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# U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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# ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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WORK GROUP ON PINELLAS

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THURSDAY OCTOBER 13, 2011

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The Work Group convened in the Toronto Room of the Cincinnati Airport Marriott, 2395 Progress Drive, Hebron, Kentucky, at 9:00 a.m., Phillip Schofield, Chairman, presiding.

#### PRESENT:

PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, Chairman BRADLEY P. CLAWSON, Member JOHN W. POSTON, SR, Member\*

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#### ALSO PRESENT:

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official PETE DARNELL, DCAS
BRIAN GLECKLER, ORAU Team
DONNA HAND\*
JEFFREY KOTSCH, DOL\*
JENNY LIN, HHS\*
JAMES NETON, DCAS
ARIS PAPADOPOULOS, SC&A
JOHN STIVER, SC&A
ELYSE THOMAS, ORAU\*

\*Participating via telephone

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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	9:02 a.m.
3	MR. KATZ: The agenda for the
4	meeting is posted on the DCAS website. And let
5	me just remind everyone who is on the line to
6	please mute your phone except when you are
7	speaking to the group. Use *6 if you don't
8	have a mute button to put yourself on mute and
9	then press *6 again if you want to come off of
10	mute. And please don't put the phone on hold
11	at any point, but hang up and dial back in if
12	you need to leave for a piece of the meeting.
13	Thank you. Phil, it's your agenda.
14	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. We
15	will start off with the Site Description from
16	the TBD, since it's a total rewrite.
17	There is a number of concerns that
18	have been raised that we would like to get
19	addressed today. One, the location of where
20	the different materials are and types and the
21	buildings.

1	How we are going to address the
2	issues of tritium exposures, problems.
3	And then some of the incidents
4	that have happened at the facility in
5	particular. There have been concerns raised
6	about those, too, of potential unmonitored
7	exposures.
8	So I guess we will turn it over to
9	you guys, since you did the total rewrite.
10	MR. DARNELL: Okay. This is Pete
11	Darnell. In general, there was a rather large
12	change that affected all of the TBDs. I'll
13	cover that one first.
14	We touched upon it in the last
15	meeting. Also, there were some General
16	Electric X-Ray Divisions or GEXM documents
17	that were interspersed with Pinellas Plant
18	documents. And the original revisions have
19	Technical Basis Documents, those documents
20	made it in to our reference documents and
21	information was incorporated in the Technical

This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Pinellas Work Group, has
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Basis Document and it has since been removed 1 and they replaced it and identified it. 2 3 that's a general comment on all of the Technical Basis Document sections. 4 Site Description TBD. The biggest 5 addition to the TBD was the D&D information 6 from '94 to '97 was added to the Technical 7 We also added a bunch of Basis Document. 8 9 information on nickel-63, carbon-14, depleted uranium, metal tritides and some of these were 10 issues that were left over from the 11 last meeting also. 12 A number of changes were done in 13 the description to organize the information. 14 And that's pretty much the major changes in 15 16 the document. Comments, questions? 17 STIVER: Yes. This is John 18 19 Stiver. Getting back to, you know, the Technical Basis one, we had, I think it was, 20 Finding 1 Matrix. We were concerned about the 21

lack of data pre-1980 and this issue about

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2 back extrapolation. 3 And in reading the transcript from almost two and a half years ago, they said --4 and also your update, too, in the national 5 document here in the first table, you have put 6 7 in what about 604 new documents. And in principle, it looks like 8 9 waterfront you're covering the on that. 10 However, before SC&A could feel comfortable signing off on that, we would like to have the 11 opportunity to look at those documents and 12 13 see, you know, how well or how representative the 14 they are of various time periods concerned. 15 16 And so that's our thing. So we -this is going to be kind of a continuing theme 17 throughout this discussion. 18 We agree 19 principle with a lot of things that you guys 20 have done. However, we would like to have the opportunity to 21 review some of the source

8

documentation and data sets that underlie the 1 2 new assumptions and methods and so forth. 3 And I think we MR. KATZ: Okay. can take care of that in tasking this meeting. 4 5 MR. STIVER: Okay. MR. KATZ: So SC&A can go forward 6 7 with that. 8 MR. STIVER: Yes. 9 MR. GLECKLER: Something that --10 this is Brian Gleckler. Something in general 11 that we may want -- I just want to bring to everyone's attention, with the revisions of 12 13 these TBDs, it's like what you just touched on -- we have acquired or captured, I guess, I 14 know it was over 400 and it gets to counts 15 16 600 new documents since these TBDs -17 since some of these TBDs were last revised. So we have added a whole lot of 18 new information on that and it's like another 19 20 thing was reorganize virtually every one of

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

the TBDs and hopefully they will flow a little

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better and be a little more readable with the 1 new formatting and stuff that was done with 2 3 them. So that has been done with every one of 4 them. This is John Stiver 5 MR. STIVER: We also had an issue about -- related 6 7 to Issue No. 6, which was the decommissioning, D&D period from '94 to '97. And I believe at 8 9 the last meeting you guys, NIOSH, indicated that, you know, if you had the time and the 10 resources, you would look into this. 11 12 And we saw that there is a brief 13 description in Section 2.3.4. However, we are still a little concerned in that there is 14 discussion 15 really no of source-terms, 16 exposures, differences because of the tearing down of some of these engineered barriers and 17 things, glove boxes and ductwork and that sort 18 19 of thing. 20 And what the -- so what may have been a contained source in the past, may not 21

1	be during the D&D period. And so we have some
2	reservations and would like to see some more
3	granularity regarding potential D&D exposures.
4	MR. DARNELL: We would need your
5	comments.
6	MR. STIVER: Yes, that's just it.
7	I mean, we would have to, you know, review and
8	provide some, you know, White Paper or a memo.
9	MR. GLECKLER: I'm not really sure
10	what else we can go into. I mean, the
11	analyses on tritium was basically the only
12	contamination source or dispersible source of
13	contamination at the site. So during the D&D
14	activities, it would just be tritium
15	contamination that they would encounter and
16	get tritium bioassay like they
17	MR. STIVER: Yes.
18	MR. GLECKLER: with their past
19	practices. There wasn't any indication that
20	they changed their practices. The contractors
21	stayed the same when they transitioned to the

1	decommissioning era. There is no indication
2	that they modified it or changed how they did
3	business in the radiologic control program.
4	So it should be pretty
5	straightforward.
6	MR. STIVER: I realized that, you
7	know, the RadCon Program really didn't change.
8	What I'm really more concerned about, you
9	know, is the potential for larger exposures or
10	exposures to the groups of personnel that may
11	not have been adequately monitored.
12	It kind of gets back to another
13	issue that is going to be coming up is the
14	MR. DARNELL: Before you move on
15	from that
16	MR. STIVER: Okay.
17	MR. DARNELL: If you don't mind,
18	the personnel that were unmonitored is covered
19	in that
20	MR. STIVER: Oh, I understand,
21	right, yes.

1 -- the Tech Basis MR. DARNELL: 95<sup>th</sup> 2 it's the Document and covered at 3 percentile. This is an issue that we have couple of times in previous 4 gone over а 5 meetings. while I understand that you 6 7 may be looking for something specific to D&D, when you have got a site that has a large 8 9 monitored workers and -population of 10 small population of monitored me, а 11 workers at the highest dose and then everybody else that was monitored at or near zero, the 12 13 only recourse you really have is to find a 95<sup>th</sup> single 14 dose that represents the percentile and that's what we did. 15 16 So from operations through D&D, if 17 it's the unmonitored worker, they are getting a combination of internal and external dose 18 19 and a couple hundred millirem and I don't know 20 what else we could give you looking for other unmonitored exposures. 21

1	MR. STIVER: Well, I guess that's
2	the kind of thing that we really haven't
3	flushed out the exact details on this, other
4	than that there is some concern that because
5	of the different types of activities there may
6	have been the potential for releases of some
7	of these, well, we have, you know, your
8	carbon-14 and your nickel-63, some DU,
9	plutonium, which
10	MR. DARNELL: It's not an issue at
11	all.
12	MR. STIVER: I know. You may have
13	a weight of evidence in this argument that
14	those really aren't sources of the exposure,
15	but say, for example, that there could have
16	been some breaching of one of these previously
17	contained sources or you might have had some
18	contaminants inside and, to not work in that
19	kind of thing, that could have become airborne
20	and been a course of exposure, too.
21	MR. DARNELL: Are you familiar

1	with the RTGs how they were filled?
2	MR. STIVER: Oh, yes. The RTGs -
3	MR. DARNELL: And controlled?
4	MR. STIVER: we aren't too
5	concerned about the RTGs. But we will get
6	into that as we go. There are some other
7	issues that we need to bring in and they are
8	all kind of interrelated, I know, at this
9	point right now, but I just want to put that
10	out there that that is a concern of ours
11	regarding the D&D period. So we could write a
12	memo about it and see what's the best way to
13	address this.
14	MEMBER POSTON: Hello?
15	MR. KATZ: Hello?
16	MEMBER POSTON: This is John
17	Poston. I'm sorry to be late. I have been on
18	travel and we also had a power outage here.
19	MR. KATZ: We're glad to have you,
20	John. Thank you.
21	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: The other

1	concern there, just let me address one thing
2	that John said, was in D&D you always have to
3	look all the way back to the history of that
4	building. Whether the materials may have been
5	at that building or may or may not have been.
6	You almost have to go through and
7	exclude certain materials and say well, during
8	the D&D we know these weren't ever in that
9	building. Otherwise, and I would say this for
10	any facility that has ever existed, do the
11	spills, accidents, whatever it was, unplanned
12	releases, a lot of that stuff gets up in the
13	nook and crannies that, when you do a decon of
14	a room or something, doesn't get cleaned up.
15	So there at D&D, that is potential
16	for some of those residual contamination for
17	exposures always exist during D&D. And that's
18	something that it's hard to say well, you
19	know, they only said tritium here.
20	We do know they had stuff in glass
21	tubes that were broke, dropped for various

1	reasons that allowed rooms to get
2	contaminated.
3	MR. DARNELL: And that, in the
4	end, was tritium.
5	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, but what
6	some of the bad news, some of those tubes
7	were coated.
8	MR. DARNELL: Right.
9	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: And then you
10	have that potential to spread to other parts
11	of that building behind
12	MR. DARNELL: You're talking about
13	the tritide issue.
14	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Right. And
15	this is something that people need to I
16	mean, the fact that, like I said, it's during
17	the D&D this it may not have been so much
18	an issue for the last 5, 10 years of the
19	facility operating as it also comes back in
20	play during the D&D just because I don't
21	care how careful you are, decon and stuff,

17

1	there's always the little nooks and crannies
2	in there that you don't get clean.
3	MR. DARNELL: One thing you have
4	to remember about the tritide issue is that
5	this the Pinellas Plant tritide issue,
6	basically, was the surface barrier, that's
7	where the tritides would have formed.
8	Okay. To get an exposure, you
9	would have to be at the point that the surface
10	barrier was breached and somehow have
11	volatized that surface barrier. Okay. And I
12	cannot foresee any way at all, and there is no
13	record of it at all, of one of those two
14	somehow getting volatized, so that there could
15	be an exposure to the tritide.
16	We are giving credit for exposure
17	to the tritide through those personnel that
18	are monitored for tritium exposure, because
19	there is no way to separate out that
20	population, but this wasn't a general exposure
21	hazard. It wasn't a hazard that would get

1	spread.
2	There is no nook and cranny that
3	would have gotten glass, when they had the
4	glass tubes, and then later went to stainless
5	steel tubes, in it that had a tritide on it
6	that you would then get an exposure from.
7	You have to remember what Pinellas
8	actually was. It's not your regular DOE site.
9	It's not a huge facility where tritium was
10	spread everywhere. It localized operations
11	within the site, RTGs, triple encapsulated,
12	it's just not a high-exposure potential site,
13	especially for external/internal. You had to
14	be in the right place at the right time.
15	Unfortunately, Pinellas did muddy
16	the waters a bit with their visitor and
17	unmonitored worker practices, because they
18	walked through areas while they were being
19	while operations were going on.
20	Other than that, while I
21	understand your concern about spread for D&D,

I just don't see it in this site, because of 1 2 the way the operations were done and because 3 of what -- the site mission was. So there is a D&D section that I 4 5 think we are just going to have to find a way 6 to come to terms with the actual operations at 7 the site, so we can see what the ramifications 8 are. 9 Yes, I think we need DR. NETON: 10 to wait until we hear the comments from the 11 senior on this. And take a quick course in 12 credible arguments that makes sense, we need 13 to look at them. 14 MR. STIVER: Yes, this is John Stiver again. You know, there's some good 15 16 arguments here. You know, you have process 17 knowledge, but what we would like to see, I mean, is some confirmatory measurements during 18 the D&D period, where there are swipe samples 19 20 taken or there are any type of after-action reports that would show that, indeed, these 21

1	assumptions or not really assumptions, I
2	guess, but the lack of the concern for
3	exposure potential or the lack thereof could
4	definitely be verified at some sort of setdown
5	monitoring measurements.
6	MEMBER CLAWSON: Pete, this is
7	Brad Clawson speaking. We have heard numerous
8	times that the plausibility of this happening
9	was little to none and then we come to find
10	out that a lot of things have played into it.
11	All these sites we have come to find out
12	intertwined with one another and a product
13	goes back and forth that little tasks or want
14	to see this and let's see what this works like
15	and like we have said earlier, we will have
16	SC&A go through this and look through this.
17	This is kind of some of our
18	concerns, because
19	MR. DARNELL: Sure.
20	MEMBER CLAWSON: we know there
21	is no way that could happen. Then a little

21

1	bit later, well, it actually did happen. And
2	these sites were unique. You know, you look
3	at over the years of what we have learned, you
4	know, coming through and how the processes
5	have evolved and there has usually been a real
6	good reason for why they have evolved, glove
7	boxes and so forth like that.
8	So it's not that we are
9	questioning it, it's just from our past
10	knowledge of sites whenever something there
11	is no way we it's usually a question
12	because something has happened.
13	MR. DARNELL: I understand your
14	point of view and actually very much agree
15	with you, but I just want to make sure that we
16	keep into account that Pinellas is not like
17	the other DOE sites. You know, it is one of
18	the three that I know of that actually were in
19	a very clean place to work as far as exposure
20	to radioactive materials.
21	Kansas City and Iowa being the

1	other two.
2	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Did they have
3	I mean, this is a question I haven't found
4	in any of the documents. Did they have
5	anything like floor traps, anything like that
6	to cut floor traps that you know of through
7	the facility?
8	MR. GLECKLER: Specifically that,
9	I'm not sure, but they did have clean room
10	setups, you know, not for the radioactivity,
11	but to keep, you know, the product clean.
12	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes.
13	MR. GLECKLER: You know, for those
14	types of reasons, not for the production
15	process and so on. I'm assuming that they
16	probably had things like that to help.
17	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: And my thing
18	is if you broke a tube, you know, you might
19	get the bigger piece, but some of the fall
20	pieces might fall in that penetration floor
21	trap or something like this. Those are always

1	some places where you start looking or like
2	the framework for holding the glove boxes down
3	around the footing of them.
4	These little tiny nook and
5	crannies where material can get into that when
6	you are doing a decon you don't necessarily
7	get.
8	DR. NETON: But remember, we do
9	have bioassay data for these people. You
10	know, that will can be used to bound their
11	exposure.
12	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: And you feel
13	comfortable with that for any of these
14	incidents that occurred?
15	DR. NETON: I think the bioassay
16	we have gone through this many, many times and
17	the bioassay data would assign the chronic
18	exposure scenario bounds of any incidents that
19	occurred. Eventually, if you get enough
20	incidents, it becomes a chronic exposure. I
21	mean, we have been through this many times.

1	MR. DARNELL: And the other thing
2	you have to remember is what is the exposure
3	pathway. Okay. If you break a tube, some
4	how, you have got to get that, because we are
5	talking about tritium, off the surface of the
6	tube or the material either on your skin or in
7	your body.
8	Okay. You have to ingest it
9	somehow and I don't particularly see these
10	guys eating glass. And that's what we would
11	really be talking about or breathing glass,
12	that's what you would really be talking about
13	for the tritide exposure.
14	For the tritium exposure, we,
15	again, fall back on the monitoring. And the
16	workers that were assigned to tritium duties
17	were pretty much invariably, correct me if I'm
18	wrong, Brian, assigned to the bioassay
19	program, which is where we get our population
20	for exposure to tritides also.
21	DR. NETON: You know, we could

1	talk all day about this, but I think it would
2	be good if SC&A goes back and tries to, at
3	least, provide some concrete examples. I
4	mean, if it's one thing, you know, if it's
5	hard for us to deal with, prove that this
6	didn't happen. This happens often in these
7	issues where how do you know with 100 percent
8	certainty that something didn't happen. And
9	that's just not a possible you know, that's
10	just not doable for us.
11	MEMBER CLAWSON: Well, this is
12	Brad. On the other hand, you can't prove that
13	it didn't, you know.
14	DR. NETON: I know, but there has
15	to be some credible scenario. I mean, if we
16	have evidence that they monitored the people,
17	there is no record of anything, some incident,
18	someone would have to demonstrate, at least to
19	me, that there were incidents that were
20	unrecorded through either worker testimony,
21	interview, that sort of thing.

1	MEMBER CLAWSON: Right.
2	DR. NETON: And even the
3	incidents, I maintain, that we have if we
4	can verify that the highest exposed workers
5	were monitored. We use that as a coworker
6	model. W bound we can bound the exposures
7	for tritium at least. There are tritides
8	entry using the coworker model.
9	MR. GLECKLER: This is Brian
10	Gleckler again. I would like to offer
11	present one more clarification on this. What
12	Pete was discussing was specific to the
13	neutron tubes to where there is very little
14	potential for exposure with those, given the
15	design of the tube and the fact that it's a
16	plated metal on that.
17	However, tritide exposures were a
18	little more possible and probably did occur
19	during the earlier era when they used the
20	for the storage beds on that. They were glass
21	storage beds.

1	DR. NETON: Right, right.
2	MR. GLECKLER: And they contained
3	a titanium tritide on that and so that was
4	like the, I guess, equivalent of a talc-like
5	powder, the titanium in there. And those did
6	break periodically, that's why they replaced
7	them with the stainless steel beds that
8	contained uranium powder.
9	And we know that the stainless
10	there is nothing that indicates that the
11	stainless steel beds ever were jeopardized or
12	broken it looks like. And being that uranium
13	is part of the fire, it's like that would be a
14	major incident. And you would have a big
15	uranium fire incident on that, so there is
16	I think we are pretty safe in saying that no
17	one was ever exposed to uranium tritide.
18	But there are there was a
19	potential and I believe some occurrences where
20	people were exposed to the titanium tritide,
21	which is one of the more soluble tritide

compounds.
compounds.

2	MR. STIVER: It's titanium
3	tritide. Yes, we don't have any problem with
4	your methods for determining tritium and
5	tritide doses, other than characterizing the
6	source-term, which we alluded to. But, yes,
7	my main concern was that, you know, the
8	process knowledge arguments are very good.
9	We would sort of like to see, if
10	possible, some confirmatory measurements on
11	D&D close out reports. Anything like that
12	that might indicate that there could possibly
13	have been undocumented incidents. You just
14	never know things that occurred or may not be
15	reported.
16	You see it at a lot of the other
17	sites. You know, I ran this as a clean site
18	for the most part. It's probably very
19	unlikely, but some confirmatory measures, I'm
20	sure, will go a long way.
21	MR. GLECKLER: The only thing that

1	I recall in the captured data that we have is
2	pretty much every room has like a final
3	analysis or a final report for the
4	decommissioning efforts and, basically, just
5	documenting that it is below levels of
6	concern. It doesn't discuss anything that it
7	encountered that they encountered when they
8	first started deconing the room.
9	And so I'm not sure if we have any
10	real information that shows what the
11	contamination levels were specifically.
12	DR. NETON: What was the time
13	frame of this decon?
14	MR. STIVER: '94 to '97.
15	DR. NETON: '94 to '97.
16	MR. STIVER: Yes.
17	DR. NETON: So this is the 835
18	era. So they should have had a fairly
19	well
20	MR. STIVER: I would think it
21	would have had a good program.

1	DR. NETON: A well-described
2	program at some point.
3	MEMBER CLAWSON: This is Brad
4	Clawson again. Pete, you started out in your
5	conversation you were talking about GEXM. And
6	you called it out pretty good in here. GEXM
7	was the pilot plant to Pinellas?
8	MR. DARNELL: You know, I'm not
9	really familiar with it, because I never went
10	there.
11	MR. GLECKLER: It's basically
12	yes, it was the it's better described in
13	the Site Description. Or more thoroughly
14	described. But it basically, they are the
15	ones that developed the neutron generators and
16	they pretty much ran out of the space that
17	they needed to expand. They needed to expand
18	to meet DOE or AEC's needs and that's for
19	production.
20	And so they were looking at other
21	sites and it involved to where they picked the

1	Pinellas Plant. So, basically, it was a pilot
2	plant. And it has been referred to as a pilot
3	plant. And it's like, initially, it's like
4	GEXM had, you know, dictated most of the rad
5	control stuff.
6	But as once Pinellas started up
7	and everything, they kind of took over the rad
8	control functions for both of them. It's like
9	you can see they are analyzing the bioassay
10	data on the dosimeters on that for the GEXM
11	site.
12	And the only reason one of the
13	main reasons that I have added it to the Site
14	Description TBD and that part of the history
15	and the relationship is we get a lot of it
16	is a separately covered site.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay.
18	MR. GLECKLER: And that
19	however, in the record for employment for a
20	our NOCTS system, it's like a lot of times we
21	will have Pinellas Plant employment that

1	predates the Pinellas Plant startup. And when
2	you go look at the dosimetry records, these
3	are GEXM records. They are GEXM. And we
4	can't assess those records. We don't have
5	there is no TBD for the GEXM site. And
6	sometimes but because the Pinellas Plant,
7	you know, the similarities between the
8	programs, we can use the Pinellas Plant TBD to
9	assess the GEXM doses.
10	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, I was just
11	trying to clarify how it started up into that
12	and if it did actually itself have
13	classified as a different site.
14	MR. GLECKLER: Correct.
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: But as we have
16	seen at a lot of these sites, Pantex is a
17	prime example, Burlington and so forth. And
18	went to Pantex and the records actually
19	predate Pantex.
20	MR. GLECKLER: Yes.
21	MEMBER CLAWSON: So I just wanted

1 to clarify.

2 I found one GLECKLER: Yes. MR. 3 of the newly captured documents that was fairly -- that was captured about a year ago 4 5 was the previous plant operator. He was responsible for the selection process for the 6 7 Pinellas Plant and initially worked for the GEXM site and everything to where it is -- I 8 9 use that -- there is а great deal 10 information that I didn't use, because it goes -- it's just kind of interesting how the site 11 12 selection process works they and how 13 ultimately selected the site. But that reference in that is in 14 Site Description where if 15 the anyone is 16 interested, it's actually a really interesting read and I wrote it back in 1977, but it gives 17 you a pretty detailed history of what took 18 19 place and how that relationship was. 20 see that relationship continue in the records and stuff. 21

1	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay. I
2	appreciate that.
3	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Who controls
4	them and actually has physical control of the
5	exposure records?
6	MR. GLECKLER: As far as where
7	MR. DARNELL: We've got copies
8	that we have received from different parts of
9	DOE.
10	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. So we
11	know one repository that has all records. All
12	the records are say after 1975, '77 or some
13	reside at a certain facility.
14	MR. DARNELL: A lot of the sites
15	have off-site repositories where they keep
16	things now. Dose records from projects
17	without site maybe might wind up at another
18	site. So pretty much when you start looking
19	for records, you ask the site that you are
20	concerned with, in this case Pinellas, which
21	is defunct, we had to go to Los Alamos and we

1	got indicators there might be stuff in Oak
2	Ridge, so we go to Oak Ridge.
3	Any place we had an indicator, we
4	went looking for the records. And it just
5	kind of balloons out from there. We know
6	there was a relationship between Pinellas and
7	Mound, so we look at Mound. You know, there
8	is no real single place DOE holds any records.
9	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Pinellas
10	scavenger hunt.
11	MR. DARNELL: Yes, it's a
12	scavenger hunt, which is why our friends at
13	SC&A can always say well, are you sure you've
14	got all the records?
15	DR. NETON: The bioassay records
16	must have come from a central location.
17	MR. GLECKLER: No. There is like
18	four or five locations that they checked.
19	It's like it's in each of the DOE response
20	files. It's like they will say exactly where.
21	I forget all the different places that they

check, but it -- but they do check like four

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2	or five locations.
3	MR. DARNELL: You would think the
4	bioassay would be in one place.
5	MR. STIVER: Yes, you would think.
6	So with that, I guess, we will put together a
7	memo to that effect articulating what we would
8	like to see and follow that up.
9	MR. DARNELL: As far as plants to
10	that, if you don't mind me asking a question?
11	We have got this 50 page matrix. Are we
12	going to move away from that and go to a new
13	document completely or are we going to update
14	the matrix and go from there?
15	MR. STIVER: The latest version of
16	the matrix, I think, is the one you guys
17	updated back in February. You provided a lot
18	of the neither one went into the new TBDs
19	in there.
20	You know, given that it has been
21	about two and a half years and, you know, we
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1	try to change our approach, we don't usually
2	look at the secondary issues so much that are
3	typically wrapped up in the larger issues.
4	In this particular case, yes, we
5	I would say let's just go ahead and update the
6	matrix. And, you know, I think this was
7	MR. DARNELL: The last edition
8	matrix was in June of 2009.
9	MR. STIVER: Right. But we have
10	we found a version that you guys had prepared.
11	It was updated as of, I believe it was,
12	February 2011. And that's what we kind of
13	worked off the last couple of days.
14	MR. DARNELL: Are you sure? I
15	don't really remember
16	MR. STIVER: It was on the O:
17	drive and it had a lot of additional text
18	where you guys put in there about what you
19	were going to do and, basically, verbatim as
20	to what went into the any TBD. A lot of
21	time in the last few days going to review

that.

- 2 MR. GLECKLER: Yes, because the
- 3 copy that I got is the '09 version.
- 4 MR. STIVER: The last was to draft
- 5 Pinellas issues matrix, PA reviewed, uploaded.
- 6 MR. DARNELL: That came in
- 7 February 2011. I was in Europe.
- 8 MR. STIVER: Okay.
- 9 MR. DARNELL: Brian would have
- 10 been the author.
- 11 MR. STIVER: Hang on. It may very
- well be an older one that was just updated.
- 13 It might have a different date stamp.
- 14 MR. DARNELL: Yes, that has
- 15 happened before.
- MR. STIVER: Yes, that's exactly
- 17 what it was, because it would have been in
- 18 December of '09.
- MR. GLECKLER: Actually --
- DR. NETON: Yes, this was written
- 21 May 5, 2008. Well, but that's a draft

1	preliminary	assessment.

- 2 MR. STIVER: Yes, the draft -- our
- 3 assessment was in the -- we have this --
- DR. NETON: But there is no
- 5 indication --
- 6 MR. GLECKLER: There should be a
- 7 date in the footnote on that for the document.
- 8 Check the footnote, because that wouldn't get
- 9 updated, unless someone updated it.
- 10 MR. STIVER: Yes, this is just the
- 11 -- this footnote isn't -- this is the SC&A
- version and then we have, I'll show you the
- 13 title of the document here.
- DR. NETON: The document that's on
- 15 the O: drive.
- MR. STIVER: Yes, it's the one on
- 17 the O: drive. It's NIOSH Response to Draft
- 18 Analysis and Matrix Review.
- DR. NETON: This is draft analysis
- 20 and preliminary SC&A assessment.
- 21 MR. STIVER: Let me see if I can

- 1 get on to the 0: drive here.
- DR. NETON: See this has not been
- 3 updated. It's listed as NIOSH Response, but
- 4 if you look at that document, it really is the
- 5 2008 matrix.
- 6 MR. STIVER: Ours is --
- 7 DR. NETON: Well, I know there is
- 8 no number. That was the update. This one is
- 9 just the draft preliminary SC&A assessment.
- 10 MR. STIVER: We have the update
- 11 right here.
- 12 DR. NETON: Let's see, NIOSH
- 13 Response.
- MR. GLECKLER: I know a lot of the
- 15 text that we put in there, as far as what we
- are proposing, as far as our proposed changes
- 17 to the TBD, some of that has changed on how we
- are going to deal with that. And so we will
- 19 need to change those.
- 20 MR. STIVER: Yes, it's very
- 21 similar to what actually went in.

1	DR. NETON: Was this ever formally
2	transmitted?
3	MR. STIVER: What's the latest
4	one?
5	MR. DARNELL: As far as I know,
6	June 2009, the one that Chick put together.
7	DR. NETON: Well, there is
8	additional information talking about draft
9	changes in there, but none of the dates were
10	changed on the document in any location that I
11	can locate or identify. It's listed as May
12	2008, but I think it has been updated. I just
13	wonder if this wasn't something that
14	MR. DARNELL: And one we passed
15	back and forth in process information.
16	DR. NETON: Yes. See this might
17	have been formally transmitted or discussed,
18	that's what I'm thinking.
19	MR. STIVER: Okay. Are you guys
20	looking at the OAD document review Pinellas?
21	MR. DARNELL: Yes.

1	MR. STIVER: NIOSH Response
2	MR. DARNELL: Yes.
3	MR. STIVER: dated 9/12/08?
4	That date modified 2/10/2011.
5	DR. NETON: Wait a minute. Well,
6	yes, it says modified, but that just means it
7	has probably been accessed.
8	MR. STIVER: No, if says, you
9	know, it was uploaded on 9/12, okay. I don't
10	know how you do this. It would be December
11	2009.
<b>T T</b>	2009.
12	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date
12	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date
12 13	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date modified.
12 13 14	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date modified.  MR. STIVER: Yes. But if you open
12 13 14 15	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date modified.  MR. STIVER: Yes. But if you open that, you will see that there are a lot of  DR. NETON: Yes, there is a lot of
12 13 14 15 16	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date modified.  MR. STIVER: Yes. But if you open that, you will see that there are a lot of  DR. NETON: Yes, there is a lot of
12 13 14 15 16 17	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date modified.  MR. STIVER: Yes. But if you open that, you will see that there are a lot of  DR. NETON: Yes, there is a lot of them changes in there.
12 13 14 15 16 17	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date modified.  MR. STIVER: Yes. But if you open that, you will see that there are a lot of  DR. NETON: Yes, there is a lot of them changes in there.  DR. NETON: Changes.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	DR. NETON: 2010, 2011 date modified.  MR. STIVER: Yes. But if you open that, you will see that there are a lot of  DR. NETON: Yes, there is a lot of them changes in there.  DR. NETON: Changes.  MR. STIVER: Okay.

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1	have	the	same	version.
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- MR. STIVER: As long as we are
- 3 working from the same version.
- 4 MR. GLECKLER: Because there is a
- 5 June '09 version.
- DR. NETON: There is a June '09
- 7 version that we have been working from.
- 8 MR. GLECKLER: Right.
- 9 DR. NETON: Because this one is--
- 10 MR. STIVER: Okay. Well, we will
- 11 need to get your -- the '09 version and see
- 12 what the differences are.
- 13 DR. NETON: Well, it's your
- 14 version, not ours.
- MR. STIVER: Okay. Well, this
- looks to be the most recently updated though.
- 17 DR. NETON: Well, the latest
- 18 response we have from SC&A is June 2009 sent
- 19 through formal channels. If you search the
- 20 documents you sent to us, the last one we
- 21 received from you is June 2009. It's like

1	June	5 <sup>th</sup> ,	Ι	think.

- 2 MR. DARNELL: June 2<sup>nd</sup>.
- DR. NETON: June  $2^{nd}$  of 2009.
- 4 MR. DARNELL: I have a copy of it
- 5 here.
- 6 DR. NETON: Okay. It came through
- 7 the normal channel.
- 8 MR. STIVER: Through Nancy.
- 9 DR. NETON: Nancy.
- 10 MR. KATZ: Nancy Johnson.
- DR. NETON: Yes.
- 12 MR. DARNELL: But it has been
- 13 through review, so that document and
- 14 everything --
- DR. NETON: Oh, yes.
- 16 MR. STIVER: This version has like
- 17 your update here on page 4, which is on 1.3.
- 18 This is the new table that went into TBD-1.
- 19 It's slightly different than what's actually
- in there in terms of the number of files that
- 21 were uploaded.

1	MR. GLECKLER: And you are going
2	to encounter that for most of those changes,
3	because what we have actually gone ahead and -
4	- you know, we have captured a lot more
5	information since we drafted up those.
6	MR. STIVER: Sure.
7	MR. GLECKLER: In some cases, we
8	have taken a very different direction. The
9	fact that a lot of these blue changes, these
10	blue font changes were very similar to what
11	was in the TBD, would mean this was your
12	latest response.
13	MR. DARNELL: Somebody may have
14	got in the document in February of 2011 that I
15	don't personally recall and I don't think
16	Brian sent anything through that channel to
17	you guys.
18	MR. KATZ: So it was posted, but
19	it wasn't actually issued.
20	MR. DARNELL: Well, it probably
21	had something to do with, you know, Chick

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1 being ill. We were working together and then 2 things kind of stopped. 3 Yes, that's kind of MR. STIVER: where the disconnect happened. Chick handed 4 this off to John and then a two and a half 5 The version that -- the June 2<sup>nd</sup> 6 year qap. 7 version, you guys have not updated? 8 MR. GLECKLER: Correct. 9 MR. STIVER: At this point. Okay. 10 Well, that's interesting. Actually, since 11 DR. NETON: the last meeting, all the issues in that matrix 12 13 have been resolved except for three. 14 MR. STIVER: Yes. I mean, there is a 15 DR. NETON:

agreement with our proposed additions and that 20 you can go back and look at the Site Profile when they are issued and verify that they were 21

indicated

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

long discussion that there is three issues

in principle, at least John Mauro, at

that

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that

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were

in

1	
2	MR. STIVER: Yes, that's really
3	where we are on this.
4	DR. NETON: Right.
5	MR. STIVER: So we need to review
6	these things. You know, we're kind of getting
7	into the discussion. Mainly, it has been, you
8	know, two and a half years and
9	DR. NETON: Yes, that's fine.
10	MR. STIVER: the disconnect
11	there with Chick passing and so forth.
12	DR. NETON: Sure. But I read all
13	the transcripts from the last meeting, and
14	it's pretty clear that there were three issues
15	and, in principle, they seemed to be well on
16	their way to being resolved.
17	MR. STIVER: Yes. We went through
18	the same thing and we talked to John about his
19	recollection of it. And we really are. I
20	guess everybody else we are, you know, in
21	principle, very close, I think, to where we

1	need to be. It's a matter of reviewing some
2	of the source documentation.
3	So I guess we can move on. I'll
4	check with Nancy on this and I guess we can go
5	ahead and
6	DR. NETON: I can send you a copy
7	if you want.
8	MR. STIVER: Well, that's fine.
9	I've got it right here. In any case, we will
10	have to start from that point and move forward
11	on that particular matrix.
12	MR. DARNELL: Okay. Next on the
13	agenda is the external dose. Anybody else
14	have any questions or comments before we -
15	MR. STIVER: Do you want to do
16	occupational medical or we want to cite TBD?
17	MR. KATZ: Well, we just started
18	with Site Description.
19	MR. DARNELL: And we did a lot of
20	extraneous stuff to the Site Description
21	that

1	MR. KATZ: Yes.
2	MR. DARNELL: the next thing on
3	the agenda is the external.
4	MR. STIVER: Okay.
5	MR. DARNELL: Okay. If you look
6	in the summary, it's like the second to the
7	last page, I believe. The occupational
8	journal does TBD with the summary changes
9	would have been in relation to the different
10	issues. So this picks up at Issue 4 where we
11	added information to Section 6 of the TBD to
12	address that issue.
13	Issue 5, the dosimetry technology
14	and missed dose sections were added were
15	updated and information added to address the
16	issues.
17	The secondary Issue 7, we actually
18	put in the monitored dose section and
19	Attachment B were added to address this, the
20	basis for the unmonitored dose assignment,
21	which is a runoff of the White Paper that was

This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Pinellas Work Group, has
been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable
information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and
certified by the Chair of the Pinellas Plant Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should
be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.

1	done in the past on this is was put into
2	Attachment B.
3	The secondary issue No. 8, which
4	is also a missed dose was revised. The
5	approach to how Pinellas calculated neutron
6	doses was replaced with an approach that is
7	more consistent and used for other sites.
8	So what is going to happen now is
9	dose reconstructions where you have higher
10	neutron doses for the years '57 to '69 and
11	lower neutron doses for '69 to '97. The
12	methodology changed.
13	For the RTG areas, measured photon
14	doses for the years '79 to '81 are higher,
15	because of change in correction factor. This
16	is applied for signal bating. And the missed
17	photon for '79 to '87 would be higher because
18	of that correction factor and a higher limit
19	of detection.
20	There is also a more claimant
21	favorable neutron energy distribution for the

1	RTG work areas. Distribution is 50 percent,
2	.1 to 2 MeV and 50 percent 2 to 20 MeV
3	neutrons. The LD values were also modified in
4	that section.
5	External electron doses from the
6	krypton-85 exposures were increased by a
7	factor of 3.5 per year, '63 to '85. And then
8	a number of other changes from a, basically,
9	reorganize present the information better and
10	get the flow a lot smoother.
11	One of the things we just were
12	very happy about in receiving, the plug for
13	ORAU there, but these were some of the best
14	reading TBDs we have seen in a while.
15	So questions, comments?
16	MR. STIVER: I can say that in
17	looking through the revisions, they look very
18	good. A lot of things that we asked for have
19	been put in there.
20	The only kind of outstanding
21	concern we have really is that, again, we want

1	to the Issue 4 was really about whether you
2	are capturing the most highly exposed group of
3	workers or whether it was cohort badging.
4	And based on the transcript, I was
5	talking to John about this, I remembered, you
6	know, signing off on that, but he couldn't
7	remember why. We'll make mistakes. But there
8	is such a disconnect as far as getting back to
9	what analysis was done with this.
10	MR. DARNELL: I actually remember
11	that conversation. There were previous
12	conversations to the than what is called
13	the transcripts, that the basis of that coming
14	to grips with the dosimetry issues and how the
15	work force was monitored had more to do with
16	the site operations and taking that into
17	account.
18	MR. STIVER: Yes.
19	MR. DARNELL: You have to remember
20	the radiation at the site was on or it was
21	off. Okay. It was only on very briefly. And

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- 1 you can see in the dosimetry records you will
- 2 have 9.9 millirem, which was a test shot, a
- 3 test. And then months later, another 9.9
- 4 millirem.
- 5 And in Unit 2, there is radiation
- 6 exposure.
- 7 MR. STIVER: It's an all or
- 8 nothing.
- 9 MR. DARNELL: Right. And it's
- 10 just the way you --
- MR. STIVER: Yes.
- MR. DARNELL: Yes, the RTG it was
- different, obviously, and so were the tritium
- 14 workers that have had exposures between then.
- 15 But for the radiation exposure, you had
- 16 clumps.
- 17 And then within the clumps you had
- 18 people that were monitored, so what I'm
- 19 assuming were ancillary personnel to the test
- 20 personnel. They were monitored in at or near
- 21 zero. Okay. And then you have this group

1	which is like a huge exposure change that were
2	85, 95 percent of them were at right around
3	100 millirem.
4	And then you had a few outliers.
5	And I think the highest personnel exposure,
6	lifetime exposure, at Pinellas is 3 rem. The
7	highest single year, I think, was somewhere
8	around the order of 1.71 millirem. So you are
9	the dose distribution is pretty wiped out.
10	And you kind of have to look at look past
11	this huge group at zero to the next group
12	where everybody's percentile is right around
13	100.
14	And in taking that into account is
15	how we got to the idea that Issue 4 was
16	resolved.
17	MR. STIVER: Yes, it certainly
18	sounds like that. You know, you have a pretty
19	clear cut understanding of who had the
20	potential for exposure. It is not like you
21	have cohorts where you just pick different

types of individuals and have them represent
whatever group. And in case you might have a
high likelihood of missing some of the higher
doses.
I would say the only thing that
SC&A would like to do would be to go back and
look at the dosimetry data and also the Issue
5 regarding the performance characteristics of
the dosimeters throughout time. We would like
to take a look at that data.
MR. DARNELL: Sure.
MR. STIVER: And review that.
This would be our only concern.
MR. KATZ: Just consider yourself
tasked.
MR. STIVER: Consider ourselves
tasked. You got something to say?
MR. PAPADOPOULOS: Do we need a
White Paper on this or a couple of
MR. STIVER: Yes, this may rise to
the level of a White Paper. At least a memo

1	from around there.
2	MR. GLECKLER: Is it worth noting
3	regarding the unmonitored dose assignment for
4	the Pinellas Plant? Is that 95 <sup>th</sup> percentile
5	dose, that was calculated, based on whole body
6	doses?
7	MR. STIVER: Yes.
8	MR. GLECKLER: Which includes
9	tritium? And excludes external photon,
10	external neutron and internal tritium dose?
11	And for some years, we were able to have we
12	had them broken down, but for a significant
13	number of years, we couldn't break out, you
14	know, the various dose types. And so we just
15	used since the doses were relatively low
16	anyhow, so if we use this stuff by
17	assigning that, we are actually accounting for
18	internal as well for unmonitored, even though
19	we are only taking personnel
20	(Simultaneous speaking.)
21	And some of the highest doses that

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1	Pete was talking about are actually tritium
2	doses. I have not been able to verify those
3	things.
4	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Those RTGs,
5	did you ever find anything that they used to
6	verify these or were they basically the one
7	size?
8	MR. GLECKLER: As far as the Pu
9	sources, there were two different sizes. And
10	I forget how many, but I think 8 and 10 grams.
11	I'm not positive on that, but it does that
12	information is not on the Site Description.
13	MR. STIVER: It was 8 to 10 grams.
14	MR. GLECKLER: Yes. Does that
15	sound right?
16	MR. DARNELL: Yes, all the sources
17	they used were relatively small hand. You
18	could carry them in your hands.
19	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I know they
20	had much bigger ones.
21	MR. GLECKLER: But Pu-Be source,

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1 they had a couple, one or two Pu-Be sources 2 and those might have been bigger. I'm not --3 those were for calibration purposes. MR. STIVER: That was back in the 4 5 early '56/57 time frame. 6 MR. GLECKLER: That's when they got them and I'm not sure when those left the 7 I don't recall it. 8 site. 9 I'm just going through DR. NETON: 10 just to go back to this confusion on what 11 document is which. It appears to me that the document that was issued by SC&A on June 2, 12 13 2009 contains your responses to the NIOSH 14 responses that are in that document that says 2011. 15 16 So somehow that document got That's the modified date, but you 17 uploaded. know how they -- so I looked through at least 18 the first 20 pages, it's identical. 19 The only exception, the only difference is that 20 21 have comments red responding in our

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1	comments

- 2 It's identical, except you have
- 3 already responded to all of those comments.
- 4 MR. DARNELL: NIOSH would be happy
- 5 to provide to SC&A their own documents.
- DR. NETON: For some reason that
- 7 modified date, sometimes if you just open the
- 8 file and you close it, it will list it as
- 9 modified.
- 10 MR. KATZ: But that's it, it's
- 11 nice to get that cleared up.
- 12 MR. STIVER: We were having
- 13 scrambling over the weekend to get things
- 14 together for this, so --
- 15 DR. NETON: Yes. No, and you --
- there is clearly items listed in red here that
- 17 are responses to those comments from that
- 18 file.
- MR. DARNELL: Okay.
- DR. NETON: All right. I'll get
- 21 you a copy of that.

1	MEMBER CLAWSON: While we are
2	taking jabs at each other, I would like
3	well, it's kind of a little bit of a jab, but
4	I would like to compliment you on the new TBD,
5	because I thought it was a great change from
6	what it was previously and the level of detail
7	that you have gone in, I would just like to
8	compliment you on it. It was a fine job. It
9	really was.
10	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That's a
11	level of detail, that's got to raise some
12	flags.
13	MEMBER CLAWSON: Maybe a little
14	nervous.
15	MR. DARNELL: Well, I hope nervous
16	in a good way. It's like they got it right.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: No, it wasn't
18	that.
19	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: We're not
20	talking firing squad level. It's a little
21	below that.

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1	MEMBER CLAWSON: But I really do
2	want to commend you, because the level of
3	detail that you went into and stuff, picking
4	out the differences in the sites and how they
5	went in, I really wanted to compliment you,
6	because it makes it a lot easier, especially
7	somebody that isn't familiar with the facility
8	and seeing these different terms, you really
9	did a good job. I would just like to
10	compliment you.
11	MR. DARNELL: That was mainly
12	Brian. Thank you.
13	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Kudos to both
14	of you.
15	MR. DARNELL: Any more on the
16	external?
17	MR. STIVER: Nothing for us.
18	MR. DARNELL: Let's see, I think
19	the internal section is on the previous page
20	of the summary that we handed out.
21	And this again begins with the

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- 1 Issue 2 Resolution, potential high issues. 2 exposures to insoluble tritium. Do we want to 3 talk about tritium now or are we going to wait until --4 can talk about 5 MR. STIVER: We 6 that. I think we actually 7 MR. DARNELL: have gone a step further than what we agreed 8 9 In the previous transcripts, we were 10 talking about a Class M exposure. And we --11 between the last meeting and now, found out that there was a Class S. 12 So the 13 tritides were going to be applied the monitored work force, the tritium monitored 14 work force. Everybody in it gets tritide 15 16 exposure. 17 MR. STIVER: At the Class S level? 18 MR. DARNELL: At. the Class S 19 level. that provides As long as 20 exposure.
  - **NEAL R. GROSS**

MR. GLECKLER:

21

Well, we assess it

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- 2 MR. STIVER: Assess at both.
- 3 MR. GLECKLER: Yes. Whichever is
- 4 more claimant favorable, because some are
- 5 more.
- 6 MR. STIVER: Yes, the lung does,
- 7 obviously, would be.
- 8 MR. DARNELL: It makes the tritium
- 9 issue very simple. Everybody that was exposed
- 10 to tritium and monitored for tritium gets the
- 11 tritide exposure.
- 12 MR. GLECKLER: Yes. And we have
- 13 also taken a whole different direction on it.
- 14 Because if I remember right, I think at that
- 15 meeting, we were geared towards going the
- 16 OTIB-66 route. And I did some missed dose
- 17 calcs not using the OTIB-66 approach, the
- 18 missed dose is for like the long one. We are
- 19 going to be like over 300 rem per one year of
- 20 exposure.
- MR. DARNELL: Right.

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1	MR. GLECKLER: And it's like this
2	can't be. This isn't realistic at all. And
3	so we have gone to using contaminant the
4	highest contamination levels in the plant,
5	which include soluble tritium and insoluble.
6	And the biggest thing, too, is rather than
7	address just metal tritides, we have changed
8	the terminology in the TBD to insoluble forms
9	of tritium, because that same approach will
10	deal with the organically bound tritium
11	compounds as well.
12	MR. STIVER: I guess we kind of,
13	at this point, are withholding judgment on the
14	tritides issue. I know there is this is
15	kind of common with Mound and I believe, Jim,
16	you are preparing a paper on that methodology.
17	DR. NETON: Yes.
18	MR. STIVER: Swipe samples.
19	DR. NETON: It's exactly the same
20	methodology.
21	MR. STIVER: Exactly the same

1	methodology.
2	DR. NETON: We have gone through
3	and characterized the swipe contamination
4	levels and then applied a fairly conservative
5	resuspension factor and demonstrated that
6	those would get bounded very nicely in a
7	reasonable manner.
8	MR. STIVER: Yes. Our only
9	concern there is the swipe samples provided a
10	representative and complete set of data. And
11	so that's really, we have no problem with
12	the you know, your approach for assessing
13	the doses once that source-term -
14	MR. GLECKLER: For the Pinellas
15	Plant we didn't use a representative swipe
16	sample. We used the highest reported one we
17	found.
18	MR. STIVER: The highest reported?
19	MR. DARNELL: It's conservative on
20	top of conservatism.

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Right.

MR. STIVER:

1	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: In Pinellas,
2	did they swipe samples? Did they actually
3	break it down as to what it was or just
4	basically the
5	MR. GLECKLER: Just tritium. Yes,
6	the swipes would have been just for gross
7	tritium. They wouldn't have been able to tell
8	whether it was metal tritide or more soluble
9	forms of tritium. And so it's like the
10	majority of the contamination incidents and
11	the bulk of the material that was causing the
12	contamination was soluble tritium in the from
13	of HTO and HT, so it's like that's a huge
14	level of conservatism in the approach that we
15	are taking.
16	MR. STIVER: Yes, my point is that
17	99% of it was the HTO.
18	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, because we are
19	assuming that 100 percent of that
20	contamination was insoluble tritium.
21	Actually, the vast majority of it was more

1	likely	soluble	forms.

- 2 MR. STIVER: You know, we would
- 3 like to -- Jim, do you have any idea about
- 4 when that paper might be available?
- 5 DR. NETON: The Mound paper?
- 6 MR. STIVER: Yes.
- 7 DR. NETON: I think it's
- 8 undergoing ADC review right now.
- 9 MR. STIVER: ADC review.
- DR. NETON: So it will be as soon
- 11 as it gets out of that. I reviewed it and
- 12 it's at DOE right now.
- MR. STIVER: Okay.
- DR. NETON: But I was surprised it
- didn't come out yesterday when the radon paper
- 16 came out on Mound. I thought they would come
- 17 out simultaneously. We sent them for ADC
- 18 review at the same time.
- 19 MR. STIVER: Cause we have -- it
- 20 would have been an anticipated effort. So
- 21 that just came out. We had a similar response

1	and it's kind of overarching.
2	MR. KATZ: Right. So you will
3	apply whatever you considered for Mound -
4	(Simultaneous speaking.)
5	DR. NETON: I agree. I think
6	that's reasonable. It's a matter of
7	demonstrating that the sample, the swipe
8	samples that you have
9	MR. STIVER: Yes.
10	DR. NETON: adequately
11	characterize the contamination levels. I
12	totally agree.
13	MR. STIVER: Yes, that's really
14	our main concern -
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That's part
16	of the reason we have had such a lot of delay
17	at this facility, because if you have answered
18	the problem at Mound, you answered the problem
19	with Pinellas on the tritium issue, so you
20	only have to tackle one line at a time.
21	MR. STIVER: Sounds good.

1	MR. DARNELL: Okay. Issue 3
2	Resolution. Well, was there something else?
3	MR. STIVER: No. Let's go ahead
4	with Issue 3. It's -
5	MR. DARNELL: Issue 3 Resolution,
6	that's certainly information that was added,
7	updated in the instructions and justifications
8	and how to use it were placed into the TBD.
9	We also kept some information on plutonium
10	uncertainties, even though that's no longer a
11	real part of the TBDs.
12	Issue 7, Section 5.7.2 was added
13	to TBD. There are the unmonitored exposures
14	and it now addresses nickel-63 and carbon-14.
15	The secondary issue 5 resolution, the
16	Pinellas basis for rejecting positive
17	plutonium bioassay results, again, replaced
18	with a new approach. This was discussed in
19	the last meeting.
20	Secondary issue 6, plutonium
21	solubility statements. You know, this

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1	information is, basically, modified heavily
2	from the last revision. And I don't know if
3	you guys have looked at that yet, have you?
4	MR. STIVER: We have done a
5	cursory review.
6	MR. DARNELL: So we will just
7	leave it at plutonium sections that changed.
8	MR. STIVER: Okay.
9	MR. DARNELL: Cables for MDCs
10	reporting levels for tritium were revised. In
11	general, the MDCs prior to 1975 increased, a
12	bit more dose there.
13	And again, organization, how it is
14	being presented was all updated in the
15	internal decision.
16	DR. NETON: It's in that document?
17	MR. STIVER: Okay.
18	DR. NETON: So it's in your CDC
19	address. I didn't have your
20	MR. STIVER: Okay.
21	MR. DARNELL: Questions, comments?

1	MR. STIVER: It was actually more
2	of a philosophical issue with No. 3. For the
3	plutonium, which, you know, the RTGs are
4	always triple encapsulated, according to TBD,
5	you know, there is some contamination found on
6	some of the batteries that were decontaminated
7	in hoods and that sort of thing.
8	MR. DARNELL: Okay.
9	MR. STIVER: So you have when
10	you look at these weight of evidence
11	arguments, you really have got to have three
12	criteria, if you will. You have the process
13	knowledge, which you clearly have here. You
14	have the confirmatory measurements. You have
15	your bioassay data and in most cases it was
16	pre-employment, but I guess there is some data
17	as well for
18	MR. DARNELL: Yes, there is
19	something like 20 samples.
20	MR. STIVER: About 20 samples.
21	Are you talking total or

1	MR. DARNELL: Yes.
2	MR. STIVER: That would be
3	MR. DARNELL: There is more than
4	20 total for this. Probably about 20 or more
5	per year.
6	MR. STIVER: Pre-employment?
7	MR. GLECKLER: The bulk of the
8	pre-employment for like in '75 it's like
9	mostly operational with as new people come on
10	to that particular activity, at the site there
11	is they get like a pre-employment or
12	baseline so some of them some of that
13	data will contain a baseline here and there.
14	And then it will be operational after that
15	typically.
16	MR. STIVER: All right. So you do
17	have certainly, not enlarge the data, so if
18	you have occupational data, confirmatory data
19	as well, you also have, you know, just the
20	modeling calculations that demonstrate the
21	level of exposure potential. So you have

1	those three items here that form a pretty good
2	basis for this weight of evidence argument.
3	But then you go on to say if we do
4	find a positive bioassay result, we are going
5	to go ahead and evaluate it this way and then
6	we are going to do a dose reconstruction using
7	Liz Brackett's - TIB-60, I believe.
8	And so you can't really have it
9	both ways in our minds. I mean, either you
10	have no exposure potential and if you find
11	that you do have some positive exposure,
12	you've got a problem. You've got there has
13	been an intake, there has been a leak of some
14	kind and so this whole weight of evidence
15	argument goes out the window.
16	MR. DARNELL: Well, I understand
17	your point, but the entire idea of having it,
18	in case we find it, was to satisfy SC&A's
19	comments from last time, you know. Because we
20	wanted it taken out, but if there is no need
21	for it, it would only be addressed in there

1	except in the external standpoint and the
2	surveys to be complete. So the idea that we
3	will do something and base it on the best
4	available information that we have through 60
5	was from you guys.
6	MR. STIVER: Well, I would say
7	that the best way to deal with that would be
8	to not say that you would look at them on an
9	individual basis, because it really changes
10	the whole paradigm. You now have
11	DR. NETON: Yes, I can understand
12	your point. If evidence does arise that
13	plutonium had been breached, we would
14	(Simultaneous speaking.)
15	DR. NETON: Okay. All right. I
16	understand what you are saying.
17	MR. GLECKLER: So does that mean
18	we can take out the plutonium?
19	MR. DARNELL: And the
20	uncertainties?
21	MR. STIVER: Well, yes. That's

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1	some kind of you know, that would be
2	triggered by the situation we actually have.
3	MR. DARNELL: That's it.
4	MR. STIVER: If you don't have
5	plutonium, you don't have to worry about any
6	of that other stuff. And I think the same
7	thing holds for the DU tritium beds, too. You
8	know, I believe in the last meeting there was
9	some discussion that there may have actually
10	been some cutting, but it turns out that was
11	GEXM data that wasn't really related to
12	Pinellas.
13	But again, if you know, you
14	have got a good argument there, except you
15	don't have a lot of confirmatory monitoring
16	data. We would like to see if there is any
17	available that would show that, indeed,
18	there
19	MR. DARNELL: I think what we have
20	was presented pretty much.
21	MR. STIVER: Everything that you

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- 2 MR. DARNELL: Yes. There is a
- 3 White Paper on it, too, I believe. The data
- 4 that we have is presented in it and it's just
- 5 not much.
- 6 MR. STIVER: Yes, it looks like
- 7 there is no exposure potential, as far as we
- 8 can tell.
- 9 MR. DARNELL: Yes.
- 10 MR. STIVER: But to really, you
- 11 know, tie up the loose ends on that, you know,
- 12 if there is monitoring data out there that
- 13 would confirm that we would like to see it.
- 14 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I don't see
- 15 it anywhere, but did they ever do any
- 16 destructive testing? The RTGs that you know
- of, like QA sampling?
- 18 MR. DARNELL: I don't know of any.
- 19 MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, they did.
- 20 They had to. We saw that coming out in
- 21 Pantex.

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1	DR. NETON: Well, right, but I
2	don't know if they did.
3	I think there was destructive
4	testing done at places like Los Alamos.
5	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I didn't see
6	anything, but I could have overlooked it,
7	where they did this at Pinellas, too, because
8	that would increase the odds of someone being
9	able to pick up a
10	MR. GLECKLER: I'm pretty sure
11	they have done destructive testing on the
12	RTGs, but whether or not the plutonium sources
13	were present in those units when they did the
14	destructive testing, you know.
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: If they were
16	not, then it's really kind of a moot point.
17	MR. GLECKLER: They could have put
18	in a, you know, surrogate for in the same
19	encapsulation, not just for the destructive
20	testing purposes. They don't need that
21	plutonium present.

1	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Well, I was
2	referred to ones that actually had plutonium
3	present.
4	DR. NETON: I know they did that
5	at Los Alamos for sure.
6	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, cause
7	just to do it on a mock-up on this, I mean,
8	you are not going to get anything there.
9	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, I haven't
10	encountered any information in the case that
11	they did any destructive testings with the Pu
12	sources present.
13	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. I
14	didn't, but I just wanted to make sure I
15	hadn't missed something.
16	MR. GLECKLER: And oh, one of the
17	things that I just recall with the Pu, one of
18	the other reasons we left it in there was the
19	one and only potential exposure scenario for
20	plutonium is the receipt surveys. It's a very
21	small potential site, because, you know, the

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1	sources, the receipts upon receipt, they
2	would inspect the sources and that's before
3	they would release them into the plant. That
4	was all done in a the hood.
5	So a really small group of
6	individuals involved with that had that
7	potential, because they did find somewhat
8	contamination. They didn't find any they
9	have never there is no indication that they
10	ever had to ship any back to the manufacturer,
11	which would mean that they would have exceeded
12	200 dpm per source.
13	And we have done I have done
14	some calculations a while back, prior to the
15	previous Working Group meeting, to where they
16	would have had it was they processed a
17	ridiculous number of Pu sources to get a lung
18	dose, so
19	MR. DARNELL: 11,000 in one day.
20	MR. GLECKLER: Yes.
21	(Simultaneous speaking.)

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1	MR. GLECKLER: Well, that was part
2	of the reason, I think that, why SC&A wanted
3	us to keep that in there on that, in the event
4	that
5	MR. DARNELL: It does bolster the
6	argument that it is not really
7	DR. NETON: Well, I think the same
8	logic applies. I mean, if we do find that
9	there was evidence of extensive or episodic
10	exposure to plutonium. You know, we could
11	certainly revise the higher approach.
12	MR. STIVER: Some of the incidents
13	that were not documented.
14	DR. NETON: I mean, that's sort of
15	almost
16	MR. DARNELL: That's pretty much a
17	given.
18	MR. STIVER: That's almost a given
19	in anything we do.
20	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: If they did a
21	document during the D&D. They had to be

1	taking swipes of stuff, that's where it would
2	jump.
3	MEMBER CLAWSON: This is Brad
4	again. Where do these sources come from, the
5	Pu sources? Who is the manufacturer for them?
6	MR. GLECKLER: I believe Mound.
7	It was kind of there is some information in
8	the initial version of the TBD that indicated
9	that they come from LANL and there is some
10	disagreeing documents.
11	I'm pretty sure it was Mound, but
12	it's like I couldn't prove that. And it's
13	like so I don't I think I took that out
14	altogether where because it really wasn't
15	needed for the TBD, but that's either Mound or
16	LANL.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay.
18	MR. GLECKLER: One of those two.
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: I was just
20	wondering in researching some Pantex documents
21	just watching the history of where a lot of

1	this came from. And now we have that's
2	where all these sites interact with one
3	another, a little bit interesting. I was just
4	wondering if they had one strict facility that
5	these were produced from.
6	MR. GLECKLER: And part of that
7	confusion could be because they might have
8	received them from both, that either one of
9	those documents would indicate, but that's one
10	of the reasons why they wanted to use it in
11	the Mound dosimeters is because Mound was
12	working with the same material.
13	Mound did produce RTG sources and
14	I believe LANL did, too.
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, LANL
16	did, I can vouch for that.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: I think that's
18	what we get down to now is my point that I was
19	getting at. I have seen this source
20	production at Mound and I haven't been
21	involved that much with the LANL, but I've

just seen different documentation, especially

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2	through Pantex and so forth. I was just
3	curious.
4	MR. GLECKLER: Cause it seems like
5	I recall there might be one other thing out
6	there that indicated that they were produced
7	at Mound and might have went to LANL for some
8	reason before they went to Pinellas. But it's
9	just interesting information as far as how the
10	all the sites were interrelated. But it
11	didn't really serve much purpose for the site,
12	so I took, I believe, that information out of
13	the TBD, since I couldn't determine exactly
14	where. I didn't have any conclusive
15	information.
16	MR. KATZ: So, John, is there any
17	follow-up on this?
18	MR. STIVER: Yes, I think the
19	follow-up for us would be to look at the
20	plutonium bioassay data and the swipe data
21	just to kind of confirm that we agree or that

we're on the same page as NIOSH.

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_	me 10 on one same page as neon.
2	MR. KATZ: Okay.
3	MR. STIVER: And then you guys are
4	going to revise the wording with respect to
5	the plutonium?
6	MR. GLECKLER: So you want to go
7	ahead and take those, basically, just take out
8	the plutonium?
9	MR. STIVER: Yes, take out the
10	discussion.
11	MR. GLECKLER: Okay.
12	MR. STIVER: A short paragraph
13	that indicates that it's positive. Bring it
14	down and then we will pursue it.
15	MR. DARNELL: What I would like to

- MR. STIVER: Okay.
- MR. DARNELL: Just do the changes,
- send them over to you.
- MR. STIVER: Sure.

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do is probably do some in-process work with

you.

1

16

1	MR. DARNELL: Make sure we are on
2	the same page. Phil, we will let you guys
3	know the results after the decision?
4	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I don't
5	really have a problem with that. Do you have
6	a problem with that?
7	MR. STIVER: That's fine.
8	MR. DARNELL: Okay. Now, the
9	actual change in the TBD may take a while.
10	MR. STIVER: Sure, yes. As long
11	as there is a commitment to make the change,
12	that's fine.
13	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Now, didn't
14	they have a few for calibration purposes, 239
15	sources, also?
16	MR. GLECKLER: Oh, it was part
17	yes, they had some other Pu sources. Like I
18	know they had at least one Pu-Be source
19	possibly, maybe two Pu-Be sources arrived
20	there in like 1957 time frame. And I'm not
21	sure when it left the site. I think I had

1	come across something on that with the GE
2	Evendale site, because that's where it ended
3	up.
4	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Correct me if
5	I'm wrong, but my understanding was those
6	sources they had for calibration purposes were
7	also encapsulated?
8	MR. GLECKLER: Correct. They were
9	either the smaller plated sources for, you
10	know, calibrating the alpha contamination
11	survey instruments, those would have been, you
12	know, plated and considered a sealed source
13	for all intents and purposes.
14	And then the Pu-Be sources were
15	encapsulated.
16	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That's only
17	the encapsulated ones.
18	MR. GLECKLER: Yes. They didn't
19	have any unencapsulated Pu at the site.
20	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: They didn't
21	have any unencapsulated Pu.

1	DR. NETON: I mean, an
2	electroplated source, electro-deposit source
3	is for all intents and purposes is bound to
4	the metal. I mean, it couldn't be
5	encapsulated and be effective to calibrate
6	source contamination monitors.
7	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Well, that's
8	what I mean, electroplated is another
9	DR. NETON: Yes. But that's
10	common at almost every site you have these
11	manufacturer sources that have plutonium on
12	the surface.
13	MR. GLECKLER: I guess the better
14	way to say it, there wasn't any dispersible
15	forms of Pu at the site.
16	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That's really
17	it.
18	MR. GLECKLER: That's more
19	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: That is a
20	little better stated than I was
21	MEMBER CLAWSON: Starting with the

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1 AEC, they had to be swiped, you know, to make 2 sure that they weren't leaking. 3 Find your TBD - I MR. STIVER: received a 7 gram 239 Pu source in January '57 4 5 for calibrating health physics instrumentation, based on information that was 6 7 sourced in the issues. It was most 8 encapsulated Pu-Be source. 9 DR. NETON: 7 grams? 10 MR. STIVER: Okay. Well, I Yes. 11 guess we can move on. 12 DARNELL: That closes MR. out 13 internal. Environmental TBD. Okav. Secondary issue was taken care of for bad 14 tritium air monitoring results, provided in 15 16 Section 4 of the TBD. 17 Brian, if you don't mind, would you give the discussion on No. 2 there? 18 19 are more familiar with all the ins and outs of 20 that.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

Yes.

GLECKLER:

MR.

21

The problem

1	we ran into is, unfortunately, that we didn't
2	have the documentation and the calculations
3	that were originally done for the
4	environmental TBD. And we needed to, you
5	know, adjust and well, we needed those
6	dispersion calculations as our starting point
7	to figure out, you know, what the predicted
8	air concentrations were at the air monitoring
9	location, so we could do what SC&A had
10	requested.
11	We found well, we can't do that.
12	We have got to reconstruct those calculations.
13	And so we just completely redid them. They
14	are pretty comparable as far as the average
15	air concentrations that we were calculating
16	for each calendar year prior to the intakes
17	and so it's like there are just some, you
18	know, differences.
19	Let me see, because I think there
20	are
21	MR. STIVER: We have induction of

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1	the stack in '81 because of higher doses.
2	MR. GLECKLER: That was factored
3	in, but it's something but they did
4	different with their calcs than what we did.
5	But we didn't couldn't figure out what they
6	did, the original authors did with their
7	calcs. So it's kind of hard to explain why
8	that change occurred at that point.
9	MR. STIVER: Yes, we were running
10	across that -
11	MR. GLECKLER: So hopefully it is
12	a lot it's better documented now, is the
13	intent, and as far as, you know, what went
14	into those calculations and all the details of
15	those calculations, so if we need to revisit
16	anything in the future, that will be much more
17	easier. We won't have to reconstruct
18	anything.
19	MR. STIVER: So Attachment A
20	provides the complete discussion of the
21	calculations and assumptions.

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1	MR. GLECKLER: Yes. And in
2	general, the when we predicted use for
3	dispersion calculations to predict what the
4	average air concentrations were at the air
5	monitoring locations and compared to the
6	actual measured data, that was we were
7	underestimating within about it's a factor
8	of 2 point something was the highest on
9	average that we were underestimating, but we
10	deemed that reasonable, because we weren't
11	factoring in that the a lot of their air
12	concentration results were less than detect on
13	that. And so if we factored those in, it's
14	like and dealt with that in a more
15	reasonable manner, it's like that ratio would
16	be closer to a 1:1 ratio. So we were pretty
17	confident that what that the dispersion
18	calculations that we are doing will generate
19	a realistic estimate of the air concentrations
20	for those intakes.

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And then also, it's like with the

1	I did a bounding environmental internal
2	dose estimate as part of the TBD, because
3	and we used you know, what we estimated
4	based on stack emissions and also the areas of
5	the I forget what pond, one of the pond
6	area sources. And our calc, you know, we have
7	intake rates for the stack, due to the stack
8	emissions intake rates attributed to the pond
9	releases, you know, from resuspension and
10	such. And then also, the air concentrations.
11	And when you so we are factoring using the
12	air concentrations on top of that, even though
13	a good chunk of that is due to the stack
14	emissions and already -
15	MR. STIVER: And double count
16	that.
17	MR. GLECKLER: And even when we
18	double count that, it's like those the
19	worst case dose, you know, for a worker that
20	was there from the entire history of the
21	plant, 1957 through 1997, the worst case dose

Τ	is less than I millirem total. And so it's
2	considered a negligible dose from our
3	perspective.
4	MR. STIVER: I thought that you
5	guys did a good job on it. I have no issues.
6	Is there anything you wanted to bring up
7	about this?
8	MR. PAPADOPOULOS: No, no. There
9	is no issues left.
10	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: The point
11	where the state comes and required monitoring
12	for the staff, is there any data from that?
13	MR. GLECKLER: From when the state
14	came in?
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes. My
16	understanding is, at least on some of these,
17	that they had to also give some of this data
18	to the State of Florida, at one point, while
19	there were still operations. I might have
20	misread that information.
21	MR. DARNELL: Florida, the State

1	of Florida itself has a rather robust program.
2	They may have asked for or done their own
3	monitoring.
4	MR. GLECKLER: Usually a state
5	won't do their own monitoring on a stack.
6	They might do environmental monitoring.
7	(Simultaneous speaking.)
8	MR. GLECKLER: The site would be
9	the one to take the stack samples and report
10	those results to the state in most situations.
11	Well, at least the states that I have been
12	involved with. But I haven't encountered
13	anything where the state was involved with
14	some monitoring.
15	MR. DARNELL: Yes. The thing is
16	the way this stuff works in the environment
17	how the site really operated had there been
18	something released, it would have stuck out
19	like a sore thumb in the data records.
20	Something that would have been caught.
21	Unfortunately, this is just one of those sites

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1	that you don't see it. You don't find it.
2	There is no record of it. So you may want to
3	think could it have happened, it seems
4	unlikely, the best way to explain it.
5	MR. GLECKLER: They did put out a
6	decent amount of tritium, but it doesn't
7	amount to much dose.
8	MR. DARNELL: Right.
9	MR. GLECKLER: That's the nice
10	thing about tritium.
11	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay.
12	MR. DARNELL: Any more questions,
13	comments on environmental?
14	MR. STIVER: No, not really.
15	MR. DARNELL: All right. That
16	moves us on to the medical TBD. And, Elyse,
17	are you still on the line?
18	MS. THOMAS: Yes, I am.
19	MR. DARNELL: I hate to impose,
20	but would you mind going over the changes of

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the medical dose TBD, please?

1	MS. THOMAS: No, that would be
2	fine.
3	MR. DARNELL: Okay.
4	MR. GLECKLER: And hopefully I
5	captured the reasoning correctly, Elyse. I
6	just had to put this summary together pretty
7	quickly. I didn't have a chance to run it
8	past you, so I hope it's accurate.
9	MS. THOMAS: Yes.
10	MR. GLECKLER: If not
11	MS. THOMAS: Yes, it's fine.
12	MR. GLECKLER: you can correct
13	me.
14	MS. THOMAS: Yes, SC&A had made a
15	comment about, you know, the equipment and the
16	techniques not being, you know, maybe fully-
17	documented in the TBD or fully-documented as
18	they could be. And so we tried to improve
19	that, you know, with a little bit better
20	description of the equipment, the dates that
21	we know certain equipment was used.

1	All of the pre-1972 X-ray doses
2	are still based on information from ORAU OTIB-
3	6, because we don't have any information
4	about, site-specific information, the X-ray
5	equipment at Pinellas before 1972.
6	The changes to the PFG doses were
7	simply a result of a slight change in the
8	doses from PFG in ORAU OTIB-6. So I think
9	that's it on the equipment.
10	The next issue, I think, SC&A had
11	had to do with the frequencies of the
12	screening examination. And, of course, now,
13	we have a lot more information in the claim
14	file records and it's very clear that Pinellas
15	did use, they called it, a KUB, a Kidney
16	Ureter Bladder, which is an AP projection of,
17	essentially, the abdomen.
18	They are similar to an AP lumbar
19	spine. They used that in conjunction with a
20	chest X-ray as a screening examination,
21	because it appears that almost or in very

1 m	many of the claim records. And so we included
2 t	the doses and just strengthened that section
3 0	of the TBD to make it clear to the dose
4 r	reconstructors that they should include the
5 d	dose from those procedures, because they were,
6 у	ou know, clearly performed for screening on
7 t	the Pinellas workers.
8	So I think that's pretty much the
9 f	requency section.
10	The uncertainty section it's,
11 e	essentially, the same as the one that we have
12 i	n ORAU OTIB-6 where we list the various
13 s	sources of uncertainty that we have considered
14 a	and then come up with a, you know, total
15 s	standard propagated uncertainty.
16	Let's see, a couple of other
17 t	things on the summary there. The time period
18 f	for PFG just changed slightly just to reduce
19 c	confusion on the part of dose reconstructors.
20	In other words, PFG is to be assigned through
21 1	.959, as opposed to up to 1960. I know that

sounds like a very small change, but it helped

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2	to reduce the confusion on the part of the
3	dose reconstructors.
4	We took out the lateral abdomen
5	exposures or KUB exposures, that's not
6	typically done for that exam. As a matter of
7	fact, I should say it is rarely done for that
8	exam.
9	We added skin doses for all of the
10	various skin locations as calculated or
11	described in ORAU OTIB-6. And then did some
12	organizational changes to make it a little bit
13	more readable and more clear.
14	So I think that kind of summarizes
15	the changes that were made to the medical
16	section. It just was it just is about to
17	be published, so I realize SC&A hasn't had a
18	chance to look at it yet.
19	MR. STIVER: Yes, from what I have
20	read of your descriptions here, it sounds like
21	you have answered most of our concerns. I

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1 would reserve judgment until we actually have a chance to review the TBD and also we would 2 3 like to look at the site-specific data to verify in our minds that it, indeed, covers a 4 5 of ground for dose reconstruction as 6 opposed to any need to invoke TIB-6 during 7 that period. 8 MS. THOMAS: Yes, sure. 9 STIVER: MR. And so other than 10 that, that's really all we have to say, at 11 this point. 12 MS. THOMAS: Okay. Something worth 13 MR. GLECKLER: noting regarding the Pinellas Plant medical 14 records is, that's probably a little bit 15 16 different than other sites, that what becomes clear after looking at a lot of these records 17 is it looks like one of the benefits that the 18 19 plant offered their employees is the use of 20 the site doctors as their personal doctors. lot of diagnostic medical 21 So there are а

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1	records, not just X-ray records, but other
2	diagnostic, you know, things regarding, you
3	know, cancer diagnoses and other ailments and
4	stuff.
5	And so plus that there is a lot of
6	diagnostic X-ray records, and that's just
7	something that's worth being aware of
8	MR. STIVER: That is an
9	interesting difference.
10	MR. DARNELL: One advantage the
11	site has is the plant nurse who was still
12	around and we did interview her. She went way
13	back in the program, so was able to tell us
14	what was going on very early in the medical
15	program.
16	MR. STIVER: Wow. You rarely have
17	that kind of -
18	MR. DARNELL: Yes.
19	MR. STIVER: access.
20	MR. DARNELL: Okay.
21	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Do we want to

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1	take a break here temporarily?
2	MR. STIVER: Yes, it looks like a
3	good time to take a coffee break.
4	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. Coffee
5	break.
6	MR. KATZ: Ten minutes. Do you
7	want 10 minutes?
8	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, 10
9	minutes is fine.
10	MR. KATZ: Okay. So about 20 till
11	we will start back up for folks on the phone.
12	I'm just putting the phone on mute. Thanks.
13	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
14	matter went off the record at 10:30 a.m. and
15	resumed at 10:42 a.m.)
16	MR. KATZ: Okay. We're back after
17	a short break. Pinellas Work Group. Where
18	are we? We have gone through the agenda.
19	MR. DARNELL: We've finished the
20	agenda.
21	MR. KATZ: We are down to action

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1	items and plans.
2	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Yes, unless
3	we have more technical discussion.
4	MR. STIVER: I think we have
5	pretty well covered it on this side of what we
6	can do at this point.
7	MR. KATZ: Same for Work Group
8	Members? Any other questions before we move
9	on to plans?
10	MEMBER CLAWSON: I did have one
11	question. In the beginning of this, and I
12	want to make sure I understood, on the beds or
13	in the glass state, was that depleted uranium
14	in those?
15	MR. DARNELL: Titanium.
16	MR. STIVER: You're talking about
17	the hydrides?
18	MEMBER CLAWSON: Right, those.
19	MR. STIVER: Yes.
20	MEMBER CLAWSON: Well, I just saw
21	the depleted uranium and then I saw uranium

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1	and I wanted to make because my
2	understanding was they actually had some of
3	the uranium beds.
4	MR. GLECKLER: The initial beds,
5	storage beds that they used at the Pinellas
6	Plant were the glass beds that contained
7	titanium hydride. And because of the breakage
8	problems with the glass beds, they replaced
9	them with the stainless steel beds with
10	uranium tritide. And so there is in the
11	1960s time frame, around '66 or '62 or '66
12	time frame, was when that transition occurred.
13	MEMBER CLAWSON: So was it
14	actually uranium? When I saw uranium, it
15	wasn't depleted uranium in the uranium beds?
16	MR. GLECKLER: I believe I have
17	got it the way I wrote it in there is we
18	believe it is either from depleted uranium.
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: Well, I
20	MR. GLECKLER: It's not
21	MEMBER CLAWSON: just wondered,

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1	because when I read in it, it talked earlier
2	about depleted uranium beds. And then later
3	on it says uranium beds and I wanted to make
4	sure they were the depleted.
5	MR. DARNELL: It's supposed to be
6	DU.
7	MR. STIVER: Yes.
8	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay. So I just
9	wanted to clarify that and make sure that I
10	understood that maybe some had changed in that
11	time frame.
12	MR. GLECKLER: Yes, the only
13	instances of non-depleted or of other types of
14	uranium that was natural uranium and that was
15	in the borosilicate glass. But any other
16	reference to uranium in that TBD should be
17	referring to the depleted in the uranium
18	storage beds.
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay. Because
20	the other side we dealt with is that they were
21	actually uranium beds. And I just wanted to

1	make sure that something hadn't changed that I
2	hadn't been following through the TBD. Thank
3	you.
4	MR. KATZ: Any other questions?
5	How about Dr. Poston, John?
6	MEMBER POSTON: No.
7	MR. KATZ: No questions?
8	MEMBER POSTON: Nope.
9	MR. KATZ: Okay.
10	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Anybody on
11	the phone have any questions?
12	MR. KATZ: Anyone else on the
13	phone with questions?
14	MS. HAND: Yes. Can you hear me?
15	This is Donna.
16	MR. KATZ: Yes, we hear you,
17	Donna.
18	MS. HAND: Okay. The how come
19	they did not use the baseline 1997 report from
20	Lockheed Martin and also of DOE as a reference
21	material in the new Technical Basis Document?

1	Because it's not mentioned anywhere.
2	MR. DARNELL: This is Pete
3	Darnell. Donna, what report are you referring
4	to? Can we have the full title, please?
5	MS. HAND: Yes. The Pinellas
6	Plant Technical Basis Document, the
7	Environmental Baseline, the report from
8	Lockheed Martin and DOE 1997. You used the
9	1995 as a reference, but you have completely
10	ignored the 1997.
11	And back in the June meeting, I
12	even brought that up.
13	MR. GLECKLER: There isn't any
14	significant information that is different, I
15	think that's probably why we didn't bother
16	using that one.
17	MS. HAND: But in that report, in
18	that baseline report, it mentions the uranium.
19	It mentions all four of them. In fact, the
20	EPA says there was krypton, uranium and
21	tritium, enough for residual contamination

1	concerns.
2	So why is it not important? And
3	that was your decontamination/decommissioning
4	period.
5	MR. DARNELL: We will take a look
6	at the report. We'll have to get back to you.
7	MS. HAND: And then how come you
8	did not include the destructive testing of
9	both the neutron generator in building 200 and
10	as well as the plutonium, the RTGs? They did
11	do destructive testing of those.
12	In fact, I have a client that
13	specifically said that on the RTGs they would
14	if something went wrong, they had to
15	physically open it up and they had used
16	asbestos gloves to open it up, because it was
17	so warm, to find out they would probably fill
18	it back in.
19	MR. DARNELL: As far as the RTG
20	goes, we have no documentation that shows that
21	destructive testing was done.

1	The battery itself is triple
2	encapsulated source, as we have discussed
3	earlier, so there is no contamination exposure
4	potential there.
5	The asbestos gloves, it's not
6	really germane to whether there was a
7	radiation exposure or not.
8	MS. HAND: Well
9	MR. DARNELL: So do you have any
10	documentation that there was destructive
11	testing that included
12	MS. HAND: Yes, I can get an
13	MR. DARNELL: the plutonium
14	battery?
15	MS. HAND: affidavit from the
16	worker himself, yes.
17	MR. DARNELL: And it included the
18	plutonium battery?
19	MS. HAND: Yes.
20	MR. GLECKLER: Some of those
21	destructive tests involved actually using an

1	explosive to blow up the device. And that
2	would explain the use of asbestos gloves,
3	because the device would possibly still be hot
4	from the explosion.
5	MR. DARNELL: But we have see
6	it doesn't matter if you blow up an RTG that
7	doesn't contain the plutonium battery. Okay.
8	That's like blowing up your car. It's not a
9	radiation exposure issue.
10	And like I said, we have nothing
11	that shows that the plutonium battery was ever
12	destroyed on that site in any regard.
13	MS. HAND: I take a different view
14	because these workers are telling me that
15	there you know, if you are blowing it up,
16	you have to have some type of radiation that
17	is coming from there. But that's a different
18	issue altogether.
19	I will get the affidavit from the
20	worker for you guys and send it to you.
21	Also, DOL has stipulated that

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1	there was a plutonium fire in 1972/1973. So
2	you are telling me let's take the plutonium
3	out completely when there was an actual fire?
4	MR. DARNELL: We have never
5	encountered any
6	MS. HAND: It doesn't
7	MR. DARNELL: information on
8	that.
9	MS. HAND: make sense to me
10	either.
11	MR. DARNELL: We have no record of
12	a plutonium fire, so
13	MS. HAND: Well, DOL does. And it
14	came from DOE, so that doesn't make sense.
15	MR. DARNELL: Supply the document,
16	please, because we have no record of it, no
17	documentation of it. As you can see in the
18	Technical Basis Documents, we have an
19	extensive list of the incidents that did
20	occur.
21	MS. HAND: Sure.

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1	MR. DARNELL: We are not seeing
2	MS. HAND: Yes. And this is an
3	extensive list. You find that there is a
4	whole area for contaminated with tritium.
5	Everything but yet, you know, you are
6	limiting that tritium to, you know, such
7	certain things.
8	MR. DARNELL: The tritium is not
9	being limited -
10	MS. HAND: And they did a bioassay
11	on plutonium.
12	MR. DARNELL: Tritium is not being
13	limited to anything. There is an exposed
14	worker population that has been identified by
15	monitoring. The unexposed or the unmonitored
16	worker has an exposure potential that is
17	recognized in the unmonitored worker dose. So
18	there is nothing that is being left out from
19	tritium monitoring, tritium exposure and the
20	dose reconstruction for it.
21	So if you have something that you

1	think is being left out, please, be specific.
2	MS. HAND: Oh, I will be. I'll go
3	ahead and let you go on with your meeting.
4	But there is a lot of information that
5	happened in the June meeting and that was
6	is not addressed and is taken out. And
7	assuming that you have, you know, now you
8	have, a new Technical Basis Document, you did
9	a lot of work, you did a lot of good, as far
10	as the history goes, but there was still
11	things that you are ignoring
12	MR. DARNELL: Could you, please
13	MS. HAND: that were
14	MR. DARNELL: be specific?
15	MS. HAND: documented in the
16	June hearing, as well as the GE/Milwaukee
17	Group X-Ray Group, they only handled the
18	paperwork up until 1966.
19	In 1966 and '67, they moved,
20	physically moved, to the plant. So all the
21	records from the GE X-Ray Plant either for the

1	for that group was physically in Pinellas
2	Plant. They have a room there established for
3	them.
4	MR. DARNELL: We retrieved all the
5	records that we could from Pinellas. We have
6	also retrieved the records from the GEXM, GE
7	X-Ray Division. You know, this is this
8	issue has been vetted several times, as far as
9	looking for documentation.
10	The process that we have is if
11	more documentation is discovered, we add that
12	information. We
13	MS. HAND: But
14	MR. DARNELL: have proven
15	MS. HAND: my concern is is
16	that you got through saying that the GEX
17	Milwaukee stuff is a separate thing.
18	MR. DARNELL: There is
19	MS. HAND: You know, but they
20	MR. DARNELL: information
21	from

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1	MS. HAND: actually moved in
2	there and they took handbooks from day one,
3	all they handled was the paperwork.
4	Everything from 1956 when they decided to move
5	it, to build it at Pinellas Plant, that
6	division was charged with it, but all they did
7	was handle the paperwork and then did the
8	drawings, et cetera, and then physically moved
9	to Pinellas in '66.
10	So if you are having to get this
11	from the GEXM and but you said you are not
12	going to use those, you withdrew those records
13	because it was the GEXM, how can you if the
14	records after 1966 they were physically
15	there.
16	MR. DARNELL: Okay. You
17	misunderstood what we are saying. There were
18	GE
19	MS. HAND: Okay. Then, please,
20	clarify.
21	MR. DARNELL: There were GEXM

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1	documents that were removed from the Pinellas
2	TBD that had to do with other operations at
3	GE. The GE X-Ray site did a lot of other
4	things that was not part of the Pinellas
5	operations and not part of the pilot program
6	that was started at GEXM and then moved to
7	Pinellas.
8	So there were personnel at GEXM
9	that are included in the Pinellas TBD. So I
10	don't understand where you have a problem with
11	us capturing them and moving them to Pinellas,
12	but at the same time removing documents that
13	had nothing to do with Pinellas.
14	MS. HAND: Well, the thing is, you
15	know, I was going to do a Freedom of
16	Information Act and look at those documents,
17	because Pinellas did a lot of things. The
18	main thing was, as you know, with the neutron
19	trigger.
20	However, they did a lot of other
21	stuff and that had radioactive material in it

1	as well. And then to the internal dose to put
2	it for the ones that got monitored for tritium
3	is the only ones you are going to do for metal
4	tritide, that metal tritide, from my
5	understanding, went around where anybody met
6	with the neutron generator, they touched the
7	metal tritide.
8	MR. DARNELL: No, ma'am, that's
9	completely inaccurate and incorrect. The
10	only -
11	MS. HAND: Oh, for someone
12	MR. DARNELL: exposure
13	potential for that tritide is to the workers
14	that were handling either the tubes or spilt
15	materials and the folks that worked with the
16	tritium day-to-day. Those were the only
17	exposure potentials.
18	You did not have a volatile
19	component to the tritides to spread it
20	throughout the plant. In the early days when
21	the glass tubes broke, it's a very local

1	exposure potential. This is not something
2	that was spread out to where you would have to
3	include an unmonitored worker who is not
4	expected to be exposed to tritium, much less
5	the tritide, so that you can separate them
6	because of the difference in work
7	requirements.
8	MS. HAND: Well, that is strange
9	because the workers themselves say absolutely
10	opposite and you said absolutely opposite in
11	the transcript of the in 2009.
12	MR. DARNELL: Can you, please,
13	reference the page? I've got the transcripts
14	right here in front of me. Where was that
15	said?
16	MS. HAND: Well, that was said
17	because you said you cannot use the same
18	MR. DARNELL: No, you are
19	misunderstanding me.
20	MS. HAND: material because
21	Pinellas Plant workers were exposed to it

1	more.
2	MR. DARNELL: Okay. I'm looking
3	at the tritium section where we discussed
4	tritides in the transcripts from the last
5	meeting. Okay. Can you, please, point out
6	where the opposite was said?
7	MS. HAND: Not at this time,
8	because my computer just froze.
9	MR. DARNELL: Oh, okay. All
10	right. As far as what this document says,
11	okay, and looking through it, the discussion
12	from two years ago is the same as the
13	discussion now.
14	The tritides were going to be
15	applied to the workers that were monitored, an
16	unmonitored dose of tritium is applied to the
17	unmonitored workers. There is no change in
18	what we are doing with the exception that
19	instead of Class M, we are using Class S,
20	because there could have been a Class S

tritide present.

1	MS. HAND: Okay. And then you
2	also are going by the DOE are you also
3	fulfilling the DOE handbook to where it says
4	MR. DARNELL: DOE handbook is not
5	a requirement
6	MS. HAND: you can't say
7	MR. DARNELL: for us.
8	MS. HAND: why as far as
9	dispersement goes, because the tritium will
10	continue going out.
11	MR. DARNELL: The DOE handbook is
12	not a requirement for us.
13	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: I have a
14	question for you. You are saying people
15	needed to use asbestos gloves. Do you have
16	the size of the plutonium batteries or the
17	RTG, the size of that or its power level?
18	That would have a huge bearing on that.
19	MS. HAND: I do know that they did
20	have two different sizes. One size that they
21	could touch with their fingers to make sure it

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was heated and another size was the size of an 1 2 orange juice can or something that they had to 3 use the asbestos gloves with. CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: A what sized 4 5 can? 6 MR. KATZ: Orange juice can. 7 CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Okay. Thanks. 8 9 MR. KATZ: Donna, this is Ted 10 think it would be helpful if Katz. 11 would for example, mentioned the you affidavit. 12 13 MS. HAND: Yes. 14 MR. KATZ: And you mentioned the plutonium fire and now you have also discussed 15 16 transcript discussion. If you would just go 17 ahead and actually specify those in writing 18 and submit them, then everybody can exactly what you are addressing. 19 And at the next Work Group meeting, they can respond to 20 that, exactly what you are concerned about. 21

1	MS. HAND: Yes, I will, because
2	it's depleted uranium with a depleted uranium
3	bed and that was from the very beginning. And
4	they had to replenish that depleted uranium.
5	Again, a worker informed me of that.
6	So you, for example, have EPA
7	saying that there was concern of residual
8	contamination of uranium and that, you know,
9	it has to be a high concern as well.
10	MR. KATZ: So if you will just
11	MS. HAND: But I will put this in
12	points. Thank you very much.
13	MR. KATZ: That's great. That
14	will be very helpful. Thank you, Donna. And
15	you can send those to DCAS and those will get
16	distributed to the Work Group through them, so
17	we will make sure that everybody, including
18	SC&A, gets the exact documents or page numbers
19	of documents that you are referring to with
20	these comments.

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

MS. HAND:

21

Will do. Thank you.

1	MR. KATZ: That would be great.
2	Thanks. Any other comments or questions? In
3	terms of actions, SC&A has run through a set
4	of tasks. I've got them. You've got them.
5	If you want to report on them, you can, but
6	you don't need to, I think, we are pretty
7	clear on the taskings.
8	MR. STIVER: Make sure we have
9	everything captured.
10	MEMBER CLAWSON: You will send a
11	copy of the -
12	MR. KATZ: Yes, I'll send it out
13	afterwards. An action plan.
14	MEMBER CLAWSON: Appreciate that
15	for the Work Group.
16	MR. KATZ: That would be great.
17	And then I think DCAS only had
18	MR. DARNELL: I had two things
19	written down.
20	MR. KATZ: Two items, yes.
21	MR. DARNELL: To find the swipe

1	data during D&D and remove the plutonium
2	information.
3	DR. NETON: Yes, the language or
4	develop language.
5	MR. STIVER: Pete and I will
6	coordinate on that.
7	MR. KATZ: Exactly.
8	DR. NETON: Works for me.
9	MR. KATZ: Excellent.
10	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Anybody else
11	have anything else?
12	MR. KATZ: Well, thank you,
13	everyone, for a productive meeting. Thank
14	you
15	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Thank you
16	very much.
17	MR. KATZ: John, for hanging in
18	on the phone and the other staff as well and
19	Donna, thank you for attending. And we are
20	adjourned.
21	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: We are

1	adjourned.
2	MEMBER POSTON: All right. So
3	long, everybody.
4	MR. KATZ: Take care.
5	CHAIRMAN SCHOFIELD: Bye.
6	(Whereupon, the Work Group meeting
7	was concluded at 11:00 a.m.)
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