like that or an incident then you were supposed to go up to medical and do your urinalysis and you were supposed to have a lung count. I don't know how you can do a legitimate lung count with the door ajar on a system that is set up to be closed. But the walls were so thick that some people were claustrophobic.

So it got to the point after several years that they would just leave the door ajar. And not ajar, I mean enough that somebody could walk in and out of it. You

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can't get a reconstructive dose or a legitimate dose with the door open on a closed system. It doesn't work.

And that happened to me every time that I was in there for 11 years. Every year I got a lung count and every time the door was open.

witnessed lot of а inconsistencies. Ι witnessed lot of bypassing procedures so that we could support production. We are all Cold War vets. these people back here one of is because peace through strength is how we kept this nation safe.

And I encourage all of you guys to hear these administrations saying, oh, you know, we're going to do everything we can for the vets, for all of our Cold War vets and things like that. It's all over the news. They're going to support us, they're going to help us. Here's your chance.

These people deserve compensation,

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we all do. We're not asking for anything that
we didn't give our lives for this nation that
we can be here today in a safe, somewhat safe
world. But if they throw a bomb at us, by
golly, they're coming back.
I'd like to give this affidavit to
whoever would like to have it.
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: You can give it
to me. Actually, Ted will take it and make
copies for everybody. If that's okay with
you? Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Okay. The next person I have
listed is Stephanie Carroll.
MS. CARROLL: Hello, I'm Stephanie
Carroll and I actually give up my time to Jack
Weaver, please.
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Mr.
Weaver, you look familiar.
MR. WEAVER: Thank you. Yes, I
think I've been up here before.
CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
MR. WEAVER: I'm going to address

three things tonight and try to keep it as brief as possible so everybody else will have a chance.

First of all, I wanted to introduce myself as Jack Weaver, Rocky Flats worker. But I also want to introduce myself as to what I did at Rocky Flats because of some things that I've heard after these meetings.

I started at Rocky Flats September the 5th, 1961 and concluded my work at Rocky Flats June the 5th of 2002. During that time laborer, a chemical operator, a was a shift supervisor, a building foreman, а production supervisor supervisor, а plutonium operations and ultimately the deputy AGM, assistant general manager, of plutonium operations with only the general manager of the plant and the assistant general manager of plutonium operations above me.

So, the reason I bring this up is because I've heard many times that people say

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upper management never participates in these things. Well, I'm upper management, if you want to call it that, and I'm participating in this because I believe in what these people are doing.

I'm not a complainant. I have no diseases. I have not had any illnesses, I have not filed for anything. I'm here to represent Rocky Flats and the people.

Secondly, I want to talk about tritium for just a minute. The introduction on tritium over here awhile ago was great but it didn't cover -- didn't cover an iota of what went on.

In 1963, working in 771 building we did a revamp of the building. In 1965 we started up the revamp of the equipment, the modernization, if you will, to meet the government needs and specs.

One of those operations was called Part 5 Line 5. What this was was when units were retired out of the military system they

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came back to Pantex, they were supposed to be disassembled, pumped down. They were sent by transport to Rocky Flats. Ultimately they went to 777 building to the gettering box, were cut apart and hydrided and then sent to 771 building for leaching. We used a heated acid leach to leach these hemi-shells before they were further processed.

Well, when they were sent from 777 to 771 they were sent in containers. containers had to be opened by the operators And the way they did in the process area. that was they had an RCT and a couple of they set the drum operators and or the container in front of an air duct and opened Attached to this air duct was it up. sampler, a water bubbler bubbler sampler. That water bubbler sampler was changed every morning by the RCT plant person and taken to 123 to be analyzed.

The only information, as an hourly individual or a management individual, that I

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ever received was they had a high count up in 123 on tritium, You guys need to inform your crew. And what I was told to inform the crew was go home and drink a lot and pee a lot. We were never sampled, we never got any results from any samples.

I never saw any results on tritium until these people showed up with this presentation, you know, and I worked there for 41 years. So I never saw anything that said tritium was a problem or it was abundant or whatever. The only things that we heard about was, oh, they had a tritium alarm go off in 77. Well, that probably meant that the next day or two we were probably going to have an announcement to go home and drink a lot.

Anyway, tritium was around the plant site in a lot of places and it came from, in our case, mostly from Pantex rather than from LANL or one of the other facilities. Those other places, like was quoted here earlier, that was more of an experimental-type

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situation. The day-to-day processing that came to us came from Pantex. Okay, enough on tritium.

I am going to read into -- a couple of questions into this for the record.

And I will give you a copy here. Stephanie and I have gotten together and talked about these things on different occasions. She gave me 11 questions. I'm only going to address two of them for time constraints.

But the first question that she asked me was, was documentation ever changed because of cost? I can only speak for myself and say, yes, it was.

In 1973, shortly after becoming a shift foreman on the midnight shift, there was a contamination leak at Line 3, Room 114 of Building 771. I was responsible for that area so I had my crew repair the leak and decontaminate the area. I wrote a detailed report on the incident and turned it in the next day to the day shift supervisor.

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The next night when I got to work my report was in the mail slot with a note attached to it. I had estimated the cost of the incident to be around \$1,000. The note said, quote, "Don't you know that any incident over \$500 is reportable to ERDA" -- at that time, that was ERDA at that time rather than requires a DOE "and headquarters Washington, D.C. investigation." I rewrote the report leaving out the manpower cost, turned in the report, and never heard another word about it.

Okay, the second question was from Stephanie, was there ever plutonium in Building 886? First of all, I'll tell you that 886 was the crit mass lab. It was not designed to handle plutonium because of the filtration system that it had. It was only designed to handle uranium and primarily uranyl nitrate, although they did do some metal experiments in there.

The answer to this. Yes, in 1983

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I was called by a radiological engineer to come to Building 886 and bring my full-face respirator. When I questioned what this was about he told me he couldn't talk about it over the phone.

out and accompanied by the rad engineer, entered into the lab area where the criticality experiments were conducted. There on a split table was an open-top container that was about 3 foot by 3 foot with an open top, kind of similar to a fish tank. Besides the open top there were hoses connected to the sides where liquid could be pumped in and out.

Inside the container were six stainless steel containers about 3 inches in diameter and 3 inches tall. They were machined and press-fit and sealed with an epoxy. One of them had ruptured and plutonium oxide had spilled out into the floor of the plexiglass container.

I knew immediately there was a

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problem because Building 886 was not supposed to have plutonium in it due only to the single-stage HEPA filtration.

I took measurements for a window for the glove box ports unit so that I could install a window with gloves and a bag-out port. I spent the rest of the afternoon rounding up supplies and trying to explain to the plant directors about how the plutonium got to 886 building.

discovered that of the one criticality engineers had requested material from Los Alamos to run some There were 76 of these small experiments. stainless steel containers containing plutonium metal in them. They had arrived from Los Alamos and went directly to Building 886 the criticality without anyone but engineer knowing anything about it.

I, along with one of my shift foremen, fitted the window to the plexiglass box, bagged the containers of metal out of the

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box and cleaned up the plutonium oxide and packaged it, bagged it out, and put everything in shipping containers. We had the plant guard truck and escort take the material to Building 371. We introduced all 76 containers into the stacker/retriever for storage.

There was quite an uproar over this because the normal channels for shipping of plutonium were not followed. When I called the director, my director at that time, and the director of plant protection you could have scraped him off the ceiling because of what was going on. They had no idea that anybody could ship plutonium without going through the regular channels. But in this case this individual had just picked up the phone, called Los Alamos and said, hey, I want experiments, send run some plutonium. They put it on a truck, drove it up to Rocky Flats, backed up to 886 building There it was. and unloaded it. And he started to do his experiments, only one went

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awry because somewhere along the line he dropped this or hit it or something and it became unhinged or came apart. And the plutonium turned to an oxide, burnt to an oxide.

It's a surprise to me that we didn't have a bigger incident problem out of this, but we managed to control it and keep everything within bounds. Nothing ever got out of 886 building. There was a little bit of plutonium contamination found when they did the decommissioning of the building, but other than that it was kind of a frightful day for me.

Anyway, I have the other nine questions here which I will give to you. If you have any questions of me I'd be glad to answer them.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Anybody have any questions? If not we -- I don't think so right now but thank you. We may have some follow-up because it would be helpful.

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MR. WEAVER: I just want to say one more thing. Thanks for coming out and listening to everybody. And thanks to the Rocky Flats folks. They've been great. I hope everything that we do makes you feel like you can pass this SEC. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you.

Okay, Danny Beavers.

MR. BEAVERS: Good evening, Dr. Melius, Board. When I stand up to speak today, I was here, I came up from Albuquerque for the petition for Los Alamos. I have a letter from [identifying information redacted] that I'll give and you guys can submit in the record.

And I just wanted to get on the record to the Board and to Andrew, thanks from Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union 412, New Mexico Building Trades and all of the workers affected for their diligence in working on this petition and getting it passed today. We really appreciate it.

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something in what I've hearing tonight, talking here from the individuals from Rocky Flats, it was said by one of the Board Members today kind of struck me a little bit. It says, I believe it was stated earlier today, that the most important issue at hand is that all the employees who sacrificed, became ill, or may become ill due to any type of exposure while working in the service of their country at any number of DoD or DOE facilities should be acknowledged and taken care of throughout their illness. just think it's something that kind of plays in with what these guys are talking about. And I wish them luck.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you.

Tell Harriet, we will -- Danny, in the interest of time we will put this into the record tomorrow when we have a little opportunity. I don't want -- a lot of people want to speak tonight. But thank her for her effort also.

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Anna Fendley from the Steelworkers.

MS. FENDLEY: Hi, good evening to the Board. My name is Anna Fendley. I'm from the United Steelworkers International Union's Health Safety and Environment Department. And I'm here today representing our former members who worked at Rocky Flats.

I'm here the And because Steelworkers are incredibly concerned these issues about the Rocky Flats site have not been resolved. Our former members, the workers from the site, are incredibly sick, they're dying and they've had to deal with years' worth of bureaucratic red tape. what we've heard about some of the other sites, to us this is another case of NIOSH having to sift through vast amounts information, some of which is conflicting or misleading documents and statements.

I don't want to take a lot of time. There are a lot of former workers here

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Flats. But I do just want to say that the Steelworkers are concerned and we intend to continue to closely monitor the situation. And we stand ready to help in any way that we can to expedite the process. So, thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. The next person I have listed is Don Sabec I believe. Don? Okay.

MR. SABEC: I'm not a very good public speaker so you'll just have to bear with me.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: That's fine.

MR. SABEC: My name is Don Sabec and I worked at Rocky Flats from 1961 to 2004.

My last job title was RCT. I was also a chem op for about 7 years. I am not an SEC claimant.

Around the 1974, which I found out maybe it was probably `73, but I experienced - this is all just tritium. I experienced alarms going off where teams were called in,

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including at Building 777 where tritium was, and I was never called to medical for tests including urine analysis or receiving any monitoring reports.

I want to tell you that during some of my job requirements where I was to respond to tritium alarms in 777, which I did three or four times. But the one I really remember is we had the gathering system for the tritium. If you had a release inside of the dry box it would start the gathering system up and it would suck down into a tank. And if it breached through the dry box you had a room alarm and then I would go in there and verify we had a tritium release, which we did.

And so I called up the SOEs, told them that we had a tritium release and they were required to bring up the exhaust to help blow the tritium out of the building. It was a recirc system which it took quite awhile for that to get blown out of the building. And it took about a half an hour for that to happen.

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We made an announcement, cleared the area. The thing that really got me was I was informed by my supervision that I did not have to make an incident report for these types of incidents. When the tritium was released into the room there was no ability to filter the exhaust air out to the outside atmosphere. Even though it was in a recirc system, it 10 eventually was exhausted out through 11 building to the atmosphere. that's all I've got 12 13 about that particular incident but I'm sure there were many more incidents that happened 14 15 that I wasn't aware of. Thank you. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: The next person 16 I have listed is Judy Padilla. 17 18 MS. PADILLA: Thank you. 19 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Hello again. 20 MS. PADILLA: Welcome, Advisory Board and Dr. Melius. Welcome to Colorado, 21

home of the famous Sand Creek Massacre, the

Ludlow Miners Union disaster, Columbine High School, the Aurora Theatre Dark Knight Rises tragedy and the greatest massacre of all, Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Facility, where the most people have been killed or mortally injured with job-induced cancers. Colorado's most shameful and most covered up crime. I applaud your courage to attend.

I am a former Rocky Flats nuclear worker who worked at the now-defunct nuclear weapons plant for 22 years. I was hired in 1983 as a metallurgical operator in the foundry in Building 707 and my job consisted of hands-on work with weapons-grade plutonium and toxic carcinogenic chemicals.

The fabrication of nuclear bomb triggers was the primary production activity at Rocky Flats and required both metallurgical and chemical processing that included recycling plutonium metal oxides into plutonium dioxides, conversion dioxides into metal in a reduction furnace, creating and

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rolling ingots, and machining the resultant parts.

Because of the fissile nature of the metal and the toxicity of the various chemicals, most of the work was performed in glove boxes. As the metallurgical operator assigned to the coatings lab on the p.m. shift, my coworkers, who can corroborate my words, were [identifying information redacted]. We were required to work in Building 774 and pass the J-line tritium vessel daily.

It was well known that the tritium pressure vessels were sent to Rocky Flats from the Pantex plant in Amarillo, Texas for disassembly and recovery. We were told by our supervisors, [identifying information redacted] and [identifying information redacted], that if we were exposed tritium would merely pass through our systems, so alarms were routinely ignored due to their frequency.

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We were told that our respirators wouldn't stop the trit gases but it would leave our systems if we drank a lot of beer or other liquids and that tritium was not considered a hazard at Rocky Flats Plant. The day shift supervisors at this time were [identifying information redacted].

We were told to leave our work areas in the coatings lab to go to breaks or lunch and not worry about the trit alarms because the stationary operating engineers, the SOEs, would take care of it by air flow measures. I conservatively estimate that this happened 20 or more times while I was assigned to coatings.

During the 1980s, at the peak of weapons production with three shifts running 24 hours a day to meet production schedules, 32 months of my dosimetry records were lost or mishandled and coworker dose calculations were used to determine my radiation exposure levels.

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This unscientific practice has been a standard procedure for NIOSH when records are unavailable. Who oversees NIOSH's formulas? Why has this been allowed and how is this claimant-friendly?

I was a sheet metal technician at Rocky Flats from 1990 to 1996 and as such was trained in arc welding. I used thorium welding rods and was never monitored for radioactive thorium fume exposure. NIOSH did not, to my knowledge, include these exposures in dose reconstruction calculations for any Rocky Flats welders.

During the decommissioning and dismantling of the Rocky Flats Plant, until the facility was closed in 2005, I was a radiation control technician, RCT. And I saw how the safety standards were lowered for a quick closure. The job that was supposed to take 30 years was finished in 6 years at a huge cost savings. The rewards and bonuses all went to the subcontractors, \$450 million,

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and the legacy for the nuclear workers was cancers, sickness and death.

Nuclear workers who worked with direct access, hand-on in the production areas of Rocky Flats for decades and have contracted cancers, deserve compensation for their wounds just as soldiers on the fields of battle. As Americans we all deserve the rights to clean water, air, and food, and we also deserve the right to know the truth about our work environment and the hazardous situations where we toil.

The Constitution promises us the rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. It's impossible if your life has been cut short by job-induced cancer. Nuclear workers have believed in America, defended her and have given her the ultimate sacrifice.

The current EEOICPA program squanders millions of administrative dollars and redundancy is rampant with no oversight and bonuses for claim denials, I've heard.

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If we don't speak out to right this wrong, if we sit and let this waste and corruption continue, our country will continue to spiral out of control. For present and future nuclear workers, standards and limits should reflect the dangers of potential nuclear exposures and the biological effects in a clear and transparent language.

Please consider the Special Cohort status for the nuclear workers at Rocky Flats in Colorado. I swear and affirm that the above is true. I submit my affidavit. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you.

Thank you very much. Jerry Harden. Is Jerry Harden here? That's fine.

MR. HARDEN: Ladies and gentlemen, honored Board Members, fellow workers. My name is Jerry Harden. I was employed at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Facility for 37 years, 35 years of those as a radiation control technician. I also served three terms

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as the president of United Steelworkers of America Local 8031 that represented the production and maintenance workers.

my many years of service, In tritium was rarely discussed in the training classes. We also did not have any available or reliable field survey instruments. believe that tritium was present at the Flats many times. last Мy awareness was the inertial fusion project in 881 building. believe the tritium releases of the 70s undoubtedly contaminated everyone and everything on plant site downwind of the 776/777 building exhaust stacks.

The plume was discovered in the city of Broomfield's water supply and I have workers doubt that the also no were in contaminated their normal daily assignments. Most of us were never monitored for it, to my knowledge.

Today I want to also talk about some significant events and that's why I held

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some of my outburst until this public comment period.

First, the 771 building fire in 1957. Originally, Dow Chemical denied that there was ever any occurrence. And then as the evidence was revealed, they admitted that there was a problem but they downgraded the significance of it.

The second event was the area 903 barrel storage facility that was outside. This also was denied as a problem by the government but coincidentally they bought additional land that was downwind to control the contamination plume.

The third event was the 776 building fire. It happened on Mother's Day. This was the most costly fire in U.S. history, industrial fire, to that time. And it was originally downplayed by the contractor as being a minimal event.

The fourth was the tritium, when it was discovered in the city of Broomfield's

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water supply, Great Western Reservoir. The contractor and the government denied it at first but later spent over \$50 million on a new water supply system and later on the Standley Lake diversion project on the east side of Indiana.

The fifth was the FBI 1989, the first time that a DOE facility had raided by the ever been FBI. And contention was it was due to fraudulent record-keeping and poor procedural things, handling hazardous materials.

The sixth is the federal grand jury. And this group went on for two years. And the irony of it is the federal judges ruled that all the documents involved in the testimony and in the presentation be sealed. Bear with me here.

This book was created by the foreman of the grand jury, Wes McKinley. And my challenge to you tonight is how could you possibly review any of these documents if they

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were sealed under a federal court order? They certainly have been denied to us as the workers at the facility.

The other part of my rant here tonight is the Jim Stone false claims lawsuit against Rockwell, in which DOE joined Jim Stone. And that amounted to the biggest environmental fine in U.S. history, to that point, against the contractor, which was later appealed.

The eighth event is the Marilyn Cook case, which took over 15 years to reach a verdict. And the jury said, yes, the contractor and the government were negligent. And the award mushroomed to over \$900 million. Unfortunately, that verdict was appealed and thrown out through the appellate process.

Now, that leads me to another thing, and it's probably going to be painful to a few people here, and that's this. We're in the process of talking about SECs. This is an ongoing series that was in the Rocky

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Mountain News in the year 2009. And that is Charlie Wolf with a mask on his face as he was subjected to radiation therapy for his brain tumor. Charlie later succumbed to that. He was an employee at the Flats and he was the poster child for the so-called Charlie Wolf Act.

The reason that I bring this up is not to torment his widow but to use it as an illustration. That was in nineteen -- or in 2009. I'm sorry, 2008. Sorry, it's the bifocals.

The other thing that was ironic was this other newspaper article, and that's a comment by our U.S. Senator Mark Udall. And I agree with this, enough is enough. But look at the passage of time. Virtually nothing has happened of any great consequence, that I can see. We still have sick and dying workers. We have unanswered claims, unanswered questions.

The current record, according to

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the DOL website this morning, is we have 2,189 claims that have been settled so far, with approximately 6,000 more to go, at a cost to date of about \$277 million. It's ironic that DOE awarded the vacating contractor Kaiser-Hill with a bonus of \$450 million for leaving an environmental wreck and problems with many of these workers' lives.

I find it hard to believe that EEOICPA has existed for 12 years and we're still arguing about whether the sick and dead workers were exposed to hazardous materials at their work site at Rocky Flats.

I also don't know how this or any other group can render an objective decision when the records are sealed or destroyed by federal court order. This is a classic example of medieval law. The king can do no wrong and we as subjects and workers unfortunately fall on the wrong side of that.

The cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats was the most costly event that has ever

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occurred in this state, over \$7 billion with a B. The airport that many of you flew into cost half of that amount. Where is the value?

The other thing I would tell you is Rocky Flats has been the most deadly employer in this state. As I've already mentioned, we've had over 2,100 people that have either succumbed to their worker exposures or have suffered one of the 22 recognized cancers.

All I can ask you tonight is please help the sick workers and their families. And I would say that these workers are desperately needing answers to their questions, justice, and closure.

And with that I would thank you and ask you if you have any questions, but make them quick because I need a beer. Thank you again.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: In light of your last request, we won't hold you up with questions then. But thank you for coming.

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MR. HARDEN: Thank you for taking consideration of the needs of the elderly. Thank you again.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Next one up is Jeff Schultz.

MR. SCHULTZ: Good evening and thank you for letting me speak tonight. I wanted to bring up the fact that the Rocky Flats Nuclear Workers Group, which is a group made up of former workers who have filed claims and are having a lot of difficulty with this process. And we all encourage each other to keep trying, et cetera.

We got together with United Steelworkers Local 8031 and we sponsored an event and had NIOSH come out. Jim Bogard came out and interviewed our workers to discuss this tritium SEC.

So the workers we assembled had pretty significant experience. We had a lot of RCTs in the group. We had a former rad control manager and a number of workers that

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were even involved in changing out these distilled water bubbler tubes, and people with real experience with the tritium exposure issues.

We had two sessions, one in the morning, one in the afternoon. And a number of significant comments were made. And I'll just summarize briefly that the instruments were very ineffective and very unreliable. Medical's response was to go drink some beer and wash the stuff out of your system.

Alarm response in general was just total confusion. The RCTs that testified pretty much said that they didn't know what to do when the alarm went off. There wasn't much of a response formulated. It was pretty much the SOEs would be informed to turn up the ventilation system and just blow the tritium outside where someone else could enjoy it.

Record-keeping was very lax. A number of people have testified that they're unaware of any tritium exposure records in

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their entire careers while at the site, that it was never raised with them as an important issue.

And another one was I believe from He mentioned that the truck Jerry Harden. transports that were used for busing this material all over the country were surveyed by the RCTs but the only instruments they had were alpha-measuring instruments. And an instrument is mentioned, I guess a triton. And I believe another worker said that in order to see if it was working or not they would smoke a cigarette next to it to come up with a beta source to see if the instrument was even working. So there was a very low confidence level by these people that were using these instruments.

So, it seems that NIOSH, in writing their report, all they seem to use as this reference document is a report generated in 1973 about one incident. Despite all of our workers testifying and telling them about

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numerous exposures on the site, the type of record-keeping, the lack of instrumentation, a very lackadaisical attitude by the operating contractor to tritium exposure, tritium releases and protecting the employees, none of that information seems to be showing up in their final report.

And I'd like to really encourage everybody here to try to find the unredacted report from those two days, those two sessions of testimony by the workers. So they had somebody recording the testimonies and they were also taking notes. What we've heard is that the recorder somehow broke and that some of the testimony was not transcribed onto the text, which is kind of an interesting story in itself.

And because the document is so heavily redacted I think a lot of the meaningful testimonies have been kind of chopped where there's not much information there. I would encourage the Board to get a

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hold of this full text if you can and read all this. And Wanda was there with us for both sessions. So I'm hoping that you can find this document and you'll read it and take it seriously.

And if you need more testimony from these workers we can identify these workers and they would be happy to speak with you more about this. A lot of them are in the room today.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you. And thank you for your effort and the efforts of others to help arrange those meetings and so forth. We are aware of the minutes of the meetings that were gathered and so forth. And so we and our contractor and the Board's contractor will be following up on that and do.

And I suspect we'll also be taking you up on -- as well NIOSH may also on the need for talk to more, gather more information

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I'm having a little trouble with this name so I apologize up front. Yvonne? Garrimone, okay. I'll blame it on Ted then.

MS. GARRIMONE: I'm Yvonne Garrimone and obviously I'm not Rocky Flats worker, but my father was. And I'm just going to give you a brief history of where we're at at this point in time.

He was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer April 2001. He then applied for this 2001, had compensation program June interview October 2001, and then he passed. Last Monday was the 9-year anniversary of him passing, so that was September 10th, 2003. And in that time frame it took NIOSH four and up with his half years to come reconstruction, which the PoC was at percent. So obviously it wasn't at the 50 percentile that we needed for causation.

They later said they were going to redo it and compensate for the S type

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plutonium, which you would think would increase. We came back with a 22.1 percent PoC because they used coworker dose. I know for a fact that one of my dad's coworkers was Judy Padilla. She worked right next to him, but not the exact same job.

At this point in time, just listening to what was said with the tritium, there are a bunch of holes in what the research and stuff has done. I, myself, not being anywhere near a nuclear physicist or pretending to be one, there are lots of questions that I need answers to.

I realize that my dad had Top Security clearance. He worked in all the hot buildings. He was an NDT tech. He was a med op. He worked in the labs. He did everything in there. And he worked p.m.'s, which meant we hardly ever saw him, and because of the classification of his job and the high security clearance we know absolutely nothing. So we are dependent upon his records and the

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testimony and everything else that he gave before he died for all these dose reconstructions and stuff that we need to prove that he died -- or that he got his cancer from Rocky Flats.

When he died he was 47 years old. So he would have been 56 today. There needs to be the SEC for this. I'm only one story out of who knows how many, and a lot of these people, you're losing all their valuable information because they're sick and they're dying. And there's nothing more that we can do except for be denied yet another time.

So I'm asking you to please pass the SEC, not just for my sake but for the sake of everybody else here. Thank you for your time.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. The next person I have listed is Memory Delforge.

MS. DELFORGE: Yes, I'll speak from here.

(Off microphone comments.)

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CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you. Dee Hasenkamp? Is there a Dee Hasenkamp here? MS. HASENKAMP: Well, I am. Ι didn't sign up so I don't have anything in writing to give you. CHAIRMAN MELIUS: It's not required. You're not required to speak either, but if you'd like to. Well, there is MS. HASENKAMP: 10 one thing if it's okay if I do that. Would you mind 11 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: doing it from the mic so that we can get it 12 13 recorded? MS. HASENKAMP: My husband Gerald 14 15 was an RCT at Rocky Flats for 13 years and he 16 died in 2007. And the doctor wrote letters on two different occasions stating that the way 17 18 his cancers presented was not anything he had 19 ever seen before, his oncologist. He said it extremely rare because 20 was he had three then 21 primary cancers and he had two

secondaries and he had two more that they

tried to -- or one more, rather, that they tried to biopsy but because the tumor was so close to a carotid artery they couldn't do it.

In other words, his body was totally ravaged with cancer.

But what I found was so interesting about the process, because I've been denied, or he was denied -- and me, because I had to start the process over again after he died I think a total of four times for the radiation. But on the last time that I was denied I had filled out the paperwork and was denied and I filed an appeal. And I had a date set for my hearing.

And 10 days before that hearing was to happen I got a phone call from NIOSH asking me if I would reconsider the appeal if they would consider the fact that my husband had lung cancer as a primary cancer. Of his three primary cancers -- he had colon cancer, adenocarcinoma in his mouth and lung cancer -- and I have biopsies of all three of those

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saying that they're all primary cancers and they were not metastasized. Later he got bone cancer and other cancers that were metastasized.

But they had this information the entire time and every time they run the dose reconstruction they did not include the lung cancer even though they were very much aware that it was a primary cancer. So when I got this phone call they said to me, would you consider dropping the hearing if we go back and do another dose reconstruction and include the lung cancer this time. And I said I absolutely would because that was the whole basis of my hearing was the fact that they were not including the lung cancer.

So they did it. I waited several months and finally got another denial, but at least this time it did go up a little bit. It was 40.10 or 40.16, I can't remember. Because I wasn't prepared to speak I don't have the documentation in front of me.

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But when they know that there was an additional primary cancer and chose to ignore it until I filed for a hearing, and then they finally run it including that cancer as his third primary cancer, I don't understand why they wouldn't do it to start with. They waited for me to keep pressing the issue before they finally addressed the issue. And I come closer, still didn't make it.

But I think that says something about the process when they're ignoring information that they have in their files.

And a lot of my husband's -- other people have addressed this -- a lot of my husband's records -- I think it was over onefourth of his work history was missing. filled in with so they а coworker's information. And not in conjunction with his cancer but he was in an industrial accident at the plant in a plenum and there was a report done on that. And I have actually read the report because it was circulating the plant

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and I got to see it and read it. But when I have asked for copies of it I've been told that it's also missing. So, there's a lot of data missing that would help us with this. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. The next person I have listed is Dr. and Mrs. Stanley Beitscher.

DR. BEITSCHER: Thank you for taking my testimony. I worked at Rocky Flats for 30 years as an associate scientist. My background is in metallurgical engineering with degrees in physical metallurgy, nuclear physics, and physics. So I can't claim not to have a background in some of the subjects we're talking about, particularly what I heard today from the representative of NIOSH.

I spent 30 years of my career and several more years beyond that doing analytical studies considering the accuracy of analysis, the probability of error, and whether or not a conclusion can be valid from

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a statistical point of view, not just a shrugof-the-shoulders point of view.

I listened very carefully to the excellent presentation by the NIOSH representative and my conclusion is although analysis can be made to an reconstruct a dose of radiation, the question is, is the analysis accurate to a probability that one can take seriously? And it sounds to me that when an analysis is based on a dose of half-lives radiation beyond 18 of that particular specie of element that there's a very strong possibility that the error is so profound that the analysis is not accurate. Although an analysis can be made doesn't mean the analysis is accurate enough be to accepted.

Furthermore, as a metallurgical engineer dealing almost exclusively with mechanical properties I can assure you that if tritium containers were handled at Rocky Flats and they were radiographed to assure that they

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were whole and intact, I can assure you that a radiograph does not show that there's a strong possibility of leakage.

A radiograph is an indication of the radio-opacity of the material. A crack doesn't affect the radio-opacity of the material, and a crack is the type of thing that leaks gasses out of containers. So, the fact that a radiograph was obtained or was made at Rocky Flats of containers containing tritium has absolutely no relevance to whether or not the containers were leaking. That's one comment that I would like to make about the NIOSH analysis.

Furthermore, one other very brief story. I can give you a firsthand testimony and experience about a tritium release. Sometime in the 1970s, and I didn't document this myself, I was working in my laboratory. I had two laboratories, one in 79 and one in 79A, right across from the hydride lab that Dr. DeGrazio ran in 79A.

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don't know exactly what doing but I was in either one of those labs told to and were evacuate the we And we evacuated the building and building. of course I'm one of the most curious people you'll ever meet in your life. I wanted to know why. Ι want to know why everything. I want to know why NIOSH came up with some of the conclusions they did on analysis that I'm very familiar with, being an analytical scientist myself.

I wanted to know why. I was told, well, it was a tritium release. And I said, What are we doing with tritium at tritium? Rocky Flats? Here I am, a scientist with three degrees in the subject that we're about here, metallurgy, materials talking science, and I didn't even know tritium was handled at Rocky Flats, nor was anything about the hazards of tritium, dangers of tritium, nor was I ever tested for tritium. And I spent a great deal of time

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within 20 or 30 feet of the hydride lab where supposedly this tritium release occurred.

Thank you very much for listening to my story. I want to particularly thank the Rocky Flats activists that are responsible for bringing the subject up. Laura and Jeff Schultz and particularly Jerry Harden, who although is quite a character, is an extremely intelligent person and brings a great deal to the stories we have to tell. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you.

Thank you for your comments. The next person

I have listed is Doug Fennell.

MR. FENNELL: I promise I'll be brief. I worked at Rocky Flats for approximately 22-and-a half-years and long before I heard from Jerry Harden and a lot of these folks that have a lot more time out there and have dealt with a lot of issues.

I want to talk about a couple of things just to get where I want to go. In

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1957, there was a fire that spread radioactive contamination, but residents were not told about the extent of that fire until 1970.

In 1970, it was a group of independent scientists that discovered plutonium offsite of the Rocky Flats facility.

And at that point they came clean and told the communities about the contamination.

In 1990, EG&G assumed management of Rocky Flats. There was a class action suit filed that Jerry spoke about. But this one included 1,300 residents alleging that Dow and Rockwell allowed plutonium contamination to be on their property.

In `72, despite requests of the grand jurors and indictments, the government prosecutors negotiated a settlement with Rocky Flats and they pled guilty and paid an \$18.5 million fine. Outraged grand jurors, as Jerry spoke of, reported in detail of the ongoing contamination and their report was sealed, which it currently is today.

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In `75, a U.S. district judge held the Department of Energy in contempt of court for failure to release documents, millions of pages of documents, regarding missing plutonium, health issues and many more other issues.

In 2000, legislation was passed to help compensate ill workers exposed to radiation, but missing records make that hard to prove. And that's what brings us here today.

I myself have some health issues and I filed for compensation as I was supposed to. I get a letter back from NIOSH that says I never worked at Rocky Flats. I gave them my man number, 513439, and to this day I never worked at Rocky Flats. Their solution was to get me to get an affidavit from one of my coworkers and have them fill it out. So I thought I'd go down to my priest and have him do it for me, because they'd probably believe him. Even though I worked there 22-and-a-half

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years, drew a paycheck all that time. That's what we're faced with out there.

These folks here are a lot sicker than I'll ever be, but they're faced with that on a daily basis. And they get up and look in the mirror in the morning and wonder what they did wrong.

They did everything this government asked them to do and more, and they've even sacrificed their lives for that. And this country's turned their back on these folks and it's hideous. This needs to stop, it needs to stop now, and you have the power to make that happen, so we're relying on you to do so. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. I had one more person listed, Knut Ringen.

DR. RINGEN: Good evening. My name is Knut Ringen. I am the senior science advisor for the CPWR, the Center for Construction Research and Training, and I'm here on behalf of the National Building Trades

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as well as the Augusta Building Trades and the petitioners for the Savannah River Site.

And I have two separate issues that I'm going to raise with you. I think this is the seventh time I've addressed you and you have my disclosures from previous appearances.

The Savannah River Site, you approved a limited SEC last December with the understanding that there were other periods subsequent to that time that the Class ended that would be evaluated later.

In August, lead petitioner [identifying information redacted] wrote you a letter asking that you expedite the review of exposures in those subsequent years. Since then, [identifying information redacted] has not received any response to his letter either from this Board, from the Working Group responsible for Savannah River, or from NIOSH. Consequently, I'm back at his request.

In August 2011, Dr. Taulbee

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presented an addendum to his evaluation of the SEC petition and in it he said he could not bound dose for thorium in two areas, but he could, he thought, bound dose for thorium in most other areas by extrapolating further from an extrapolation model developed from the 300 area.

He said he could limit the size of the SEC by determining that those workers who had been employed in the areas where they had trouble bounding dose because they could identify those workers using their dosimeter codes, which he said were specific to the place of employment.

However, subsequent to that the petitioners did considerable research and presented to you evidence that in fact the use of dosimeter codes to establish employment in a particular area in Savannah River had no validity. And as a result you adopted the SEC Class last December.

We think that it's time to

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expedite the review of the rest of the time period since then, because questions that you have to answer are very basic. What in the period subsequent to the end of the current Class, when during the subsequent periods were exotic radionuclides used at the Savannah River Site?

The second question is were there opportunities for undocumented exposure during those periods? In other words, exposures that were not captured on dosimeters.

And third, does NIOSH have a valid way to identify those workers who could have been exposed in such a manner? NIOSH would be able with answers to come up to questions very quickly. And if they can't, think your consultant, the Board's then I consultant could do so. And I hope that you will take that into account and get it done very quickly because I think the petitioners at Savannah River and the workers down there have waited long enough.

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The second issue I want to raise with you is at the request of Sheldon Samuels, who is a special representative for the Metal Trades Department of the AFL-CIO and who can't But his request and our request is be here. would the Board be willing to define those legislative changes that are needed to the EEOICPA Act to overcome the numerous deficiencies that have been found in NIOSH's dose reconstruction program subsequent to the establishment of Subpart B of the Act?

These deficiencies have been clearly made evident by the fact that you're spending all of your time evaluating SEC petitions rather than reviewing dose reconstructions. So there is a fundamental problem with this program that we all know.

And NIOSH's 10-Year Review of it concluded the same thing. It's a very big problem, it centers on these very questions that we've raised time and again since the first dose reconstruction rule came out, and

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that is the question of what NIOSH means when it says "sufficient accuracy." A dose reconstruction has to be done with sufficient accuracy in terms of its underlying science.

An SEC, or an addition to the Class of the SEC, can be made when there is not sufficient accuracy to determine that the dose reconstruction can be done. Both of these rules rely on this term that NIOSH has never defined clearly.

I want to use one example to illustrate how difficult this issue is. In the SRS evaluation that Dr. Taulbee made and that I referred to earlier, and I mentioned that they used specific dose codes, dosimeter codes, to define where people were employed on the Savannah River Site.

After we reviewed that issue and found it to be not valid, an attorney for the many claimants from Savannah River, Bob Warren, sent an FOI request to NIOSH asking for the underlying evidence that was used to

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determine that dosimeter codes could be used to make that determination.

What Bob Warren got back from that was a one-page, a copy of one page from some kind of report. And in the upper right-hand corner of that is written in pencil "1956" in a circle.

That report basically has -- or page has two columns on it. One has areas codes and the other has dosimeter codes. And based on this one page, presumably NIOSH concluded that therefore these codes had to be specific to that place of employment, and if a person had that code he had to work in that place of employment.

As near as we can tell, the sole documentation that NIOSH used to make that critical determination in its evaluation of the petition from the workers at Savannah River was one page from a document that we cannot find a reference for, either in Dr. Taulbee's Evaluation Report or subsequent to

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Now, Dr. Taulbee signed off on this evaluation as did the leadership of this program. And I think it was bogus.

And that brings us to the question of, first, we don't know whether this page came from 1956, whether it represented some reality in 1956, whether it represented some proposal for something that might be done in 1956, whether it represented the period before 1956. Was it valid for periods after 1956? Was it ever valid? Nobody knows. But we know from the cases that we presented to you that it's not valid.

And this goes to the heart of what is meant by sufficient accuracy. Is it really sufficient accuracy to present information like this in an Evaluation Report and to rely on it to draw a conclusion? I don't think so, but I would like to know more clearly what you think sufficient accuracy is supposed to be in terms of a standard that we should expect to

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have met in this program. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. That is the end of our people that have signed up for public comment. Does anybody else wish to make public comment? Okay. You, and then we'll do -- okay. We've got three more. And can you please identify yourself.

MR. MCCARTHY: My name is Bill McCarthy. I'm a Rocky Flats retiree. I hired on in 1962, September 5. I retired September 1, 1992.

My first days of employment was Building 776. They come and got me in a squad car and took me down there because my boss would not go in that building. He was in Building 444. In fact, I spent the biggest part of my time in Building 776-777, 83, 81, got the first pit in 371, 44, 460. I was one of those people that every time a posting come up I signed it because I wanted something different. I didn't want to push the same button every day.

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I've not spent a day in college but when I left out there I was in special weapons development and I'm not going to tell you what we done. There might be a cop here.

But I was called a senior product engineer.

Now, I came up from a tool grind to a senior product engineer because I had good bosses that wanted somebody that was willing to work and wanted to work. That's the way I was brought up.

But we're talking about tritium here. If they didn't think they had a problem with tritium why did they have a gettering system made and why did they have it put in 777? Just to have some money to blow off? I don't know. But a lot of my time I spent disassembling pits.

And I'm going to use the word "units." I'm not going to say "pits" because when I disassembled them they were units, and I done it in what was referred to as a B box.

Does anybody know what I'm saying? It's a

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lathe with plastic all the way around it and sliding doors. You could get in there and oil it, you could clean it, anything else.

And we was taking return units from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, believe it or not, we even had some Pantex involved there. I done all of my work in a half-mask and a lead apron, and believe it or not the lead apron only came up to here. was required to have my badge inside. nothing up here. Do you want to talk about with brain tumors? these quys homework, somebody, please.

I could hit the gettering system with a snowball from where my lathe was that I was cutting these units into. And I do not hesitate one minute to say I probably cut over 300 units over my period of time.

And I'm going to use a term now that not too many people in this room has heard. I cut some neutron units apart. You ever had that in your paperwork? I was

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cutting four units a day until a monitor -and bless his heart, he's been called up -- he
didn't like what was going on and he got his
manager down there, and he brought all kinds
of instruments down there.

And they got me to where I was cutting one neutron unit a week. And I had lead gloves like usually goes into a dry box, these were out of a sack or whatever and I put on. I had a full face mask on. But all of a sudden, you know, the light come on. Somebody done their homework.

I was doing four a day and they was on a cart, a little roll-away cart, one cart. I've got a lead apron on. This is before they got curious. And the other two or three were parked behind me.

Now I'm not going to tell you, but, yes, I've got cancer. And I've not filed a claim because my mom told me a long time ago don't push stuff up the hill unless you've got an outlet. Mine's the grave. I'll take it.

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I'm not going to mess with this.

But I'm saying that you folks have been lied to, misrepresented to and the main product was filed in the trash can. And the trash can involves these people's paperwork. I know what went on out there. I'm a curious person, that's the reason I signed these postings and I bounced around all over and I knew the different operations, the different procedures and how to do them. And that's how I managed to get up the ladder. And folks, do your homework. Throw the trash can away.

Now, a parallel here is when the FBI hit Rocky Flats, and I was there that day when they stepped off the pad. You know, they got their white smock on, they got their belt on, they got their gun on the side and they're getting ready to step off the pad in a hot area. If they'd have fired a gun, blew a window out, we'd have lost Kansas.

The FBI, they can do any darn thing they want to -- I cleaned that up in a

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hurry, didn't I? But anyway, they wanted to know where everything was buried out there. So they spent millions of dollars on X-rays, soil samples, metal detectors and stuff.

All they had to do was to go to heavy equipment operator on the plant and check with the guys that run the backhoes, the front end loaders. They're the one that dug the hole. Why did they have to go to a bunch of desks to find out where that stuff was buried? Two men could have told them, but they carried lunch buckets. They wouldn't talk to them. Too far down the ladder.

Folks, here's the people you need to talk to, right here. These are the front end loaders. These are the guys running the backhoes. They know what went on out there, they know where it's at. Thank you.

MR. LOGAN: Hi there, I'm Michael Logan. I really appreciate you guys showing up to give us some support if you can.

This young lady, I worked with her

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father for quite a few years, we had different jobs, different departments we worked in. But I helped support his department at times.

I've got a real big question that I've had a real tough time struggling, trying to figure out why her father, a good friend of mine, and one other guy, they all did the same exact job. They worked with the same chemicals, they did the same thing day-in and day-out. They all three died of the same illness, pancreatic cancer.

[Identifying information redacted] got awarded the money for his compensation for it, but they're turning these other people down? I mean, I'm not a rocket scientist but I can't figure out why three people who do the same job get turned down.

That's like when NIOSH did my radiological dose reconfiguration. When I've been trying to get my radiological report from Washington they say it's missing. But when I get the dose reconfiguration from NIOSH I had

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some questions so I talked to the guy who did it.

And he says, "according to our records." I said, "Records? What records is that?" He said, "Well, your radiological records." I said, "Oh yeah? Where did you get those?" They said, "Washington." I said, "No, you didn't, they're missing. That's what they're telling me." He says, "No, I've got them right in my hand."

So, how do you figure something like that out? They tell me they're missing, they're gone, but yet NIOSH has them? If you guys can give me an answer I'd really appreciate it, because I don't understand.

And I don't understand why her and her mother have had such a fight to get things done right and have them taken care of morally and ethically and legally. I don't understand how the system is failing them. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. And

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I believe there was one more person. Do you have a public -- wish to make a comment?

MR. FREIBERG: Yes, and I'll make it as brief as I can.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: It's fine.

MR. FREIBERG: My name's Ken Freiberg. I started out there after I got out of the military in early `53 and worked out there damn-near full-time until it was closed. I've also worked at all the other sites and I'm still working now at Los Alamos and Oak Ridge and some of the other sites. And I'm in my eighties.

I want to compliment the Board and a lot of the DOE and Department of Labor workers, which is a little different than some of the things you've been hearing. But I've had cancer five times. I was loaded with plutonium, et cetera, and they treated me right and took good care of me. And it worked out very well.

Sitting here listening, and I was

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involved in almost every incident and every fire out there during the period of time, and in upper management most of the time. The workers deserve whatever we can do for them and their families.

And a lot of the data is available, but it's not getting to, I don't think, the right people. The old saying of sit down around the table and sit down with the right people and get the information you need and you can answer the question very rapidly.

Thorium was brought up here earlier, thorium strikes. The only real thorium strikes we did was on uranium-233, which most people don't even know about, okay? I was the health physics person that was in charge of that for the thorium strikes. I know why they were done and how they were done, and know the people that worked on it.

There's about five or six people, including Jack Weaver that was here a little

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earlier, that can answer that young lady's question. There's not many of us old people that are now in our eighties, okay, still around that know exactly what happened, what instruments we had, what we could do with those instruments.

We couldn't read neutrons at the very beginning, which most of you know, because we didn't have the instrumentation. We didn't even look for them until we got spheres and things of that nature. We didn't know what was plutonium and what was uranium when we first started and I came up with the isotopic analyzers that would separate the energy so we could tell which was what of the various different isotopes.

There's about five or six people that I can name and give you the names of that can answer most of the questions that were brought up here tonight very quickly. I've given deposition upon deposition, a lot of it with [identifying information redacted] that

is following up all these cases. I don't believe any of the reams of documentation on all the incidents, on all the accidents and the special projects. Most of that data has never gotten to the Department of Labor or to DOE to review.

There's been an awful lot -- also now we're starting the Cold War and the Rocky Flats Museum. There's 120-some orals including mine that go through all the fires, the incidents and what experience the people have and what they did.

And what I would highly recommend is that when questions come up, there are still -- there's only two plant managers left that were there for a long time, that's [identifying information redacted]. I just made a video with those two guys on the history of what we've seen, what we did at Rocky Flats, including the good things. Besides just making weapons like people think, there was an awful lot of good things happened

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out there, a lot of technology and the workers made that happen.

Generally speaking, even upper management try to do the best job they did. And I think most people in DOE, Department of Labor, feel the same way now. But the people — a lot of things we didn't know. When we first started we built the weapons by hand, believe it or not. We didn't start machining weapons until 1957. When we first started we actually hand-sanded some of this stuff, okay? And there was a lot of incidents and I received a lot of plutonium.

But I lucked out and got well taken care of, still get every 3 to 6 months checkups and it's working out very well. But a lot of these people, because the answers aren't being given to the right people, aren't getting what they deserve.

There's also a lot of things being brought up now on trichlor, perchlor and other solvents. A lot of the things at Rocky Flats

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wasn't from plutonium, it was from chemical aspects, asbestos, the chemicals we worked with and the other things. And that's causing a lot of problems now with neuropathies and other things like this that the doctors at Jewish, University of Colorado, and other hospitals in the area are well aware of. And that should be looked at also.

But what I'd like to recommend is I can make these names available. And that includes the dose people that did the dose [Identifying information redacted] did lot of them. [Identifying information did redacted] lot of work а that, [identifying information redacted], myself. Most of them are slowly disappearing, because like I say I'm in my eighties now and we won't be around, like that young lady says, too much longer.

And I'd recommend the questions that came up here, like a simple thing like on the thorium or the tritium, the people that

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were there, which I was there, should be asked the questions, sit down around a round table with some representative here, not hiring new contractors that don't have any of background or the experience. We're not going to lie, we're not going to say anything bad or wrong, we're going to just say what it was and what happened. And we can do that. And I'd appreciate if somebody would maybe get someone here to ask those questions and get with us, the few of us that are still left, and go through that.

And most of that data is available in some of the production areas. Like I say, Jack Weaver and I are still doing some work with Los Alamos. We're now working on a CMR facility and also Oak Ridge. Because the newer kids -- people, I should say -- don't have the background that we got by the handson through many, many years of experience. And I'd just like to recommend that somebody, if the questions do come up and particularly

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for a person's exposure or something like that, go with the people that worked there and ask them, okay?

That's all I have to say. And I thank you for your participation and, like I say, taking care of a lot of us. A lot of us have been well taken care of, but a lot of the people still haven't. Okay, thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. And I thank everybody for coming here tonight.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 7:35 p.m.)

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