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## U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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SAVANNAH RIVER SITE WORK GROUP

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FRIDAY AUGUST 12, 2011

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The Work Group convened via teleconference at 8:30 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, Mark Griffon, Chairman, presiding.

## PRESENT:

MARK GRIFFON, Chairman BRAD CLAWSON, Member JIM LOCKEY, Member

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## ALSO PRESENT:

TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official DAVID ANDERSON
TERRIE BARRIE
STU HINNEFELD, DCAS
JENNY LIN, HHS
MARK MAHAFFEY, ORAU Team
ARJUN MAKHIJANI, SC&A
JIM NETON, DCAS
TIM TAULBEE, DCAS

1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	8:34 a.m.
3	MR. KATZ: Then there's an agenda
4	for the meeting, which is posted at the
5	website at the under the Board section.
6	And, Mark, it's your agenda.
7	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Thanks, Ted. I
8	actually should look at the agenda. I was just
9	going to say I believe we have one major focus
10	on the agenda. I just want to make what I say
11	agrees with what's posted. Yes, it should.
12	Okay.
13	The one main item I think is the
14	discussion of the NIOSH SEC Petition ER
15	Addendum, which everyone should have received.
16	Every Board Member I mean should have received
17	yesterday. Jim and Brad, I know you have
18	it. Jim, did you receive that?
19	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes, I have it.
20	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay. Okay.
21	And then the other part which I've talked to

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Group, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally	
identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been	
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time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to	
change.	

1	Tim Taulbee, and Tim can correct me if I'm
2	wrong, but I think since our last Work Group
3	meeting a lot of effort and focus has been on
4	the thorium issues. So the second part is
5	more of just a status update. I didn't want to
6	go through the entire matrix item-by-item. If
7	Tim can just give us maybe a brief update on
8	where he stands on some of the major actions.
9	And then the last section might be to discuss
10	out of the thorium issue discuss what the Work
11	Group if we want to bring a recommendation to
12	the August Board meeting.
13	And by the way for those on the
14	phone, I expect this whole thing to take maybe
15	a couple of hours. So if you're planning your
16	day, I don't think this is going to be
17	certainly a full day, but I expect we can get
18	through this in a couple of hours.
19	So I would just let NIOSH and I
20	assume Tim Taulbee will start off the
21	presentation of the Addendum to the ER.

1	MR. KATZ: Would everybody please
2	identify yourselves when you speak so that the
3	Court Reporter knows who is speaking in each
4	instance because he may not recognize some of
5	your voices.
6	And lastly, let me just ask
7	everyone on the phone except when you're
8	speaking to the group, would you please mute
9	your phones? There's some background noise
10	now. And if you don't have a mute button,
11	press *6 to mute your phone and press *6 again
12	when you want to come off of mute. But,
13	please, everyone mute your phone.
14	Thank you.
15	And, Tim, it's all you.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Thank you,
17	Ted, and thank you, Mark.
18	Yes. Yes. My plans here for
19	going over this ER Addendum, and this is
20	actually the second addendum to this petition
21	regarding thorium, is to kind of give a little

bit of an overview of where we're at to remind 1 2 everybody. And then we'll talk about new information that we've captured and analyzed 3 the last Work 4 the past since 5 meeting. And hopefully this will build an 6 explanation as to how we came to recommend this particular Class. 7 So to kind of back up, back in 8 January SC&A provided review comments on our 9 first addendum. And one of the most, in my 10 significant finding 11 opinion, the most 12 Finding #3 about us not evaluating thorium 13 exposures in other areas besides the 300 Area. 14 So we agree that this was an area 15 that we had not addressed sufficiently. And 16 so at that time we began to go back to the site and look at other information to try and 17 characterize what other thorium work was going 18 19 Our perception at that time was that the on. level of thorium work in other areas such as 20 21 the 773 Area, the TNX Area, separations were

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all kind of low-level type of activities as 1 2 far as not much thorium work going on, just some minor research. 3 And so that was our original opinion. 4 That changed when we did our first 5 data capture, our first data review in March 6 of this year, March 2011, when we went through 7 the classified vaults with SC&A, particularly 8 Kathy Demers and Abe Zeitoun. 9 And what we found there was the inventory reports which 10 catalogued where thorium was on-site through 11 12 the basically history of this project making uranium-233. And from those inventory 13 14 reports it became clear that there was a much 15 larger source term in 773A and the TNX Area 16 than we had anticipated, much larger. 17 And so in addition to those monthly reports we reviewed or those inventory 18 19 reviewed the Monthly Technical reports, we 20 Reports. And I reported on this at the May 21 Board meeting discussing, giving a little bit

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1 of a preamble of what was to come. But there 2 was a couple of things that we still needed to 3 track down and follow up on, and that was the these physics logbooks for 4 health two 5 particular areas of concern, 773A and the CMX, TNX Area. 6 During this time we also conducted 7 multiple interviews, especially after we saw 8 9 those inventory reports that were indicating significant quantities, and by "significant" I 10 mean tons of material in 773A. 11 And so conducted additional interviews to gather more 12 13 information, more insight, as to what 14 going on during this time period. 15 So that kind of gives background as to where we were and what we started to 16 17 look at. What we found from the interviews those people were saying 18 was that it 19 generally small quantities of thorium that was being worked with in these 20 labs, and 21 coincided with the reports that we were

1 seeing, both from the Savannah River Site and 2 other areas. But when we questioned people specifically about the fabrication lab or the 3 metallurgical lab which is in the back part of 4 5 the 773 building, that was where people kind of backed off of the low small quantities type 6 of discussion. They're indicating well, there 7 could have been more back there because the 8 9 capability in that back lab, metallurgical lab, was such that they could make an entire 10 fuel assembly basically from scratch. 11 12 from our research what we've 13 to conclude is that the bulk of that 14 material was in that back laboratory in Area 15 773. And I don't know if you have your ER open in front of you, but if you were to turn 16 17 page 20, there's а really nice picture which shows 773A lab and it shows where the 18 19 caves are, the high level caves section 1B, And what I'm talking here is that section 20 21 2 of part 3. That's the metallurgical

1 actually several of few 2 thorium were handled. This is where they did 3 some research the metallurgy of the on thorium, and this is the area that we had come 4 5 to the conclusion that we don't feel we can estimate dose for. 6

know that there was research going on there in the metal fabrication lab, and actually throughout 773A. I'll turn your And this is a better attention to page 36. layout of that whole building. And one of the things I want to point out to the Work Group the grayed areas, these here is are where we identified the thorium work was going on from the health physics logbooks. the health physics logbooks there would be entries and discussion about taking smears for thorium. I believe there's a couple instances of air samples. But mostly it was discussing when spills happened and they would give the room number and they went and they did smears

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1 for that particular purpose.

2 And that in so you can see addition to that back metallurgical lab which 3 had extensive thorium, even in section E and 4 5 section C there were small labs that 6 doing work, doing research, which was consistent with what most of the people we 7 interviewing were discussing. 8 were That 9 doesn't mean there weren't any exposures in 10 there, even though -- because they're quantities. spills 11 Some of the were 12 significant that we looked at. 13 This research based upon our 14 limited review of the health physics logbooks, went on literally from 1953 into 1957, early 15 At that point it really appeared to 16 1957. 17 stop There wasn't hardly any mention thorium in the logbooks at all after that time 18 19 period. And this was consistent with an order 20 that came down from DOE, or AEC at the time, 21 that the thorium research or the

1 activities to make U-233 were really curtailed 2 at that time period. 3 Savannah River had built a thorium processing building down in the TNX Area. 4 5 construction was completed at the end of 1956, 6 but the building never went hot. And, in fact, it got turned into another 7 type facility. It never had thorium enter that 8 particular building because the project was 9 basically cancelled. And this is consistent 10 from the health physics 11 with what we see 12 logbooks, so we've got a lot of consistency 13 going on there. 14 The interesting part is when the 15 further research appeared to stop, within a year or two there was a lot research to begin 16 17 on neptunium. And what we found from the monthly reports, and we reviewed these in 18 19 March, was that although they weren't doing work with thorium, they were using thorium as 20 21 a stand-in for the neptunium research. So it

wasn't research for U-233 anymore, they were 1 2 doing research for neptunium but using thorium as a stand-in chemical, I quess due to their 3 similar chemical properties. 4 5 And so that continued on, and then by the mid-1960s the thorium research for U-6 233 became prevalent again and this is with 7 thorium oxide. And we see the same push that 8 9 happened over in the 300 Area of making large quantities of thorium slugs, more radiation, 10 there was a second major campaign to produce 11 uranium-233. 12 So one of the things that we found 13 14 when we were doing this evaluation of 773A and 15 the work from the health physics logbooks is that they really had an active radiological 16 17 protection program. There were routine surveys in the corridors, most indicated no 18 contamination detected, but there were clearly 19 documented spills and incidents with thorium. 20 21 And one of the things that struck me from

looking at some of these incidents was 1 2 spill indicated 37 counts per minute as 3 smearable contamination from highest t.hat. particular spill, which is pretty low. 4 And so anything that was even low-level spills were 5 incidents 6 considered, you know, and health physics responded to them. 7 And there were 8 other spills that indicated several thousand 9 counts per minute. So they weren't all small, some of them were larger. So clearly there 10 was some potential for exposure in these labs 11 that they were doing this work in. 12 13 One of the other things that 14 struck me from the health physics logbooks was 15 that researchers. their conduct the of operations and I'll call it sometimes was less 16 than formal. And this is where there would be 17 discussions between -- within the logbooks by 18 the radiation control technicians concerning 19 people doing things that they weren't supposed 20 21 to be doing or outside the scope of

special work permit and they would be caught, 1 effectively, and they would be written up in 2 3 this logbook and reported to the supervisors. And so rad control was actually, 4 5 you know, really trying to control the areas 6 there. But like other radiological any facility, things are going to happen. 7 8 Usually those types of incidents 9 aren't a big deal from a dose reconstruction standpoint because we have bioassay or air 10 sampling data and we can still then estimate 11 The problem with the thorium is 12 the dose. bioassay 13 that the data has low а 14 sensitivity, and this is why had never we 15 proposed to use it. And if you'll recall from the bioassay data, we only have data from 16 1956, and this comprises data for 175 workers. 17 Early indications from the health physics 18 logbooks early prior to 1956, I believe it was 19 around 1954, 1955 time frame, was that they 20 21 were beginning to compile a list of all the

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who ever worked with thorium. 1 workers So 2 which kind of explains a little bit of why it 3 is thorium that bioassay logbook only indicates 773A as people who were monitored. 4 5 And it appears that the health physics control group there started compiling a list of these 6 people. 7 Now the problem is we don't know 8 The list that they 9 if this a complete list. were talking about we have never been able to 10 find to identify that, yes, these are the only 11 people that worked with thorium in 773A or, 12 13 you know, any other information about it. It's 14 just that we have the thorium bioassay logbook 15 and then we have the sanitation in the health 16 physics logbook indicating that they compiling a list of workers who worked with 17 thorium to do follow-up bioassay, by the way. 18 19 That was specifically stated. 20 So it appears that they followed 21 through in 1956 as the program was

they followed 1 curtailed that through 2 monitoring workers there. But, again, we don't 3 have a way of confirming it. Other data within 773A is 4 air 5 sampling data. Now in the other areas around Savannah River, particularly the 300 Area, the 6 100 Areas, the 200 Areas we have air sample 7 logsheets that are numerically -- that are 8 9 numbered. And so starting with a particular day in 1955 you'll see an air sample logsheet, 10 and the next day and the next page will be 11 12 either one the same day or another day; and We've not been able to they go in sequence. 13 14 find that for 773A nor for TNX. And my best 15 estimate as to why we can't find it is these were two different divisions. 16 17 773A and TNX were operated by the Savannah River Site Technical Division, 18 the Production Division. 19 And so there was divisions, 20 basically three The Technical 21 Division, the Production Division

Construction Division.

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2 So we haven't been able to find any of the data or a significant amount of the 3 data, especially air sampling data from this 4 5 time period. There's some interfacings in the logbooks, but nothing that I would consider 6 Plainly, 7 complete. they were doing air sampling in those buildings. There 8 was annotations about checking all 9 of the air sampling data, and no abnormals; that type of 10 the things from our 11 entry. But one of 12 interviews that we=ve conducted is we found that the air sampling in these laboratories 13 14 was not breathing zone representative. Unlike 15 the 300 Area where we talked to a person, talked to the rad tech who took the samples 16 and indicated the position of the sampler at 17 nose height, where the workers were working 18 when he took his ten-minute or five-minute 19 20 sample, the laboratories that we were looking 21 at people were all indicating that the air

1	samplers were on the ceilings or on the walls,
2	so they're really not breathing zone
3	representative even if we're able to find
4	them.
5	There was some smear data within
6	these health physics logbooks. Most of it
7	indicates no contamination detected unless
8	there is a spill. But the way these logbooks
9	are filed, we only looked at a small sampling
10	of them. The logbooks are actually filed by
11	individual radiological control technician's
12	name. So once they filled up a logbook, they
13	filed it off and it went off to the Records
14	Center and it was filed as their logbook, ever
15	though they weren't the only technician making
16	entries in there. So it wasn't that every
17	technician had their own logbook, it was kind
18	of whoever started that particular log, it's
19	filed under that person's name, which makes it
20	very difficult to find at this time.
21	As I indicated, you know it's

clearly that they were doing checks of the 1 2 labs, but it's not clear where these routine 3 samples within the labs were taken. Sometimes the logbooks they would indicate 4 in 5 samples were taken at the edge of the hoods, other times they indicate -- or they don't 6 indicate where the location was. 7 So even if we had all of the smear 8 9 data and all the air sampling data, I'm still not sure we could actually develop an exposure 10 model that would be reasonable for this 11 particular population. 12 So the final thing that we could 13 14 do for dose reconstruction would be something 15 like a source term model. The problem with that for 773A was we were looking at different 16 chemical forms and different physical forms in 17 every laboratory and within the laboratories. 18 Mostly the material back in the metallurgical 19 lab, that's a lot better in that it was just 20 21 metal. But in the laboratories they

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actually doing some dissolving of irradiated 1 2 thorium and taking it from a metal slug all 3 the way into a solution and then extraction. And when I say "a section of the metal slug," 4 I=m meaning a very small section, I'm taking 5 like an 8 milliliter out of it. 6 So small quantities quite highly 7 radioactive due to the irradiation component 8 9 of that, but trying to do a source term model for this particular facility I think would 10 just be virtually impossible. We don't have 11 enough information to try and track down where 12 all the material was all of the time, all of 13 14 the different chemical and physical forms and how it was handled within the lab. 15 16 So without having bioassay data, 17 air sample data, smear data and not really being able to model the source term, we're 18 19 pretty much left with designating an SEC for this building for thorium. 20 And so that's how 21 we came to the conclusion to include 773A into

1	the or recommend to you all to include it
2	in the SEC.
3	Let me pause here for a second.
4	Does anybody have any questions at this point?
5	(No response.)
6	DR. TAULBEE: Is anybody still
7	there?
8	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, we're here.
9	We're just trying to stay on mute.
10	I don't have any questions.
11	This is Brad.
12	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Thanks, Brad.
13	I just wanted to make sure I didn't get
14	disconnected and I'm just talking to myself.
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: No.
16	MEMBER LOCKEY: No, I heard. I
17	don't have any questions either.
18	Jim Lockey.
19	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Thanks, Jim.
20	Okay. Let me move on to the TNX
21	Building or the semi-works. And this is

really CMX and TNX, but I'm going to focus on 1 2 TNX and let me explain why. The CMX/TNX Area was a semi-works 3 plant is what it's called there. Other people 4 5 might call it a pilot plant. This is an area where Savannah River went from the benchtop 6 scaling in those laboratories of 773A into 7 semi-production. And this is where they would 8 9 scale up from a beaker to, you know, a 100 gallon tank, or something along those lines. 10 looking 11 And so when we started at what 12 operations were going on there, the CMX 13 facility supported reactor research and 14 reactor development and supported the TNX 15 separations. 16 basically handled mostly So CMX 17 canned slugs of thorium, and from that standpoint doing thermodynamic 18 they were 19 testing on the slugs themselves; they would 20 heat up the water and see how they would 21 respond in a reactor. Even though they didn't

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a reactor down there, they were 1 2 doing heat-transfer types of tests; fuel flow, 3 thermodynamics, heat-transfer. And it was mostly with encapsulated thorium. 4 5 TNX, the other hand, on were chemical separation semi-works. 6 And this was dissolving chemical extraction, taking whole 7 non-irradiated thorium slug and dissolving 8 9 them down and trying to add things, catalysts to improve the dissolving -- accelerate at the 10 time of particular 11 that step. And SO 12 everything was scaled up from the lab and they 13 were doing this down there at TNX. 14 In reality, you can't separate CMX 15 from TNX workers. There is a picture of the CMX/TNX facility. Let me flip to that here. 16 17 believe it=s page -- page 21 of the ER. And you can see, these two buildings are right 18 19 next to each other. So going into this area 20 is where you would be badged. So in reality, I 21 can=t separate out who worked in CMX, who

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worked in TNX, but TNX is really the area that 1 2 would cause us concern from an unencapsulated standpoint, 3 thorium which is exposure why we're recommending it. 4 The internal monitoring is similar 5 Again, no bioassay for this area. 6 to 773A. We also don't have any air sample data for 7 this area. 8 9 health physics logbooks, we did find a one for this particular area. 10 could probably locate more, although the one 11 logbook again was much like 773A. It didn't 12 give 13 locations of where the surveys 14 conducted. It didn't give -- most of the time 15 there was no smearable contamination detected 16 unless something happened, and then there'd be 17 some wipes and discussion of smears. the source term to try and 18 And 19 estimate dose is similar to 773A but not quite And by the time you got down to 20 as complex. 21 the semi-works plant, they had a pretty good

idea of which of, you know the two to three 1 2 methods would be best. And so they really 3 didn't. different. have the dozen or SO operations for dissolving thorium that were 4 5 going up in the 773A Area. So it was less but still you got 6 complex, similar issues. Within one process line, the whole purpose was 7 to take an irradiated slug and dissolve it 8 9 into a solution and separate out the uranium-233. So that was their whole goal. 10 So in dealing with the semi-works 11 TNX area we didn't feel like we could estimate 12 the dose for this area, and so we wanted to 13 14 include this in the SEC as well. 15 Another area that we looked at and followed up was the burial grounds. 16 And this is something that the health physics logbooks 17 really helped illuminate. Now we found back 18 19 when were doing the research from the 300 Area and Addendum 1 and Report 46 that material 20 21 leaving from the 300 Area to the

grounds was surveyed. They would take smears 1 2 on this and then they would send it out to the 3 A significant portion of the burial grounds. logbook entries for 773A and TNX were just 4 5 that. It was sending material, leaving the 6 building, some going to the burial grounds, some going to other areas, going to the 300 7 Area the TNX And whenever 8 orarea. SO 9 material was moving between these regulated areas, between these radiation control areas 10 effectively, it was surveyed. And so we don't 11 12 really feel that there's any potential for internal contamination there at 13 the burial 14 grounds due to thorium. 15 The other interesting component of this was the high level cave waste when it was 16 17 leaving 773A to qo to the burial before it was surveyed it was encapsulated in 18 19 concrete and then sent to the burial ground. 20 And this was due to these were irradiated 21 plugs, and so they had a high gamma component

and so they wanted to reduce the dose rates, 1 2 so they encapsulated them in concrete and then 3 sent them out. So, again, we don't really that there's a potential for exposure 4 5 here at the burial grounds. 6 200H separations is the next one that I want to discuss. 7 And this is, the only thing that's important to remember with 8 9 this particular process was the product was uranium-233, not thorium. 10 And by the way, for the 200 separations, now I'm talking 1964 to 11 1972 time frame. 12 this time period 13 During the 14 product was U-233. Coming out of the reactors 15 these slugs have a rather high dose rate. what I'm talking is in the r per hour type of 16 17 range. So these were transported in shielded They were taken from the shielded 18 casks. 19 casks by an overhead crane and lifted and put into the large canyon cells for dissolving. 20 21 So there's really a minimal potential for

exposure on the front end here.

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2 At that point in the canyons, and 3 Brad and Mark when we toured those canyons you seeing from the crane view 4 remember 5 remote cameras that would move from one cell to the next cell all the way through the hot 6 canyon side into the warm canyon side the 7 And then the final uranium product would. 8 9 solution that would be coming out of this And at that point would go up the B line. 10 during the first campaign the thorium and the 11 mixed fission products were pumped directly 12 out to the waste tanks as high level waste. 13 14 After that first campaign, 15 Savannah River decided to start trying to recover that thorium, and so they added a 16 hold-up tank for the thorium nitrate. And so 17 they went through the whole process. 18 The 19 to the B line, the mixed uranium goes up 20 fission products go out to the waste tanks, 21 and the thorium went into a hold-up tank there

1 at the end of the canyon.

2 that hold-up tank it From transferred to railroad cars. 3 It was pumped We found directly into the railroad cars. 4 5 that these railroad cars were equipped with 6 filtrate -- filters to prevent particulate contamination during the filling, and also for 7 thermal expansion. This material was stored 8 in these railroad cars for actually several 9 months, and I believe over a year in one case 10 before being sent to Fernald. it 11 So was stored there on-site in the railroad cars. 12 due to the high photon dose 13 14 rates from this material, and I'm not talking 15 r per hour now, it's back down to the mr, but it is still significant. These railroad cars 16 17 were roped off and they were inspected via binoculars for leaks. So people weren't going 18 19 up to them, they weren't lingering around them

isolated until they got clearance that Fernald

during the time period.

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They were kind of

1	could handle them, and they were then sent to
2	Fernald.
3	So because of this particular wet
4	process operation, the filters on the railroad
5	cars, Savannah River roping these railroad
6	cars off, inspecting with binoculars, we
7	really don't feel that there's a significant
8	potential for internal exposure from this
9	process either.
10	So this pretty much left us then
11	with a proposed Class for the 773A and the TNX
12	Area. And before I go into the Class
13	Definition, I will pause here and see if
14	anybody has any questions.
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: Hey, Tim. This is
16	Brad.
17	Now you're telling me that they
18	roped off these railroad cars and just looked
19	at them with binoculars, period. I kind of
20	have a little bit of a hard time with that,
21	because per a lot of your inspection criteria,

you know you've got to be able to check it for

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4	so many chings. It's like my casks right now.
3	I have to physically go out there and look for
4	any cracks or degradations that could create
5	something. I have a question on that because
6	it sounds real good to me, but I just I
7	really have a hard time with that.
8	So I just want you to keep that in
9	the back of your mind. I'll let you continue
LO	on because things may clear up. But I do have
11	a little bit of a question there.
L2	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. I thank you
L3	for that, Brad.
L4	This is what we found from the
L5	reports where they talked about isolating
L6	these such that people wouldn't be around them
L7	and they were trying to minimize the exposure
L8	to the people doing the inspection, and so
L9	this was a method to try and do that.
20	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
21	DR. TAULBEE: So, that's just the

1	information we have. But thank you for that.
2	MEMBER CLAWSON: And I understand
3	that. You know, because in the back of your
4	mind you've got to look at something. They put
5	a lot of this in because they were worried.
6	Something triggered it to make this a big
7	problem. So I just you know, I just wanted
8	to keep that in the back of your mind, and
9	we'll continue on.
10	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Yes. By the
11	way, the big problem here really was the
12	photon does rate, so that was why they were
13	doing it, at least that's what the
14	documentation says was the dose rate.
15	DR. MAKHIJANI: This is Arjun.
16	May I ask a question?
17	DR. TAULBEE: Sure.
18	DR. MAKHIJANI: I mean, you
19	determined that there was no significant
20	exposure potential at these railroad cars.
21	But how did you extrapolate that to the

reprocessing plant in general?

chemical separation.

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2 DR. TAULBEE: And this is where I hope that Mark and Brad can help me out. 3 Ιf you look at how the canyons are designed, 4 5 people don't go where thismaterial was being dissolved. It's moved from one cell to the 6 other all remotely, the different extractions, 7 dissolve them down, the columns were set for 8

Due to the extreme high dose rate the fission products that are within particular slugs, and in this protactinium that was causing a very high dose rate that was causing lots of problems for really them. And so there wasn't any potential during that dissolving process. You know, once the process was done, they flushed if they were doing a systems. And modification of one then they=re flushed first, then they=re pulled out, and I

These were remote.

there's any major

don=t

see

where

or

1	potential here for an internal exposure during
2	these campaigns.
3	So that's how I came to that
4	conclusion. Is people aren=t standing next to
5	these next tanks or being able to get to these
6	tanks and then after they got material in
7	them, the dose rate is so high that people
8	aren't working on them. They're done by remote
9	from a crane overhead lifting this entire
10	pallet down into the cell. And I think Brad
11	and Mark, you remember standing out there
12	outside of the canyon area seeing those
13	pallets that have all the piping and tubes and
14	tanks and so forth.
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
16	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Tim, this is
17	Mark.
18	Yes, I do remember that, and I
19	think generally you know that's an accurate
20	description. I would question, you know if
21	there was a path for exposure. The only parts

1	of it that I don't know enough about to really
2	speak to or historically, would be whether
3	there were opportunities for exposure through
4	maintenance and things like that where in
5	between runs, you know, did parts of the
6	system get contaminated, did workers have to
7	go in there? You know, that part I wouldn't
8	know. The general processing I think you
9	accurately describe though.
10	DR. TAULBEE: Yes. I think
11	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: At least from
12	my understanding, yes.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: This is Arjun.
14	Yes, I know that reprocessing is done by
15	remote control. But the implication of what
16	you just said, Tim, is that generally in
17	reprocessing operations there's no internal
18	exposure potential to uranium/plutonium
19	fission products. And I don't think that the
20	actual monitoring records would sustain that.
21	There is internal exposure

1	potential documented by internal exposures to
2	reprocessing workers in the 200 Area. There's
3	also internal exposure documented to tank farm
4	workers.
5	So, you know while filling
6	railroad cars is not the same as tank farm
7	work, there are considerable similarities.
8	And I'm just raising a question as
9	to how you did this extrapolation. And
10	basically I'm hearing that you say the
11	position is there's no exposure potentials for
12	internal there's no internal exposure
13	potential in the reprocessing process
14	altogether. So, I just want to clarify that;
15	that's all.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. Thank you.
17	And let me explain that
18	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: This is Mark.
19	I guess I should say if I said no,
20	I didn't mean to say no. I think lower. I
21	would tend to think from the of what they

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1 did, would that it guess was lower 2 potential. But, you know, no I wouldn't go so far as saying no potential. 3 MAKHIJANI: And that can be 4 DR. 5 verified by comparing canyon --6 CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes. 7 DR. MAKHIJANI: exposure potential with other areas --8 9 CHAIRMAN **GRIFFON:** Yes. Absolutely. Yes. 10 DR. MAKHIJANI: -- we have data. 11 12 DR. TAULBEE: Let me explain just a little bit further here. 13 You're absolutely 14 right, Arjun. In the 200 Area there were 15 plutonium exposures and uranium exposures. But if you think of the process that was going 16 17 on for making plutonium, the irradiated slugs, the uranium irradiated slugs came into the 18 19 They were dissolved down. And the canyon. 20 plutonium nitrate them went up to the B line 21 for further separation. That area is where

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1	the plutonium intakes would be occurring;
2	where the plutonium nitrate was then taken
3	back into metal, you know it was taken to
4	plutonium fluoride. The neutron, there's
5	neutron exposures then. And that's where
6	those plutonium exposures would be occurring.
7	The uranium exposures within that
8	area would be when the uranium went down the A
9	line for recycling, basically to extract out
10	the uranium again and recycle it and reuse it.
11	So both of those two when you're
12	talking about exposures for internal, those
13	were the two main pathways for alpha emitters
14	within the 200 Area.
15	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes.
16	DR. TAULBEE: In the tank farm
17	area, you're talking mixed fission products.
18	Well, the same this particular process, the
19	mixed fission products would then go to the
20	tank farm areas and its mixed fission
21	products. In this particular case with the

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thorium, the thorium didn't go down an A line 1 for extraction back into thorium metal and is 2 3 pumped directly to a rail car. The uranium that was separated from the thorium actually 4 5 went to the B line down the same path that the plutonium would be. 6 So from a uranium-233 standpoint, yes, I would agree that there was 7 a potential for internal exposures to U-233 8 9 from that process. But for the thorium, it was just in this hold-up tank and then pumped 10 to the railroad cars. 11 12 And I also agree with what Mark minutes 13 said few You know the а ago. 14 potential for exposure was lower, I agree. Ι 15 misspoke if I said there was no potential. Ι apologize for that. I would say that 16 17 potential was very low here such that doses that we had from uranium metal work over 18 19 in the 300 Area where there's grinding and welding and so forth on these slugs, I feel 20 21 that the doses would be bounded because this

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1	is a wet process and it was only limited
2	exposure during that pumping operation and
3	then it was stored there in the railroad cars.
4	This is why we haven't included this in the
5	SEC.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. Now in our
7	review of your Report 46 we did point out that
8	recycled thorium was handled in the 313M Area.
9	Where did that come from?
10	DR. TAULBEE: Well, that would
11	probably be coming back from Fernald after it
12	would go to Fernald, be turned back into metal
13	in this case, this time period actually it
14	would come back as thorium oxide.
15	But remember, in the 300 Area we
16	have lots of uranium bioassay. And I mean a
17	lot of data. A lot of bioassay for uranium.
18	And so
19	DR. MAKHIJANI: I'm not talking
20	about uranium. I'm talking about recycled
21	thorium.

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1 DR. TAULBEE: Right. But recycled 2 thorium, the contaminate would be uranium. 3 DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, I'm no. exposure to thorium, not 4 talking about the 5 exposure -- there would also be exposure to fission products as well as U-233. 6 So it's not just -- there would be mixed -- there'd be 7 uranium-232, there's 8 exposure to neutron 9 exposure potential. There lots of are complications with recycled thorium. 10 I'd have to 11 DR. TAULBEE: Okay. 12 from that standpoint from you on 13 that. We do have what the assay was of the 14 thorium that came out that was sent back to 15 Fernald. So we do have the U-233 content and I believe, again, the component measurement as 16 17 well for that. So we do have data on recycled thorium that was sent to Fernald. So 18 19 that was turned back into a thorium powder and was sent to Savannah River for, you know the 20 21 whole recycle path. We do have data on it.

1 MAKHIJANI: I'm just raising DR. 2 questions. know I've Because, you briefly looked at your report, of course. 3 Right. I understand. 4 DR. TAULBEE: 5 And I apologize for this not getting to you all sooner. I really hoped that it would. 6 Sorry about that. 7 8 CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: This is Mark 9 I did want to say one thing, that I think that's probably a general thing 10 from this call today is that, you know this is 11 good -- it's definitely worthwhile you going 12 13 through this and giving us this background. 14 think -- as we get towards the end of this 15 call we probably want to hone in on your proposed Class and sort of discuss that. But I 16 17 think what we're going to have to say at the end of the day is that, you know, even if the 18 19 Work Group is going to make a motion to bring 20 to the Advisory Board regarding the proposed 21 Class, Ι would also say that SC&A has

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1	additional comments or questions or needs more
2	time to consider the other operations and
3	whether we're ready to say they would be
4	bounded by the current approach, that sort of
5	thing. I think that sort of stuff is going to
6	have to probably wait for more analysis you
7	know, more discussion and work between all of
8	us.
9	So anyway, I think that's where we
10	want our goal today would probably be to
11	flush out the proposed Class, anyway, by the
12	end of the call.
13	DR. TAULBEE: I fully understand
14	that, Mark. Would you like for me to go over
15	the proposed Class and how we came up with
16	this Definition?
17	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: I didn't mean
18	to cut you off if you have more on the
19	operational end, just to go through. Because,
20	quite frankly, this is a good background
21	discussion for me and for all of us I think to

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1	hear. But if you're ready, you know, if you
2	don't have any more sort of other thorium
3	operations that you've considered in putting
4	together this document that you want to go
5	through then I'll leave it up to you, I
6	guess.
7	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. The only
8	other area that we covered here within the
9	report a little bit were the reactor areas.
10	And I believe I discussed that some at the May
11	Board meeting where, you know, it was
12	encapsulated thorium at that point, so
13	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Why don't you
14	just through that and then go into the Class,
15	and that'd be good.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay.
18	DR. TAULBEE: Well with the
19	reactors, if you recall from the whole process
20	once the thorium is canned in the 300 Area, it
21	is then sent to the reactor area for

1	irradiation, and so at that point the
2	individual slugs are loaded into full
3	assemblies fuel assemblies. These are then
4	lifted into the reactor for an extended period
5	of time. The slugs would be irradiated,
6	basically creating uranium-233. At the end of
7	the cycle these fuel assemblies would be
8	lifted out of the reactor, again remotely,
9	directly put into a transfer channel that
10	dropped down into the disassembly pool, that I
11	think Brad and Mark, you guys might remember
12	walking around. And at that point those fuel
13	assemblies were allowed to sit for a number of
14	days to cool and to allow the short lived
15	fission products to decay off. And then these
16	fuel assemblies would be unloaded. Basically
17	they're under water. The assemblies would be
18	unloaded, the individual slugs would be put
19	into a cask. The cask then sealed, lifted
20	out, put onto a rail car and sent to the 200
21	Area.

Τ	So because we're starting with
2	sealed thorium slugs and we are ending with
3	steel canned highly radioactive now thorium
4	slugs going out of the building, I don't see
5	any potential for the internal exposure in
6	this particular area. There were times when
7	they would take a slug, a few slugs out and
8	they would do some visual inspection. We
9	found reports of this. They would do
10	basically non-destructive testing. They were
11	very concerned about the warping of these
12	slugs and how much the dimensional changes
13	might be due to heat within the reactor. And
14	so we found quite a few reports on this type
15	of an operation.
16	And there's no indication of any
17	of these being I shouldn't say no. There
18	was some slug ruptures, but not significant. I
19	can only recall one report talking about a
20	thorium slug rupture and when this occurs,
21	remember they're coming out from the reactor

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into a water pool under that walkway area that

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we walked though and they're kept under water at that point. the main hazard when one of So these ruptured was actually the iodine and the fission products, the gaseous fission products That's the major concern. coming out. are kept under water and some of these gases come out and will bubble up and cause dose to people. But it's not due to the thorium at that point. So when this occurs, the will be sent over to the high level caves in 773A for further analysis as to what happened. have not is included the this why we reactor areas within this particular Class Definition, within this proposal, is we just don't see a potential for internal exposure here that is significant. with that, that pretty covers all of the areas. The only other area

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that's out there is the 400 Area, and that's 1 2 the heavy water plant, and there's no evidence 3 that thorium was ever there in any quantity from those inventory log sheets. 4 5 These other areas that I've discussed clearly in the 300 Area, the 773A, 6 the reactors, they all 7 the TNX, had verv significant quantities of thorium according to 8 9 those inventory logs. So with that, we're looking at how 10 can we identify who was potentially exposed in 11 773A and TNX from other workers down-site. 12 13 And in particular, you know you got the 400 14 Area workers that were exposed to tritium. 15 They were doing heavy water separation and reprocessing this heavy water coming from the 16 17 reactors. So, you know, when somebody=s bioassay indicates they worked in the 400 18 19 Area, their dosimetry records indicate they worked in the 400 Area, we interviewed them 20 21 for dose reconstruction, they indicated they

worked in the 400 Area. 1 There's really no 2 potential for exposure to thorium for this 3 type of a worker. So we started looking at how can 4 5 we identify a Class of workers who up looking at 6 exposed. And we ended external dosimetry data. Within all of these 7 areas where thorium was worked with, it was 8 9 required that people film wear а This is in procedures. It's been 10 dosimeter. confirmed through interviews 11 documented or We've specifically asked them 12 with workers. "Could you have worked in one of these areas 13 14 without a film badge?" And the answer came 15 back no, that people were monitored going into 16 these areas wearing a film badge. 17 It kind of plays out from when we look at the claimant populations for Savannah 18 River, 80 percent of the claimants that we 19 have have external monitoring data. 20 21 bears out that Savannah River was monitoring a

of

people

for

number

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external

2	radiation.
3	So from that standpoint we felt
4	that these regulated areas, 773A and the TNX,
5	you had to have a film badge to go into them.
6	Could we use the dosimetry codes? Well, it
7	turns out we feel we can.
8	At the bottom of the early cards,
9	early dosimetry cards, this will be 1953
10	through 1957, at the very bottom of the card
11	it lists the area where the individual worked.
12	And it would be A area, G area, TNX, CMX. It
13	could also indicate T reactor, R reactor, L,
14	the F area, the H area, D area. And so just
15	from looking at an individual's card you can
16	tell where they were monitored.
17	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Tim, this is
18	Mark Griffon.
19	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, sir.
20	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Can I ask a
21	question? It's hard to interrupt when we

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tremendous

can't see each other.

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2 But just while I'm thinking of it, 3 the question I have and this does get to the heart of this Class question I think for most 4 of us, is you know the determining who had 5 6 access and not. But, I mean, you said you talked to many people and they all agreed that 7 you had to have film badges to go in. But did 8 9 they have to have film badges with notation on the bottom for the particular 10 I mean, access control is different 11 building? 12 then requiring a film badge to enter certain 13 areas, isn't it? And can you speak to that a 14 little bit? 15 Absolutely. DR. TAULBEE: You're absolutely correct. And this is why as you'll 16 17 see here in a minute, we've included the G area for this early time period and why you'll 18 19 see for the second time period why we included that 6B through 6Z series and 12D through 12H 20 21 and 12J through 12Z is to account for those

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people who might have been badged from other 1 areas that could have worked in 773A. 2 3 have tried to address this directly. Bear with me here and I think I'll 4 5 be able to explain this. I hope. 6 CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Sorry to interrupt. 7 Okay. Oh, no problem. 8 DR. TAULBEE: No 9 problem whatsoever. with this early time 10 Okay. So period we have these dosimetry cards that are 11 in each individual's file. For people who are 12 more along the construction trade, there are a 13 14 separate type of card that we see where their 15 dosimetry is also entered on an individual 16 Visitor type of badge information, so card. construction trades going into this area will 17 have one of these little visitor card tablets 18 And on there it will indicate 19 that we see. 20 the area that they may have worked in.

whenever

So

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has

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somebody

1	dosimeter code that is A, G, CMX, or TNX we
2	consider them to be included in the Class.
3	And that G area basically covers all of the
4	central shops workers all during that time
5	period. So all the construction trades who
6	might have gone into 773A and conducted
7	renovations, which by the way the logbooks
8	bear out. The health physics logbooks clearly
9	discuss when renovations were going on and,
10	you know, construction trades workers coming
11	into the area and then briefing them on the
12	work that needs to be done. And so health
13	physics was involved with this. I'm quite
14	confident that these people were monitored and
15	that we have those records from looking at
16	these dosimetry codes within their records.
17	This early time period, and this
18	is a little bit confusing as to why we went
19	January 1, 1953 to December 31, 1957 is purely
20	due to a change in the recording practices at
21	the site. It doesn't change anything with

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exposure potential. It just changes how they 2 started monitoring or recording the dosimetry 3 badges. Prior to 1957 all of the data is 4 recorded on these individual cards and they're 5 filed by a person within the dosimetry lab. 6 So when people file a claim with us, 7 dosimetry lab who will issue records there at 8 9 Savannah River goes to their stacks, goes to their microfiche and pulls out an individual 10 worker's card and they send them to us. 11 And so we can look at these cards and we can see 12 these 13 all of different areas where an 14 individual worked. Starting 15 1. 1958 January thev 16 started using an IBM system, an electronic 17 computer system to record their data. At that time they changed how the dosimetry codes were 18 19 being recorded. So instead of just A area, indicating 20 thev started basically more 21 information within A area.

1 I'11 all ask you to go 2 certain page. Let=s qo to page 41 of I'll give you all a second 3 Evaluation Report. to get there. 4 5 This is the table that discusses 6 the early time period that I was just talking about where we were discussing the different 7 separations the manufacturing 8 area, area, 9 heavy water, the technical and semi-works areas, A Area supports, reactors and central 10 shops. And what you'll see there in that third 11 column of Table 7-4 is the area designation 12 13 that we find on those dosimetry cards. Then 14 the other columns seeing you're was 15 unencapsulated thorium, encapsulated thorium and then whether we feel that they should be 16 17 included in the SEC based upon whether we can reconstruct doses for those areas. 18 19 this covers that early time So period up to 1957 -- up to 1958, rather. 20 you flip the page to page 42, you'll see Table 21

1	7-5 has the area codes for the same areas and
2	you'll see that the HP area codes has changed.
3	Instead of it being F Area or just an F there,
4	the HP code was 1A. 2A was the 200H, 3A was
5	the 300M, 4A was 400D, 773 was 5A, 777M which
6	is over in M Area next to the 300 Area so
7	they're doing those reactivity measurements on
8	thorium, not doing any other manipulation with
9	the thorium, that code would be 5D. The CMX,
10	TNX Area was 5C. The A Area support is
11	actually goes 6A through 6Z.
12	We excluded 6A from this
13	particular definition and that's because 6A
14	designated Building 703. And 703 is that
15	large white building that's the administration
16	building that you can see from the road when
17	you first pull in. This is where all of the
18	managers and so forth from the entire site
19	would be located. And they were badged out of
20	that area because they basically went anywhere
21	on site. So instead of moving around or

1	picking up a visitor badge everywhere, I
2	believe they badged them directly out of that
3	building. I don't believe that those managers
4	and so forth would spend a significant amount
5	of time in any of these areas such that they
6	would be exposed to thorium for an extended
7	period, you know, 250 day type of scenario.
8	Other people around the 700 area,
9	though, could have been. And that's why we
10	included those 6B through 6Z. Somebody
11	working over in 723, which we was an add-on to
12	the metal lab for a short period of time,
13	could have gone over into the other metal lab
14	to do some work for, like I said, 250 days
15	over this 20 year period. And so because
16	people were badged out of these other
17	buildings in that 700 Area complex area, we
18	feel that they should be included in the
19	Class. So that was why we included them.
20	The 7A dosimeter codes are the R
21	reactor. 8A is the P reactor I'm back on

1 table 7-5 right 9A would be the L now. 2 reactor, 10A is the K reactor, and 11A is the 3 C reactor. And then you got the 12 series. 4 5 And these were all the central shops areas. all 6 These are construction trades workers. You'll see here that we have excluded 12A, B, 7 and C, and the primary reason for this is 12A 8 9 was the locomotive shop. So these would be people that worked on the trains that were 10 hauling materials back and forth. 11 traffic 12 12B was the and 13 transportation shop. This where was 14 maintenance was done on all of the vehicles on 15 site. And then the 12C traffic and was transportation office. And, again, people who 16 17 handling how traffic and transportation and how cars are signed out and so forth. 18 19 just don't feel that there's a potential for exposure to thorium for those people. 20 21 The other shops in that

area,

1	however, 12D through 12H, this is including
2	carpenters, the carpenter shop, the
3	boilermakers, the pipe fitters, the glazers,
4	all of the other construction trades workers.
5	They were separated by dosimetry code by shop
6	where they were issued their badge out of the
7	shop. All of them could have gone to 773A,
8	all of them could have gone to TNX for
9	extended periods of time doing these
10	renovations in these areas, and so therefore
11	we feel they should be included in the SEC.
12	We excluded in particular 12I. And
13	this was because this was from the temporary
14	construction area, this was the B Area. And
15	this is the area where it housed the
16	offices of procurement, payroll, medical,
17	accounting, timekeeping, and the management
18	offices for the construction division. So
19	these weren't workers. Well, they were
20	workers, but they aren't trades workers per
21	se. These were the people handling all the

administration for construction trades, 1 2 they were badged out of that particular area, out of that designation 12I. 3 And so we=ve excluded those individuals as well because we 4 5 just don't see that people from construction payroll would have been up in 773A working and 6 being exposed to thorium during these time 7 periods. 8 So this Class Definition is unique 9 due to the thorium being located in two areas 10 are having difficulty and we don't 11 and 12 feel we can estimate the dose identify workers who were working there 13 14 kind of split it into three categories. The 15 first category being people who definitely worked in those buildings, and that would be 16 from that latter dosimetry code area 5A and 17 5C, 5A being 773, 5C being the TNX, CMX Area. 18 The second category is people who 19 may have been exposed to thorium. 20 And that would include the people in the surrounding 21

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1 buildings around 773A that could have gone 2 into there. They were part of the Technical They could have worked in there 3 Division. including 4 excluding the managers and the 5 construction trades workers who also could have gone up there and worked and been exposed 6 to thorium for an extended period of time. 7 Those are all people we considered may have 8 9 been exposed to thorium and we feel should be included in the Class. 10 The third category is people who I 11 consider not having a potential for internal 12 13 exposure to thorium, and that would be all the 14 in the D Area due to how those reactors 15 materials were handled. Please keep in mind that the 300 16 17 Area there definitely potential for was internal exposure to thorium, however we feel 18 the uranium bioassay method that we proposed 19 in Addendum 1 and the air sample in Report 46 20 21 would enable us to estimate the doses

1	those people who worked in that 3A dosimeter
2	designation.
3	And that basically leaves then the
4	200 Area which I believe you're going to be
5	looking at and providing us some comments more
6	on. At this time we feel that the 300 Area
7	can be for the doses that we've got we've
8	estimated from the 300 Area would bound the
9	minimal exposures to the 200 Area during that
10	transfer of thorium from that hold-up tank
11	into those railroad cars.
12	And this is how we came up with
13	this Class Definition. And I'll pause there
14	for questions or clarifications, comments,
15	whatever.
16	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes, Tim, this
17	is Mark. And those tables are useful
18	summaries of your approach.
19	One question, I mean it looks
20	well, a couple of questions, but I'll start
21	with one on the process side, and I may have

1 missed this. You may have said this earlier 2 in your discussion. But 777M, I'm looking in 3 table that determined your areas you unencapsulated thorium existed and yet you're 4 5 not proposing to include in the SEC. One of them, 6 obviously, is 300M you just talked But the 777M can you give me a little 7 about. background on that and why the rationale for 8 9 not including that? It's probably in your footnote, but I'm talking as I'm reading some 10 of this. 11 main 12 DR. TAULBEE: Yes. The 13 here is this is where there was 14 series of critical piles where they would do 15 thorium reactivity measurements on sluas. 16 Most of the thorium that was over there in 17 that area was encapsulated. However, not all of it. Some of it was bare thorium slug, 18 19 however they weren't doing anything with them 20 other then loading them into a critical pile, 21 taking reactivity measurements and unloading This transcript of the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, Savannah River Site Work Group, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a) and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary. The transcript, however, has not been reviewed and certified by the Chair of the Savannah River Site Work Group for accuracy at this time. The reader should be cautioned that this transcript is for information only and is subject to change.

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They weren't doing grinding, 1 glazing, 2 cutting, welding; anything else with these in 3 mostly that So this is handling area. encapsulated thorium, but there were a 4 5 times where we've seen some bare thorium 6 measurements that they were doing. They're doing reactivity measurements, taking it up to 7 critical for a short period of time, not an 8 9 extended, high-flux, this is just to measure the reactivity of the cross-sections of what 10 was happening with the different slug or the 11 different fuel geometry, assemblies; that type 12 13 of thing. 14 So that was what they were doing 15 And so we feel that the 300 in this area. Area M, the 300M Area, which is this just to 16 17 the east end of that particular area if you look at it on a map where it's located, we 18 19 feel that these people would be bounded by 20 those uranium exposures from that M Area. 21 CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay. And then

I'll start into the one obvious area I think 1 2 that some of us have on our mind, which is you 3 know I think we've stumbled down this path several times where we've tried to parse out 4 5 buildings. And I think, you know we all get a 6 little nervous when we -- and I'm sure you guys also, that you are concerned about from 7 the implementation side when Labor tries to 8 9 implement this. And I know you've talked to them a little bit. But I mean the question of 10 did the workers go back and forth between 11 buildings. 12 And I appreciate your approach That's a good thing I 13 with the central shops. 14 think. And the A area, some of those things 15 are taking that into account. 16 thing There's in this, one not 17 intended to be a sort of -- I mean, the last and Ι reading this 18 meeting when was and 19 thinking of the 300M Area and some of 20 approach you were using from that, I went back 21 to the transcript from the last

Because I remembered this, but I just wanted 1 2 to refresh my memory. 3 And, you know when we talked about those bioassay measurements, the logsheets, I 4 5 guess. Anyway, I can find the excerpt from the last 6 transcript from time. But it was basically you were saying that they -- I think 7 Joyce pointed out that all these workers that 8 you're using for the M Area were actually --9 in their column of where they worked it said 10 773, Building 773. And then you said, yes, 11 but based on some of them also indicated M 12 13 Area, and in fact we heard through interviews 14 that people were moving back and forth between 15 the two areas. 16 So I guess 300M Area jumps out at 17 me as one that it seems like in the past, at least, that you've concluded 18 through interviews and other information that 19 these people were in fact moving between these 20 21 areas. So I think that might be a problem in

just which workers belong in this 1 of 2 Class Definition. 3 Let me clarify DR. TAULBEE: Yes. a little bit. You know, our information at 4 5 that time that it was only small was quantities of thorium being worked with 6 773A. So in an effort to try and explain why 7 all these bioassays for 773A and none for M 8 9 Area, drawing conclusion, we were а incorrectly because the inventory reports have 10 shown us clearly that there was significant 11 material in 773A now, that there was movement 12 13 between the two buildings. 14 Now the interviews you're talking 15 about, absolutely they did indicate that they would go between the buildings, however 16 17 people who were talking to were the we engineers and researchers type of 18 scenario. 19 The regular production workers don't we believe that they were moving back and forth 20 21 as being described here because they were in

different divisions, from what I can see at 1 2 this time. This changes from what I had said 3 back in January, yes. CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: 4 Okay. I mean, 5 just looking at potential pitfalls on 6 going forward that we're going to have people claiming that they were in that area all the 7 time. I mean, we've been through this play 8 before, you know. 9 10 DR. TAULBEE: Yes. And, I mean and 11 CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: those engineers if they worked there 20, 25 12 13 years over that course of time, could they 14 have been in the 773 Area, you know could they 15 have been in one of the areas that you're designating for more than the 250? 16 I mean, 17 how do you sort of make a judgment call on that, I guess? 18 Well, from what we 19 DR. TAULBEE: 20 can tell the engineers and so forth were 21 actually badged out of the 5A dosimeter code

1 out of 773A.

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2 CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Oh, okay. So

3 they would have been included?

That's correct. DR. TAULBEE: So, yes, they should have been included from that, or should be included. And as far as the buildings in the Class Definition of doing this, this is why the Class Definition is written the way it is. There's no indication of building written in there. It is only time period and the dosimeter codes. And that is because there are -- the front section of 773A is all administrative offices. So there could be secretaries who worked in that front part of that office, in order to go to the back area to go into the regulated area, they had to pick up a dosimeter badge. And there were visitor badges there. And when they picked one up and they file a claim, we see that visitor dosimeter badge. So if they went back

there into those areas, then we would see a

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1	dosimeter badge from that standpoint. So this
2	is why we've written the Definition the way
3	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: And what if
4	they had a visitor dosimeter badge? Then do
5	you try to parse it out to say well they were
6	an administrative worker that went back there,
7	but it was only a visitor badge so they
8	probably weren't there more then a few days?
9	DR. TAULBEE: I wouldn't do that,
10	but I don't know how Department of Labor is
11	going to do this.
12	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay. I mean,
13	these are the problems sometimes we get into
14	with this. I mean, I think overall you lay
15	out a reasonable argument for this,
16	notwithstanding other questions that we have
17	still on the 300M area and your approach that
18	you're using there and some other areas that
19	Arjun has raised as where you may have
20	concluded that there wasn't any significant
21	chance of internal exposure. But SC&A may

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We still have those issues on the 1 you know. 2 table, but for these particular areas or for this Class that you're proposing to add, you 3 make a reasonable argument, I think, at least 4 5 from my opinion. Ι just worry about these coming forward and having to 6 folks know, then you get into a situation of an 7 individual having to fight Department of Labor 8 to say "But I was in there all the time. What 9 I can get supervisors to give 10 do you want? affidavits that say that I was in there." 11 12 mean, I worry about going down that path is my 13 point.

DR. MAKHIJANI: This is Arjun.

I have a question about the badge designations. What were the badge designations of the construction workers who were not DuPont employees; subcontractors and subcontractors of subcontractors? Because we have very clear sort of interview information that, you know, they went wherever they were

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1	asked and they did similar jobs to production
2	workers sometimes, and then they did
3	construction worker jobs, you know,
4	maintenance jobs, new buildings, new
5	facilities, you know, the works.
6	Did they have the same badge
7	designations as DuPont workers? I'm not
8	including DuPont maintenance workers now. I'm
9	just talking about construction workers who
10	were not DuPont employees.
11	DR. TAULBEE: It is our
12	understanding that they would have been
13	badged, now it would depend upon where they
14	first reported. If they were reporting down
15	to, say, the carpenter shop in the central
16	shops area and then going out with a crew from
17	there, then they would have been badged down
18	there from the central shops.
19	(Simultaneous speaking.)
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: that that's
21	what happened?

1 I'm sorry? DR. TAULBEE: 2 DR. MAKHIJANI: Now this is from memory, Tim, because I haven't looked at these 3 interviews in a while. But I think that's 4 5 what they said happened, and of course apart 6 from the question that they've said that they often working when they didn't have 7 But leaving that aside for 8 badges. 9 moment, Ι think non-DuPont construction workers -- I mean, I just don't know whether 10 they would fall into these badging categories 11 12 and whether your SEC would capture them. Well, I believe the 13 DR. TAULBEE: 14 SEC would capture them because they would go 15 through one of two paths. Either they would go down to the central shops and be badged 16 17 from the central shops area or they would be badged up there in the 700 Area. 18 In latter 19 there's particular years а badge 20 designation for -- called the construction 21 gate where they would be badged from. So one

1	of those six series, 6B through 6D would
2	capture them under that particular
3	designation. So when they went into the 700
4	Area and then down in the TNX Area. These
5	workers would be badged as visitors, but again
6	whenever they would file a claim with us,
7	Savannah River sends their dosimetry to us, we
8	can look through their dosimetry codes and we
9	can see where it is that they worked.
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: And so the claim
11	is basically that there are no generic
12	visitors' badges. That visitors' badges are
13	assigned to particular workers consistently
14	and not to any other workers so that you could
15	actually track when a construction worker went
16	into the 773 Area that they always wore the
17	same badge?
18	DR. TAULBEE: It is our
19	understanding that for a continuous project
20	they would have. However, if once that
21	project was finished and they went to, say,

1 the R reactor, they would get a different
2 visitor badge issued out of the R reactor
3 And so it would have the R reactor
4 designation. Their name would be associated
5 within a badge in the 700 area and a badge in
6 the R area.
7 DR. MAKHIJANI: Besides their own
8 badge, so they did they not have a badge
9 that they continuously wore themselves?
DR. TAULBEE: That's correct, the
11 did not have a badge that they continuously
wore themselves unless they were going to be
doing an extended project in that area. And
then we do see a lot of construction trade:
workers that are monitored for a period of a
16 few months, and then they drop off. And when
17 you look at the dosimetry logs, the largest
group of people that are on determination world
19 are construction trades workers that are
20 moving in and out of different areas.
DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I'm a little

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1	I'm actually more confused now then I was
2	before. So are you saying that there were
3	many construction workers on site who were not
4	badged unless they were assigned to particular
5	areas of work?
6	DR. TAULBEE: I'm not sure what
7	you're asking there.
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, if they were
9	only wearing visitor badges, they went into
10	700 or 300 or 100 and then they got a badge of
11	that area that had their name on it and that
12	would be in their file, then presumably they
13	didn't have any badges when they were not
14	assigned to a particular area?
15	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Perhaps I can
16	try. This is Mark Griffon. If I'm
17	understanding Tim correctly you're saying they
18	would be assigned "visitor badges," but they'd
19	be area-specific visitor badges, Tim?
20	DR. TAULBEE: That is correct.
21	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes.

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1	DR. MAKHIJANI: As a person-
2	specific? So not just area-specific
3	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Right. They
4	hold onto that badge while they're working on
5	that project in that area. But then if they
6	went to another area, they would turn in that
7	badge and get another badge from the other
8	area.
9	DR. MAKHIJANI: I'm not
10	understanding. What happened to that badge?
11	Did somebody else wear it after before it
12	was read?
13	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: I'm assuming it
14	was read. Yes, I don't know that. Yes.
15	That's a good question.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, it would be
17	read. It would be read with that particular
18	person and then basically you know, that
19	one person that say he wore this badge for a
20	week in R area, that badge would then be read.
21	He then went to, say, 700 area, he was issued

1	a different badge
2	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes.
3	DR. TAULBEE: and he wore that
4	for, say, two weeks, and that badge would be
5	read.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. And in
7	between assignments to these areas they had no
8	badge?
9	DR. TAULBEE: If they were not in
10	the area that was regulated or a radioactive
11	material area, that's correct. They would not
12	have a badge.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. Because a
14	lot of them have said that they were in
15	radioactive areas that were not properly
16	marked. And so essentially you're confirming
17	something that they've said, I just wanted to
18	clarify that.
19	And so I presume that you've
20	tracked this kind of visitor badge issue
21	because it's obviously going to be a very

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1 issue, especially for central non-DuPont 2 employees because you know a good level of confidence that they had individual badges 3 that were designated as visitor badges that 4 5 also carried the name of the person 6 consistently and were read consistently that I mean, I presume you've researched and 7 documented that. 8 9 DR. TAULBEE: Yes. Within the 10 dosimetry logs or dosimetry records there are visitor logs as well. And this is almost -- I 11 12 wouldn't say exclusively, but the 13 majority of the entries of people in those 14 visitor logs are construction trades workers. 15 And when everybody had their badge and -continuing on this R 700 Area example, they 16 would have an individual card and it would say 17 that this person was monitored for this week 18 19 and in there, and here's the dose. And then 20 next line would be the person monitored for -- well, externally monitored in 21

1	the 700 Area for this week and it would have
2	that dose.
3	So these individual cards are
4	filed by alphabetical name, comprise multiple
5	dosimeter badges for an individuals who was a
6	nonstandard DuPont worker who had a payroll
7	ID.
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: And this kind of
9	thing extends to the film badge before
10	we're talking mainly before the TLD era,
11	right?
12	DR. TAULBEE: That's correct. Yes.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: So you're talking
14	about somebody goes for two days, does a job,
15	has a film badge, and it will be read. And
16	then, of course, it's over for that film
17	badge, right?
18	DR. TAULBEE: That's correct, yes.
19	DR. MAKHIJANI: And that there is
20	a kind of that all of the construction
21	workers so there's another kind of

1	question. Did the construction workers always
2	just use visitor badges? Weren't there
3	construction workers who were there on site
4	for years together who were not DuPont
5	employees who had their own badges, and what
6	were their badge designations?
7	DR. TAULBEE: That is well,
8	yes. The construction there's two
9	different parts here. One for within the
10	dosimetry logs is construction trade workers,
11	okay? Not all of them were DuPont employees
12	because they have payroll ID numbers that are
13	very large. And depending upon the trade
14	number it kind of goes sequentially but it
15	jumps up to like 90,000 not all of them are
16	DuPont employees. Many of the DuPont
17	employees were actually under roll two; these
18	were mechanics, maintenance type of people.
19	They were all under what was called the Local
20	Wage Roll. Construction was different wage
21	roll.

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1	And so was going to be there
2	for an extended period of time, got their own
3	badge designation. And these would be out of
4	that 12 series that you're looking at, and
5	they could go anywhere with that single badge,
6	which is why we've included them in the SEC.
7	So the roll four is not just
8	DuPont, it also includes some of these other
9	construction trades workers. What I've been
10	talking about with the visitor ones is people
11	who only worked at the site for, you know, a
12	maybe one to two year period and worked
13	between multiple areas. Those were the ones
14	who they probably did not issue an individual
15	badge to and assign an individual number to.
16	But we do have the dosimetry when they file a
17	claim we can get their dosimetry back and look
18	at which areas they worked in.
19	DR. MAKHIJANI: Probably?
20	DR. TAULBEE: I=m sorry?
21	DR. MAKHIJANI: Probably?

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1	DR. TAULBEE: What do you mean by
2	B-
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, it=s just a
4	question. I mean, if they worked for one to
5	two years, they probably didn't have a badge
6	but maybe they did and we're not sure or was
7	there a time limit like three years? If they
8	worked for three years, they had their own
9	badge? And if they did, if they were non-
LO	DuPont so I'm a little puzzled because I
L1	mean we've got a bunch of interviews with
L2	workers that said that, you know, they could
L3	have been there for a few months and there
L4	were people who came for a few months and then
L5	they were laid off, and they were brought back
L6	and there was construction union hall hiring
L7	and all that. And then there were
L8	construction workers who were on-site for
L9	years who were not DuPont employees and many
20	of them later became DuPont employees, as you
21	know. And I'm talking about those

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1	construction workers who were there on site
2	for prolonged periods whether they had their
3	own badges and what those badge designations
4	were and whether you've captured them.
5	DR. TAULBEE: If they were on-site
6	for prolonged periods, then they were given a
7	unique identifying number. And, yes, we have
8	their dosimetry data, their log they are in
9	those dosimetry logs, okay?
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: No, no. Whether
11	you=ve captured them in your SEC
12	DR. TAULBEE: Yes
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: these badge
14	designations?
15	DR. TAULBEE: they would have
16	been badged out of that 12 series. Almost all
17	of the construction trades workers are badged
18	out of that 12 series.
19	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay. Including
20	non-DuPont employees?
21	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.

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1	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay.
2	MR. MAHAFFEY: Tim, Mark Mahaffey.
3	We have hundreds of records of
4	visitors, call ups and non-DuPont construction
5	workers with badges as short as one day and
6	over multiple months, and also bioassay data.
7	And, you know, the HP techs we interviewed
8	said that no one went into the rad controlled
9	area without a film badge.
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: Oh, yes. I'm not
11	talking about whether they went without a film
12	badge or not because we're parsing this by
13	film badge designations and not whether they
14	were badged or not. I mean, if the SEC were
15	you know all workers who were badged, that
16	would be a different argument.
17	MEMBER CLAWSON: Tim?
18	DR. TAULBEE: Yes.
19	MEMBER CLAWSON: This is Brad
20	speaking.
21	I hope you understand. I mean,

1	you've talked several times on this. Savannah
2	River is a very unique site from the
3	standpoint of the operations personnel being
4	DuPont employees plus a large majority of the
5	contractors being DuPont employees. Then we
6	switch over to the subcontractors of
7	subcontractors being classified as
8	construction trades, too. And this is kind of
9	where I know where Arjun is going because me
10	and him have looked into many of these things
11	and heard many of these interviews as well; at
12	one time I was a DuPont employee and then I
13	wasn't. I was working for Rust, or somebody
14	like this, and so forth. That's kind of where
15	our worry comes into this.
16	You know as well as I do the
17	uniqueness of Savannah River. And when we
18	talked to especially the construction trades,
19	I understand what you're saying if they're in
20	the central shops and stuff, if they weren't
21	hadn't been there for several years, or

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1 whatever, part of the pool to say then they 2 didn't have a film badge. And when they went 3 out to different sites, like the R or any of the other areas, then they would get a new 4 5 film badge. And I was surprised but I was also 6 delighted to hear that when they went out, 7 that these film badges were reading and that 8 9 you've actually found where at one week they were at this place and they were one week at 10 the other place. Because this was one of the 11 questions of, you know, did they just take 12 13 this film badge and go from one site to the 14 other or did they have designators in it. And a lot of times they couldn't tell us that they 15 did or they didn't. And this is why it was 16 see that you'd found this 17 good to in the radiological reports and so forth, which I'm 18 19 sure that Arjun's going to look into it and stuff like that. 20

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But I want you to understand we're

not criticizing what you've done or we're not 2 trying to nitpick at it. The thing is that from my standpoint is it seems like we've been 3 down this road again. And we just want to 4 5 make sure that we have our questions answered 6 to make sure that we've covered all of our And as Mark said earlier, we just got 7 bases. this the other day so there might be a lot of 8 9 questions that you have that you can answer it'll 10 for us and give us а better, 11 feeling on it. Because, know, it's you 12 looking pretty good. I just want you to understand when 13 14 we say these things, it isn't criticizing the 15 work that you've done and stuff like that. Actually, my personal opinion is that you've 16 17 done a very good job. We just want to make sure that we're implementing it in the right 18 19 Because with Savannah River, especially way. 20 the construction trades, it's whole а 21 different ball game then any other site.

1	unique in its own way. And I just want you to
2	understand that.
3	DR. TAULBEE: Thank you very much
4	for that, Brad.
5	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Tim, this is
6	Mark Griffon. I think at this point, I mean I
7	just wanted to think path forward. And I
8	agree with Brad=s sentiments.
9	You know, at least my feeling is I
LO	appreciate the intent of this Class being
L1	added. There still might be some questions
L2	about, you know, trying to do it this way as
L3	opposed to the all worker approach, which we
L4	often end up at.
L5	But I think what I'd like to do is
L6	there is time on the agenda in the upcoming
L7	Board meeting at the end of August here at
L8	Hanford for Savannah River. I think it even
L9	says, Tim, you were going to present, and I
20	think I had a little time, or whatever.
21	T don't know that today we

1 necessarily have to come up with a Work Group 2 motion to bring to the Board. What I'd rather 3 propose is that, you know, well Tim will summarize, but I can also say that from our 4 5 standpoint we heard this and, you know, that -- just sort of outline what the Work Group's 6 still doing. And my intent right now would be 7 to present that I support the addition of this 8 9 Class, but that have some remaining we questions about the who part of the Class, 10 whether NIOSH can adequately identify these 11 workers for the reasons we've just discussed 12 And then, you know offer it for 13 for a while. 14 discussion to the full Board. 15 And maybe the other thing I would Ι don't if 16 ask is that know this we \_\_\_ been offered; 17 document has if it's on the website and/or if it's been 18 sent to the 19 petitioners. Because I think they might be 20 able to comment during that time period on 21 these very issues whether they believe, you

1	know, on the badging questions and things like
2	that. We might get some useful public
3	comments that would be helpful to sort out
4	this question.
5	So that would be my proposal right
6	now is to sort of bring this back in to
7	Hanford. And then if the Board, if everyone
8	sort of feels comfortable at a certain point,
9	we might want to make a motion during the
10	Board meeting to add the two, accept this
11	Class Definition and add the Class. But I
12	don't know that we have to have a Work Group
13	motion today.
14	How do other Brad or Jim, how
15	do you feel about that?
16	MEMBER LOCKEY: I agree with you
17	on this, Mark.
18	I'm going to be right honest.
19	Part of my apprehension is having tried to
20	single this out, and Tim has done a very good
21	job of expressing why he feels that this would

1	be the best and so forth, I would just like a
2	little bit of time to be able to look at it.
3	The way it looks, it looks good to me at this
4	time. And I think that we could do something
5	at the Board and go from there. But also
6	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: And the other
7	MEMBER LOCKEY: time to look at
8	it.
9	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: And this is
10	Mark again.
11	The other thing I plan to say in
12	my portion of the presentation is that and
13	this is just with regards to thorium. I hope
14	that after we finish this discussion in a few
15	minutes, Tim will update us on other areas
16	that the Work Group is still working on.
17	But that, you know, we're not
18	the SC&A and the Work Group are certainly,
19	even if we support and make a motion to add
20	this Class, it doesn't mean that we support
21	everything in Addendum 2. We have some

1	questions about other areas, and we have to
2	research those further. You know, this is new
3	to all of us so we want to still consider,
4	like, 300M Area and the other model that's out
5	there and those issues. So I'll also bring
6	that up.
7	But I think that probably is the
8	best thing to do now would be just to bring
9	this issue back to the Board and discuss it
10	there.
11	Jim, do you have any thoughts on
12	that?
13	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes. I agree with
14	that. I'd like some additional time to look at
15	the report I got yesterday.
16	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Right.
17	MEMBER LOCKEY: And so I agree. I
18	concur with what you're both saying.
19	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay, and I
20	don=t know Arjun, I think as far as I
21	don't think we have to get a separate tasking,

1	but I would think by the nature of SC&A being
2	tasked in the Work Group that I would ask that
3	you continue working on looking at this
4	report, also SC&A look at this report and
5	certainly compare it to your last thorium
6	report and continue on those issues,
7	especially with regard to other areas where
8	you believe and the question of the 300M
9	area, the current model that's out there, et
10	cetera. I think that's still a task for SC&A.
11	Is that do you agree with that? Arjun?
12	DR. MAKHIJANI: Am I off mute?
13	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Oh, you're on
14	now, yes.
15	DR. MAKHIJANI: Sorry. I didn't
16	remember I was on mute.
17	Yes, the two reports that we wrote
18	covered the period up to 1972, which is the
19	same period now or '71 something, that this ER
20	Addendum 2 covers. So maybe for the moment we
21	would restrict ourselves to that.

1	As you know I sent a note to the
2	Work Group and to Tim when he sent an email
3	around about the period after 1972, which
4	they're researching, which we had a fair
5	amount of information about that too. What
6	I'll do for the moment until the Board meeting
7	is to look at this in some more detail.
8	Obviously, there are a lot of comparisons to
9	be done to see whether we want to revise
10	anything we said before or modify it, or stand
11	by it, or you know. I have to consult with
12	Joyce, obviously.
13	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Sure. Sure.
14	That's fine.
15	And you know I would expect that
16	you could I mean some of these issues are
17	for review not necessarily for the upcoming
18	Board meeting but for the next Work Group
19	meeting after the Board meeting. You know,
20	sometime in the future. But at least you'll,
21	hopefully, have a little time to look a little

more at this report before the Board meeting

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2	also so that during our presentation if we
3	need to call on you, I'm sure you'll be ready
4	to help us out.
5	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I'll
6	certainly be more ready then I am today having
7	glanced at this
8	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: I think we can
9	all say that. Yes, yes.
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: But what I propose
11	for the longer until the next Work Group
12	meeting for this particular topic is maybe we
13	can make a table that shows the various
14	positions with comments, or write a memorandum
15	or something like that. I mean, I can send you
16	an email about what format I think might work
17	best without going into another long drawn out
18	report.
19	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes. That
20	sounds good. Yes. Okay. All right.
21	And, Tim, if there's nothing more

1	on thorium, do you have anything else to add?
2	Otherwise, I would just ask you and I
3	understand based on our earlier discussions
4	that this has taken a lot of your team's
5	efforts in the last several months. And
6	that's why I didn't want to go through the
7	entire matrix at this meeting today. But I
8	thought if there's any you know, some of
9	the main actions you might just give us a
10	little update on other actions that are
11	proceeding, other coworker models. You know,
12	the exotic radionuclides, some of that stuff,
13	whether it's you know, just give us maybe a
14	little status report on some of those issues
15	if you can today. That would be great.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Sure. Before I do
17	that, though, I do appreciate you recognizing
18	that the team has been working very hard on
19	this, and so we haven't made a tremendous
20	amount of progress on the other issues. They
21	are still going on kind of in the background.

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1 again, the team Mike Mahaffey is the 2 ORAU lead on this site for us. And pulling 3 this report together in this relatively short time period has taken a tremendous effort. 4 5 And I really thank Mike for doing that and 6 pulling this together pretty quickly. With regard to the other issues, 7 the main one that has been worked on is the 8 radionuclides, 9 exotic the coworker model associated with that. We had gone back, and 10 I'm not sure if I reported this during the May 11 12 the February Board meetings, but we had 13 coded or began coding all of the americium 14 americium, curium and californium data data, 15 from the logbooks, and that effort has been completed. And so the data is being cleaned 16 17 at this time and being checked and up verified. And at that point we will begin the 18 19 coworker model development. And this is a 20 case where we are comparing the construction 21 trades workers to non-construction trades

And we've developed the methodology

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2	to do this.
3	As you might be aware, this is a
4	rather difficult task compared to the tritium
5	in that there's significant missed dose or
6	not missed dose, a below-detection result
7	associated with these particular radionuclides
8	because of the way they were handled in glove
9	boxes and fume hoods and so forth. So we have
10	a lot of data and a lot of it is below-
11	detection limit. So we have developed methods
12	on how to do that, and therefore doing a
13	stratification comparison and the methodology
14	is developed, not just for Savannah River but
15	kind of complex-wide. Fernald, for example,
16	is another one where we might use this
17	particular type of methodology.
18	So we've ended up making progress
19	on that. The data, like I said, has been coded
20	and so we're getting ready to start that
21	particular analysis.

1

workers.

1	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Tim, you said
2	that was for americium and californium?
3	DR. TAULBEE: Americium, curium,
4	californium.
5	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Curium and
6	californium? Okay.
7	DR. TAULBEE: And so, like I said,
8	that effort is going to be first. These are
9	actually coming in serial. There's some here
10	we can work in parallel, we have been. But
11	due to resource limitations when it gets down
12	to the actual analysis part they do go in
13	series. So this is where we're at with this
14	one, the exotic
15	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Do you have any
16	idea on timing on this? As you're giving
17	updates if you have any ideas on times?
18	DR. TAULBEE: Yes. Let me see.
19	Give me just a second here to pull up our
20	project plan of when we expect that this would
21	be completed. It looks like the first draft

1	to us is going to be sorry. It looks like
2	it's in November is when we will get the first
3	draft of this. So I don't think it would be
4	available by the December Board meeting, but
5	shortly thereafter the final approved coworker
6	model comparing construction trades workers to
7	non-construction trade workers should be
8	available.
9	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay.
10	DR. TAULBEE: Okay. And the next
11	one is neptunium, and then after that we'll go
12	on to the next fission products and then the
13	cobalt-60.
14	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Am I still on?
15	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, you are.
16	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes, I get
17	confused with the *6.
18	Is there any sense, Tim, of
19	because I'm just thinking here, you know, in
20	terms of prioritizing. Assuming we accept the
21	Class for these thorium areas anyway, a Class

1	related to thorium work, then that goes from
2	'52 to '73, am I right on the dates there?
3	I guess my question would be is
4	there anyway that if the for instance, I'm
5	just giving an example, if the curium work was
6	also in one of the areas covered by this SEC
7	and the workers, the external monitored
8	people, it would have been the same folks,
9	then we might be able to de-prioritize those
LO	because they would already have been added to
L1	the SEC. Do you understand what I'm saying?
L2	Is there any way that you can look at that and
L3	prioritize, you know, assuming we add this
L4	Class?
L5	DR. TAULBEE: Yes and no.
L6	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: I knew that
L7	would be a clean answer.
L8	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, clearly most
L9	the bulk of the americium, curium, californium
20	work was done in 773A. So up through 1972,
21	yes, that would be something that could, I

1	guess, be de-prioritized within that time
2	period.
3	But really at that point it
4	doesn't really buy us a whole lot. The time
5	periods for this particular work that we're
6	looking at really goes up into I think the
7	dates here are 1963 through 1989. So post-'72
8	there's still a significant fraction of work
9	that's going on in those labs dealing with
10	americium, curium, californium. So the
11	addition of the '63 to '72 time period, once
12	the data=s been coded, which is really the
13	longest time period. And we are there are
14	two parts to this.
15	The first part is coding the
16	bioassay data. The second part is going
17	through the work history cards to identify
18	what that person's job title was when they
19	left that bioassay sample. That latter part
20	is what is taking the bulk of the time.
21	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Understood.

1	DR. TAULBEE: So once we get past
2	that step the actual analysis goes fairly
3	quickly. There's a lot of internal review
4	that has to be done to check numbers, but the
5	bulk of the time period is actually I
6	wouldn't say it's post '72, '63 to '89
7	covers a very large time period.
8	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes.
9	DR. TAULBEE: So it's really not
10	adding that much work. So I guess
11	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay. And I
12	would just say you don't have to give me
13	necessarily the details on each one of these,
14	but as you're doing your project planning, I'm
15	sure you probably already thought of this, but
16	you know if some of the ones are cleaner, in
17	other words they are totally encapsulated by
18	that SEC time frame, maybe put those at the
19	end of your work to do, or whatever. If
20	there's any way to be more efficient with our
21	process, then keep that in mind, I guess is

1	what I would say.
2	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
3	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes.
4	DR. TAULBEE: Just to follow-on to
5	that, I=m going to look at the cobalt-60
6	dates, but I think the cobalt-60 might be
7	completely encompassed by this Class. So I'll
8	look at that.
9	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay.
10	DR. TAULBEE: And the other one,
11	polonium, which I think SC&A has a task right
12	now, that would be completely encompassed by
13	this Class. So that might be one that you
14	might want to de-prioritize as well.
15	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: That's what I'm
16	looking for. Okay. Thank you.
17	DR. MAKHIJANI: May I ask a
18	question, Mark?
19	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Sure, yes.
20	DR. MAKHIJANI: The exotics, I
21	only heard Tim mention the californium,

1	americium. Actually, I think we kind of
2	decided this memory may not be serving me
3	well, but that we were going to restrict the
4	term "exotics" to other radionuclides than
5	these specific ones and neptunium that are
6	called out in the matrix. I mean, we've been
7	using the term in different ways in different
8	SECs. But there are a whole bunch of other
9	radionuclides under exotics, and I'm wondering
10	whether
11	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes. I think
12	your memory is correct that we decided to
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: which is a
14	separate category. And we've written a report
15	about that. And, you know there's a table
16	with what they are. I mean, I guess we agree
17	there may not be 150, but you know there are
18	dozens of them.
19	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes, right.
20	And I think that's right. We did the ones
21	we called out I think we've been saving

1	that longer list for it to be called
2	"exotics," and these other ones we specified.
3	I think you're right. So we should try to
4	stick to that when we're discussing it, I
5	guess, yes.
6	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I was just
7	wondering about the status of what we have
8	been calling exotics before.
9	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Right. Yes.
10	Go ahead, Tim, do you have
11	anything on that, other
12	DR. TAULBEE: Yes. We do have a
13	report that is under development to address
14	these other exotics, if you will. In fact,
15	I'll try and limit exotics to this other
16	category, and this is responding to Arjun's
17	report. We do have a report that's in draft
18	and undergoing review currently. And it looks
19	like the timeline for this one would be,
20	again, the end of October first of November
21	that we would be providing that to the Work

1	Group here.
2	One of the things that just struck
3	me as I was talking about this one is that
4	that would be another area where we could
5	possibly eliminate some of these exotics if a
6	Class were designated. Because a lot of this
7	research took place in the 1960s in the 773A
8	laboratory. So
9	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay.
10	DR. TAULBEE: So some of these
11	might go away or not go away, but from an
12	issues standpoint here.
13	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes. All
14	right.
15	And then, I'm sorry, I might have
16	sidetracked your process there, but I think of
17	the ones that were listed, I didn't hear
18	neptunium. Did you report on that?
19	DR. TAULBEE: Neptunium is one
20	that we will follow right after the americium,
21	curium, californium. That's next in line.

1	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay. All
2	right.
3	DR. TAULBEE: Then we will move to
4	the mixed fission products, and again I got to
5	look at the cobalt-60 and see if that time
6	period is already encompassed by this proposed
7	SEC.
8	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: And what about
9	neptunium timeline, where is that solved, do
10	you know offhand?
11	DR. TAULBEE: The neptunium
12	actually continues on into the latter time
13	periods.
14	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay. All
15	right.
16	DR. MAKHIJANI: Mark, this is
17	Arjun.
18	So far as SC&A is concerned, give
19	me a little direction. For the moment I'll
20	just focus on thorium and we have some a
21	couple of to-do items that are in other areas

1	
2	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Tim just
3	mentioned polonium was something that you were
4	tasked with.
5	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes. I was
6	thinking it might be better to wait
7	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes.
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: until this
9	matter is clarified
10	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes. If this is
11	going to be covered, it may not be a priority,
12	right.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: I think polonium
14	and tritium are responding to NIOSH's tritium
15	report.
16	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Right.
17	DR. MAKHIJANI: I think sort of we
18	were talking past each other a little bit in
19	that tritium report. But I've been kind of
20	knowing that this was coming, I kind of
21	thought that we shouldn't be wasting effort

1	and to see what the outcome of this particular
2	revision was going to be. So I'm looking for
3	a little direction here as to whether you want
4	me to focus on any other thing or just thorium
5	for the moment?
6	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: I think just
7	thorium for the moment.
8	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Yes.
10	Tim, any other updates of
11	significance? You don't have to go through the
12	whole every matrix item, you know.
13	DR. TAULBEE: Again, just as
14	priority issues, the americium, curium,
15	californium, followed by neptunium, mixed
16	fission products, cobalt-60 and then that
17	exotic radionuclide report; those are our
18	priorities right now that we are focused.
19	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Okay. All
20	right. That sounds good. And I think we'll do
21	what we just discussed at the upcoming Board

1	meeting. Tim, you're going to probably
2	present similar to what you presented this
3	morning to the full Board, right? An overview
4	of the Addendum and then I'll just sort of
5	give a very brief status that the Work Group
6	discussed this as well and where we stand on
7	it, or if it doesn't come up in your
8	presentation, I'll at least raise the question
9	of the concern about trying to designating
10	workers by the badge number and that we
11	discussed it a bit and, you know, it seems
12	like you have a good basis for it. But also,
13	we've seen pitfalls on this before. And let
14	the full Board sort of discuss that I think is
15	the best way to go with this.
16	And then, hopefully, we'll get a
17	motion to move on this Class out of the next
18	Board meeting. Because I think the Savannah
19	River petitioners would appreciate that as
20	well.
21	So that's really all I have. Does

1	anybody else have anything else to add?
2	I know we had a couple of folks
3	from the public, and I think one representing
4	the petitioner, if there's any comments at
5	this point? Okay. All right.
6	Tim, anything else? Ted, anything
7	else to add?
8	MR. KATZ: No, Mark. This is
9	Ted. Sounds all good.
10	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Well, we were
11	very efficient, and I think we're good to
12	adjourn.
13	If Jim and Brad, do you have
14	anything else to add before we adjourn?
15	MEMBER CLAWSON: This is Brad. I
16	just wanted to comment that Jim agreed with me
17	today. I thought that was a milestone right
18	there.
19	CHAIRMAN GRIFFON: Let the record
20	say that B- state that.
21	(Laughter.)

1	Okay. All right. Very good.
2	Well, everybody have a good
3	weekend and if we don't talk before then,
4	we'll see each other soon in Hanford.
5	Meeting adjourned.
6	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
7	matter went off the record at 10:27 a.m.)
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