### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

#### CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

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# NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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# ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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#### 81st MEETING

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# THURSDAY DECEMBER 8, 2011

The meeting convened at 8:30 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, in the Tampa Marriott Westshore, 1001 N. Westshore Blvd., Tampa, Florida, James M. Melius, Chairman, presiding.

## PRESENT:

JAMES M. MELIUS, Chairman
HENRY ANDERSON, Member
JOSIE BEACH, Member
BRADLEY P. CLAWSON, Member
R. WILLIAM FIELD, Member
MARK GRIFFON, Member
JAMES E. LOCKEY, Member
WANDA I. MUNN, Member
JOHN W. POSTON, SR., Member
DAVID B. RICHARDSON, Member
GENEVIEVE S. ROESSLER, Member
PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, Member
PAUL L. ZIEMER, Member
TED KATZ, Designated Federal Official

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# REGISTERED AND/OR PUBLIC COMMENT PARTICIPANTS:

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<sup>\*</sup>Participating via telephone

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# 1 P-R-O-C-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 8:31 a.m. 3 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Good morning, everybody. We'll reconvene. Everybody is 4 5 prepared here this morning for that. 6 So, and with that, welcome, Mark 7 Griffon, who has joined us today, and let me turn it over to Ted, for the preliminaries. 8 Sure, thank you, Jim. 9 KATZ: 10 Let me check on the line, to see if we have Member Mike Gibson. Are you on the line with 11 us, this morning? 12 13 (No response.) MR. KATZ: Okay, then 14 just 15 couple of things. Welcome, everyone, here and 16 on the line, for day two of our Board meeting. There is no public comment session 17 today. Just a couple of things. 18 19 We have several presentations Those presentations, you should find 20 today. on the NIOSH website, under the Board section. 21 So, you can follow along from wherever you 22

1 | are.

I'll just ask folks on the phone to please mute your phones while you're listening. Press \*6 if you don't have a mute button, and then press \*6 again to come off of mute, if you're going to address the Board, if you're a petitioner for one of these presentations.

Please don't put the phone on hold at any point, but hang up and dial back in, if you have to leave the call for a while, and that's it. I think we're ready to go. Thanks.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, the first item on our agenda this morning is the Linde Ceramics Plant, the SEC petition, and we have a request from Senator Schumer's office to read a statement into the record. Laura Monte, are you on the line?

MS. MONTE: Yes, I am.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, go ahead.

Welcome.

MS. MONTE: Okay, thank you. Good

morning.

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I wanted to briefly address the Advisory Board regarding this issue that concerns Senator Schumer and Senator Gillibrand.

be Today, the Board will discussing and voting on the Linde SEC Senator Gillibrand joins Senator petition. in expressing great pleasure relief that this second and final Ceramics SEC petition has been recommended for approval by NIOSH.

Linde Ceramics Sickened workers and their families have been waiting for many years for not only the final disposition of these two SEC petitions, but also for complete and accurate Site Profile that will the evaluation of provide the basis for individual dose reconstruction claims workers that do not the those meet SEC requirements for fair compensation.

NIOSH has been using a wholly

incomplete and fundamentally inaccurate Site Profile to evaluate individual dose reconstruction claims for Linde Ceramics workers since 2005.

Senator Schumer and Senator Gillibrand find this extended degree of delay to be both unreasonable and unconscionable, in light of the paramount interest in NIOSH providing timely evaluation and disposition of all claims.

Schumer Senator and Senator Gillibrand strongly urge NIOSH and the Advisory Board to work together to expedite the much needed and long delayed revision of the Linde Ceramic Site Profile, to ensure that those Claimants that do not meet the SEC requirements may finally receive the full, and Claimant-favorable evaluation their individual dose reconstruction claims that they have been denied for far too long.

Senator Schumer and Gillibrand would also respectfully request that our

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offices receive a full listing of those Claimants that will have their previously denied individual dose reconstruction claims re-evaluated and re-dosed as soon as practicable.

If you have any questions or need further information, Senators Schumer and Gillibrand would ask that you please contact Ms. Antoinette Bonsignore, who has been an advocate and representative for the Linde Ceramics workers and their families for the past eight years.

Both Senators' offices will be in contact with Dr. Howard in the near future, to discuss this matter.

Senator Schumer and Gillibrand hope that NIOSH and the Advisory Board will seriously consider the consequences of this policy today when voting on the Linde SEC petition, and for all SEC petitions going forward.

Thank you for your attention to

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1	this critical request.
2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you.
3	MS. MONTE: Thank you.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And now, we'll
5	proceed with our discussion on Linde, and I
6	believe Gen Roessler would like to say a few
7	words of introduction. Gen is Chair of the
8	Work Group.
9	MEMBER ROESSLER: Thank you, Jim.
10	I thought I'd bring the Board up to date on
11	our Work Group activities.
12	We're considering the Linde SEC-
13	00154 petition, which covers the dates
14	November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953.
15	We had a Work Group meeting with
16	regard to this period, just before our last
17	Board meeting, and at that meeting, we met
18	face-to-face in Cincinnati.
19	We identified a number of things
20	that we had to discuss, utility tunnels. There
21	was a new TBD at that time, which SC&A hadn't
22	looked at, and we talked a lot about uranium

progeny, and we decided that we wanted SC&A to look at a number of these things, and then we'd meet again.

We scheduled a meeting for October 24<sup>th</sup>. We thought we were ready to begin the evaluation that NIOSH had prepared at that time, that they could do dose reconstruction, but then we learned that there was -- that DCAS had re-evaluated the information in quite a bit of depth.

They presented it to us that Work Group meeting, and in their re-evaluation, they had decided that there wasn't sufficient information to do dose reconstruction.

This was kind of a -- it came upon us rather quickly, and although Jim Neton made a very good presentation, when I read back over the transcript, I see it's all really there, but it came kind of quickly.

So, we decided we needed a little time to think about it. We wanted to see the new ER from DCAS. They promised that to us by

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late November. We received it on November 1 22<sup>nd</sup>. 2 3 Monday after Thanksqiving, I took out the old ER and the new ER, and I'm sitting 4 5 there, trying to compare them and that -- you 6 just can't get the gist out of that. 7 So, Ι asked DCAS and Chris Crawford, could he prepare a written brief 8 summary itemizing why they had revised their 9 10 petition. He did a very good job of that, 11 and it's in your packet. If you want to look 12 13 at the details, you can read that. So, then the Work Group met again 14 15 by teleconference, and we had this 16 summary. We recognize a lot of work was done, not only by DCAS, but SC&A in looking at all 17 the new information. 18 19 So, that is the background. Jim is going to present the PER, and then I'll 20 give you the conclusions of the Work Group, 21 22 I'm hoping we can have a vote this and

morning.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, and just - because I believe the Petitioners are on the
line, also, just to clarify what our
procedures are, we'll hear from Jim Neton. Gen
will provide some further comments, and we'll
have some -- any questions for Jim, sort of
technical questions, comments on the report
and so forth, and then before we take any
action or propose any action, we'd like to
hear from the Petitioners, also.

So, at that point, we'll call on the Petitioners. So, go ahead, Jim.

DR. NETON: Okay, thank you, Dr. Melius. That was a pretty good introduction by Gen.

I am going to talk about Revision

1 of the Evaluation Report, where NIOSH has

come to a conclusion to reverse our previous

position, that dose reconstruction can be

done, that was I think, presented to the Board

a little over a year ago, November 2010, Rev

1 0, Ι think it was at the Redondo Beach 2 meeting, although I'm not certain of that. 3 have background slides, some just to refresh your memory about Linde and 4 5 what has transpired, and then I'll have a few slides to detail, and hopefully I can convey 6 7 to you the rationale behind our change of opinion here. 8 The petition has been around for a 9 10 while. It was received, as you see here, November 2009, and the Class here was all 11 12 employees who worked at the Linde Ceramics 13 Plant from November 1, 1947 to December 31, 1953. It's a discrete six-year -- almost six-14 15 year interval, and it qualified in 16 January. NIOSH has evaluated the same Class 17 that was petitioned for, which is that same 18 19 time interval, 1947 to 1953. 20 The covered period, I'll remind the Board, runs from October 1, 1942 through 21 22 December 31, 1953. That's the AEC contract

period.

Then there is a residual contamination period that extends from that 53 date, all the way through October 2009, and it's actually still contaminated.

That date is there because that's the latest update of NIOSH's residual contamination report, or the latest non-draft version of NIOSH's residual contamination report.

The last bullet here I think is fairly important. There were two previously added Classes to the SEC, and those were from October 1, 1942 to October 31, 1947, the very beginning period of Linde, that was -- became an SEC based on an 83.14 petition by NIOSH, and then there was another Class added more recently, from January 1954 through December 1969.

If you recall, that was after the covered period was over. We were in the residual period, but there was some renovation

activities going on, that the Board felt that we couldn't reconstruct with sufficient accuracy.

So, the bottom line is, this -the Class that we're talking about today is
right smack in the middle of those two other
Classes.

I've talked about this, original proposal that was presented to the Board in November 2010, and our belief that we with doses sufficient could reconstruct largely tied accuracy to these was approximately 600 urine samples that we had that were collected between 1947 and 1950.

The fair amount of urinalyses data available, it seemed to us that we could use those, like we always do in modeling, to come up with exposures for workers in those areas.

But during the review, as Gen suggested, we went back and took a fairly detailed look at what those urine samples represented and how they could or could not be

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used to reconstruct doses in a couple of different situations that I'll talk about later.

This just more -- by way of more background information. I think we're all familiar that the plant is in Tonawanda and it wasn't unique -- it wasn't new to Linde that they were handling uranium. They actually worked with uranium to make dyes and ceramic tableware and such.

But in 1942, the Manhattan Engineer District contracted to make uranium oxide and later, green salt.

There were a number of buildings erected by the Manhattan Engineering District, and these are actually DOE facilities, as such, and they constructed several buildings. The ones that we're going to talk about today are Building 30 and 38. So, keep those in mind.

There was a three-step process.

They started originally with just raw ore. I

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think I have some slides here.

The three-step process, the first process, which happened very early on in the contract period, was the conversion of uranium ore, which included Belgian Congo ore and some tailings, ores, all kinds of varieties of ores that were unpurified, if you will, and converted that ore to U308, also known as black oxide.

We all know, this is very much like the operation that occurred at Mallinckrodt, where you end up with a lot of raffinate material, that is residual extracted material that contains the uranium progeny.

Most of the raw ores that came, for instance, from the Belgian Congo, are pretty much assumed, and I think this is true, to be in 100 percent equilibrium, all the long-lived progeny are there, you know, the radium, in particular.

And so, in that process, you end up extracting a lot of these and concentrating

a lot of these progeny in various steps and in various pieces of equipment.

If you remember, the Mallinckrodt SEC was added because of the -- I think it was the Sperry filter cakes, or something like that, where there was a thorium concentrate or they had no monitoring data for those workers. So, keep that in mind.

Step two, which also occurred in Building 30, was the conversion of the black oxide to brown oxide UO2, with UO3 as an intermediate.

So, these two steps were in Building 30. We all recall that Building 30 was the, quote-unquote, most contaminated building onsite, primarily because of these -- the ores that were processed through there.

Step three is a slightly different situation, though. They converted the UO2, the brown oxide to green salt, uranium tetra fluoride, and that was done solely in Building 37 and 38, mostly in 38.

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Because the ore had been -because the uranium had been extracted and
purified, you don't have the raffinate
problem, the residual long-lived radioactivity
issue in Building 38 that you would have in
Building 30.

Okay, that kind of sets the stage. This is just talking a little bit about the production of UF4 in Building 38. The time period was from November 1947 through the middle of 1949, and that particular process, they fluorinated UO2 to produce the UF4 and the fluorine will become important as I talk, in a little bit.

But as I mentioned, it started with purified uranium, so, there was no progeny.

The D&D operations, the major operations, again, I forget the topic of the next slide here, which is the major operations. I want to focus on what happened between 1947 and 1953.

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So, here we have in 1947 and to 1 2 the middle of 1949, the production of UF4 in 3 Building 38, but also have somewhat we simultaneously ongoing, the D&D of Building 4 5 30, it had all the raffinate material in it. 6 There was the step two process 7 equipment that was removed. A lot of step one equipment was being decommissioned, et cetera, 8 and we recall from the last SEC, there was 9 10 extensive activity, sand blasting, removal of contaminated parts, jackhammering, torching, a 11 12 number of things they tried to clean up that 13 building, and as I mentioned, this created a large potential for exposure to uranium and 14 15 progeny. So, you've got two buildings here, 16 Building 30 and 38. 17 Building 38, after they stopped 18 19 production of the uranium tetrafluoride, is a 20 little less uncertain as to what happened. efforts decontamination The 21

there certainly was a lot of contamination

there. They produced a fair amount of UF4, but the decontamination efforts were not able to find any significant amount of documentation as to what occurred, although it is fairly clear from a memo trail, that various attempts had been made to clean it up.

There was a minor clean-up that we identified at the end of operations. Equipment was placed in stand-by. As I mentioned, if you go through these memos, it's almost sort of an implied thing. They would survey it, and then a couple of years later, they would survey it again, and say, well, it's still not clean enough. How clean does it need to be?

It wasn't until 1954 that they finally cleaned it to the point where they felt it was available for release.

We have absolutely no internal monitoring data for these efforts. I mentioned at the onset that 1947 to 1950, we have about 600 urine samples. After 1950, there is nothing. We have no air sample data.

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We have no urine sample data.

So, we took a look at the 1947 to 1950 urine sample data, fairly took a hard look at it, and to see what we could do with it, based on these two conditions that existed.

The uranium was, as usual in this time period, a fluorometric analysis, meaning it measured only mass of uranium. You had no isotopic information from that measurement.

Looking at the details, and I spent some time looking at the individual results. They appear to almost -- not almost -- not exclusively, but almost exclusively, then collected the monitored workers in Building 38.

That was the building that did not have the raffinate material. It was purified uranium, and it makes some sense, and part of the reason I believe that, is that most of the urine samples had a fluorine result associated with them.

1 Ιf you remember, they 2 hydrofluoric acid as part of the process, and 3 I'm forgetting what the biological effect of hydrofluoric acid is on the body, but I'm sure 4 5 it's not good. 6 So, they were keeping track of the amount of fluorine that people were excreting 7 to make sure that they didn't incur a health 8 hazard from that chemical. 9 10 So, anyway, that kind of corroborated that these samples were really 11 12 not taken for any -- were primarily taken for 13 monitoring workers in Building 38, remember, we had the ongoing operation of the 14 clean-up of Building 30, with the raffinate 15

material.

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We have no evidence that the workers that were doing the clean-up were monitored in Building 30 and in fact, even if they were, you remember, this is a uranium mass measurement.

It gives you no information about

the thorium-230, the radium-226, all the other long-lived progeny that could have been there from the uranium, and of the by nature chemical process, there would have been equipment various pieces of that had concentrated levels of different radionuclides.

So, we really don't know what those workers were breathing and being exposed to during the D&D of Building 30.

There are air sample data from that period, but they are gross alpha measurements. We have no isotopic-specific activity.

Ι indicate here, So, as mass incapable of evaluating measurements are long-lived progeny present intakes of Building 30, and since we have no bioassay or air sample data after 1950, we really don't feel that we can bound the -- any of the D&D activities that had occurred in Building 30 --38, which is the purified uranium processing

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1 building, but we have no bioassay samples. 2 If there was D&D activities going 3 on, what do you use to bound those exposures? So, this is sort of -- I think 4 sort of summarizes what I just said. 5 Building 6 38 was decontaminated after July 1949. So, 7 they were either unmonitored or the monitoring records have been lost. 8 Building 38 was contaminated with 9 10 raffinate material that included raffinates of unknown concentration, and it is 11 12 now our opinion that the available bioassay 13 data are incapable of quantifying exposures in either of those plants. That is, the entire 14 15 time period between 1947 and 1953. 16 I'11 talk а little bit about radon, that's been an issue here. 17 It's our favorite exposure pathway, I believe. 18 19 In the Linde site exposure -- or the Site Profile, it is assumed that all 20 workers were exposed to 10 picocuries 21 liter radon in above-ground structures. 22

That value was arrived looking at the values of radon that measured during the processing of the ores that had long-lived progeny in them, and what we did was, we took the lowest concentrations that were measured in the era, and said, well, we don't know what they are, but they're certainly no higher than what -- the lowest concentration that was measured during the processing era, and that ended up being 10 picocuries per liter.

So, in dose reconstructions, we will assume that all workers, since we don't know where people really ended up being, you know, during the plant production era, all workers will be exposed to 10 picocuries per liter.

There has been some discussion about these tunnels, these underground tunnels that are there. Our documentation, we feel fairly strongly indicates that the utility tunnels near the plant were not built until

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after 1956. That is, 1957 and 1961.

So, and we also -- there is some conflicting -- we have a couple of conflicting pieces of worker input on this issue, but we feel that the weight of the evidence is that these tunnels weren't there.

So, we don't believe that there should be any radon assigned from the underground tunnels during this time period.

That is the subject of some debate still within the Working Group, I believe, and in our opinion, that rises to the value of the level of a Site Profile issue.

External dose, we still believe that we can reconstruct. We haven't changed our opinion on this.

There are direct beta/gamma measurements -- I mean, there is about 6,000 weekly film badge results that we have, that we can use to correlate job category and measured dose, and there are a few gaps in the records where film badge data are not

available, but we have some fair -significant amount of radiation area survey
data that we can use to supplement the film
badge readings.

So, we feel fairly comfortable that we can still bound the external exposures to workers between 1947 and 1953, and those would be included in dose reconstructions for those folks with non-presumptive cancers.

Okay, the evaluation process, we've already determined that it's not feasible to estimate the radiation dose with sufficient accuracy, so, by definition, in this case, health has been endangered, we believe, as this slide indicates.

So, health has been once endangered, then we need to determine if -- is it based on just presence or is it 250 days, and our review of that, like many other sites, that individual indicates there was no incident that we could use -- we could point to, that would have endangered health, but

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these essentially were the result of chronic exposures incurred over a period of time and therefore, we will use the 250-day parameter to -- for workers to be -- you know, 250 days is required to have worked there to be a member of the Class.

Our final recommendation here is all NIOSH employees who worked in any area of Linde Ceramics Plant in Tonawanda, New York from November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 days, and this is our summary of our recommendations here.

We cannot do uranium and progeny exposure. It's not feasible for the entire time period. We will assign 10 picocuries per liter radon exposures for those not in the Class.

We can do external exposure.

Medical, I should have made a little note on that.

Medical exposures, we came across

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1	some records that indicated that the medical
2	x-rays were taken offsite between 1947 and
3	1959, I believe, at the Blackrock Clinic, is
4	what I'm remembering.
5	Since they were taken offsite,
6	then they're not covered exposure under this
7	program. After 1950, they were taken onsite.
8	So, we will assign medical
9	exposures between 1950 and 1953, for those not
10	in this Class, and that is it. I'll be happy
11	to answer any questions.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Jim.
13	Wanda?
14	MEMBER MUNN: Jim, do I understand
15	correctly from what you said, that the major
16	factor here in our lack of information centers
17	around the scarcity of air samples and our
18	ability to determine what, other than uranium,
19	was being kicked up during the D&D period; is
20	that correct?
21	DR. NETON: That would be correct,
22	between 1947 and 1950.

1	MEMBER MUNN: No, this period, the
2	early period.
3	DR. NETON: The early period.
4	After 1950, the D&D operations were over in
5	Building 30.
6	We don't know what really occurred
7	in there, either, that well, but principally,
8	you have indications that D&D occurred in
9	Building 38, where there was uranium
10	contamination, no long-lived progeny, but
11	uranium, purified uranium, and we have zero
12	bioassays.
13	I mean, no samples. No air
14	samples. Nothing, in that three-year period.
15	MEMBER MUNN: Okay, fine, just
16	wanted that clarification. Thank you.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Anybody else
18	with yes, David?
19	MEMBER RICHARDSON: You talked us
20	through issues regarding Building 38 and some
21	of the issues regarding Building 30.
22	There were two other buildings

1	that were related to step three, if I'm
2	understanding this.
3	DR. NETON: Yes.
4	MEMBER RICHARDSON: I mean, you
5	pointed to 37, and there's also
6	DR. NETON: Yes.
7	MEMBER RICHARDSON: what wasn't
8	measured is 31
9	DR. NETON: Yes.
10	MEMBER RICHARDSON: which I
11	wondering if you could tell us about that.
12	DR. NETON: Yes, 31, I had
13	originally on my slide 31, and it's really not
14	clear to me. It appeared to be more of a
1 -	
15	warehouse-type structure, than anything, a
16	warehouse-type structure, than anything, a very small block building.
16	very small block building.
16 17	very small block building.  So, yes, I don't think it was a
16 17 18	very small block building.  So, yes, I don't think it was a major player. It certainly could have had
16 17 18 19	very small block building.  So, yes, I don't think it was a major player. It certainly could have had contamination, as well, and added to the

1	exposure.
2	MEMBER RICHARDSON: And 37 is the
3	same?
4	DR. NETON: Thirty-seven is
5	similar. I think it's sort of intermediate
6	between the cinder-block building and 38.
7	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Anybody else
9	with questions?
10	I think, Gen, you wanted to say a
11	few words in follow-up?
12	MEMBER ROESSLER: Well, why don't
13	we hear from Antoinette first?
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay. Well,
15	now, if no more questions or comments, we'll
16	now turn to the Petitioners, and I believe
17	Antoinette, are you on the line?
18	MS. BONSIGNORE: Yes, I am, Dr.
19	Melius. Can everybody hear can you hear
20	me?
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, we can,
22	very well. Thank you.

1	MS. BONSIGNORE: Okay, great.
2	Thank you. Thank you very much.
3	Good morning, Dr. Melius, Members
4	of the Board. I want to thank you on behalf
5	of the Linde workers and their families for
6	this opportunity to address the Board this
7	morning.
8	I would also like to thank the
9	Linde Work Group for their efforts during the
10	Linde SEC evaluation process.
11	I will be providing the Board with
12	a copy of my presentation later this morning.
13	This morning, I am going to
14	address three main points. First, I will
15	recap the very long journey the Linde workers
16	and their families have traveled since the
17	initial filing of their SEC petitions in March
18	of 2008.
19	Second, I will discuss some
20	ongoing problems and concerns within the post-
21	SEC Evaluation Process regarding the re-
22	evaluation of previously denied individual

dose reconstruction claims.

Lastly, I will discuss what can be done moving forward to provide greater oversight to the SEC and post-SEC evaluation processes.

I wish to also express how grateful I am that NIOSH has finally recommended the approval of Linde Ceramics SEC-154.

More importantly, I would like to express how grateful the Linde community is, that NIOSH decided to delve more deeply into the critical data that they have been relying upon for this SEC during these past six weeks to discover that their initial evaluation recommendation was incorrect, and calling for a wholesale reversal and recommendation for SEC approval.

NIOSH's decision has brought a great deal of relief and solace to many families that have been waiting for the final conclusion to this long process.

To begin, I would like to briefly recap this SEC history for the Board.

Linde workers and their families started this SEC petition process in March 2008, when two SEC petitions were filed, one covering the residual period, which was eventually recommended for approval by this Board, over NIOSH's objection. The second SEC, which we are discussing today, was not initially qualified for review.

As the Linde SEC representative, I appealed that denial and that appeal was rejected.

NIOSH denied qualification initially on June 26, 2008. I then appealed that denial, to a three-member panel, which quickly affirmed NIOSH's refusal to qualify this SEC petition.

In order to discover what reasoning the three-member panel had used to justify the qualification denial, I was forced to go into federal court, to get a copy of the

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panel's August 2008 report, which the CDC FOIA Office initially refused to disclose pursuant to my FOIA request.

Eventually, the CDC FOIA Office released that report, which turned out to be a mere one-page document that contained nothing more than a boilerplate and perfunctory review of the SEC qualification denial.

After some additional information that the Petitioners gathered from SC&A's many reviews of the Linde Site Profile issues, this current SEC petition was refiled on November 5, 2009, and it finally qualified for review on January 22, 2010, nearly two years after the initial filing of this SEC petition in March 2008.

NIOSH's first November 2010 Evaluation Report recommended the denial of this SEC, then quite unexpectedly, NIOSH announced during the October 24<sup>th</sup> Linde Work Group meeting that, after combing through the available data over the past six weeks, NIOSH

had discovered that they had been misidentifying the most critical data that they needed -- that they had been relying upon, presumably since the issuance of the first Linde Site Profile in 2005, that NIOSH needed to reconstruct dose for this Class of workers.

So, after a very long journey, that has been highly complex, opaque and mindbending at times, the Linde workers and their families have come to the end of a long road that officially began for the Linde community in March 2008, but in reality, started in April of 2003.

The second issue I want to address this morning brings me to the post-SEC evaluation process, and what can be done to provide more consistent and claimant-favorable outcomes during the post-SEC evaluation process.

Individual claimants that have never and will never meet the SEC requirements

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are still being denied their most fundamental rights under this repairatory compensation program.

It is in my opinion, one of the most critical and fundamental underpinnings of why EEOICPA was enacted and what it was intended to accomplish, that being the timely and fair compensation of sickened workers.

In this post-SEC evaluation process, details and accuracy matter, because those details affect the lives of aggrieved and sickened workers, which brings me to the Linde Site Profile and the newly revised and recently issued ER.

NIOSH has been using a wholly incomplete and fundamental -- fundamentally inaccurate Site Profile to evaluate individual claims for Linde workers since the issuance of the very first Linde Site Profile in 2005.

There have been four additional revisions since 2005. This extraordinary degree of delay is both unreasonable and

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unconscionable, in light of paramount interest NIOSH has in providing for timely evaluation and disposition of all claims. Some of these claims date as far back to the inception of this program.

But my concern is twofold. First, at the last Linde Work Group meeting, held last Thursday, when I first received a copy of the revised ER and a copy of a simplified explanation of what data NIOSH has misidentifying for so many years and why that data could no longer be used to reconstruct dose for this Class of workers, I raised this very issue, regarding those claimants that are still waiting for the fair proper and evaluation of their claims.

Some members of the DCAS team seemed to indicate, rather quickly, after I expressed my concerns about the Site Profile, that my concerns were unfounded and somewhat irrelevant because hardly any previously denied claims would be affected by the ensuing

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Site Profile revision to the degree that would result in the approval of those claims.

Admittedly, there was some pushback about the impact of Site Profile revisions from other members of the DCAS team.

However, I cannot remain anything but troubled, by the -- about the integrity of the eventual program Evaluation Report, and claims re-evaluation process, after having that meeting.

The second concern I have deals with my review of the revised ER of this past weekend, where I discovered some rather troubling problems within the revised ER, that were not -- I would like to now briefly outline for the Board, and specifically, for the Linde Work Group.

First, regarding the ongoing issue of when the underground tunnels were constructed under the main uranium ore processing building. NIOSH still maintains that those tunnels did not exist under those

uranium ore processing buildings during the operational time period.

What concerns me is that there is zero mention of the written memoranda that I supplied to NIOSH and the Linde Work Group in December 2010, regarding this specific issue in the revised ER, and along with that memo, I also supplied a number of original Linde memoranda from 1945 and 1948, regarding the diversion of effluents from overflowing injection wells the processing near ore buildings, to injection wells located near the Tonawanda building and Building 8, which is also known as Plant 1.

That memo and accompanying documents are not listed in the revised ER references and were never noted in the second revised ER, discussing the tunnel issue.

Moreover, that same memo and documentation is also never mentioned in the most recent version of the Linde Site Profile issued on July 15, 2011.

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In my opinion, those documents clearly demonstrate that effluence was averted from wells near Building 30 or the ceramic wells, at the northwest end of the site, to the wells near Building 8, or the Plant 1 wells at the southeast end of the site.

Furthermore, no mention is that Steve Ostrow from SC&A has recommended, after reviewing this information along with all of the information that NIOSH has supplied to date about the tunnel construction issue, and here, I'm just going to briefly quote Mr. Ostrow from our Linde Working Group meeting October 24<sup>th</sup>, where from he said, SC&A's position on the tunnels is that we reviewed everything that NIOSH supplied, reviewed everything that Antoinette Bonsignore supplied, various things, and we really can't -- we think there is no definitive answer, the tunnels were built. So, our conclusion is that there really is insufficient hard evidence to say when the

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tunnels were built, and that I guess a claimant-favorable conservative assumption would just be assuming that the tunnels were there all the time. There is too much doubt about when they were actually built.

You can review Mr. Ostrow's complete comments and further details about this issue in my written materials.

Again, I would remind the Board and the Linde Work Group that none of this petitioner-submitted information is noted in the July 2011 revised Site Profile or the newly revised ER.

Consequently, I cannot help but question whether NIOSH -- whether the NIOSH team has seriously considered this information.

I find this to be yet another example of an extremely troubling pattern of Petitioners' and workers' arguments and statements, being disregarded time and again, as wholly irrelevant to the SEC and Site

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Profile revision discussions.

A second serious problem within the revised ER is the continued use and reliance upon discredited interviews conducted by the ORAU team, with some Linde workers in March 2010.

All of the ORAU March 2010 telephone interviews are noted in the revised ER's reference section. These interviews had been repeatedly discredited because the ORAU failed to verify the statements noted in those transcript summaries with the workers they interviewed, before releasing the transcripts of those interviews for use by the Linde Work Group.

One of those workers was then reinterviewed by SC&A in May 2010 during the Niagara Falls Board meeting.

Mr. Hinnefeld was kind enough to apologize to that worker for the fact that he was materially misquoted and misrepresented in that ORAU interview transcript and needed to

attend an interview session with SC&A in Niagara Falls to rectify that misinformation, much of which dealt with misinformation regarding the occupancy and the use of the tunnels by workers.

I must ask why these interviews are still being referenced by NIOSH when, to my knowledge, they are not referenced in the July 2011 revised Site Profile?

Furthermore, none of the documents that were produced by SC&A from that May 2010 re-interview of that particular misrepresented worker, along with a number of other workers, have been referenced in the revised ER, or for that matter, in the July 2011 revised Site Profile.

Consequently, issues that SC&A resolved and noted in their two reports from May and July 2010 that were produced from those interviews have now once again been materially misrepresented in this newly revised ER.

Some of those issues deal with occupancy and detailed descriptions of the tunnels. I have noted all of the errors I have found so far, in the revised ER, in my written presentation, along with the SC&A documentation demonstrating those errors in my written statements.

prominent Two the more worrisome examples include, for instance, that the revised ER notes that none of the records indicate that it was a general practice for employees to use the tunnels to get from one building to another. Such a practice was not condoned by the company and was against company policy. That quote is in the revised ER.

NIOSH then specifically references the transcript of a misrepresented worker that was re-interviewed SC&A to support that statement.

This theory has been wholly refuted time and again by many of the workers

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present at the SC&A interviews in Niagara Falls, and more importantly, SC&A clearly delineates that fact in their May and July 2010 reports, detailing the Niagara Falls interview sessions.

Additional misinformation within the revised ER that continues to be perpetuated and misrepresented dealing with worker occupancy issues within the tunnels is also referenced in the May 2010 SC&A report that the Board Members can also review in my written presentation materials.

I point out these ongoing serious discrepancies because of the lack of attention to timeliness and Site Profile accuracy that has plagued the Linde SEC and Site Profile revision process for far too many years now.

NIOSH has known about worker radiation exposure issues in the Linde tunnels since January 2006.

However, this exposure issue was never addressed in any of the Site Profile

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issues, until the most recent July 2011 Site Profile, which notably represents the fifth time NIOSH has needed to revise and issue a new Site Profile since May 2005, this despite the fact that the workers detailed that they had worked in the utility tunnels to SC&A interviewers in January 2006.

NIOSH never followed up on this issue and SC&A never questioned NIOSH at any time after they issued their own July 2006 audit report of that 2006 Linde Site Profile, calling for further investigation of the tunnel occupancy issue.

The third and final issue I would like to address deals with constructive questions that need to be asked in order to provide greater oversight to the SEC and post-SEC evaluation processes.

I find no -- I find no explanation within this revised ER explaining or detailing how NIOSH finally discovered that they had misidentified this data after so many years of

claiming that they had sufficient data to reconstruct dose for this Class of workers.

The workers that have waited for so many years for a resolution of these issues deserve an explanation of how this critical mistake was finally discovered and rectified.

Why did NIOSH suddenly begin a, quote, more detailed review of the site data and what prompted NIOSH to do so, and why, as Dr. Neton explained during the October 24<sup>th</sup> Linde Work Group meeting, did NIOSH decide to begin to, and I'm quoting here, comb through this data, quite meticulously in the last, you know, six weeks or so?

I believe these are important questions that must be addressed, not only for the Linde community, but also with respect to needed reforms that will be implemented as a result of the ten-year NIOSH review.

So many questions remain unanswered. How will the Site Profile revision and re-evaluation of previously

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denied claims be accomplished in a timely manner? How long will Claimants that do not qualify for either of these two SECs need to wait to have their claims reevaluated?

These workers and their families remain in an ongoing state of limbo, waiting for the bare minimum from NIOSH: the fair and timely disposition of their claims, using accurate and appropriate information from the Linde Site Profile.

The post-SEC evaluation processes and PER review is -- are far too opaque.

Yesterday, Mr. Hinnefeld discussed the implementation goals of the NIOSH ten-year review.

One aspect dealt with adopting aggressive timeliness objectives for dose reconstruction. A significant part of those objectives should deal with the Site Profile revision process that occurred within the post-SEC evaluation and the associated PER process whereby previously denied claims are

identified for reevaluation and re-dosing.

As I noted earlier, I remain very concerned about the immediate reaction and posture from some members of the DCAS team, that post-SEC Site Profile revisions and PER analysis would yield an insignificant degree of reversals of previously denied claims.

This statement was made just this past Thursday, before the post-SEC evaluation review even began between the DCAS and SC&A.

Another aspect of the ten-year implementation guide discussed yesterday. think it is critical to utilize staff other than health physicists, when appropriate, to guard against professional orientation toward accepting adequacy of techniques and to take a critical look post-SEC evaluation at the procedures in place for Site Profile revisions and PER development that could include a formal peer review of the process to ensure consistency, claimant-favorability and transparency Claimants and advocates for

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representing those Claimants.

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The Linde community strongly urges NIOSH and the Advisory Board to work together to expedite this process and to set specific time-sensitive goals.

The much needed and long delayed revision of the Linde Site Profile is critical to ensure that those Claimants that do not meet the SEC requirements may finally receive the full, fair and claimant-favorable evaluation of their individual claims, that they have been denied for far too long.

Т would further ask that t.he request forth by Senator Schumer set and Senator Gillibrand, in their recent letter to Dr. Howard, Dr. Melius and Mr. Hinnefeld and noted earlier by Laura Monte in her statement, be approved, so that their respective offices can receive a full listing of those Claimants that will have their previously denied claims reevaluated and re-dosed.

I will provide a copy of that

letter for the Board's review along with my written statement.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Melius, the Advisory Board, Dr. Wade, Mr. Katz and Mr. Kinman for their time and patience. I very much appreciate the opportunity to present these very important issues for the Board's review during this final Linde SEC presentation.

I would also like to thank Senator Schumer and Senator Gillibrand for their tireless effort.

More importantly -- most importantly, I would like to thank all of the Linde workers and their families who have waited so patiently for so many years, for a semblance of justice and for their years of support and help while pursuing these SEC petitions.

I had truly been an honor representing the Linde community. Thank you.

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1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you.
2	Okay, now, Gen.
3	MEMBER ROESSLER: I hope,
4	Antoinette, you're going to provide us a
5	written
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
7	MEMBER ROESSLER: document
8	because you speak a lot faster than I can
9	think, and we're going to need that.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, now, she
11	has indicated that she was sending in all
12	all of what she said would be in writing, to
13	us.
14	MEMBER ROESSLER: Okay, thank you
15	so much. I think the next order then, would
16	be to consider the this SEC Class.
17	At the Work Group meeting, I made
18	a statement that my conclusion was that we
19	need to be consistent with other similar
20	situations at Linde, and where other SECs have
21	been recommended.
22	Because of that and all the new

1	information, my personal opinion is that I
2	agree with NIOSH that this Class should be
3	recommended for an SEC.
4	The other Board or the other
5	Work Group Members present, Josie Beach and
6	Jim Lockey, agreed with that and we decided
7	then to bring it to the Board for a vote.
8	I will present a motion, and then
9	I guess we could have discussion.
10	The motion is that this Class,
11	this Linde Class, should be recommended for an
12	SEC.
13	MEMBER BEACH: I will second it.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you,
15	Josie. Any further discussion?
16	So, if I can find the right slide
17	here, yes, okay.
18	So, we would be making a
19	recommendation that all employees working in
20	the any area of the Linde Ceramics Plant,
21	November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953, be
22	added to the SEC Class.

1	So, if there are no further
2	questions or comments, Ted, do you want to do
3	the role?
4	MR. KATZ: Yes, thank you. Dr.
5	Anderson?
6	MEMBER ANDERSON: Yes.
7	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach?
8	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
9	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
10	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
11	MR. KATZ: Dr. Field?
12	MEMBER FIELD: Yes.
13	MR. KATZ: Mike Gibson, are you on
14	the line? Mr. Gibson?
15	(No response.)
16	MR. KATZ: Okay, I will collect
17	his vote. He's absent. Mr. Griffon?
18	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
19	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lemen is absent.
20	Dr. Lemen, are you on the line? We didn't
21	check this morning.
22	(No response.)

1	MR. KATZ: Okay, I'll collect his
2	vote. Dr. Lockey?
3	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes.
4	MR. KATZ: Dr. Melius?
5	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
6	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
7	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
8	MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston?
9	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
LO	MR. KATZ: Dr. Richardson?
L1	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes.
L2	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?
L3	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
L4	MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield?
L5	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Yes.
L6	MR. KATZ: And Dr. Ziemer?
L7	MEMBER ZIEMER: Yes.
L8	MR. KATZ: And it's unanimous, all
L9	in favor, two absentee votes. The motion
20	passes, and I'll collect the rest of the
21	votes.
22	CHAIRMAN MELTIS: Okay very good

1	Our next agenda item would be the
2	what I'll do you want to say something?
3	MEMBER ROESSLER: I think we need
4	to comment that the Work Group will be meeting
5	again. We need to discuss the items brought
6	up by Senator Schumer's office and by
7	Antoinette, to talk about the workers not
8	covered by this SEC, and we will do that.
9	We'll need to have some things in
10	place, before we do it. But I just wanted to
11	assure people that we will be meeting again.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, yes. I
13	think yes, my understanding was, the Work
14	Group had still not resolved some of the Site
15	Profile issues and on that, and will be
16	continuing to work with NIOSH on those, and do
17	that.
18	Yes, I think we need to hold off
19	on Fernald for a little bit, Stu. So, you can
20	get ready, but don't go, okay?
21	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, I was just -
22	- I wanted to

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Getting ready?

Okay, Mark, you can sit down for a little too,

because we had told the Petitioner at 9:30

a.m. So, we need to start that at 9:30 a.m.,

and do that. Yes?

MEMBER ZIEMER: Just for our information, can any of the DCAS people tell us how many claims have previously been handled for Linde, and do we have some idea -- some questions raised about the PER and time tables?

What can you tell us right now, about sort of the status of claims and what -- do we know enough now, to know what the time table might be, understanding that some of these issues -- all of these issues that have been raised by the Petitioners have to be addressed?

But what are we looking at, in terms of numbers of claims already that will have to be looked at, particularly those previously denied?

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1	DR. NETON: I can't speak to that
2	particular number, but there are 273 total
3	claims submitted for dose reconstruction from
4	Linde as of November 15 <sup>th</sup> .
5	There was 144 who meet the
6	definition of the Class under evaluation that
7	you just voted on.
8	Now, presumably those 144 also
9	many of them also had employment in the other
10	periods that SECs were granted.
11	So, it's some number less than
12	144, is all I can say, at this point.
13	As far as the process moving
14	forward, I think the I believe that the
15	only real outstanding issue is this tunnel,
16	the you know, getting our hands around
17	our heads around when the tunnels were there,
18	and some agreement to that effect.
19	Interestingly, the tunnels is a
20	radon-exposure situation, which would
21	principally affect lung cancers. Lung cancers

are covered under the SEC, although there will

	De some subset of workers who have less than
2	250 days that would be affected.
3	So, it would be, I think I
4	think, at the end of the day, it will be a
5	fairly small number, but I can't predict.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thanks, Jim, for
7	that.
8	We have a few work groups left
9	over that we didn't get a chance to talk
10	about, so, we'll do some of those, while we
11	have time, and as soon as I thought of that,
12	Mark ran, left for the he had to make a
13	call.
14	But we have the Science Work
15	Group. Dave, do you want to give us a brief
16	update on that?
17	MEMBER RICHARDSON: The Science
18	Issues Work Group had a phone conversation,
19	during which we
20	MR. KATZ: David, can you speak
21	more directly into your microphone, please?
22	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, I'd be
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happy to.

The Science Issues Work Group had a phone meeting, and we made a listing of topics that should be covered by the Work Group.

We kind of gave them an order of priority for tackling. We agreed on sort of a process by which we would take one and -- pretty much, one topic at a time, and moving through the list, not try and divide the group into working simultaneously on several issues.

The aim is to produce a brief report back to the full Committee as we work through these topics, on this kind of status and open questions and perhaps, suggestions on ways to move forward on issues.

The first issue that we're tackling is dose and dose rate effectiveness factors.

We've received a very large report from NIOSH, about 400 pages, prepared by a contractor on this issue, and will be

1	producing, in the near future, what I hope
2	will be a very brief synopsis of the topics
3	of the issues raised within that report, and
4	we'll see how that process goes.
5	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, good, and
6	good participation and interest there. I
7	mean, there is a lot of issues there. I just
8	
9	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, yes, good
10	participation.
11	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And we're behind
12	on dealing with this.
13	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So, I urge you,
15	and I think one of the other things to think
16	about, in terms of Stu's presentation, is how
17	do we handle some of the there are some
18	scientific issues scientific issues that
19	are a part of the ten-year review and so
20	forth, how do we handle those, also?
21	Do we try to fit them in or, you
22	know, what are relative priorities?

1	Buy anyway, I am glad that is
2	moving along and so forth.
3	Okay, our other missing Work Group
4	reports are Mark's, so, we'll wait and why
5	don't we go ahead and get ready on Fernald. Go
6	ahead, Mark. We're close enough.
7	MR. KATZ: Just to note for the
8	record, Dr. Lockey is recusing himself for
9	this session.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We will come
11	find you.
12	MR. ROLFES: Okay, thank you, Dr.
13	Melius. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I
14	am Mark Rolfes. I'm a health physicist from
15	NIOSH Division of Compensation Analysis and
16	Support.
17	I'm here today to provide a brief
18	update on the status of the discussions of the
19	Feed Materials Production Center Special
20	Exposure Cohort review.
21	There has been six main topics of
22	discussion with the Work Group of the Advisory

Board for Fernald.

The first main topic that has been discussed was the coworker model for uranium internal exposures for unmonitored employees.

We developed the coworker intake model and published that in OTIB-78. However, there were some concerns that subcontractor data may not have been entered into the HIS-20 database which was used to produce this intake, this coworker intake model.

So, NIOSH went back and looked at the data that were used to develop the coworker intake model, and found that prior to 1985, late 1985, some of the subcontractor data was not entered.

And so, NIOSH has recently proposed a White Paper to adjust subcontractor intakes, and this White Paper was provided to the Work Group in November of 2011.

The second topic of discussion was the validation of the HIS-20 database. NIOSH has completed a full validation of the HIS-20

database, and I believe this issue was closed at the February 8, 2011 Work Group meeting.

The third topic was recycled uranium, and NIOSH recently delivered another revision of a White Paper on bounding the duration of potential exposures to the unblended Paducah Tower Ash.

We were asked, basically, to quantify how much time a person could have been exposed to the worse case scenario recycled uranium contaminants, and this White Paper was delivered in November of 2011 to the Work Group.

The fourth topic was the use of radon breath data for reconstructing doses from the inhalation of radium-226 and thorium-230. NIOSH has completed its work and this issued was closed at the April 19, 2011 Work Group.

The fifth topic was the review of radon emissions from the K-65 silos and associated exposures. We have agreed to move

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this to the Site Profile discussions.

We've determined that radon doses to employees can be bounded, and we had decided to move this to the Site Profile portion of discussions at the Work Group meeting that occurred on February 8, 2011.

The last issue that has been discussed was the reconstruction of internal exposures from the inhalation of thorium-232.

NIOSH has proposed to use daily weighted exposure data from 1953 through 1967, and this has been accepted and closed at the April 19, 2011 Work Group meeting.

The chest counts, which were used from 1968 through 1989, NIOSH recently provided a revised White Paper on the Mobile In Vivo Radiation Measurement Laboratory Calibration and also, an evaluation of the data completeness.

Both of these White Papers were provided to the Work Group for their input in November of 2011.

1	That concludes my presentation,
2	but I know that John Stiver has some
3	additional information and a lot of additional
4	details in his slides.
5	So, if you'd like to ask questions
6	after he has given his presentation, I'd be
7	happy to answer any questions.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, that is
9	fair, good. Thank you, Mark.
10	MR. ROLFES: Thank you, Dr.
11	Melius.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
13	MR. STIVER: Thank you, Dr.
14	Melius. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
15	My name is John Stiver. I am a
16	health physicist with SC&A, and in the last
17	year, I've been leading the SC&A efforts on
18	the Fernald SEC Petition review.
19	I'm giving a slightly more
20	detailed overview of our progress today. We
21	have as Mark indicated, we have received
22	the four White Paper responses from NIOSH, and

1	we are now in the process of reviewing those,
2	and today, I'm going to present kind of a
3	recap of where we stood, as of the August
4	meeting, Work Group meeting, and also, our
5	initial impressions on the new NIOSH
6	responses.
7	I'd like to give just a this
8	slide here is really just to kind of give an
9	overview of the history of the Fernald SEC
10	process.
11	I believe it is the longest
12	standing SEC, going on about five and a half
13	years, at this time.
14	As you can see, this just
15	summarizes the various steps in the process. I
16	note that from August 2007 to August 2011, we
17	have had a total of 11 Work Group meetings.
18	In May of 2011 at the St. Louis
19	meeting, I presented a detailed summary of our
20	position on all of the SEC issues, as of that
21	date.

At this point, we have come to a

place where I believe we are in a position where the remaining SEC issues can probably be decided in one more Work Group meeting, after we provide our responses to NIOSH.

Basically, I think we are at a place where we can either move issues into the Site Profile discussions or bring them before the Board for an SEC determination.

These are the issues, which Mark briefly touched on. From the SC&A perspective, the coworker model for uranium internal exposures remains open. Validation of the HIS-20 database has been closed, based recommendation. Recycled uranium on our remains open. The radon breath data from raffinates is closed. The radon emissions from the K-65 silos has been moved to the Site Profile discussions.

Issue 6A, which is the reconstruction of internal exposures from the inhalation of thorium-232 from 1953 to 1967, the DWE data that are comprised of breathing

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zone samples, we recommended closure in the April meeting, of this year, and the chest count model from 1968 to 1989 remains open.

In addition, there is a seventh This is the issue of recycled thorium. issue. This first came to our attention, the Savannah River Site discussions, in August 2011, as a potentially significant SEC issue. However, sense at this point is, this may be tractable for Fernald for a number of reasons, which in Ι will get into later the presentation.

The open issue number one, this is the coworker model for internal exposure from uranium.

Our basic concern is regarding the completeness and adequacy of the uranium bioassay data, which were used in coworker modeling, which is put forth in OTIB-78.

Our concerns have been largely resolved, except for matters related to the applicability of the coworker model for the

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construction workers.

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NIOSH was to perform the analysis of the construction worker versus non-construction worker bioassay data and then provide a report, which they did in November of this year.

We're currently reviewing that report, and we'll prepare a response before the next Work Group meeting.

Our preliminary observations basically summarized here. NIOSH has concluded most of these type-50 bioassay data records are, indeed, for contractors. They special records are termed and were not included in the original coworker model because they were presumed to be incidentrelated.

However, the new analysis shows that when these records are considered, and basically, they are pooled together, the coworker model estimates go up by about a factor of 1.25 to 1.6, depending on whether

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we're looking at annual or quarterly data.

This next bullet point should be revised, and basically, it is clear that the data were pooled, based on our most recent investigations.

And so, NIOSH did not compare the two samples of the type-50 separately to the population of the original model, but will -- they pool them together and then looked at the overall distribution.

I believe the reason for that was that they felt the type-50 data was really indicative of short-term acute exposures, whereas, the original model was based on this assumption of chronic intakes over long periods of time.

So, they didn't feel that the data should be compared separately. They were basically not compatible populations for that kind of comparison.

However, we note that when the data are compared alone, the differences are

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considerably higher than 1.25 and 1.6. I believe they ranged from about 2 to 4, and in 1972, they were even higher than that.

Two other concerns was the paper really doesn't have any details of the analysis, only a graph. The final results were presented, whereas, most of the White Papers we've seen have more thorough analyses, sample sizes, fitted distributions, time periods and that sort of thing.

So, we would like to -- we would recommend that a new revision be provided that has that kind of detail provided.

Open issue number three: recycled uranium. This is a very long standing issue. We started making progress on this, about this time last year, in the November Work Group meeting.

The main concern here is the default concentrations of plutonium-239 and neptunium-237, technetium-99 and fission products that were associated with recycled

uranium at Fernald may not be bounding for certain Classes of workers and certain activities and time periods.

Numerous White Papers have been exchanged, where NIOSH presents their stance on why they believe the defaults are bounding and we present our concerns regarding whether they may not be bounding for certain workers.

As of August 11, 2011, there was considerable progress made on this issue, mainly in response to our comprehensive review of recycled uranium that we submitted in February of this year.

Basically, NIOSH is looking at three different time periods. These are the new proposed default values. The 1953 to 1960, they're recommending no constituent intakes, based on the fact that a very small amount of material is being stored onsite, and had not been introduced into the process yet. It's believed that most of this material is very low in recycled contaminant levels.

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From 1961 to 1972, they proposed the original defaults from the original model, which were 100 parts per billion on a uranium mass basis for plutonium-239, 3,500 parts per billion for neptunium and 9,000 parts per billion for technetium.

Then for 1973 to 1989, they proposed increasing the default values, based on a re analysis of the DOE mass-balance report data, which really looked at -- they footed the data to a log-normal distribution and then picked out the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile.

And so, basically, that result was that plutonium went up by a factor of four, to 400 parts per billion. Neptunium went up to 11 parts per million and technetium, up to 20 parts per million, and for plutonium-239, which is the isotope of the most dosimetric significance, this is increase was based on the concentration of magnesium fluoride that was used in the induction pot liners in the metal production Plant 5, and we have very

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good reasons to believe, this was the highest continually exposed group of workers at Fernald.

Our position, as of August 2011, was that from 1953 to 1960, the intakes can certainly be bounded. However, we have concerns that a default of zero may not be adequate in an SEC context.

From 1961 to 1972, we feel that the -- that the intakes can be bounded. It's really become a Site Profile issue.

this period of time, During Ι believe this was mainly group 6A material, which was less than 10 parts per billion, typically in about the two to five parts per billion range, with the and so, even magnesium-fluoride concentration mechanisms being considered, we believe that the 100 part per billion -- that data does support 100 parts per billion as bounding for chronic intakes.

From 1973 to 1989, we certainly

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believe that the 400 parts per billion chronic intake is likely bounding for the highest continuously exposed subgroup, which would be Plant 5 metal workers and associated millwrights.

However, we did have concerns regarding subgroup 10A. This was the highest contaminated material that came from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 1980. There were about 24 metric tons of this that ranged for about 100 up to 7,000 parts per billion in plutonium.

So, our concern was with the people who were handling this material and up front, before it was blended down, say, the repackaging operations and then the front-end dumping operations and that sort of thing, and so, we believe this was an SEC issue, from about 1973 to 1985, but particularly, from 1980 to 1985.

From 1986, when Westinghouse came in and took over the operation from the NLO,

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good reason to believe that 1 have industrial hygiene and the health physics 2 3 programs were robust and that the data are acceptable during that period of time. 4 5 The important points here to take 6 home in this is that the -- you have a small 7 sub-set of workers. We all agree on that, that it can't be identified, based on the work 8 records. 9 10 The real issue that came out on this in August was that you have intermittent 11 12 exposures, fairly short-term, over defined period of time. 13 So, our concern was, is the 400 14 15 parts per billion chronic intake bounding? 16 Certainly, from а common sense standpoint, you could make subjective 17 а 18 argument, that yes, it has to be. 19 However, we wanted more from an SEC perspective, and we would like to see if 20 these intervals could be quantified. 21 22 So, that was NIOSH's action item to quantify these down-blended intervals, if at all possible and assess the impact, and of course, we were to review the report when it became available.

This report here, what we call the down-blender assessment, is the title provided there. We have several preliminary observations here.

Basically, NIOSH is estimating that any single worker would have spent at most eight percent of their time, of their work hours, annual work hours, handling this unblended plutonium out-of-specification, or POOS material, as it was called, the sub-group material.

However, no data were located that defined the down-blending and front-end handling operations, although it can be narrowed to about 82 to 85, based on process knowledge.

What they do have, and what we had discovered earlier in the summer, prior to

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August, the August meeting, was that the time necessary to repackage five of the most highly contaminated hoppers is available. It took place from April through May of 1982.

Those five hoppers are identified. We know what the contents were. They're all above 400 parts per billion, average values, and one was, I believe, up in the thousands parts per billion.

So, they have the number of shifts that were required to repackage this material, that was kind of a burn-as-you-go process. There were a lot of problems, and so, NIOSH is relying on this data as bounding for all the subsequent steps.

After the material is packaged in the barrels, then it would be, for the most part, remotely handled, whether it was being sent directly to the refinery that produced brown oxide, or whether a certain amount of it, actually, the five hoppers were initially sent to be calcined in the plant, and then

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1	were blended down at a later step.
2	So, they're relying
3	unfortunately, what we we do have some
4	concerns about these assumptions that were
5	used to drive this eight percent value,
6	regarding the number of hoppers that were
7	considered and the time per shift.
8	Our main concern here was they
9	didn't really consider the variability in the
10	plutonium concentration in these hoppers, and
11	that the the period assigned per shift was
12	it was kind of a subjective judgment.
13	So, we feel that an alterative set
14	of assumptions that were equally valid could
15	result in a higher time for action.
16	The bolded line here, though, I
17	guess the take-home message here is that we do
18	feel that, based on this analysis, it's a
19	well-reasoned argument and we feel that this
20	problem is probably tractable at this point.
21	We are in the process of preparing
22	a response for the Work Group, which we plan

to have ready in time for the next 1 2 meeting. 3 Six-B is probably the one issue remaining a problem, 4 that is from an SEC 5 standpoint. 6 Issue 6B was the use of the chest 7 counts to reconstruct thorium intakes 1968 to 1989. 8 After 1968, when this Mobile In 9 10 Vivo Radiation Monitoring Laboratory introduced, the DOE -- or the DWE program was 11 12 essentially terminated and so, completely dependent on the integrity of these 13 chest count data from 1968 to 1989. 14 believe there 15 do are large 16 uncertainties in the data that may render them inadequate for dose reconstruction. 17 White Papers have been exchanged, 18 19 again, as of the -- the first time this issue 20 was really looked at in detail was in April of this year, and during that period of time, 21 22 NIOSH was to provide formal responses to our

concerns on data adequacy and completeness.

Those responses were delivered, again in November, and we're in the process now of reviewing those, and providing our final responses to the Work Group.

I put in a couple of slides to kind of recapture our concerns. The issue of most concern to us is the data integrity from 1968 to 1978.

This is the data that was reported in milligrams thorium. This was during the period of thorium processing.

We have a whole series of these concerns that came out of our White Paper. I'm not going to go through every one of them. They're available for review.

But number three is a very important one, and this is the questionable method to evaluate the age of the source and transform the actinium-228 and lead-212 daughter emissions, the activity back to milligrams of thorium-232.

There are no raw data available, just milligrams thorium reported, and there are considerable uncertainties in the age of the source, the times of the intakes.

If you look at a closed system and you're only looking at lead-212, you've got an uncertainty of maybe two, which is tractable. It's something that can be dealt with.

looking However, you're at actinium-228 from the radium-228 buildup, after thorium is separated, depending on the material, you can of that have uncertainty of up to a factor of 200, if you don't know the age of that material after separation.

The bottom line here is that the inconsistencies between thorium and lead-212 for the period of overlap -- excuse me, I kind of got behind myself. The print is very small, here.

The bottom line is really here, the very last bullet point, the large

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variability and uncertainty in the data and the lack of knowledge on the derivation we believe precludes -- or may preclude the ability to bound the intakes from 1968 to 1978.

So, we do believe this is a continuing SEC issue.

Also, this is another recap of the data adequacy. This is for the next period, the next ten-year period from 1979 to 1988, and during this time, the data reported in nanocuries of thorium, based on both lead-212 and actinium-228 activity levels, and this was a period of stewardship.

Basically, most of the processing was done. Fernald became the thorium -- national thorium repository, and so, much of this material was just being stored during this time frame.

The important thing to take home here is that the raw data are available, and so, it's possible then, based on the relative

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ratios of the activities of the 1 daughter 2 products, to estimate the age of the thorium. 3 So, we do believe that these data may be adequate to bound intakes, and would 4 5 possibly be a Site Profile issue, but we do 6 note that the coworker model for this period 7 uses a GSD of seven, a geometric standard deviation of seven, which is a very large 8 value. 9 10 However, we don't -- we believe 11 that it doesn't really address the 12 individual measurement, the measurement 13 uncertainties. However, it may be adequate, when 14 15 it's applied to an annual distribution of 16 multiple workers, that have not yet been quantified. 17 looking observations 18 We're at 19 regarding data adequacy. We really sum these 20 into two groups. First is the variability 21 and uncertainty of milligram of thorium. 22 Our

original position has been stated. Our interpretation of NIOSH's position is that they basically state that they believe our arguments regarding the lack of usefulness of the milligram data are unfounded.

The large uncertainties in the data, they claim, will just result in larger GSDs and higher upper-bounds in the model, and they also stated that the large proportion of the sub-MDL data are indicative of minimal exposure potential to thorium.

We believe that last statement can be misinterpreted and -- but it really -- our interpretation of that is that the high MDL of six milligrams is really indication of a -- limitations of the counting system, and our basis for that is that chronic intakes of MDL can result in very high doses to organs, up into the sievert level, which could be in the 100 rem level, at the worse case.

We do note that the GSD for this period was 3, and it's -- our concerns remain

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as they did with the later period of time in that the individual measurement uncertainties are not necessarily being accounted for.

The second big issue is the appropriateness of the Mobile In Vivo method for quantitative estimates versus just a screening estimate, and the basis for this is this SRDB reference 011596, which is a fairly detailed paper by Hap West from 1965.

Our original position, which was essentially taken from this report, was that the method was used to determine the thorium burdens, carries many uncertainties and should only be used for qualitative assumptions about thorium burden.

NIOSH disagrees with that position. We agree to disagree on this. They believe that they take excerpts from the same paper to bolster their position, and they also cited our data completeness report as evidence of tacit acceptance of the quantifiability of this data.

We note that at this point, position stands on the limitations of this method, and we also would like to note that study was completeness based the assumption of adequate data. What we did was, we did the two -the adequate -- the adequacy and the completeness study in parallel. The

completeness study is written -- a set-aside adequacy for the time being.

So, let's just for assume that the data are good. Let's look at there is enough of it available to bound the most highly exposed group of workers.

So, our summary position is, plain language, is that our opinion on this is t.hat. NTOSH use the results wants to milligram thorium without really knowing what the results mean.

We don't know which daughters were We don't know how the results from measured. the daughters were transformed into thorium

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lung burdens. We don't know the sensitivity of the measurements, and there were very few number of individuals in 1979 who had measurements in both milligram thorium and in based t.he nanocuries, and on NIOSH methodologies, those two -- those values don't match up.

We'd also like to bring up, there is a precedent from the NIOSH Evaluation Report for Weldon Springs, that provides guidance to disregard the chest counts for that site, due to uncertainties as to when the intakes occurred, which is essentially a disequilibrium argument, and this quote here came right out of that report.

Since the cases were such use of the in vivo data, would be necessary -- would be limited to those with very specific circumstances and information.

So, we do believe an SEC issue remains for milligrams for thorium for 1968 to 1978.

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1 I'd like to move on to the data 2 completeness study. 3 Basically in April, we were tasked to look at three different aspects of data 4 5 The first were whether completeness. 6 thorium workers and their associated exposures 7 were adequately represented in the data set. If they were not, could chemical operators 8 provide a reasonable surrogate for thorium 9 10 workers, for use in a coworker model, and finally, were the workers with the highest 11 12 exposure potential to thorium targeted more 13 frequently for monitoring? preliminary observations 14 Our on 15 the latest NIOSH response is that -- well, let 16 me just back up here. We brought this -- broke this up 17 until three different sub-issues. 18 19 The first being the identification 20 of thorium workers and their relative exposure potential. 21

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Our original position on this was

that there were certain workers identified in the 1968 memo as being thorium workers, and we looked at that group and we looked at chemical operators and then we looked at all workers.

We were able to demonstrate that the thorium workers did, indeed, have higher lung burdens than chemical operators who were not associated with thorium, as well as the all-worker group and, to characterize years after 1968, we made an assumption, and this is kind of what we call a constancy assumption, and that was that workers who were identified in this memo or in the log sheets had thorium worker or former thorium worker identified.

We assume that that sub-group, that cohort was involved in thorium work during that whole ten-year period, from 1968 to 1978, and based on that, that assumption, we were -- reached similar conclusions as we did with the 1968 data alone.

NIOSH's position on this, our interpretation of it, NIOSH's position, is

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that they analyzed this empirical 1968 data using a different approach. They used this Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, and they concluded that thorium workers did not come from different parent population than the other worker population, and they did not feel the comparisons assuming constant thorium worker population were valid.

that they We agree don't necessarily constitute in the independent population, however, we do believe, based on the empirical evidence -- and let me also say that NIOSH's data adequacy response provided some nice probability plots and quantile plots and they show that in most cases, most of the data, which you would expect below the MDL, would kind of be normally distributed, but about five percent is way up above the allowed plot line.

And so, this indicates that there is kind of a -- maybe bimodal distribution, with a sub-set of workers who are -- have a

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higher exposure potential to thorium, and we believe that that particular sub-set needs to be captured in any model that NIOSH is going to put out.

Issue number two is the number of positive results identified during the production period.

We noted that 97 percent of the chest count data in milligrams thorium were less than the detection limit, and this kind of called into question in our minds, reliability of any model based on this data.

We also noted that the percentage of samples greater than the MDL for workers who handled thorium was greater by a factor of two. So, they were more represented in that upper tail of the distribution, seven percent versus three percent for the non-thorium workers.

NIOSH's position on this particular sub-argument was that the model was used, using uncensored -- they used uncensored

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data, and the number of records below the MDA is irrelevant for this type of model.

We do note that OTIB-44, put out in 2009, addresses this very issue of, what do you do when you have a large fraction of data less than MDA?

However, the NIOSH model predates OTIB-44 and instead, relied on OTIB-95, and so, we have concerns that, you know, if this data were to be deemed usable in a coworker model, that it might be a good idea to go back and check and make sure that the OTIB-44 methods had, indeed, been applied.

We also noticed the large proportion of lung burdens, greater than the MDL for thorium workers who just -- for workers who handled this material had a higher exposure potential than workers who did not, and then as a result of that -- I'll just jump ahead.

We feel that some upper-bound value, whether it be the  $95^{\rm th}$  percentile or

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1	some other value, is appropriate to actually
2	capture those workers who did, indeed, handle
3	thorium more frequently than the other non-
4	thorium workers.
5	Issue three was the monitoring
6	criteria for inclusion in the Mobile In Vivo
7	Lung Counting Program.
8	Basically, what we looked at was
9	whether there was any correlation between the
10	those who had higher lung burdens in the
11	sampling frequency.
12	We noted that chest counts, one
13	was coupled with uranium counts, but not
14	always the reverse was true.
15	We also noticed that the in vivo
16	monitoring results showed no bias towards
17	plants where thorium operations took place.
18	NIOSH's position and our
19	observation on this is that specific let me
20	back up here.
21	NIOSH did go back in their
22	response, and provided the specific site

1	interviews, with site experts, and they
2	definitively indicated that there was no
3	preferential sampling conducted for thorium
4	workers after 1968.
5	They were basically chosen for
6	overall exposure potential, not necessarily
7	thorium exposure potential.
8	We agree with that position. We
9	also concluded there is not correlation
10	between workers' monitoring frequency and the
11	thorium lung burden. We also agree with that.
12	This is our summary of our
13	position on this issue, is that the we feel
14	that the in vivo monitoring records are
15	essentially complete. There are no
16	significant chronological gaps.
17	There is no evidence that the
18	highest exposed worker was systematically
19	excluded from the monitoring program.
20	As I said earlier, though, we
21	believe that NIOSH it's incumbent upon

NIOSH to assign a sufficiently bounding intake

1	rate to assure claimant-favorability, that the
2	most highly exposed group of workers is
3	captured adequately.
4	We note that the original model,
5	what we call ORAUT 2008, didn't provide any
6	guidance as to how coworker model should be
7	applied. Basically, what they did was, they
8	calculated the geometric needs and geometric
9	standard deviations.
10	However, the new response does set
11	a floor below which no one should be assigned
12	a lower dose, and they're going to assign the
13	50 <sup>th</sup> percentile, but there is no guidance as
14	to how to determine upper bounds in that
15	particular response.
16	I'd like to move on to this last
17	issue: recycled thorium.
18	As I said, we first became aware
19	of recycled thorium at Fernald at the Savannah
20	River Site teleconference in August 2011.
21	Our SRDB review has indicated that

hundreds of metric tons of this material was

received at Fernald from the mid 60s to the late 1970s, mostly from Savannah River.

Our principle concern here is exposures to U-233, U-232, as well as short-lived isotopes, thorium-234 and protactinium-233, as well as fission products during the processing, handling and storage.

It's kind of analogous to recycled uranium problem, only we're dealing with the contaminants in the thorium instead.

I'd like to also note that previous investigations of thorium intakes had focused on the coworkers models, the DWE model and chest count model. So, any ability to reconstruct intakes of recycled thorium dependent constituents are kind of and predicated on the veracity of those coworkers said, we have serious models, and we as concerns regarding the milligram thorium data during that ten-year period, from 1978.

We note that the data on source-

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1	term configurations and the periods of concern
2	is somewhat sparse, may require data capture
3	trip.
4	However, our sense at this point
5	is that accommodating the recycled thorium
6	will likely result only in changes to the TBD.
7	The main reason for that is that
8	at Fernald, there is an abundance of uranium
9	bioassay data, and the principle constituents
10	of concern are uranium isotopes, and so, what
11	this may involve then is a review of the
12	neutron dose potential from the U-233 and U-
13	232, as well as maybe a re-investigation of
14	the internal DCFs to accommodate U-232.
15	We plan to deliver a paper for
16	discussion at the next Work Group meeting,
17	before the Board meeting in California.
18	So, in summary, few main issues
19	remain to be dispositioned between NIOSH and
20	SC&A, one being the recycled uranium from 1973
21	to 1985.

 $\ensuremath{\operatorname{NIOSH}}$  has quantified the front-end

1	handling intervals to bound the periods during
2	which down-winders and bystanders may have
3	been exposed to the sub-group 10A material.
4	Our concerns, are the new defaults
5	significantly bounding for that, and if so,
6	which we believe they may be, we can move this
7	to a Site Profile discussion.
8	The other issue being chest count
9	data. We need to provide formal response to
10	NIOSH on their November 2011 adequacy and
11	completeness reports, and as I said, SEC
12	concerns remain for 1968 to 1978.
13	We need to provide also a paper on
14	our findings on recycled thorium.
15	We believe that the remaining SEC
16	issues should be resolvable in one final Work
17	Group meeting, and it may be optimistic, but I
18	think we can probably do this before the
19	February final Board meeting, the Work Group
20	meeting, and that is it.
21	Do you want me to take any
22	questions you may have at this time?

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any questions
2	for Mark or John?
3	David and then Bill, or Bill and
4	then David, either one.
5	MEMBER FIELD: I just had a
6	question about a topic that wasn't discussed
7	in your presentation, as far as the radon from
8	the silos.
9	Can you just talk a little bit
10	about that, that potential for exposure,
11	estimating where a person may have been for
12	exposure, from that source?
13	MR. STIVER: The radon from the
14	silos, we basically came to a point where we
15	agreed to disagree with NIOSH, and this was
16	the K-65 silos.
17	During a period of time, when they
18	had not been capped, we felt that the radon
19	concentrations that were emanating from these
20	silos could have been silos 1 and 2, could
21	have been up to a factor of 10 higher than
22	what NIOSH had predicted.

1	We did an extensive review of
2	their transport model, as well as the
3	emanation model, and essentially came to
4	different conclusions on that.
5	I know Bob Anigstein Bob, are
6	you on the line? Bob was going to join us.
7	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Yes, I am.
8	MR. STIVER: Bob did the final
9	analysis on the transport model.
10	Could you say a few words to Dr.
11	Field, and answer his questions on that
12	particular concern?
13	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Is this I'm
14	sorry, I'm having the reception is kind of
15	bad, here. I think I'm misunderstanding you.
16	This is the analysis of the N/P
17	ratio?
18	MR. STIVER: No, this would be the
19	radon emanation in the transport model, the
20	basically
21	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Radon inhalation,
22	I did not do.

1	MR. STIVER: No, I believe that
2	you did the transport model for
3	DR. ANIGSTEIN: The transport
4	model of radon
5	MR. STIVER: Of radon from the K-
6	65
7	DR. ANIGSTEIN: from the K-65
8	silos.
9	MR. STIVER: It's been a while,
LO	sorry to put you on the spot, Bob.
L1	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Is that what we're
L2	talking about?
L3	MR. STIVER: Yes, that's the
L4	issue.
L5	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Well, the yes,
L6	well, we disagreed with the basically, with
L7	the model used oh, I really hadn't expected
L8	to talk about this, it's been quite a while.
L9	But to the best of my
20	recollection, bear with me a minute.
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Why don't we
22	just follow up, then? This is

1	DR. ANIGSTEIN: What we disagreed
2	on
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Bob, please, why
4	don't we just follow up and when you're more
5	prepared and so forth
6	DR. ANIGSTEIN: Okay.
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: It's very hard
8	for us to hear, also.
9	MR. ROLFES: Dr. Field, I believe
10	I might have an answer.
11	I think you asked about the
12	placement of the employees in different
13	positions around the site.
14	That was actually done as part of
15	a research project with the University of
16	Cincinnati, that was led by Susan Pinney, an
17	epidemiologist.
18	She had done about 3,000
19	interviews with workers and basically, placed
20	people into various positions on the site, to
21	determine how much radon they could have been
2 2	ownoged to

1	Now, she asked the individuals
2	this was also a cigarette smoking assessment,
3	because they were looking for, basically, any
4	kind of change in lung function, as a result
5	of working at the Fernald site.
6	So, it necessarily wasn't a cancer
7	outcome, but it was there were some other
8	lung problems that they were looking into.
9	She had interviewed these
10	individuals and when there was uncertainty as
11	to whether the employee was working in one
12	area versus another, they were put into the
13	higher exposure category.
14	They also entered the interview
15	questions also included, you know, what shift
16	they were working, to determine whether or not
17	they could have been subjected to inversions,
18	atmospheric inversions.
19	That was the basis for our
20	approach to use that is the approach that
21	we have adopted to complete dose

reconstructions for radon, because we have

employee specific radon dose estimates in
working level months by year.
MEMBER FIELD: But Susan's study,
the I believe she had like she had
information on about one-third of the workers,
good information, and the rest, sort of like
surrogate location, based on job
classification, work shift, is that right?
MR. ROLFES: I believe so.
MEMBER FIELD: Okay.
MR. ROLFES: I believe that is
correct, and in addition to that in
addition to the MCC siles have research also
addition to the K-65 silos, her research also
included in-process materials, the radon being
included in-process materials, the radon being
included in-process materials, the radon being released from the Q-11 ore silos and in-
included in-process materials, the radon being released from the Q-11 ore silos and in-process in the plants.
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1 positioning of the workers in the various
2 facilities.
What we did question was both the
4 release model from the K-65 silos and the
transport model, and the research done by the
6 University of Cincinnati, using the etching of
7 the window panes, it seemed that the model was
8 valid and they used actually, the transpor-
9 model to validate and to calibrate their -
10 the etching measurements.
But if the transport model itsel:
was not correct, then and the release mode:
was not correct, then the results, the
validation and the calibration is not correct.
So, there was a gap in the logic
that was you know, obviously, you know, we
had no quarrel with the technical part, at the
far end of it, that the University of
19 Cincinnati did.
But the in between part left
was open to a lot of questions.
22 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: David, you still

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, I am -I'm trying to think about what you mean by
bounding with the use of the in vivo data, and
maybe -- maybe you could help me try to
understand.

There is a -- you described that there is a mobile unit which arrives for in vivo counting. It comes on a periodic schedule. There are a number of workers, and there is some probability that a worker is drawn in to visit the van and have an in vivo count.

And so, you could imagine that the information available for a worker has -- there are large time gaps between one in vivo counting and the next.

The timing of the visits of the van is not incident driven, if I'm understanding correctly. It's one of convenience or some sort of schedule.

MR. STIVER: I believe that is how

1	it was done, although in 1968, there was an
2	effort to count the thorium workers in that
3	particular time, up front.
4	MEMBER RICHARDSON: But for a lot
5	of the period, it sounds like there is, let's
6	say, 100 measurements performed in a calendar
7	year, and so, that there is large time gaps
8	between when these counting's are occurring
9	and there the bounding that is so, what
10	is happening, in terms of the bounding?
11	I mean, for me, now, it seems like
12	that is there is a lot of history that
13	could happen between measurements for a person
14	and the
15	MR. STIVER: Well, certainly, you
16	could have an intake at any time, you know,
17	from the end of the last measurement, all the
18	way to the day or the day before the next one.
19	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Right, and so,
20	what's being proposed is is the bounding
21	based I mean, you were talking about the
22	bounding based on the we draw a sample of

1	workers. We've got a limited detection and
2	we'll think that, well, workers may have had
3	something up to that limited detection, and
4	there is uncertainty about the this is the
5	question about the dates of the intake and how
6	large actually
7	MR. STIVER: No, it's the
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: It seems to me
9	like there is you know, actually, you could
10	have intakes and the gap between these
11	measurements is so long as to create a very
12	large
13	MR. STIVER: Well, you could have
14	I guess the problem is, we don't know, for
15	that milligram thorium data, what was
16	measured. All we have is one number
17	milligrams thorium.
18	We have a period of overlap for
19	some workers, where the two data sets don't
20	match up, using the NIOSH approach.
21	We also note that the one
22	measurement or the one set of calculations we

1	were able to locate did indeed use actinium-
2	228, and this is the one that you know,
3	depending on when that material was separated,
4	you could have huge variability's in that
5	number.
6	And so, we just don't think those
7	are credible values to use.
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: And it's
9	the variability, there, you're talking about -
10	_
11	MR. STIVER: In an individual
12	measurement. For one particular worker,
13	you've got a value of milligrams thorium, we
14	don't really know what that means, and we also
15	have you know, like I said, we did have
16	concerns about so much of it being less than
17	the detection limit, although after reading
18	the
19	MEMBER RICHARDSON: But there is -
20	- is the variability the variability you're
21	talking about is characterization of the age
22	of the material that was taken in, but it's

1	is it what about the variability related to
2	the time between intake and the measurements?
3	MR. STIVER: Well, that's also a
4	concern.
5	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Because there,
6	you need multiple measurements, I would think,
7	or
8	MR. STIVER: We do.
9	MEMBER RICHARDSON: information
10	on the date of intake.
11	MR. STIVER: And multiple intakes,
12	you know, because this was periodic work.
13	MEMBER RICHARDSON: That is what
14	I'm not understanding from the description of
15	the process of the individual monitoring, how
16	you're what are the assumptions there?
17	MR. STIVER: Joyce, are you on the
18	line? Joyce Lipsztein has looked into did
19	most of the
20	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Sorry, I was on
21	mute.
22	MR. STIVER: Yes, Joyce, I know

1	you looked at this in considerable detail,
2	about all the different uncertainties that
3	could result in huge variations in these
4	milligram thorium measurements.
5	I know one was the time of the
6	intake relative to separation, also the length
7	of time the material was in the lung before
8	the count, multiple intakes, things of that
9	sort.
10	Could you provide Dr. Richardson
11	with kind of a summary of what your concerns
12	were?
13	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, we let me
14	just get this here.
15	Yes, we have a lot of concerns,
16	especially on the thorium measurements that
17	were reported in milligrams, where concerns
18	refer to we don't know how the results in
19	milligrams were obtained.
20	There were several papers that
21	were where NIOSH has tried to respond to
22	us, and but there is no definite. Sometimes
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

it changes from one paper to the other, and we don't know how the thorium was -- how the measurements in milligrams were derived.

We don't know what was the minimum detection level, and we don't know the uncertainties that were related to the calibration of the -- of the counter.

So, we have too many uncertainties on the information of what was really measured, because thorium cannot be measured by itself. It has to be measured through the daughters.

We know that the daughters that were properly measured were either actinium-228 or lead-212, or a combination of the two, and we don't know how they used this combination, if they used the combination or if they used just one of the nuclides.

What happens is that depending on the time, some separation of thorium from the daughters and the time that the measurement took place, then the activity of the daughters

will vary a lot.

The other thing that we don't know is that what happens is that the daughters have a different behavior in the lung, so, what they mean is that thorium is less soluble than the daughters, so, thorium remains longer in the lung than the daughters.

So, when you measure the daughters, you have to know in relation to the exposure time, how long has it been there, even if you know the age of the source, you don't know how much time has passed since the worker was monitored and the measurement was made.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, that was the --

DR. LIPSZTEIN: So, to relate to this uncertainty in the lung, you have to know if the worker was engaged in that thorium work, at that time, in a continuous thorium work, or if, you know, he worked and was measured six months after or eight months

after. So, we don't know this, also.

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MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, it was the last point that Ι particularly was interested in, and whether you've had an look opportunity to at some illustrative records for workers and consider how long the timing is between when they had an in vivo when the next in vivo count and occurred.

So, the description here is that there was not specific targeting of thorium workers, which means that each time the van visits, there is some sort of random draw of workers from the full population in, and it means that the gap — the timing gap then, for the thorium workers, is not each time the van visits the facility —

DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: -- and it's not incident driven, which means that you've potentially got long gaps between when you have one in vivo monitoring and when you have

1	the next.
2	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Yes, sometimes.
3	MEMBER RICHARDSON: And I would
4	imagine that becomes a very large
5	DR. LIPSZTEIN: For the workers,
6	you have several measurements, depending on
7	the year, also.
8	So, it's very valuable and we
9	don't know who were the workers that
10	specifically were working with thorium, and if
11	it was a continuous work with thorium.
12	So, there are too many
13	uncertainties, and we don't even know which
14	side was which daughter was measured.
15	So, you know, it's too many
16	uncertainties on this transformation on the
17	data on milligrams, and we have a bunch
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you.
19	DR. LIPSZTEIN: You know, we have
20	some
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Excuse me, we
22	need to move along here. We've got a

1	petitioner waiting to speak and other issues,
2	and I think we understand the point.
3	DR. LIPSZTEIN: Okay, okay.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you.
5	DR. LIPSZTEIN: My point is that,
6	that many uncertainties is related to the
7	measurement in milligrams.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, that's the
9	point we understood. Thank you.
10	DR. LIPSZTEIN: And I don't think
11	we know exactly which what each measurement
12	means, in terms of the dose.
13	MR. STIVER: All right, thank you
14	very much, Joyce. I think you've clarified
15	this, to the extent that we can, at this
16	point.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Mark, do you
18	have a brief comment?
19	MR. ROLFES: Yes, I do. Dr.
20	Richardson, to address the issue of the
21	intermittent measurements on site.
22	The mobile in vivo monitoring

1	laboratory did come on a regular basis of
2	about six month intervals. They did focus on
3	the employees with the highest potential for
4	exposure, and we have no reason to believe
5	that those people with the highest potential
6	for exposure for uranium versus thorium were
7	any different. We believe that they were the
8	same Class of workers, the chemical operators.
9	If you have one point of in vivo
10	data in time, the incident issue that you
11	brought up is more significant than if you
12	have multiple data points.
13	When you have more data, you're
14	able to get a better understanding of how much
15	thorium that worker was exposed to over their
16	entire work history.
17	And so, that is one of the reasons
18	that we've agreed to assign a baseline of a
19	coworker intake at the 50 <sup>th</sup> percentile for
20	everyone.
21	So, we believe that one point by

itself may not be meaningful, but as a whole,

1	the data that have been collected, the
2	thousands of measurements that have been
3	conducted, are meaningful in a coworker intake
4	model.
5	Regarding the incidents, there
6	have been incidents where employees from
7	Fernald were sent to other facilities to have
8	lung counts done, because of that incident,
9	and the same mobile in vivo unit also serviced
10	the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, as well
11	as the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
12	There has also been instances of
13	employees from Fernald going to those two
14	facilities, as well as to Oak Ridge, to have a
15	lung count conducted.
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Mark.
17	John?
18	MR. STIVER: Okay, I was just
19	saying that, you know, what Mark says may be
20	valid. We did make that point in our
21	presentation, that when multiple workers are

considered over a long period of time, over an

1	annual interval, that a lot of those
2	uncertainties may cancel each other out.
3	We do still have concerns
4	regarding the individual measurements and what
5	they really mean. I guess that is really
6	where I wanted to be at this point, and we'll
7	take this up in the Work Group, the next time.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, John,
9	thank you. Can we hear is the Petitioner
10	on the line, and do they which to speak?
11	MS. BALDRIDGE: Yes, this is
12	Sandra.
13	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you,
14	Sandra.
15	MS. BALDRIDGE: I've prepared a
16	statement, and I thank the Board for the
17	opportunity to express some of my concerns
18	about thorium.
19	As a reminder, the Fernald
20	petition was filed because of discrepancies
21	between the Site Profile prepared by NIOSH,
22	and the historic Federal Fernald documents

that I was able to obtain, in particular, it involved thorium processing in Plant 6.

Section 5.2.3 of the Technical Basis Document for the occupational internal comprehensive effort dose states, "A reconstruct the effluent of uranium and thorium from the Fernald Plant discovered that a large number of records and files were destroyed in the early 1970's, during the declassification efforts." according to Dolan and Hill, 1988.

Review of Atomic Energy Commission records in Oak Ridge and Atlanta failed to uncover additional details. Thorium processes had been shut down and most of the thorium processing equipment had been removed, prior to the effluent data reconstruction, which made the reconstruction more difficult.

The data reconstruction was based on information that was gathered from FMPC, Oak Ridge, the Atomic Energy Commission and FMPC customers, in addition to interviewing

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1	current and retired Fernald workers.
2	The questions that workers were
3	asked are noted in the Technical Basis
4	Document.
5	I find it strange that they were
6	not asked if they had knowledge of additional
7	plant locations where thorium had been
8	processed.
9	So, the records discovered
10	presented incomplete picture of thorium at
11	Fernald. The attempt to reconstruct data is
12	flawed. NIOSH missed three and a half years
13	of thorium processing, in Plant 6. The
14	question is, what else has been missed?
15	What was in the records that were
16	destroyed? Was it so incriminating that it
17	had to be destroyed?
18	In June 1989, Federal Court
19	documents from a trial entitled 'Fernald One
20	Summary Jury Trial' indicate the Defendants,
21	that's National Lead of Ohio, represented that
22	there was no thorium-230 at the Feed Materials

Production Center.

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It was not until August 1990, that the plaintiff learned that the thorium-230 had been leaking from the K-65 silo.

This would suggest that workers may not have been aware that they were processing thorium. I'd like to note that trial proceeded the lawsuit this established the medical monitoring program for Fernald workers.

Shortly after filing the SEC petition, I met a former supervisor from Plant 6, who was working there while thorium was being processed. He insisted that I was wrong and that thorium was never in Plant 6.

The historic documents, however, included monthly and weekly reviews of the processing over the three and a half year period.

Based on my experience, I can assume that some of those workers interviewed by NIOSH may have also been limited or had no

1	knowledge of the thorium being processed at
2	Fernald.
3	I feel NIOSH established a mind
4	set about Fernald at the onset of dose
5	reconstruction process, and have manipulated
6	information to reinforce this mind set.
7	For example, Fernald documents
8	revealed one of the dirtiest operations in the
9	nation, yet NIOSH, according to the TBD, would
9	nacton, yet Niosh, according to the IBD, would
10	have us believe they followed strict good
11	housekeeping practices.
12	NIOSH acknowledges that Fernald
13	was the official national repository for
14	thorium, beginning in 1972, but failed to
14 15	
	thorium, beginning in 1972, but failed to
15	thorium, beginning in 1972, but failed to acknowledge petition documentation that
15 16	thorium, beginning in 1972, but failed to acknowledge petition documentation that Fernald was requested to begin stock piling
15 16 17	thorium, beginning in 1972, but failed to acknowledge petition documentation that Fernald was requested to begin stock piling thorium as early as the late 1950s, thereby,

report by Dr. Pinney, I'd like to also point

out that that did not include thoron, and I

21

1	thank you for the opportunity that I've had to
2	present my perspective on the thorium problem
3	at Fernald, and I feel based on the lack of
4	information and the way in which it was found,
5	that there is probably more to the story than
6	has been revealed. Thank you.
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you,
8	Sandra, appreciate it.
9	Brad, you had a comment, and then
10	
11	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes, I just
12	wanted to make sure that everybody understood
13	that on several of these, SC&A has felt that
14	it's bounding, but it hasn't come to the Work
15	Group yet. That is their recommendation at
16	this time. But the Work Group has not
17	addressed those.
18	But what I do want to bring up is,
19	all of you are starting to see the complexity
20	of this plant. In one side, it's tried to tie
21	it up into a nice little box and a nice little
22	bowl, and my personal feeling is, is it's not

that way.

As you can see by the complexity of this, we are going to have one more Work Group, and then -- because many of these, we can -- we differ on.

So, it's going to be coming to us.

So, in the part of -- end of January, we're going to have our final Work Group meeting, and what I would ask the Board to do is if they have specific questions on this, that we get them kind of in advance, so that we can try to address these out.

This is a complex plant. Part of the problem too is they have good urinalysis.

So, you've got some good information, not others, and this plant did a lot of work and produced a lot of stuff out of it, and it's difficult.

So, if there any of these things, if you could send them to us, so, we can try to have these addressed, so that we can come to the Board, and I apologize.

1	I know there is a lot of
2	information on there, but I requested John to
3	go into great detail on it, because I wanted
4	you to see the complexity of what we're
5	dealing with. Thank you.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you, Brad.
7	We need to wrap up here, because we need a
8	break, and then we need to move on.
9	But I would urge the Work Group to
10	also think about how this can best be
11	packaged.
12	I have some concerns, whether
13	given that you are in different places, in
14	terms of reviewing issues, and I'm not totally
15	confident you'll resolve everything in the
16	next Work Group, that you think about how to
17	package and bring it forward.
18	It seems to me that the 1967 to
19	1978 period is close, and you know, frankly,
20	I'd be ready after today, to vote on that, and
21	I think certainly, bring it to some sort of

decision by the Board, and may make more

progress, or if there is other -- there is a lot of other areas there of concern. I think what we heard presented raised a number of issues.

So, those -- some of those issues may be brought forward. I may remind, we keep hearing about something being bounded, but it has to be a plausible bond, and some of those bonds, at least to me, based on what little I heard was -- don't appear to be necessarily plausible, and other issues.

But let's -- we need to try to really -- it's gone on long enough. We really need to try to resolve, as best we can. Maybe we can't, by the next Board meeting. But we should at least be trying.

But what the Work Group can bring forward, if it's too complicated, or certain issues aren't ready, maybe we need to split them up somehow, in terms of how they're presented.

We will try to leave a significant

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1	amount of time at the Board meeting, to deal
2	with this. It may be longer than our usual
3	hour or whatever, if that's what I think may
4	be necessary, because I'm not sure that
5	everyone can anticipate all of their questions
6	by the Work Group meeting, or they'll end up
7	having more afterwards. That is a it's
8	hard to do from a distance.
9	We also will do our best to get a
10	good package of information out to the with
11	key documents and so forth, to Board Members
12	ahead of time, that are pertinent to what
13	needs to be addressed.
14	So, is that satisfactory with
15	everybody?
16	Okay and you'll notice, I didn't
17	mention radon, Wanda.
18	Let's take a break. Let's try to
19	be back here about ten of, and we'll get
20	started.
21	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
22	matter went off the record at 10:33 a.m. and

	resumed at 10.57 a.m.)
2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, I think
3	we're ready to resume, and we're going to be
4	talking about the Savannah River Site, and I
5	think that we all know that at our last
6	meeting, NIOSH had recommended that a Class be
7	added to the SEC for Savannah River.
8	We had had some questions or
9	there. There were questions on the Class
10	Definition, and so, the Work Group has been
11	following up on that, as has NIOSH, and I
12	believe Mark is going to give us a
13	presentation on
14	MR. KATZ: Yes, just to start.
15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: To start, so,
16	Mark Griffon.
17	MR. KATZ: So, just I'd said
18	earlier, I had distributed some material from
19	Tim Taulbee, to Mark and the rest of the Board
20	Members, by email, just to let you know, some
21	slides that he prepared, just delivered this

morning.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, I'll -- I think the way I'd like to do this is to sort of introduce this, and then have NIOSH do their presentation, and then I'll give a brief introduction on what the Work Group has done and SC&A is going to fill in some of the details on what they've done.

We had looked at this initial proposed Class Definition in a Work Group phone call meeting. Out of that phone call meeting, there were some questions about how NIOSH, or actually, how DOL would implement the Class, whether they could identify the workers that would fall within the Class.

So, we, the Work Group, asked SC&A to go back and consider that Definition a little more closely, including looking at some sample cases.

Subsequent to that, before our last Work Group meeting, which we just had a few days ago, NIOSH modified their Class Definition.

1	So, we're in the midst of
2	considering, you know, just this Class
3	Definition, and the main issue under
4	discussion is whether they can identify this
5	sort of sub-set of workers, or whether we have
6	to consider a broader definition, in terms of
7	the workers, if we consider all workers within
8	the time period.
9	So, I'll first ask if NIOSH wants
10	to present their piece.
11	MR. HINNEFELD: We don't have
12	anything to present. We thought, you know,
13	the presentation was
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: Oh, I thought the
15	
16	MR. HINNEFELD: There is a
17	presentation, but it's not ours.
18	MEMBER GRIFFON: But there was a
19	PowerPoint that Ted sent around this morning.
20	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, he sent a
21	few slides.
22	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay.

1	MR. HINNEFELD: Tim sent a few
2	slides, which I believe are complementary or
3	supplementary to this.
4	MEMBER GRIFFON: Well, it was a
5	PowerPoint, explaining some of the we asked
6	them to look at the gaps in that data. Anyway,
7	okay.
8	MR. HINNEFELD: Hang on a minute.
9	MEMBER GRIFFON: I guess we have
10	the slides, but
11	MR. HINNEFELD: This was what was
12	sent this morning, right?
13	MEMBER GRIFFON: Right, right. So,
14	no one is really available to speak to that,
15	from NIOSH?
16	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, Tim is on
17	the phone, I believe. Tim, are you on the
18	phone?
19	MR. KATZ: He is.
20	MEMBER GRIFFON: Tim, can you give
21	a brief you don't have to go through your
22	exact overheads, but if you can give a brief

1	description of where you're at with the new
2	Class Definition and this gap analysis that we
3	asked for in the last Work Group meeting.
4	MR. KATZ: Tim, we can't hear you.
5	I don't know if it's your end or our end. But
6	your voice is very faint. I don't know which
7	end the problem is.
8	DR. TAULBEE: Can you hear me now?
9	MR. KATZ: There we go.
LO	MR. HINNEFELD: That's better.
11	DR. TAULBEE: Okay?
L2	MR. KATZ: Yes, thank you, Tim.
L3	DR. TAULBEE: Thank you very much.
L4	They did an update on why we've changed our
L5	Class Definition slightly.
L6	We wanted to provide some
L7	clarification. From reading SC&A's report, it
L8	appeared that there was some confusion among
L9	our Class Definition, as to what our intent
20	was, and so, by changing some of the wording
21	around, we've hopefully made this clear, and

clarifications are -- is to

some of the

1	specify that the 250 day requirement isn't 250
2	days within an area, or 250 days worth of
3	dosimeter codes.
4	What we indicated during our
5	presentation back at Hanford, was that we
6	would have one dosimeter code would be all
7	we would consider for inclusion into the
8	Class, not 250 days worth of dosimeter codes.
9	So, we hopefully clarified that
10	with this new proposed Class.
11	The other item was the inclusion
12	of unknown location. Within the latter time
13	period, this would be post-1958, a dosimeter
14	code of 000 was used when the issuance
15	location was not known.
16	To us, the other these people
17	are equivalent to the ones who may have been
18	exposed to thorium.
19	Again, I've broken when I did -
20	- provided my discussion to the Board back in
21	August, I separated workers into three
22	categories. One was likely exposed workers,

and those are the ones within 773A and CMX/TNX facilities, and then workers who may have been exposed, and that was where we opened it up to construction trades workers.

Then the other category was workers not exposed, based upon their dosimeter codes, as working in the reactor area or the separation areas in specific time periods.

So, we included the 000 code and - in this definition, and added language about
when records are illegible or indeterminable.

The only other change to the definition was the addition of two dosimeter code designations, Y and D2 for the CMX/TNX facility, and this was the result of an investigation that we went through and found that the designation for that area actually changed.

This was the very first facility at Savannah River to handle radioactive material, and so, it changed from Y to D2, or

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Y to CMX, then D2, and so, we wanted to add those two designators for completeness.

So, are my slides present for everyone to see?

MR. KATZ: Yes.

TAULBEE: Okay, if you go to DR. the next slide then, this is our proposed Class Definition, and it's currently at all externally monitored employees at the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies and their contractors and subcontractors, records have least at one of the following dosimeter codes, A, G, CMX, TNX, D2, or the code is blank illegible, Y or indicating issuance from an unknown indeterminable location, and worked at Savannah River Site from January 1, 1953 through December 31, 1957, for a number of work days aggregating at least 250 days, occurring either solely under their employment or in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other

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Classes of employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort, or this is a very long definition.

So, the next slide, if you go to, or whose work -- or whose records have at least one of the following dosimeter codes 5A, 5C, 6B through 6Z, 12D through 12H, through 12Z, or 000 indicating issuance from an unknown location and worked at the Savannah River Site from January 1, 1958 September 30, 1972, low number of work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more of the other Classes of employees, including the Special Exposure Cohort.

So, that is our changes to the Special Exposure Cohort petition definition, that we're proposing.

Are there any questions on that, before I move onto the gap analysis?

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MEMBER GRIFFON: No, I think, Tim, you can go ahead onto the gap analysis. Maybe explain, from the Work Group, why we -- why you did this gap analysis, sort of what was the reason that we asked for it?

DR. TAULBEE: Okay, a week ago, Monday, on November 28<sup>th</sup>, we received a report from SC&A considering our Class Definition, where they did an analysis of 10 Claimants, and went through their dosimetry records to see if this Class could be -- I guess the purpose is implemented, or whether there were any gaps within the dosimetry records that needed be resolved would to or create problems.

Well, they identified 130 gaps among these 10 Claimants. One of the comments, though, that SC&A indicated in their report was they did not evaluate the reason for the gap, and so, during our Work Group call last Friday, we committed that we would go through and look at these gaps, and see if

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1	there is a reason for them, and whether they
2	can be resolved.
3	Well, we used the Site Research
4	Database and work history cards to evaluate
5	these gaps, that were identified.
6	So, in summary, of the 130 gaps
7	that were identified, we've resolved 99 of
8	them, just in the past few days. So, that
9	comprises 76 percent.
LO	Now, there is still 15 that we've
11	categorized as possibly resolved and 16
L2	unresolved.
L3	So, in total, there are 88 percent
L4	of these gaps, we've categorized into resolved
L5	or possibly resolved.
L6	It's important to note that there
L7	are no unresolved issues post-1963. So, all
L8	of these gaps that are still in the possibly
L9	resolved or unresolved category are pre-1964.
20	So, this is an early time period
21	where we would expect to find more difficulty
22	with the gaps.

So, if we go to the next slide, I'll give a little better definition of what we've defined as resolved, possibly resolved and unresolved.

For the resolved, we either found dosimetry data, or they were not employed during this time period, the code was 000, and the break-down of those 99, 49 of them we found dosimetry results in the SRDB that were not provided with the Claimant's file, but the data is there, within our access, within our Site Research Database.

So, we've considered those gaps to be resolved in that we have HP location information. We have these dosimeter codes and information during that time period.

And then on top, the number of 000 codes, there were 24 of those 99 resolved, were the 000 codes, which I think our change - or our addition to Class Definition takes care of. So, those are resolved.

So, that left us with, I believe

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it's 26 unresolved -- or no, 26 resolved issues, that we were able to come through from a job change within their work history cards, where they changed from a job, where they were monitored, to a job where they were not expected to be monitored, such as electronics and instrumentation technician, E&I technician, to a clerical position.

The possibly resolved is again, being evaluated right now. We're not done. We just got started on this last week, so, we've got some more work to do.

just to give an indication, again, job change appears to be one of the major issues. Nine of 16 possibly the resolved are one individual and it's -- he has a GI indicated in his work history card, but we're not sure what that means. It could be military service. It could not be. We just don't know at this point. We need to track that down more.

And then there is an additional --

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1	I think it's 16 or 12 percent, that are
2	unresolved, that we need for further evaluate
3	over the next few weeks.
4	So, that is where we're at with
5	this analysis. Again, we haven't had this
6	a great deal of time. We really got started
7	on this last Thursday and Friday, and my team,
8	Mike Mahathy in particular, has been working
9	very hard over the past few days to try and
LO	get this far.
L1	So, that is where we're at with
L2	the gap analysis.
L3	One final slide, the next slide,
L4	please, is an analysis that we did of the
L5	Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews, and
L6	this was something that was brought up back in
L7	August, could we use this information?
L8	And it doesn't it's not a
L9	scientific study, because we're looking at
20	self-reported information.
21	But we went through and identified
22	did a keyword search within the CATI

1	database, all Claimants from Savannah River,
2	and we identified 171 Claimants who self-
3	identified that they worked in Building 773 or
4	CMX/TNX.
5	Of these 171, 154 were identified
6	as during the covered period from 1953 through
7	1972.
8	Based on the definition that we've
9	proposed, originally, not even this modified
10	one well, I guess the modified one does
11	include the 000 code, so, I should clarify
12	that.
13	But based upon these dosimeter
14	codes, 151 of the 154 self-identified people
15	would be included in the Class, based upon
16	their dosimetry codes.
17	Three Claimants were not included.
18	One of them was an administrative person who
19	worked in a typing pool. Another was a
20	computer programmer who stated in the CATI
21	that they did not work with radioactive

materials, and the other was a power equipment

1	operator or power equipment inspector, who
2	went around to various buildings throughout
3	the plant, and in his CATI, indicated a large
4	number of buildings that he said he went into.
5	So, that is kind of an overview of
6	our CATI analysis, where we feel that this
7	dosimeter or this Class Definition will
8	work, in the vast majority of the cases, and
9	so, that's an update, where we're at.
10	Are there any questions?
11	MEMBER GRIFFON: Thanks. Yes, I
12	think we had one or two questions. David, did
13	you have a question on that, on the NIOSH
14	presentation?
15	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Thank you. So,
16	by gap, you meant a year in which or maybe
17	first, could you define to me what you meant
18	by a gap?
19	DR. TAULBEE: I would defer to
20	SC&A to define that, sorry. They are the ones
21	who came up with their definition of gaps.
22	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, by gap, we

1	meant where we didn't find a record with a
2	dosimetry code, and the 000, where we did find
3	them, were explicitly identified as such. We
4	didn't call them gaps, but to combine all of
5	those into the 130.
6	But gaps was when employment was
7	indicated, at least as far as we could tell,
8	and there was no code that we could find for
9	that period.
10	MEMBER RICHARDSON: And a gap
11	could arise because the person was unmonitored
12	in that year, or the was monitored the
13	dosimetry record was not located, or the
14	dosimetry record was located and it didn't
15	have a health physics department code
16	associated with it?
17	DR. MAKHIJANI: Yes, Dr.
18	Richardson, we as I as Tim said
19	correctly, we did not explore the reasons for
20	the gaps, and we looked at two things.
21	We looked at the DOE files in the
22	Claimant records, and we also looked at the

Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews, and we 1 2 didn't go into the details, and Tim has gone 3 into some of that in his presentation to you. 4 MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay, and so, you -- Tim, you described that you resolved 76 5 6 percent of the gaps by identification that --7 or by -- by determining that a job change had occurred? 8 Not all of those. 9 DR. TAULBEE: The vast majority of them were a page -- a 10 page of the dosimetry record was not in the 11 Claimant's file, but we have the actual -- we 12 13 have complete quarterly dosimetry reports that we've obtained form the site, and we went 14 15 through those. 16 Those are all located in the Site Research Database, and we went through those, 17 looking for that particular person, and that 18 19 gap, that missing data, and in 49 of the 99 20 resolved cases, we were able to find those. That was the reason that gap was resolved. 21

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Okay,

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so, that is one group of

1	these of those 99 resolved.
2	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Could you
3	first describe that to me a little bit more?
4	They had dosimetry information that wasn't
5	provided to SC&A?
6	DR. TAULBEE: They had that is
7	correct. They had dosimetry information that
8	is in the Site Research Database, that was not
9	provided by the site in the Claimant file.
10	Generally, what happens, a page is
11	missed or in the earlier time periods, when
12	Claimant files were being sent to us, if there
13	was no change in the dose, for example, they
14	were monitored but all of their dosimeter
15	readings were zero, and the site wouldn't send
16	us that particular page.
17	The location information is still
18	there on that page. It's just, all of their
19	doses are blank for that time period, and in
20	that time period, blank can mean one of two
21	things.

One, that the reading was zero in

1	the main is the main one, and the other is,
2	is that during that time period, they never
3	picked or wore their dosimeter badge.
4	So, if they were working in
5	another area, but badged in a particular area,
6	they never went into the area.
7	So, the site, whenever the
8	dosimetry or the the total dose doesn't
9	change, didn't always send us every one of
10	those pages, and that's why we were able to
11	find so many of them.
12	But the location information is
13	there.
14	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, just to
15	finish up with this
16	DR. TAULBEE: I'm sorry, you were
17	breaking up, sir.
18	MEMBER RICHARDSON: The proposed
19	Class Definition that you have is based on
20	health physics area codes, right?
21	DR. TAULBEE: That is correct.
22	MEMBER RICHARDSON: And so, how is

1	a gap where there is a missing health physics
2	area code for a period of employment resolved
3	by determining that their job title has
4	changed?
5	I would consider those as two
6	dimensions of a matrix, where somebody may
7	hold a job title and that job title may be
8	held in various areas, either potentially
9	clerical workers assigned to the 100 area or
10	the 200 area and so on.
11	To identify that the person has
12	changed from an E&I tech to a clerical worker,
13	to me, doesn't resolve the question about the
14	other dimension of classifying them, which is
15	the area in which they worked as a clerical
16	worker.
17	DR. TAULBEE: I don't disagree
18	with you on principle, that it is a two-
19	dimensional type of matrix.
20	We are making an assumption that
21	when somebody moves from a when somebody is
22	monitored and their job title is electronics

and instrumentation technician, and then they

-- the monitoring records stop for a time

period, and we look at the work history card

and it says they became a clerical person for

this time period, and then their monitoring

records pick up again, and their job title

changed again, either back to E&I or to some

other job, that one might assume to be

monitored, in our opinion, it's showing that

somebody is moving from -- that those two are

coinciding together.

I agree that it wouldn't always be the case, but this seems like a very plausible scenario of somebody who is monitored and then they're not monitored. Well, why were they no longer monitored? Why don't we have any records for them? It's in that work history and their job changed.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: I am not contending that any of those are wrong, that they are -- that their job title did not change and the determination that they needed

to be badged or not badged changed.

But I'm asking, why are you assuming that they weren't a clerical worker in a given area? Why do you believe that they changed spatially, their physical location, as opposed to a job title change, where for a while, I'm a pipefitter in an area, and then I switch over to, you know, a general service operator in that same area, and I'm working -- you know, I tend to work in that physical location?

DR. TAULBEE: You are correct, they could have continued working in that area. There was that job title change. I believe without them being monitored, there would not have been an exposure to thorium.

In order to be exposed to thorium in the 773A area, you had to have been badged. You had to have gone into that area.

So, for the Class Definition, if they were still working in 773A, and I don't know the specifics on this, personally, I

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1	don't have them in front of me, but say, they
2	moved from the laboratory area into the front
3	part, into A-wing, where it's an
4	administrative area, they didn't physically
5	change location, but their potential for
6	exposure to thorium ceased when they moved
7	into this other part of the building.
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: But is that
9	how the Class is defined?
10	DR. TAULBEE: The Class is defined
11	based upon the potential for exposure to
12	thorium in 773A in the TNX facilities.
13	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Based on
14	health physics areas, right, not based on job
15	titles, held within health physics areas?
16	DR. TAULBEE: That is correct. It
17	is based upon the monitoring of the health
18	physics codes.
19	What the gap analysis or what the
20	gaps were purporting was that we don't have
21	complete records, and so, when this person is
22	not when this record is incomplete, we

don't know whether they worked and exposed to thorium or not, and what I'm trying to show during this review of work history cards is that it doesn't appear like this had а potential for person exposure thorium, when this code changed, or when this monitoring record ceased before it picked up again.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: So, the way that you've resolved the gap, I guess is what I need to be clarified.

Are you resolving the gap under the assumption that they've remained in that area and continued to accrue their days of exposure there, or have you resolved the gap under the assumption that for that break in period, they moved out of that health physics area to one which is not considered part of the Class Definition?

DR. TAULBEE: The latter, but it's more of the standpoint of, they moved out of the area and were not monitored because they

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1	didn't need to be monitored.
2	If they moved to another area, and
3	were monitored, we have that record.
4	MEMBER GRIFFON: Why don't we I
5	think at this point, it would be good to have
6	
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, Jim
8	MEMBER GRIFFON: Oh, I'm sorry,
9	Jim, go ahead.
10	MEMBER LOCKEY: Just maybe, for
11	David, it would inform you that this analysis
12	was done on what 10? I forget, it was 10
13	cases that were submitted.
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: Right.
15	MEMBER LOCKEY: It's not a random
16	analysis, so, there are concerns about that.
17	I'd like to know whether this is
18	representative of the group as a whole. I
19	don't know that one way or the other.
20	MEMBER GRIFFON: It's also
21	interesting that a lot of effort has gone into
22	resolving these 10 cases.

1	But having said that, I'll let
2	SC&A maybe present their side of what they've
3	you know, they've reviewed this, also, and
4	Arjun, if you can present your work.
5	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: While we are
6	getting that set up, I have a logistical
7	question.
8	I know Dr. Lockey has to leave
9	around 3:30 p.m. Has anybody else got an
10	earlier flight?
11	(Off mic comments.)
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, I just
13	wanted to check. Sorry to pick on you, Jim,
14	but no, I just needed was trying to figure
15	out
16	MEMBER LOCKEY: You warned me.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: That's right, I
18	warned you. I won't tell you informed
19	consent, but informed.
20	MEMBER LOCKEY: Informed, that is
21	right.
22	DR. MAKHIJANI: Okay, I just want

to ask whether Lynn Ayers is on the phone?
Lynn, are you one the phone?

(No response.)

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DR. MAKHIJANI: Doesn't matter, Okay, the first slide just gives a okay. little bit of an overview of the history of the thorium SEC issue, and the -- in 2010, NIOSH published an ER addendum covering one part of the thorium issue in which they presented a dose reconstruction method in the 300M area, and then there was another report that went beyond 1965, and there are a number of outstanding issues. We've issued reports about that and so on.

That is not under discussion actively today. But just as reminder, that there are other thorium areas that have been and continue to be under discussion.

Then on August 9, 2011, NIOSH published addendum 2, which is what we're discussing today. Sorry, it says September 310, 1972. Should be September 30, 1972, in

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1 the last bullet there. 2 As you have heard from Tim, NIOSH 3 SEC for thorium for certain proposed an workers in certain areas, up to September 30, 4 5 1972, starting in 1953. 6 I put up the original definition because our analysis of these 10 cases was 7 against this original definition, certain 8 areas up to 1957 and certain dosimetry codes 9 10 in the years from 1958 to September 30, 1972, and so, now, that has changed, and I'll come 11 12 to that. 13 But I just want to remind you that this is what we were analyzing against. 14 15 So, we, as Dr. Lockey said, we 16 reviewed a small sample. It was not random. This was just to get an idea of whether there 17 18 were gaps. 19 The reason we did this, other than 20 time and resources and to get a preliminary

look, is that in the way this Class Definition

has been proposed, you actually have to have a

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1	record for every area and every period for
2	which the worker worked, because even one
3	designation of the particular type that's in
4	the Class, would qualify the worker.
5	So, if you've got one period in
6	which you have more records, then you don't
7	know what to do with that, and so, the object
8	was to find how many periods there were, for
9	which there were no records or illegible
10	records and so on.
11	We submitted a report on November
12	28 <sup>th</sup> , and most of these claims were provided
13	as being problem claims of non-random in that
14	sense, too, by Petitioner representatives.
15	So, let's see, here. So, our main
16	finding was that there was only one case.
17	Now, we reviewed the DOE files and
18	the CATIs, the DOE file in the claimant record
19	and the CATI.
20	Only one case had complete records
21	out of 10, with no uncertainties or
22	discrepancies. Four out of 10 cases had some

uncertainties and discrepancies, gaps, various kinds of things, and there were several kind of problem areas that we identified gaps, meaning no records, the 000 code that you about, heard and in the first period, especially from 1957 -- from 1953 to 1957, there were illegible records, blank records, stuff that was scratched out and not replaced, twice scratched out, replaced with something, again scratched out and so on and so on.

So, we considered all of these to be problem areas, and five out of the 10 cases where there were these incomplete, illegible records and so on, there was no -- or there were gaps, there was no code present indicating that they would be qualified for inclusion.

Now, under the present -- under the present revised definition, more than four out of 10 would be included, but not all 10.

All right, so, a little more detail. We compiled a number of employee

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years, and there were 139 employee years 10 workers, and 55 percent these the 3 employee years had complete records. Forty-five percent of the years were either fully or partially problematic in

> Now, I understand, you know, NIOSH has filled in some of those gaps. This is as presented in our November report, and so, percent of the claims had some kind of gap or illegible records, or blank or unreadable records and so on.

> also looked at the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews, and we had a couple of conclusions about that.

> Generally, these computer assisted interviews are very broad, where did you work. I worked in 100 area. I worked in the 200 area, but they don't give you years, you know, or even -- this requires, in many cases, a finer grain than years. They don't say, "Well, in the first quarter of 1964, I worked

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some way.

in the 200H area and so on." You don't have that kind of detail, generally, in the computer assisted interview.

They may have referred to the 773 or 773A, as Tim has indicated, but in survivor interviews where the worker himself has passed away, generally, you have even less detail than that and often, you may find nothing. So, there would be kind of an issue.

Generally, we didn't think while you might be able to include people from CATI and go there and find that they, in deed, were potentially thorium exposed, CATI would not be very useful to ensure that a worker was not present in SEC area, generally speaking.

So, we presented this at the Work Group meeting, and NIOSH, upon reviewing our research, proposed wider definition, which you have heard about, and you have seen a written proposal, so I won't dwell on this.

So, a couple of comments on what NIOSH has presented.

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You heard from the Petitioner yesterday that, you know, for construction workers they may have had a badge in a particular area and then worked in other areas.

I've looked over the interviews.

We did some interviews with workers in 2010 or 2009, I don't remember.

the interview Anyway, you have record that was provided to the Board, and put drive, and in reviewing those on the O: records, the construction workers who were not DuPont - the construction workers who were DuPont employees generally were assigned to some particular operations area. This according to the interviews that we've compiled.

Construction workers who were not DuPont employees tended to fill in the gaps where they were needed, and so, who were more -- possibly more all over the site and could be called up to go from one place to another.

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So, that is one particular issue.

In regard to the gaps, I'd like to comment. This -- there has been a question about workers not wearing badges, and this question would come up.

The third point I'd like to make is something that was referred to by Dr. Lockey. You said that, of course, you wanted to see a more complete analysis.

Complete analysis that is non-random and a properly -- that is a random sample, that is properly stratified would be pretty forbidding in this case, in my opinion.

I mean, we haven't consulted with our statistician, and I would certainly defer to him, if we were asked to do that.

But because you have to have every record, you'd have to have a pretty large sample. You not only are looking at the DOE records, then you are looking at every single record for every worker.

These are available at Savannah

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1	River Site, as Tim has mentioned. Sometimes,
2	each record runs into 1,000 pages. We did
3	this at Nevada Test Site. We did some workers
4	and looked at every single page of records.
5	It's a pretty forbidding task, and just want
6	to alert you to that possibility.
7	MEMBER GRIFFON: I guess we can
8	have some questions. We have time for some
9	questions, right?
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
11	MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean, one
12	thing, this is really for Tim, I assume you're
13	still on the line.
14	I was curious, when you say you
15	resolved 76 percent of the gaps, how many
16	claimants, out of these 10 that you looked at,
17	how many of those cases were 100 percent
18	resolved, all of the gaps, you know,
19	completely resolved for an individual
20	claimant, because we're talking like, you
	1

know about the 10 claimants.

know, these exposure years here, but I want to

21

1	DR. TAULBEE: Mark, unfortunately,
2	I don't have that information right here in
3	front of me. If you give me maybe 15 or 20
4	minutes, I can try and pull it up.
5	But I mean, that is something that
6	we were planning on including in a report.
7	This was a preliminary analysis of this, and
8	we're still going through some of these
9	unresolved.
10	So, I just don't have that number
11	in front of me right now. I'm sorry.
12	MEMBER GRIFFON: Arjun is yes,
13	go ahead.
14	DR. MAKHIJANI: One thing I did
15	not say, that I intended to, when I looked
16	over and I don't have the chance to study
17	the new Class Definition, but I noticed that
18	it did not address one point that we had
19	brought up, which is these scratched out
20	codes, and so, I had asked Lynn Ayers to send
21	me some information of how many of the cases

out codes,

had

scratched

22

that were not

1	replaced? Lynn, are you on the line?
2	(No response.)
3	DR. MAKHIJANI: I'll go over it.
4	There were three cases in which there were
5	scratched out codes, Case 2 in which for
6	example, in 1955 I won't go through the
7	whole detail.
8	But just to give you an example.
9	There was a code on a card in 1955, but it was
10	scratched out, and you can read it, but it was
11	scratched out.
12	So, we don't know what we would
13	attribute, whether that was that hasn't
14	been addressed in the new Definition.
15	So, whether that would be taken as
16	an area code or would be taken as an unknown,
17	hasn't been addressed. Illegible and blanks
18	have been addressed.
19	MEMBER GRIFFON: Arjun, can I ask
20	you the same question? I know that NIOSH has
21	attempted to resolve some of these gaps that
22	you initially identified, but in your first

1	cut through, how many of the 10 did you find
2	was some gap in their records, during the time
3	period of interest?
4	DR. MAKHIJANI: Well, we don't
5	know which cases the 12 percent remaining
6	unresolved and the 12 percent potentially
7	resolved, that were not resolved.
8	MEMBER GRIFFON: No, no, no, but
9	I'm asking in your first
10	DR. MAKHIJANI: Nine out of 10
11	cases did not have complete records.
12	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay.
13	DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: That is what I
15	was looking for. Anyway, Jim has a question.
16	DR. TAULBEE: Mark, this is Tim. I
17	was able to pull that spreadsheet up, while we
18	were talking here.
19	It looks like four additional ones
20	do not have any gaps associated with them,
21	now, if I'm interpreting this right.
22	MEMBER GRIFFON: So, four

1	additional? So, that would be five out of 10?
2	DR. TAULBEE: So, five out of 10.
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: So, you have 76
4	percent potentially resolved, but you really
5	drop to 50 percent of the claimants that are
6	resolved?
7	DR. TAULBEE: Well, yes, but keep
8	in mind, one, this is not a random sample, and
9	two, we're not finished with our work yet.
10	MEMBER GRIFFON: Right, I
11	understand, I understand. I'm just putting
12	some perspective on it. Go ahead, Jim.
13	MEMBER LOCKEY: You know, I wanted
14	to ask you about why maybe you can inform
15	me why we'd be such a it would be such as
16	task to do a random sample, you know, at the
17	at-risk group, that's before 1973?
18	You set your alpha and beta. You
19	look at your power calculations, and I don't
20	think I'd be asking you to go back and look at
21	everybody, but it doesn't seem to me that that

You don't have to look at everybody. You can set your statistical power as your outcomes and go ahead and do that.

DR. MAKHIJANI: Dr. Lockey, obviously, my comment was a preliminary comment, and subject to change.

But this is very different thing than say, what we did at Rocky Flats, where if you have not a complete dosimetry record, and you are looking to see whether a coworker model is feasible, you can fill in the gaps with, you know, bioassay information from coworkers who were doing the same job or were in the same building and so on.

The way this particular Class has been defined, every worker has to have a complete record for every period, or a complete explanation, if you accept that they did not -- that they were not badged in every case, that they actually were not in the designated areas, if we, for the moment, accept that.

So, how -- I imagine that it would take a fair number of -- a fair size sample to conclude that with very high probability, you had all of the workers in Savannah River, who had all the codes, all the time.

So, you're asking for us, for a degree of certainty in this particular case, that we have not come across in any work that we've done for you, to the extent that I am aware, and then you'd need some stratification of this sample because as you've heard, construction workers were different than non-construction workers.

We have done a number of reports for Savannah River Site, and I'm not sure we'd have to stratify further than that, but we have found a fair number of differences among construction workers, by type of construction worker.

So, I just am making a preliminary remark, that it seems to me that because of the degree of certainty required, you probably

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1	and the kind of stratification that may be
2	needed, you'd probably need a very large
3	sample, and each worker and you have to
4	examine the whole work period, because and
5	we didn't go to the full records.
6	So, you have seen from what we
7	did, just looking at what is in the claimant
8	file and what Tim Taulbee did, looking at the
9	whole record is a lot more work.
10	That is all I am saying. I am not
11	saying it should or shouldn't be done. I'm
12	just saying it is
13	MEMBER LOCKEY: I would like to
14	actually see that. I don't necessarily want
15	you to go ahead and do it, but I would like to
16	see the power calculations, and all I'm really
17	interested in is, from my perspective, is
18	these 10 cases aren't random.
19	DR. MAKHIJANI: They are not.
20	MEMBER LOCKEY: So, I can't draw
21	any conclusions from these 10 cases.
22	But what I would like to do is a -

1	- is this a systematic problem as a cohort,
2	where there are gaps existing, and I don't
3	think it's going to be as laborious as you
4	think it is. I really don't.
5	DR. MAKHIJANI: You may well be
6	right, I don't have an opinion right now.
7	MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, two things.
8	One, the issue of indeterminate, it seems to
9	me, the case that you described where the
10	thing is crossed out is clearly indeterminate,
11	but I guess either DOL or NIOSH would have to
12	define what they mean by indeterminate. That's
13	kind of a side comment.
14	I don't see anything in the
15	proposed Class that specifies that you have to
16	have 100 percent of the records. Where is
17	that coming from?
18	DR. MAKHIJANI: My interpretation
19	in that direction is the Class, as it is
20	proposed to you, says that you have to have
21	only one correct one dosimetry code or area
22	code, that corresponds to that list, to be

1	included.
2	It's not a you don't need to
3	have 250 days in 773A. You need to be 250
4	days on the site.
5	So, if you've got one blank, if
6	you've got one period for which you have no
7	information, can you assume in a claimant
8	is it claimant-favorable to assume that they
9	were not in there?
10	MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, what about
11	the whole rest of their record?
1.0	You're just saying maybe that is
12	Tou it just saying maybe that is
13	the only time they were there and none of the
13	the only time they were there and none of the
13 14	the only time they were there and none of the other codes and that is obviously, a
13 14 15	the only time they were there and none of the other codes and that is obviously, a possibility.
13 14 15 16	the only time they were there and none of the other codes and that is obviously, a possibility.  DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.
13 14 15 16 17	the only time they were there and none of the other codes and that is obviously, a possibility.  DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.  MEMBER ZIEMER: For most people,
13 14 15 16 17	the only time they were there and none of the other codes and that is obviously, a possibility.  DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.  MEMBER ZIEMER: For most people, that probably wouldn't be the case.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the only time they were there and none of the other codes and that is obviously, a possibility.  DR. MAKHIJANI: Right.  MEMBER ZIEMER: For most people, that probably wouldn't be the case.  DR. MAKHIJANI: That would

1	indeterminable and the addition of the 000
2	characterization what does that do, in
3	terms of the construction workers and so on?
4	I don't know if you've had a
5	Knut Ringen has a had a chance to look at
6	this, but is there anyone that can tell us the
7	extent to which this does or does not address
8	the issues raised for construction workers?
9	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim Taulbee.
10	I can partially address that.
11	The inclusion of 000 code actually
12	includes a large number of construction trades
13	workers, at least based upon my review of the
14	Rule 4 workers, which are typically
15	construction trades workers, within the
16	dosimetry report.
17	It appears that the Savannah River
18	Site, in processing the dosimeter, the
19	where the badge was issued was known in many
20	cases, but in many in some of the others,
21	it was not known, and so, 000 was entered for
22	that dosimeter location.

MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, I guess I'm
wondering if the group that was looking at
that for the construction workers, Dr. Ringen,
whether you folks have had an opportunity to
look at these revisions yet, and whether you
have had a chance to analyze the extent to
which this may or may not address those
problems? Perhaps it's premature.
DR. RINGEN: Well, there are a
couple of a number of things here that we
can talk about, that may not be worth it.
I am still uncertain, what is
meant by 000. I don't know how you define
that, how you come up with the taking a
worker's record and saying, "This is a 000
record." That is the first question.
But the more broad question is
that nobody is arguing here that you can't use
dose codes to include somebody as having
worked in a particular area.

dose record codes to determine that somebody

did not work there?

In other words, can you use the dose record codes to exclude them from the SEC, and that is where we say, "We don't think that can be done, based on the records that we have seen," and we don't think that this new definition fixes that problem at all.

If anything, it complicates it, in many ways, makes it more complicated, the Class Definition, and I just don't see how you get around the question of whether somebody worked there and did not have the code that they're supposed to have, according to this Class Definition.

When Tim earlier said that they had looked at these workers who had a -- who said they had worked in CMX or TNX, in their work history interview, you have to remember that that is a select group of people, as well, very significantly. So, there are people who remembered where they worked.

In this case, that excludes an

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awful lot of Claimants who are survivors, and you have to remember, this goes back, now, we're talking about a Class that starts — that ends in 1972, so, that anybody who can qualify for that — for that SEC, at the very least, would have to be today, 58 or 59 years old, and most of them are significantly older, and most of them were there — represented by survivors, since these are cancer cases.

So, they have no way of establishing -- a lot of survivors have no way of establishing clearly, that their -- that the -- the person they survived worked in one particular area or another.

This is where I think we're just digging ourselves into a deeper and deeper hole.

I don't want to stand in the way of a Class being established, based on the codes, but I also don't want a Class established that would exclude somebody, by using the codes.

1	That is our point, and we can
2	discuss this further.
3	As you can see, after Arjun and
4	Bob Warren submitted their the cases that
5	they have identified, Tim realized that there
6	are two additional codes anyway, that should
7	be included here.
8	Now, I don't know how many more
9	codes are out there that should also be
10	included, and I don't know how we find that
11	out. I don't know quite where the existing
12	codes come from, because they are not
13	justified in the Evaluation Report, but I
14	believe it was maybe from a list of codes,
15	dated 1959.
16	Anyway, I can go on and on about
17	this, but I think I don't want to waste
18	your time by being circular.
19	DR. MAKHIJANI: One thing about
20	this 000?
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Go ahead, and
22	then I want to comment. Go ahead.

1	DR. MAKHIJANI: Just the 000 is
2	actually a dosimetry code in the records,
3	where they don't know, and since 000 has been
4	included in the proposed definition, this
5	would address Dr. Ziemer's earlier question,
6	that if you don't know.
7	So, if there is a gap, so, what is
8	the difference between having a single gap and
9	having a 000, in my opinion, seems pretty
10	parallel.
11	So, you have to have 100 percent
12	complete record to exclude some of them.
13	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think another
14	perspective on this is just thinking
15	historically. This Class Definition is unlike
16	any other. It's more much more complicated
17	than and much more difficult to implement
18	than any other Class Definition we have ever
19	had, that has been able to survive.
20	In fact, if you look back, we've
21	actually gone and revised Hanford and a number
22	of other sites, where we tried to just get it

down to area or even badging or not badged, and other constructs like that, and those have not proved feasible for the Department of Labor to implement.

So, we've the -- the other one -the only other one that I believe we've used
something akin to this, that's still
operational, is the Mound one, and that is not
working.

Now, we're still trying to resolve how to do that in a fair way, but it's -- it's on a much smaller number, I believe, and much less complicated situation.

But you know, just based on our past experience -- and then, you know, we -- not only are we being dependent on, you know, a high degree of accuracy in all the records, but a lot of records to be reviewed, to go through, and it didn't come up here yet, but in the Work Group call, which I listen into, there were issues related to the legibility of the records, so they have to be re-scanned, as

1	I understood it, in order to be able to
2	interpret that, and then we have to define
3	illegible.
4	You know, we're back to hanging
5	chads and the you know, it sounds
6	straightforward, but not always as easy to do.
7	Right, right, I know. Well, I hope we don't
8	have to go to the Supreme Court to resolve
9	this one.
10	But I mean, it's that and I
11	think and again, it is I mean, I tend to
12	agree with Arjun on well, I do agree with
13	Arjun, I should say, on the sample size
14	required, because you really are going to
15	you want very few false negatives, I think.
16	You know, it's not to be you
17	know, you're not going to have 100 percent
18	Class Definition, no, but do you can you
19	miss five percent? Ten percent? I don't
20	know.
21	Given that we've already revised

the Class Definition in less than a week, to

1	include two more areas, plus illegibility, in
2	order to address the issues raised by a sample
3	size of 10, I hate to think what happens when
4	we, you know, go to a higher sample size.
5	But I think just historically,
6	these haven't worked, and I think the onus of
7	proof really is on NIOSH to if they think
8	they can make something work, to really be
9	able to demonstrate it, and I think that
10	should be our test in this situation.
11	Does anybody else have Bill?
12	MEMBER FIELD: I think part of the
13	problem is, we don't see the actual data. It's
14	hard to really understand. You can see
15	summaries, but it still makes it difficult to
16	understand.
17	One of the questions I had was,
18	are dose codes closely associated with job
19	codes?
20	DR. TAULBEE: This is Tim Taulbee.
21	Dose codes are not associated with job codes.
22	They are associated with areas.

1	MEMBER FIELD: Okay.
2	DR. TAULBEE: The codes at
3	Savannah River Site was 310 square miles in
4	size. The dosimeter exchange cycles were done
5	by area, and so, the badging was done by
6	independent areas, and so, that is why we are
7	using dose codes, for this purpose.
8	MEMBER FIELD: So, there is not
9	any one job code, where everyone in that job
10	code has an eligible dose code, is that
11	correct?
12	DR. TAULBEE: That is correct. No,
13	it is by area, and for example, in the post-
14	1958 time period, 1958 to 1972, the dosimeter
15	code for people who were badged out of the
16	773A area, the code was 5A.
17	So, everybody, regardless of job,
18	badged out of 773A, were given the HP area
19	code of 5A.
20	MEMBER FIELD: I understand. Okay,
21	thank you.
22	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, Dr. Ringen,

1	I thought had another comment, and then we
2	should listen to the give a chance for the
3	other petitioners, the representatives to
4	speak, also.
5	DR. RINGEN: I just want to make a
6	clarification to what Tim said.
7	He said that dose codes are
8	associated with a particular area.
9	I would like to correct that, to
10	say that dose codes may be associated with a
11	particular area, but in very many cases,
12	including the cases that we have submitted to
13	you, and granted, that is not a representative
14	sample, but we don't have a denominator, you
15	know, that is not information that we have
16	access to.
17	But we have enough records
18	submitted, to show that the person worked in
19	various areas, having the same dose record or
20	dose code and vice versa.
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, Mr.
22	Anderson, did you have something, also?

1	MR. ANDERSON: I'm not sure if this
2	would be helpful or not.
3	Bob Warren sent me, just something
4	today, I'm sorry.
5	If you would like to see a card,
6	or a code from 1957, with crossed-off things
7	on it, this one is not necessarily indicative.
8	I do want to point out that our
9	non-random sample that we sent into SC&A was
10	really pretty random, because we just starting
11	looking, thinking how is the Department of
12	Labor claims examiner going to deal with these
13	codes? Let's go look.
14	All of the sudden, one after the
15	other came up problematic.
16	So, it's easy to think, "Oh, we
17	looked for the problem ones and sent only
18	those," but that is not necessarily true.
19	Almost all of these are problematic.
20	In this particular case, even
21	though the alpha numeric system was not
22	supposed to start until 1958, here, we have

someone in what appears to be A9, whatever that is, crossed out and moved to C, and this one little sheet, we've got bunches and bunches and bunches of these sheets.

But the other thing that I wanted to talk about is whether or not this might be a systemic problem, you know, not just looking at these particular problematic codes, but you know, all along, we thought that the codes that have been used in dose reconstruction are not the codes, but the records have had all kinds of problems in them, that NIOSH has glossed over.

Also, talking about the Site Research Database that was referenced earlier by Dr. Taulbee, are the claimants going to able to get to that Site Research Database, to find all of the records that they need?

Is the Department of Labor claims examiner going to be able to do that? We are very concerned about how the Department of Labor is going to deal with this, because at

1	an earlier meeting, a representative said,
2	"You know, we just don't we're not going to
3	be able to dig that deep."
4	Well, how deep are they going to
5	need to dig to qualify someone who should be
6	qualified?
7	So, I think Mr. Warren is on the
8	phone, I hope, and would like to make a
9	statement, as well.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, Mr.
11	Warren, are you on the phone?
12	MR. WARREN: Yes, yes, I am. I'm
13	here.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, would you
15	like to make a public statement?
16	MR. WARREN: Well, just staying
17	with this same piece of papers that I just
18	faxed to David Anderson.
19	The one paper in there is the DOE
20	verification, on the comments not listed the
21	report of 1960, for this particular case, and
22	if you actually look at the 1960 the fourth

quarter, look at the data, and then you look at the summary sheet for 1960, should have had 655 deep, 705 shallow.

But then on this fourth quarter of 1960 paper, it looks like 905 and 855, and whatever the figures are, they're not the same as listed on the summary.

What I sent this for is, these HPAREH records are supposed to be the basis for everything that NIOSH does. They say these are all verified and they all add up, but on this particular case, which I just happened to look at, it doesn't pan out.

What I guess I want to say today, is over the nine years I've been representing claimants, and I appreciate the Board's courtesy; former Chair Dr. Ziemer and present Chair Dr. Melius and all of the Members of the Board, but special thanks goes to Ringen, for organizing members, Dr. meetings and keeping workers informed on all of the proceedings.

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	Since	2002,	we've	had	meet	ing
after	meeting,	worker	transcı	ripts,	wor	ker
testimo	ny, secret	testim	ony, and	d all	of t	hem
testifi	ed about	the	missing	reco	ords	or
incorre	ct records	, and t	he one	thing	I th	ıink
that's	been the	hardest	for me	e thro	ough	all
these y	ears, is	when I	get the	e clie	ent t	hat
calls a	and I'm in	the la	ast conv	ersat:	ion w	vith
that cl	ient, becau	use they	ask me	, they	thou	ıght
the pro	cess was th	nat y	ou know	, the	180 d	lays
NIOSH h	as to answe	er an SE	C petit:	ion.		
	They	ask me	e if	they	had	to

They ask me if they had to stipulate an answer, and the missing records, why the process wasn't working.

I've had about 30 of those calls, and I've always responded saying, "Advisory Board had the authority to move forward. NIOSH has been granted delays," and this most recent delay is just -- has not been justified.

I think you just need to include all employees from 1953 through at least 1972, and David Anderson would be glad to pass up

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1	those that paperwork to you. I don't have
2	I just found it this morning. The only
3	reason I I forwarded it to you.
4	But it just gives an example that
5	DOE has this data, then when you look at the
6	exact data, you see that it isn't transcribed
7	directly on the card.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, thank you
9	very much, Mr. Warren.
10	Are there any other petitioners
11	that wish to speak?
12	(Off mic comments.)
13	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Further
14	discussion? Work Group? Where is the Work
15	Group? Go ahead.
16	MEMBER CLAWSON: I am speaking for
17	myself, but I think other Members of the Work
18	Group are the same way.
19	This is very complicated. This is
20	and I know that it's not our responsibility
21	with the Department of Labor, but we've got to
22	give to them something that they can actually

1	implement, in my opinion.
2	I've seen the other sites that
3	have been much smaller than this, Mound and
4	all of these others, they're having trouble
5	with this, and I have to agree with Dr.
6	Ringen.
7	I can understand to use this, to
8	involve somebody in a Class, but to exempt
9	them, I have a problem with it.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Mark?
11	MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean, where the
12	Work Group, we decided to bring the issue back
13	to the Board. We really didn't come with a
14	recommendation, necessarily.
15	But the, you know, the concern I
16	have, similar to what Arjun was speaking to,
17	was that if we do further analysis of bigger
18	data sets, you know, and I think Jim, you
19	mentioned this, too, what degree of certainty
20	do we want to come out of that?
21	Is 90 percent acceptable? That
22	means that, you know, 10 percent, you could

1	have people that and this is not a
2	population study. This is decisions on
3	individual claimants.
4	So, I think we want to be close to
5	100 percent right, and I see the Petitioner
6	has a question, related to my comments. Go
7	ahead.
8	DR. RINGEN: Well, let me say
9	also, that if you accept a certain margin of
10	error here, that is not distributed randomly
11	throughout this population. It's going to
12	affect one group of workers much more than the
13	other ones, and they are the ones that are
14	transient throughout the site, and this would
15	be incredibly unfair, particularly to the
16	construction worker population.
17	Now, to the Working Group, the
18	Petitioners have made a recommendation that is
19	two-fold that you could consider.
20	The first is to include all
21	workers from January 1, 1953 through, I guess
22	it should be September 30, 1953 1972, to be

consistent with what Tim has proposed for now.

Secondly, to expedite the process of reviewing all of the other exotic radio-nuclides in the other areas where thorium has been used and other periods where thorium has been used since then. Those are the two basic recommendations that we have.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, so, anyway, and you know, the -- I mean, I guess the other reason I was highlighting the gap analysis is, you know, my concern of a larger study, is that to resolve these gaps on 10, you know, it took quite a bit of effort on NIOSH's part, and I'm not sure we, you know, are even going to be definitive in the resolution.

I mean, it seems like there is some sort of assumptions that are made, "Well, a shift to a job meant that they were out of an area."

There is some -- so, you know, even in this gap analysis, I think we're not going to have a very certain answer when we

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1	complete a we'll do a lot more work, and
2	probably won't get a definitive answer.
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Mr. Rowe, as you
4	back on the line?
5	MR. ROWE: This is Gordon Rowe.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Mr. Rowe, are
7	you back on the line? We also appear to have
8	music on the line, and I think that is
9	interfering. So, we're trying to get that
10	off. Go ahead, Jim.
11	MEMBER LOCKEY: I was thinking in
12	the gap analysis, we have the codes where
13	workers will be included in the cohort during
14	the in the SEC.
15	So, you know, what I was really
16	interested in is looking at situations where
17	workers were not had none of those codes
18	and where there is a gap, and where re-
19	analysis puts them into the cohort.
20	That is really what I want to
21	know. Yes, that is the piece I want to know.
22	If they ever have one of these

1	codes, they're already in the cohort. They're
2	already in the SEC. They're not
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: But how would you
4	say the re-analysis, just to take this down
5	the road, how would you see the re-analysis
6	putting them into the group?
7	MEMBER LOCKEY: They're already in
8	the group.
9	MEMBER GRIFFON: No, no, if you
10	took that sub-set that was not, that didn't
11	have a code
12	MEMBER LOCKEY: I would look at
13	MEMBER GRIFFON: examine the
14	gaps on that
15	MEMBER LOCKEY: Look at the gaps
16	and see how many would then result in them re-
17	entering or going in not re-entering,
18	but going into the SEC.
19	MEMBER GRIFFON: But how do you
20	define that? How do you determine whether
21	they would re-enter it?
22	MEMBER LOCKEY: Going back and

1	look at the records to see if there is records
2	that weren't included.
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: That have the
4	code?
5	MEMBER LOCKEY: That, or for some
6	other reason, would suspiciously put them back
7	into the SEC.
8	See, I don't know that. What I do
9	know, that if you ever have that code, you're
10	already in it.
11	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
12	MEMBER LOCKEY: So, I'm interested
13	in if you don't have that code, all right,
14	where are those people? Yes, where are they?
15	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, yes.
16	MEMBER LOCKEY: Where are they?
17	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
18	MEMBER LOCKEY: And what you are
19	saying is, if there is a gap in anybody,
20	they're automatically into the SEC.
21	MEMBER GRIFFON: Well, I mean, I
22	think the argument is for all workers, that

1	you can't resolve these gaps, yes.
2	MEMBER LOCKEY: Yes, the workers,
3	right, yes.
4	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
5	MEMBER LOCKEY: And that is a
6	you know, before making that decision, I would
7	like to have some information about that. That
8	is a huge leap.
9	MEMBER RICHARDSON: So, was that -
10	_
11	MEMBER GRIFFON: I'm just not sure
12	how you would determine if the
13	MEMBER LOCKEY: No, I think we
14	MEMBER GRIFFON: These workers
15	that didn't have the code
16	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Was that what
17	we were
18	MEMBER GRIFFON: that have a
19	gap, how do you place them in you know, how
20	do you
21	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Mark, was that
22	what was shown with the I wasn't quite

1	following.
2	There were 154 workers who were
3	had was it self-identified, as working in
4	773A?
5	MEMBER LOCKEY: CATI.
6	MEMBER GRIFFON: That was the
7	CATI.
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Based on the
9	CATI, had said that they worked there?
10	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
11	MEMBER RICHARDSON: And 151 of
12	those had codes which indicated that at some
13	point, they had worked in there and three did
14	not have codes that indicated that they worked
15	there?
16	MEMBER GRIFFON: Correct, yes.
17	MEMBER RICHARDSON: And is that
18	that is the type of discordance you're talking
19	about?
20	Was there a gap or was there some
21	what was the basis for them, not having
22	been flagged as working there?

1	MEMBER LOCKEY: No, I'm actually
2	going the other way.
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: He's going the
4	other way.
5	MEMBER LOCKEY: If they have a
6	code, they're automatically in the SEC, no
7	matter where else they worked.
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Right, but I
9	think Mark's question was, what sort of
LO	external information on somebody who didn't
L1	have these codes, would be available that
L2	would suggest that you would move them in, and
L3	one type of external information would be
L4	their self-reported
L5	MEMBER GRIFFON: Or would answer
L6	the question that they right, right.
L7	MEMBER ANDERSON: Or move them
L8	out.
L9	MEMBER GRIFFON: Right.
20	MEMBER ANDERSON: Because now, the
21	way it's defined, if there is a gap, they
22	would be moved in, right?

1	MEMBER GRIFFON: So, if I'm I
2	mean, my let me maybe try to clarify.
3	If you look at that set that
4	didn't have a code, and they have gaps, then
5	I'm asking what criteria would you would
6	NIOSH look at, to determine whether they had
7	enough information that said they didn't
8	belong in those codes?
9	You know, how would you what
10	exclusion because you know, if you just
11	look at job you know, you say, "Well, they
12	were an administrative assistant," it may
13	answer it, but they might have been in 773,
14	you know.
15	So, what would your criteria be?
16	That is my concern. My concern is it's going
17	to be a lot of grey area there.
18	MEMBER LOCKEY: We have to turn to
19	NIOSH, and ask the criteria.
20	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, right, yes.
21	MEMBER LOCKEY: But the lack I
22	do what I am reassured is that they have

1	the codes that are going to be in there.
2	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay.
3	MEMBER LOCKEY: If they have none
4	of those codes, then how many people have
5	unknown information, then they put them back
6	in they put then in the SEC, and we don't
7	know that part. That's what my concern is.
8	MEMBER GRIFFON: Oh, I see, okay.
9	MEMBER LOCKEY: We're dealing with
10	a vacuum here, which we're making a very
11	substantial expansion of the people eligible
12	in this SEC. I'd just like to have some
13	objective information that I can rely on, for
14	this to be justified.
15	MEMBER GRIFFON: Okay, yes.
16	MEMBER ZIEMER: I think Dr. Lockey
17	is suggesting that you looked at the gaps in
18	the wrong group. You have looked at gaps in a
19	group that is already included.
20	So, it's the issue of people who
21	are have none of these codes, and do those
22	groups have gaps that might have put them in,

and as a start, you could do the very same thing and start picking 10 of those and see if it's similar.

It might give you some idea. I think it makes sense logically, why look at gaps in people who are already in, when we're really interested in the gaps for those who would be otherwise excluded, anyway.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: But I think the point to do -- that Arjun made, and I agreed with earlier, was that to do that type of an effort, you're talking about a large research effort that is going to take a significant amount of time and effort, and you know, is not what we have required in other similar situations in the past.

I guess I can't quite see the justification for requiring that. Why would - - why should we develop a -- you know, a new way of defining Classes, when we know that -- or implement -- recommend implementing a new way of defining Classes, when we know in the

past, this has not worked, and in fact, NIOSH has not found it to work, and has recommended -- and Department of Labor has not found it to work at other sites, not at this site, and have found that we end up with these broad Classes.

I think if one also thinks about - you know, again, it's not that -- what -the question of the monitoring part, it's a
question of the records which were never
developed or designed to -- for dose
reconstruction. That was not their purpose.

I don't think it faults the site or anything. It's just sort of fact of life, given how things developed at that site, and at most Department of Energy sites of those years, and I think we've gotten frustrated with it, at several sites, but I think it's something -- you know, we went through it with GE. We go through it with others, and I think we'll continue to confront it.

But it just -- more specific Class

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Definitions, based on area or monitoring or whatever, just have not appeared to work, at all.

The question is, do we want to, you know, delay action on this, while we then -- you know, do a large study, to make a determination? May be helpful. It may not. It's hard to tell.

But it would be certainly a large effort. I mean, I don't know how -- whether this is a question of priority, but just the analysis of the CATI interviews, the 150 CATI interviews took -- is still not complete. We don't have a report on that and I don't believe a report -- and that has been since our August meeting, I believe is when that was discussed and started, and here, it's you know, three or four months later, and you know, at the Work Group meeting, and you were there, Jim, and Tim reported that, well, maybe by the end of December, this month, we'll have it.

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1	Yes, and again, it's not
2	necessarily faulting Tim. It's just, you
3	know, some recognition that these efforts take
4	a long time and that there are competing
5	priorities and so forth, and I think we have
6	to think carefully about that, and weigh that
7	also.
8	People have waited. Yes, Dr.
9	Ringen, last comment.
10	DR. RINGEN: Yes, I would like to
11	comment on this idea about trying to do the
12	representative study.
13	NIOSH has had we invited NIOSH
14	to come down to talk to the workers about the
15	problems of the dose record at Savannah River,
16	starting in 2003, spent basically eight years
17	trying to prove that the records were suspect,
18	and then came up with this problem with the
19	thorium, records at the last minute.
20	Workers have testified repeatedly
21	to NIOSH, in interviews of various kinds, that
22	there are deficiencies in the dose records and

somehow, many people on this Board don't seem to accept perhaps, their word for that.

But I don't think they are being misleading in this regard.

Going back to trying to validate this in a statistical study would be very hard, something, by the way, that NIOSH has never done in any way in this dose reconstruction program. It's never validated the dose reconstructions, themselves.

But if you want to do that statistical study, first it's going to be a question of, what is the denominator? That is very difficult. It can't be CATI interviews. It can't be workers with dose records, because you have to have also record workers without dose records.

You have the -- which would be very difficult to identify, and to come up with a comprehensive really, population, a denominator at Savannah River would be just about impossible, and it would be huge, 67,000

construction workers, alone, I believe is what we estimate has been at Savannah River.

If you're going to do that study, in the end then, we're also going to have to ask for a replication, for a validation of that study, just like everything else, and how long is that going to take?

We've been doing this for eight years, basically, and we have submitted, Dr. Lockey, objective evidence. These are cases that show that the record is not complete. We can do that. That is as much as you can expect in this case, the Petitioners to do, I think.

I don't think you can expect the Petitioners to do a statistical study for you, and I don't think -- how NIOSH can do the statistical study, either, in anything that would take years.

I mean, we were going to -- we would have to have a very long discussion about the study design, first of all, and that

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1	is going to you know, this is very
2	complicated, if you will, epidemiological
3	study, of administrative records, that are
4	very incomplete, to begin with.
5	Those of us who have done
6	epidemiology, based on administrative records,
7	know how difficult it is to do that.
8	So, I just see more and more
9	problems being raised by this proposal.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Josie and then
11	Jim, do you have another comment, or are you
12	okay?
13	MEMBER BEACH: I just want to say
14	that I believe that implementation of this
15	Class, as defined, would be impossible.
16	I agree with your comments, Dr.
17	Melius and of Arjun's, and I think we should
18	move forward to vote on a different
19	Definition, including all workers at Savannah
20	River during those dates.
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. Jim?
22	MEMBER LOCKEY: I guess my
18 19 20 21	move forward to vote on a different Definition, including all workers at Savanna River during those dates.  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you. Jim?

1	comments are I'd like to know if this is a
2	systemic problem, and not necessarily just
3	applies to this particular SEC. It may apply
4	to others, and we don't have a database to
5	know that, in regard to those people that
6	don't have a code that puts them in the SEC.
7	And so, I don't think it would be
8	that as difficult as some were saying, to
9	go back and design a randomized study that
10	allows us to see if this is a systemic
11	problem. You know, I don't think that would
12	be as difficult as people are thinking.
13	We've given this data some
14	objective data to say, you know, this is a
15	problem and it doesn't just apply to Savannah
16	River. It very well may apply to other
17	facilities. Okay, that is what I'm interested
18	in.
19	MEMBER GRIFFON: I guess just to
20	follow up on that.
21	I think that I mean, my

question would be, the end point of -- the

study that you're describing, and if you were to look at those that didn't have the code, you know, the sub-set that didn't have the code, and looked for gaps in those records, that is one study, how many of these claimants in this time period have gaps in their records, period?

That might be something that is definable and doable.

I think the thing that really would really run into problems is if you tried to say, how many of these have gaps that could not be resolved, and this resolution of these gaps is a very gray area, in my opinion. It's -- even in these 10, it's been difficult.

You know, the question of whether this -- a change in job is actually changing their area, we've heard a lot of testimony where construction workers in particular, were badged in one area, but worked in different buildings with the same badge. They came on our Work Group call saying that.

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So, I think that is where it gets into that gray area, and I am afraid we're going to end up with some sort of very inclusive results. So, I don't know, that is my concern.

MEMBER LOCKEY: Non-resolution can

MEMBER LOCKEY: Non-resolution can be -- five to 10 percent non-resolution is really significant. That has huge implications, for me, in this classification.

MEMBER GRIFFON: Right.

MEMBER LOCKEY: I'm not talking about 50 percent is acceptable. I would say five to 10 percent is, to me, pretty much unacceptable, because that means there is misclassification occurring, and if this is a systemic problem because of records across all facilities, during these time frames, I think that is some important information to know.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: It certainly has implications for other sites, where -- even though these definitions aren't -- Class Definitions aren't -- apply to other sites,

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1	certainly, I think it would have implications,
2	in terms of what happens during dose
3	individual dose reconstruction, and how gaps
4	are handled?
5	Now, when there are coworker
6	models and so forth, it's part of that, and I
7	think maybe it's less of a problem, at certain
8	sites. But certainly, it can be a bigger
9	problem than that. Henry?
10	MEMBER ANDERSON: Yes, I guess my
11	only issue is, this would be the first time
12	we've used, you know, badge codes to classify
13	individuals as being part of an SEC.
14	I mean, the issue of, are we
15	putting people in, who don't belong, I mean,
16	that is the basis of the whole SEC thing, is
17	we don't know whether they belong or not.
18	So, they're typically put in and
19	they and the option here is, we either go
20	with, we're just going to include all
21	employees during these years. This is an

attempt to narrow that down some, and I think

1	you know, whether that is doable or not, is
2	problematic, as you know, and people can
3	always appeal, if they were left out, as well,
4	and then you have the individual records
5	looked at.
6	But I'm not sure what would be our
7	alternative here, that would make the kind
8	of the false positives lower, and so, what
9	would be the alternative here if you say,
10	"Well, 10 percent of them," if you really look
11	at them carefully, don't belong, in this SEC
12	definition.
13	MEMBER LOCKEY: No, we're not
14	looking at excluding people from the
15	Definition. We're looking for people who,
16	based on this Definition, would not be in it,
17	and we're looking to those people who would
18	not be and how many would belong.
19	MEMBER ANDERSON: So, they would
20	all have they would have complete records,
21	then?

MEMBER LOCKEY:

22

No, if we looked

1	at those people who don't have those codes,
2	and we can't resolve gaps in five or 10
3	percent of them, to me, that is enough doubt
4	across the cohort as a whole, to include
5	everybody.
6	MEMBER ANDERSON: Okay.
7	MEMBER LOCKEY: That is what I'm
8	trying to say.
9	MEMBER ANDERSON: Okay, that is
10	what I see what you're I was going the
11	other way, that we're somehow getting too
12	many, and therefore, this would be different,
13	yes, okay.
14	MEMBER LOCKEY: No, I'm looking
15	at, if you if there are gaps in the people
16	who don't qualify for the SEC, how significant
17	are those gaps, and this is a systemic
18	problem, or is just isolated to this facility?
19	MEMBER ANDERSON: Yes.
20	MEMBER LOCKEY: That is what I'm
21	talking about.

Bill?

CHAIRMAN MELIUS:

1	MEMBER FIELD: I think we have had
2	a lot of discussion. I'd like to hear from
3	NIOSH and if they would happen to have any
4	further comments.
5	We've had a lot of discussion
6	regarding to some of the limitations of the
7	method that was proposed.
8	I was just wondering, is there any
9	response that would give us maybe more
10	confidence that this is a valid method to use?
11	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Stu?
12	MR. HINNEFELD: I don't know that
13	we have really a lot to add, other than what
14	has been provided already, in Tim's
15	presentation.
16	I don't know if Tim is on the
17	phone, he can hear us or not?
18	DR. TAULBEE: Yes, I am on the
19	phone, Stu. If I'm understanding the question
20	correct, Dr. Field, are you asking is there
21	anything that you feel that is there
22	anything that we feel we could do that would

1	improve your confidence, is that correct?
2	MEMBER FIELD: Well, I think that
3	is what I was asking. There were a lot of
4	concerns expressed over the past half-hour.
5	I was just wondering if there were
6	any concerns that you heard expressed, that
7	you think you could address?
8	I know there a lot of concerns
9	were raised, and there seems to be a lot of
10	criticism to the method that was first
11	proposed. I was just wondering, do you have
12	maybe a fallback method or something else, or
13	thoughts on some of the problems that were
14	discussed?
15	MEMBER ANDERSON: Why you think
16	this would work?
17	MEMBER FIELD: Yes.
18	DR. TAULBEE: I guess one thing
19	that I could comment on, and again, this is
20	just off the cuff here, is that the study
21	proposed by Dr. Lockey is really would not
22	be incredibly cumbersome to do.

I believe it's possible to pull a random sample from all claimants that we currently have, and from that, develop some statistics of which ones would be included in based what the Class, upon we've got currently, and from that random sample, those that have the complete gap analysis -- or a complete analysis, all dosimetry, placing them somewhere else.

I think that would be possible to do.

The question of -- Mark had pointed out, of what do you do with the -- those that are, you know, true gaps, that are unresolved, that we don't know?

I don't have an answer for that. I don't have a way of looking at that, that I can think of right now, to use, but you know, once we get into the random sample, you know, if 90 percent of them, we can place, then the 10 percent, I think that is something for you all to discuss.

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1	But we don't know until we get to
2	that point, and please let me know if you guys
3	could hear any of this. There is a lot of
4	ringing going on, on the phone.
5	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
6	MEMBER ANDERSON: Yes, we heard
7	you.
8	DR. TAULBEE: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I just have to
10	comment. I mean, I don't think it's the
11	putting back 10 percent error rate back on the
12	board, to solve is not appropriate.
13	I know, I know, I'm not saying
14	anybody on the Board was proposing that,
15	either, to that Jim Neton had a comment.
16	DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton.
17	I've got a question. I guess I'm a little bit
18	confused on this gap analysis.
19	It seems to me that the gap
20	analysis is really identifying monitoring
21	periods where there is no information at all.
22	Is that correct?

1	It was my understanding that if
2	there is no information in there, Tim, correct
3	me if I'm wrong, it was our position that then
4	no dosimeter was needed to be worn, because
5	they were not in an area that required a
6	dosimeter. Is that correct?
7	DR. TAULBEE: That is correct,
8	Jim.
9	DR. NETON: All right, so, the
10	fundamental issue here seems to be, is do we
11	believe that if there are there is no code
12	in a monitoring period for a worker, that it
13	is 100 percent certain that that worker did
14	not need to wear a dosimeter, and then the
15	remaining issue is, what are the codes in the
16	filled in spots?
17	I mean, that is really what it
18	comes down to.
19	So, if the Board does not believe
20	that Savannah River actually monitored or
21	had a dosimeter on everybody that needed to be
22	monitored, and if there is a gap there,

1	meaning there is nothing in that slot for that
2	monitoring period, then it didn't need to be
3	monitored, then this won't work.
4	But I think it's fundamentally
5	NIOSH's position right now, as I'm hearing
6	Tim, that if there is a gap, if it's blank, no
7	dosimeter is required, and Tim did a little
8	bit of research on that to show that it made
9	sense on the ones that he that were
LO	observed.
11	How far you go down that road, I
L2	guess is really the issue.
L3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, but I think
L4	that there is the issue of the gaps, there
L5	is also people being falsely attributed to be
L6	assigned to some other work area, when in
L7	fact, they were in the work areas that are
L8	covered.
L9	DR. NETON: Well, see, that has
20	not come out in any analyses I've seen to
21	date, though. I mean, that is not
22	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, but that

1	is another
2	DR. NETON: That is another issue,
3	okay.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Another problem
5	with this approach.
6	DR. NETON: Right.
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And we'll do
8	that, and so, I think that also has to be
9	would have to be addressed.
10	DR. NETON: Well, that would make
11	it a more complicated analysis.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, and I think
13	maybe that is why I think it's a larger
14	effort, but I'm not sure years or whatever.
15	Brad has a question and I think
16	I think we need to try to move forward on
17	this.
18	DR. NETON: Right.
19	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think we've
20	heard a lot.
21	MEMBER CLAWSON: I guess we have,

all of these conversations here today.

It's ultimately going to come down to DOL, to be able to implement what we put out there.

MR. KOTSCH: Jeff Kotsch with DOL.

The only thing I can say is we've seen some samples of records which would indicate that, you know, those codes exist, but other than that, we can't say much, as to whether they're complete or the comprehensiveness of the records.

I don't think we could allow -- I don't think we could expect our CEs to have to do any kind of in depth analysis of these things, other than just looking at, you know, sheets, however we get those, whether we get those PAR requests or whatever, and the question of whether we have access to the Savannah River database, you know, routinely to be able to get these -- you know, these records.

But I think basically, you would

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1	just have to have whatever get whatever
2	records we could for the particular worker,
3	and look at them to determine whether there
4	are codes there or not, and that is about, I
5	think, all we could do.
6	Again, like I said, I don't
7	we've only seen a sampling of records from
8	that site.
9	MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean, just one
10	more point, and this is I don't know if
11	this will clarify or complicate matters.
12	But I mean, it sort of goes to
13	what David Richardson was asking earlier. Jim
14	Neton, you indicated that if they didn't have
15	the if there was a gap and they changed
16	jobs, or whatever, there was a determination
17	that they didn't need a dosimeter.
18	I think, I mean, my understanding
19	of this is that by establishing this Class
20	Definition, NIOSH has determined that you
21	can't do thorium dose reconstruction.
22	(Whereupon, the above-entitled

1	matter went off the record briefly at 12:30
2	p.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: For those of you
4	on the phone, we're laughing because we got
5	unplugged here, by mistake, our Court Reporter
6	and a few of us here.
7	MEMBER GRIFFON: I guess my point
8	was that, you know, you're looking at you
9	know, the HP department made a decision on
10	dosimeters, not necessarily on inclusion in a
11	thorium monitoring program or anything like
12	that.
13	So, then you get back to the
14	question of whether this is an area or you
15	know
16	DR. NETON: Well, no, I think the
17	dosimeter were the dosimeter codes,
18	according to Tim, are area specific, right?
19	If you needed a dosimeter to work
20	in a certain area, you were assigned at that
21	area. So, I think that covers it.
22	The question is

MEMBER GRIFFON: But I think there 1 2 is some question on job, too, that you could 3 had different job designations have and 4 remained in those buildings, but Tim was saying possibly not in a function where you 5 6 could have exposure. 7 So, the question is --But then you wouldn't 8 DR. NETON: have a code in that block. That is what I'm 9 10

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have a code in that block. That is what I'm saying. If you have no code in there, you could be in the same area, but not in an area that you could have been exposed to radioactive materials. That is the assumption.

The underlying assumption is, you had to wear a dosimeter to go in to work in an area where thorium was present.

MEMBER GRIFFON: I guess, it's a subtle point, but I'm making the distinction that they weren't making the determination for badging based on --

DR. NETON: Well, yes, it's --

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1	MEMBER GRIFFON: potential
2	internal thorium exposure. They were making
3	it based on, you know, other you know,
4	potential to receive a certain amount of
5	external exposure.
6	DR. NETON: Right, but it's
7	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, I know.
8	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Wanda, then
9	Josie.
10	MEMBER MUNN: There are thousands
11	of people who have worked at Savannah River,
12	who are extremely healthy, hardy and led good
13	lives as a result of their employment at
14	Savannah River.
15	Many of them will never have any
16	serious disease, including cancer, or any of
17	the radiation generated concerns that we face
18	here.
19	There is yet, more thousands and
20	thousands of people who have worked at
21	Savannah River, who, like every other
22	individual in the United States, will have the

same percentage of cancers occur in their lives, as those who have never had any interaction at all with any of our sites, or with any radiation inducing disease.

Those individuals are led to believe, if they do incur any of the cancers that we talk about here, that they incur them as a result of their work at Savannah River.

If we do not in some way, limit the classification of individuals that we look at, when we're looking at Special Exposure Cohorts, then we are misleading that large group of people who have had, and never will have, any adverse effects from their work there.

Many of them were never in any way, exposed to any significant amount of radiation and even many who were exposed, were not exposed at a level that is of any concern.

There was a good program, not a perfect program, by any means, we've never encountered, so far as I know, a perfect

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badging and perfect record of any of our sites, that is not likely because they were all operated by human beings, and every single one of us has flaws in our record keeping.

My checkbook has flaws in it.

Certainly, the kinds of records that we have to have for these kinds of programs will have flaws in them.

That doesn't change the fact that it is incumbent upon us, in accordance with the charter that we have been given, to try to make some reasonable decision with respect to the number of people who may be compensated for injury that may have come to them as a result of their work for us and for our nation, and this program.

It's not going to be easy to do, and it's an ugly, messy business, certainly for Savannah River, it's worse than most. That is a foregone conclusion.

But we need to do something to agree that we will limit the number of people

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1	that will be granted noblesse oblige for
2	cancers that they suffer, if they have worked
3	at Savannah River.
4	What we're talking about here
5	today is difficult, and nobody that has
6	spoken, to the best of my knowledge, has a
7	full grip on exactly how to go about doing
8	that.
9	But it would be a mistake, and I
10	think a misuse of our time, and of everyone
11	else's time, if we did not continue to
12	struggle with how to identify and how to
13	define this special cohort in some way, other
14	than everybody who worked anywhere on the
15	site.
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Josie?
17	MEMBER BEACH: I would like to
18	make a motion to reject NIOSH's proposed Class
19	Definition for the SEC, as written, and I
20	don't know if I can do that in two motions or
21	not, but redefine the Class Definition.

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CHAIRMAN MELIUS:

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Well, there is

1	no motions. I think it would be easier to
2	work from a positive motion.
3	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, I wasn't sure.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
5	MEMBER BEACH: So, then I'll
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, I think
7	that
8	MEMBER BEACH: Then I'll change
9	that.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: There is no
11	recommendation from the Work Group, and so,
12	there is no motion pending.
13	MEMBER BEACH: Okay.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And so, we're
15	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, I was
16	wondering if we needed to reject
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We can move what
18	we want.
19	MEMBER BEACH: So, then I would
20	like to make a motion to propose or change
21	the Class Definition to all workers during the
22	time periods listed.

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Do we have a
2	second for that?
3	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I'll second it.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Any further
5	discussion? Yes, Paul?
6	MEMBER ZIEMER: The Work Group
7	itself didn't make a recommendation on it. I
8	was wondering if they had had any plans to
9	further evaluate this newest material that
10	came before us.
11	I'm sympathetic to the motion in a
12	certain sense, and but also, to the
13	frustrations that we face in both for the
14	Class as described, and how it might be
15	administered, as well as the concerns for the
16	construction workers.
17	But I am a little uncomfortable in
18	voting on this new Definition right off the
19	bat. Was the Work Group otherwise planning to
20	look at any of these issues further?
21	I am not talking necessarily about
22	Dr. Lockey's proposal, but just this new

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1	information that came on the gap analysis and
2	so on, because I
3	MEMBER GRIFFON: Where we left it,
4	we just had a phone call meeting, and where we
5	left it was, we asked NIOSH to complete as
6	much as they could of the gap analysis, prior
7	to this meeting, because we wanted to bring
8	the issue before the entire Board.
9	But there was no plan for further
10	action, you know, pending our discussion here.
11	MEMBER ZIEMER: Could I follow up?
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Sure.
13	MEMBER ZIEMER: The other sort of
14	possibility that occurred to me would be to
15	proceed with the recommendation of NIOSH,
16	recognizing that it may not fully cover the
17	Class ultimately, certainly, some additional
18	information needed on construction workers, as
19	well as perhaps, if those gaps are a stumbling
20	well as perhaps, if those gaps are a stumbling block, and then allow later, the expansion.

certainly feel comfortable in moving ahead with a big portion of this right away, and that is the Class, as defined, and then if we find that these other issues are really surmountable, then to expand it at a later time after we've had a chance to consider it in more depth.

But that would be a separate motion. Anyway, that -- I just get that on the table, and others can comment.

MELIUS: Additional CHAIRMAN I would just add one -- I'm sorry, comments? Jim, but one further, I guess, piece of information, and is that after the last meeting, where we -- remember, we -- these issues were all raised at the last meeting, and I have talked to NIOSH staff, to Stu then, and we followed after the Work Group meeting and so forth, saying is there -- are there alternative Class Definitions that would at least appear to be more feasible to implement?

And I think we're at a loss to,

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1	you know, come up with that. I have not heard
2	any suggestions. I know there is thoughts.
3	Mark and I have talked about that, also.
4	So, it's not like, you know, there
5	has been no thought given to that. I just
6	think it's it's difficult to find something
7	in between. That is all.
8	MEMBER ROESSLER: I am if we
9	bring this motion to a vote, I'm going to vote
10	against it.
11	I am just not ready to take that
12	big step. I think it's irresponsible for us,
13	as a Board, to do that, without maybe looking
14	a little bit more at a step-wise approach to
15	this, and I'm also uncomfortable because the
16	Work Group hasn't come up with anything that
17	we can really grab onto and feel comfortable
18	with.
19	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: My comment to
20	that would be, I think I also feel it would
21	be irresponsible to recommend a Class
22	Definition that we know that Department of

Labor cannot implement, and it's not been implementable in any other sites that we've dealt with so far.

We're sort of caught in between. I understand the concern, and but I don't know if there is an easy alternative or a ready alternative. Brad?

MEMBER CLAWSON: I have been involved in a lot of the data captures at Savannah River. We all know that all of these sites have numerous issues with their data keeping, especially in the early years.

But something that also is eating at me, and this may be just a personal thing, interviews that in these have performed at Savannah River, and the people that I have interviewed and have talked to, and they have talked about how that -- this badge coding would not work because they were buildings, outside the in the trenches, running away from these buildings, but they didn't have the job codes for those areas, or

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the badging, I'd say over half of them that I've interviewed are no longer with us.

We are losing the majority of the people that actually worked during this time frame, and I think it is incumbent upon us to also realize and buck-up, and this -- we're grasping a straws to try to limit to this, and I understand why, but I think we really need to look at what we are here for and this is for these people, and I understand the concern, but I don't know how we would get at 100 percent resolution of knowing where we're at.

This information is full of holes, and I think we're giving something to the Department of Labor that is far harder to implement than what we have ever done before, and they've had problems with.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Phil?

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I agree that this is a real difficult problem, because we have so little real accurate data that we can

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1	honestly say that if you had a certain code,
2	you only were in that certain area.
3	Almost any facility you go to,
4	people will say, "Well, you know, I was
5	assigned this area, but I went over to this
6	area regularly," or maybe when they were
7	short-handed, they'd move over there. People
8	shift around, and that code is not set in
9	concrete.
10	I mean, it's not like, well, you
11	can't pass through that door because you have
12	this code on your badge. If it was that
13	accurate, then I would have no problems not
14	voting for it.
15	But as it is, I just don't see how
16	we can say that strictly on a code basis, for
17	what is on that badge, you are either in or
18	out, when it's not that clear-cut or set.
19	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Brad, do you
20	have another comment? Anybody else which to
21	speak? David, yes?
22	MEMBER RICHARDSON: I am

sympathetic to the approach, I mean, in part because this approach for we use kind epidemiologic analyses, for NIOSH, and we -you know, we proposed it to them for trying to primarily, non-radiological figure our hazards, but also, to impute exposures in years when workers weren't -- had gaps their dosimetry information.

And I think -- I mean, I'm sort of -- you know, kind of the CATI-based kind of evaluation of it was sort of impressive to me, in that fact that it had kind of the level of concordance with what people were reporting that it did.

I mean, that -- in a way, that was more -- that is -C that is surprising to me, but I take Knut's point, that it's -- those people were providing CATI information are not necessarily a random sample of those people who could recall what building they were in, maybe not fully representative.

Now, the other side of it is that

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when we used it for distinguishing between workers who on average, had a higher potential for exposure than the remainder of people who were not classified in the area, that wasn't making the case that we -- you know, that we had perfect -- like, a diagnostic test, or perfectly separating these into distinct groups of people. That is not the intention of epidemiology what so ever.

We were aspiring to be sort of right on average, and our level of discomfort with it was always the fact that, well, this is -- these are badging areas, and people are moving in and out through them, and so, it -- as developed, it was not intended for this purpose, I guess is a starting point.

As it would be used for -- in terms of implementation, I was just sort of looking through.

We scanned through the quarterly log books, scanned in the codes, and I think - now, that is not -- I mean, this was for

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22,000 people who were the prime contractor employees, this bigger group of construction workers, which you're saying is maybe 60,000 workers.

don't know that anybody exhaustively tried to inventory what is recorded there, but I have like five pages of codes recorded, maybe it looks like different numeric codes that we picked up, and what we had to do for gaps was, when there was a gap, we -- and we did what you would do in epidemiologic study of, made we assumption that the area was just consistent across any of the gaps, where there were -- or we split the time -- split the difference, when there was an area.

So, and we did a lot of that. I mean, for these 22,000 workers, there were -- we did a lot of imputation for their work history.

NIOSH has tried to pick up these codes, but I mean, one of the other things I

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1 remember with these areas codes is that the 2 site was dynamic over time. Area codes were 3 introduced and removed as things changed. We could never find -- and I don't 4 believe NIOSH has either, in their hands, 5 6 something that says what all these 100 --7 what, 120 codes actually correspond to. mean, so, 40 percent of 8 have historical record of it, 9 some 10 calendar year, what that code -- you know, where on a map it corresponds to, but there is 11 12 a lot of codes which we -- are not 000's, but 13 there are -- they're OZA, or something like that. 14 15 I don't think anybody knows right 16 now, what that code means. That is not a 000, but it's also not interpretable as a distinct 17 place on a map in a given year. 18 19 So, there is -- there would be more -- I believe Department of Labor would 20 encounter more problems than simply missing 21

data or explicitly missing data.

non-intelligible data, and there is assumptions that a code in two years means the same thing year to year, and then there is -- I think there is going to be a lot of gaps, just based on -- and this was the best -- I think probably the best documented workers, the prime contractors, the construction workers.

My recollection of SEC is -- what the -- the dosimetry data was not as complete.

So, I think there are -- I mean, just from our experience of trying to impute where workers were moving through over time and assign them days worked with exposure potential as high versus low, this was -- you know, was perhaps, the best attempt at the time, to use available historical information, but I'm not quite sure it does something as refined as declaring that somebody had no exposure, based on these codes, which were not recorded for that purpose, at all.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you,

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1	David. That was helpful. Paul?
2	MEMBER ZIEMER: I just would like
3	to ask David, I interpret what you say as
4	speaking for the motion, is that correct?
5	I'm trying to I want to I
6	think I understand what you're saying, and I
7	think it supports the motion, is that correct?
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: I am not quite
9	sure what you mean. There are several
10	MEMBER ZIEMER: I know it's
11	MEMBER RICHARDSON: There are
12	several motions.
13	MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, I thought at
14	first, you were sort of married to the codes,
15	but I think you're saying in spite of how you
16	use them before, you're separating out the epi
17	work from this which is very different from
18	making a decision on compensation.
19	MEMBER RICHARDSON: That is
20	MEMBER ZIEMER: Are you saying
21	you're supporting the motion, is what I'm
22	saying, or were you speaking in support?

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Just clarify.
2	I'm more confused, but the motion is all
3	employees. That is the motion that is on the
4	floor.
5	MEMBER ZIEMER: Yes, all right,
6	that is what I was asking.
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, and it has
8	been seconded and I think what David was
9	yes, was
10	MEMBER ZIEMER: Well, I
11	understand, but I'm the implication of this
12	toward the motion, I believe, is that it
13	supports the idea that the codes are not that
14	useful for the purpose that has been described
15	to us in the original NIOSH.
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think it's
17	MEMBER ZIEMER: I don't want to
18	presume what you but I am trying to fit it
19	in with our debate here, to help me inform my
20	my vote.
21	MEMBER RICHARDSON: I think that
22	is right, Dr. Ziemer. I mean, my what

1	yes, the characterization that I think that
2	codes the codes are not going to be useful
3	or a sharp tool for saying that somebody was
4	or did did or did not have potential for
5	exposure in a given area is true.
6	I also think from kind of the
7	administratively Department of Labor
8	perspective on our question of trying to
9	recollect how many gaps are there and what do
10	we mean by a gap?
11	I think there is the more you
12	dig into this, the more kind of ambiguous
13	information there is.
14	So, that is going to be very
15	difficult to use for that purpose.
16	Now, whether the conclusion from
17	there is that we propose something entirely
18	different from the SEC Class Definition that
19	is here, is the next step.
20	But I'm comfortable with this
21	Class Definition, as NIOSH has proposed.
22	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think one

some evidence of this issue with the codes, I
think is the fact that based on the sample -non-random sample of 10, Tim ended up adding
two more codes, areas, and a third, which was
the illegible, I'm not sure how that counts,
but and do that.

And I think that, you know, you're
just going to find people that were coded in
different time periods in different ways, that
may have actually worked in some of those
areas, it's just that, and then beyond that,
there is the question of how inclusive is

So, again, they weren't -- these codes weren't designed for our purposes.

that, and accurate is it, to find everybody?

Any further discussion before we vote? Sorry, Gen?

MEMBER ROESSLER: I don't think David answered Paul's question. I'm not sure what -- I think what you said is you are against the NIOSH proposal. That is pretty clear.

1	But are you willing to take the
2	next step, and say, let's go for the motion
3	that is on the floor, that I don't think we
4	heard 'yes' or 'no' from you. Maybe you're
5	not willing to say.
6	But I think that was the question.
7	MEMBER RICHARDSON: In a sense,
8	you're asking me to vote before you want to
9	know how I'll vote before we vote, which is,
10	you know, fair enough, if you'd like to know
11	that.
12	MEMBER ANDERSON: But you don't
13	have to say it.
14	MEMBER RICHARDSON: The other
15	option that I'm still weighing with, and I
16	think other people have asked NIOSH for, is
17	is there and you posed this question to
18	them.
19	Is there do you have something
20	else in your pocket? Like, is there do you
21	can you imagine another Class Definition
22	which is more workable than this one, which I

1	am having a hard time seeing work?
2	So, if that is the out there still
3	as an option, I'd be open to hearing it.
4	If not, then I think it is I
5	mean, there is some sort of this could go
6	on and on for a long time. I don't think
7	there would be a lot to be gained by further
8	study of these data, but that is my
9	perspective, having studied these data. I
10	mean, other people may be more creative and
11	have use for them, but we did spend five years
12	working through the employment history.
13	So, I can say it's a long process,
14	even for the 22,000 operations workers. I
15	can't imagine how long it would take to work
16	with the rest of them.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So, I think the
18	question is for you, Stu. Does NIOSH have
19	another Class Definition ready?
20	MR. HINNEFELD: Well, no, I'm
21	feeling a little bit like Captain Kangaroo up
22	here, if anybody remembers Captain Kangaroo,

he used to pull, you know, one thing after another out of his pockets.

But no, we've reached pretty far,

I believe, with what we've presented so far,

pretty far from, meaning -- pretty far from
what we have typically done in defining
Classes.

And so, I don't know that we have another reach that we could be expected to come up with in a reasonable amount of time.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Thank you for that clarification. Any further discussion, before we vote? Bill Field, I'm sorry, and then John Poston.

MEMBER FIELD: And that's why I was asking before, was there a fallback, because this is a hard vote. I mean, it's a very hard vote, and you look for something that is going to work, and I guess I was hopeful that at some point, the dose information we had would be related to job codes, so you could fall back and use job

1	code, perhaps as a measure. That doesn't seem
2	to be the case.
3	We're not hearing any other
4	fallback strategy. I think there were some
5	discussions of looking at the data further,
6	but I think that may be an endless process.
7	I'm not sure looking at the data further is
8	going to tell us much, and this could be two
9	or three years down the road.
10	So, it's I think this is a very
11	hard vote. I'd prefer the stepwise process,
12	but I don't know what the steps to that
13	process are. They haven't been identified, as
14	far as I can tell.
15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: John?
16	MEMBER POSTON: I can't be as
17	eloquent as Bill, because he said everything I
18	wanted to say.
19	So, what I do want to say one sort
20	of thing, something in summary, and that is,
21	I'm very frustrated and don't know exactly how
22	to vote on this, and one of the reasons I'm

frustrated is, we don't have a recommendation from the Working Group, and that really bothers me.

Ι mean, we've made a decision Working Group, who without the had been working on this project for quite a while, to come with something solid, and so, now, we are making -- we're doing the work of the Working just really bothers Group, and that because it would be easy if consider recommendation, to what they're recommending or vote against what they're commending.

But here, we don't have a solid recommendation that we know what to do. So, we each one of us is not only confused, but I'm personally very frustrated that we don't have such.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, in fairness to the Work Group, I've listened in on their last phone call, and I think one of the issues they have, that made it difficult, one is it

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1	was a phone call. So, it's a limited amount
2	of time.
3	Secondly, there was new
4	information presented, which again, without
5	a report from NIOSH, that they wanted to be
6	able to think about and third, that NIOSH was
7	going to do some further work, you know,
8	looking at the those 10 cases, and I think
9	they felt that by this week, there would be
10	more information, but I also think the Work
11	Group was had the same concern, you know,
12	that many of us have raised here, hoping there
13	was some other way of resolving this.
14	I think that is why they
15	hesitated. Is that fair, Mark? That was my
16	interpretation?
17	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes, yes.
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Just listening
19	to it.
20	MEMBER GRIFFON: I mean, yes, I
21	think it was, in part. We were waiting for,
22	you know, NIOSH to kind of if they could,

complete this gap analysis and come to some more conclusions and didn't want to push it to a vote on the Work Group call, but rather, bring it back to the floor to discuss with all -- you know, all of our perspectives.

But I mean, I still feel strongly

-- I mean, I have my opinion, but I wasn't

ready to, you know, take a vote on the Work

Group, but I still feel strongly that the -
you know, doing further analysis on this is

just going to lead us into more gray area, and

I think we have a lot of past activities to

support that, as well as the issues on the

records that David has discussed.

So, you know, I'm pretty convinced, just with the problems on these 10 that we analyzed, whether they were random or biased or what, I think we -- you know, we could be at this for a while, and you know, in trying to define.

And then, you know, when you get down to it, is five percent, you know -- if

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1	you miss five percent of the people that
2	should have been in, is that an acceptable
3	rate?
4	You know, so, I think that is
5	where I stood, but I wanted to give the Work
6	Group you know, there was still information
7	in process, so we didn't push it to a vote on
8	the Work Group.
9	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Henry?
10	MEMBER ANDERSON: I was only going
11	to say, I mean, the other thing is, is it
12	workable, and the decision of is it workable,
13	is really a Department of Labor decision, and
14	is there any way to get a read from them, as
15	to or will they wait they won't do
16	anything until we've
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Not quickly.
18	MEMBER ANDERSON: Okay, well,
19	fine, and that helps, in my vote. Thank you.
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Paul?
21	MEMBER ZIEMER: I think some of
22	the frustration we feel is not unlike what we

felt at General Electric and some other locations, as well.

We know that at Savannah River, although it's a very, very large site, and in fact, because it's a very large site, there are many workers there who were non-rad workers, but we don't have a good way to distinguish these issues on, perhaps, any of them.

So, we end up with a case where in order to take care of those who we know are in the categories that would be covered by the SEC, we end up pulling in many, many others, and it's as Wanda described, in a certain sense, those who are -- end up coming along for the ride.

They certainly won't object. We aren't doing our country a service, in a sense, by doing that, because it's money out of everybody's pocket, but we sort of had a mandate to take care of those who are entitled to this, and I'm not seeing how we can

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separate it out at this point.

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had, Ι think, almost that We situation at GE, in Cincinnati, and we finally said, "You know, we just -- we've got to bite the bullet, " so, I'm uncomfortable as John is, we're Wanda, and Ι think all kind of uncomfortable in these kind of situations.

They probably occur at all sites, to some degree, but at a big site like this, it gets magnified.

So, that is the only comment. I am at the point where I probably will support the motion, but I want to express my degree of discomfort.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I would just add that in addition to GE, I mean, we should remember that NIOSH ended up making the same recommendation -- and DOL, essentially, making the same recommendation at Hanford, where we went from areas, to all employees, because of feasibility issues, I mean, just to administer the Class, and so, you know, I think we have

1 some responsibility to come up with a workable 2 Class Definition. 3 But if there is further no comments, and we've been at this a while, we 4 5 should take a vote or take lunch. 6 MS. LIN: Dr. Melius? 7 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Before you take the 8 MS. LIN: vote, can you state the --9 10 CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, Ι It's all employees of the Department of 11 and their 12 Energy, its predecessor agencies contractors and subcontractors who worked at 13 the Savannah River Site from January 1, 1953 14 15 through September 30, 1972, for a number of 16 work day aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment 17 or in combination with work days within the 18 19 parameters established for one or more other 20 Classes of employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort. 21

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MR. KATZ: Dr. Anderson?

1	MEMBER ANDERSON: Yes.
2	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach?
3	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
4	MR. KATZ: Mr. Clawson?
5	MEMBER CLAWSON: Yes.
6	MR. KATZ: Dr. Field?
7	MEMBER FIELD: Yes.
8	MR. KATZ: Mr. Gibson is not on
9	the line, I presume. So, absent I'm marking
10	for him. Mr. Griffon?
11	MEMBER GRIFFON: Yes.
12	MR. KATZ: And Dr. Lemen, I
13	presume is not on the line? I'm marking him
13	presume is not on the line: I m marking him
14	as absent. Dr. Lockey is absent, now. I'll
14	as absent. Dr. Lockey is absent, now. I'll
14 15	as absent. Dr. Lockey is absent, now. I'll collect his vote, as well. Dr. Melius?
14 15 16	as absent. Dr. Lockey is absent, now. I'll collect his vote, as well. Dr. Melius?  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
14 15 16 17	as absent. Dr. Lockey is absent, now. I'll collect his vote, as well. Dr. Melius?  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.  MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?
14 15 16 17	as absent. Dr. Lockey is absent, now. I'll collect his vote, as well. Dr. Melius?  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.  MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?  MEMBER MUNN: No.
14 15 16 17 18	as absent. Dr. Lockey is absent, now. I'll collect his vote, as well. Dr. Melius?  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.  MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn?  MEMBER MUNN: No.  MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston?

1	MR. KATZ: Dr. Roessler?
2	MEMBER ROESSLER: Yes.
3	MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield?
4	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Yes.
5	MR. KATZ: And Dr. Ziemer?
6	MEMBER ZIEMER: Yes.
7	MR. KATZ: The motion passes.
8	There are two 'nays' and two absences. So,
9	the motion passes.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Now, we have the
11	second motion to consider, which is lunch.
12	MEMBER BEACH: How much more work
13	do we have?
	do we have?  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, that is
13	
13	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, that is
13 14 15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, that is what I was going to go through.
13 14 15 16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, that is what I was going to go through.  What we have left to do is, we
13 14 15 16 17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, that is what I was going to go through.  What we have left to do is, we have at least one or we have some of the
13 14 15 16 17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, that is what I was going to go through.  What we have left to do is, we have at least one or we have some of the letters to talk, but we can do those those
13 14 15 16 17 18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, that is what I was going to go through.  What we have left to do is, we have at least one or we have some of the letters to talk, but we can do those those are quick.

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1	So, those are all quick, well,
2	should be, and then the question is how do
3	we want to spend more time on the 10 year
4	review issue?
5	Remember, we heard Stu's
6	presentation, but we really didn't have the
7	time to ask questions or present.
8	So, or you know, have further
9	more discussion and some disposition on those.
10	So, I think the options are, we
11	can break for about an hour for lunch, come
12	back at 2:15 p.m. or something. I don't know
13	what that does, in terms of people's
14	schedules, and then we would go on for about
15	an hour, or we can go on for at least
16	roughly a half-hour, but that would mean not
17	doing the 10 year discussion, which that or
18	we could just charge through for another hour.
19	It's up to take a short break, and then do
20	the hour.
21	MEMBER ROESSLER: The other option
22	is, can we at least take a five minute break?

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Oh, we will,
2	yes.
3	MEMBER BEACH: No, let's take 10.
4	MEMBER ROESSLER: If we come back,
5	I think we can go without lunch.
6	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, is that
8	everybody's
9	MEMBER BEACH: Ten minute break?
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Ten minute
11	break. We'll reconvene around 1:15 p.m., and
12	will someone go and buy some cookies?
13	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
14	matter went off the record at 1:05 p.m. and
15	resumed at 1:20 p.m.)
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, let's
17	reconvene. I think Dr. Ziemer had to leave,
18	but I think everybody else is back, and do
19	that, and I'm going to do the letters. You'll
20	have to bear with me, we're sort of doing this
21	on the run, this time.
22	But I'm going to actually do them

one at a time. We'll probably break them up with some other discussion here, because I've got to find them on my computer and make sure I've got the right version, because we've been going -- Jenny and I have been going back and forth, we've got the language right.

So, the first one I'm going to do is actually Savannah River. Again, sort of the usual preface on this.

But the Advisory Board on Radiation Worker Health, the Board, has evaluated Special Exposure Cohort SEC Petition 00103 concerning workers at the Savannah River Site under the requirements statutory established by the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) of 2000, incorporated into 42 CFR Section 83.13.

The Board respectfully recommends that SEC status be accorded to "All employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies and their contractors and

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subcontractors who work the Savannah River Site from January 1, 1953 through September 30, 1972, for number of work а days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other Classes of employees included in the Special Exposure Cohort."

"This recommendation is based on the following factors, individuals employed at the Savannah River Site during a time period in question worked on the production of materials for nuclear weapons."

Number two, "The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) review of available monitoring data, as well available process and source-term information for the facility found that NIOSH lacked sufficient information necessary to complete individual dose reconstruction with sufficient accuracy for internal radiological

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exposures due to thorium in some areas of the 1 2 facility during the time period in question." 3 "The Board concurs with this determination. The Board also found that 4 5 available personnel and monitoring records 6 were not adequate to identify all employees 7 who worked or may have worked in those areas of the Savannah River Site and for whom dose 8 reconstructions are not feasible." 9 10 "Hence, the Board has recommended a Class Definition that includes all employees 11 12 at the Savannah River Site, not withstanding 13 of available personnel and monitoring records." 14 15 "NIOSH determined that health may 16 have been endangered for these Savannah River Site employees during the time period in 17 question. The Board also concurs with this 18 determination." 19 "Based on these considerations and 20 the discussion at the December  $7^{\text{th}}$  and  $8^{\text{th}}$  2011 21 Board meeting held in Tampa, Florida, the 22

1	Board recommends that this Class be added to
2	the SEC, closed documentation from the Board
3	meeting, where this Class was discussed,
4	documentation includes copies of the petition,
5	NIOSH review thereof and related materials."
6	"If any of these items aren't
7	available, they will follow shortly."
8	The only difference from some of
9	our usual letters, I just wanted to clarify
10	that we were essentially agreeing with NIOSH
11	on the SEC Class of thorium areas, but that we
12	were I wanted to get the rationale we had
13	for expanding the Class Definition in there,
14	compared to the recommendation.
15	So, we'll circulate these, also,
16	but as long as no one has any major concerns,
17	I think we're fine, and let's go ahead then
18	with the Work Group Report 1 from Mark, Rocky
19	Flats.
20	MEMBER GRIFFON: We had a call, a
21	Work Group call on Rocky Flats, and the focus

discussion was,

the

of

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well, two-fold,

actually.

One was to clarify how DOL came up with a new bulletin on how to implement the Class, considering the use of the Ruttenber database data, and we had a discussion around that, and then we also had a discussion on continuing the Site Profile review that had been set aside for several years.

There were some outstanding Site Profile issues that remained on our matrix of issues. So, we're -- we made our first attempts at resurrecting that process, and we'll take those issues up at our next meeting.

I would like to ask maybe for a specific agenda item on the next Board meeting. I think it can be the phone meeting, if we have a phone meeting coming up between the -- as usual, to have Rocky Flats, a discussion of the Class Definition by the full Board.

Our concern on the proposal, or

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some on the Work Group are concerned that the proposed use of the Ruttenber database is -has some -- is flawed, specifically in that it relies on identifying people in the Ruttenber that were noted to have database neutron exposures greater than 100 millirem in any one year, and why, in my opinion, that is flawed, already, because by this we Definition, have indicated to NIOSH that we don't believe neutron doses can reconstructed during that time period.

This would rely on the same neutron/photon ratios used in the original proposal by NIOSH to reconstruct doses, to make a determination on this 100 millirem.

So, if it wasn't useful for dose reconstruction, we feel it isn't useful to identify a cut-off for who is in and out of an SEC Class.

So, I think we want to come back to the full Board with that, and possibly consider modifying the Definition of the Class

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1	for Rocky Flats.
2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, any
3	questions for Mark on that?
4	Okay, good, and do you want to do
5	your Subcommittee?
6	MEMBER GRIFFON: The Subcommittee
7	is very quick.
8	No meeting occurred between the
9	last Board meeting and now. We have a
10	Subcommittee meeting scheduled for December
11	19 <sup>th</sup> .
12	So, there is really no report on
13	the DR Subcommittee for this meeting.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay, we are
15	going to go back to letters, and now, we can
16	read through the Linde letter.
17	The letter is, "The Advisory Board
18	on Radiation and Worker Health (the Board) has
19	evaluated a Special Exposure Cohort SEC
20	Petition 00154 concerning workers at the Linde
21	Ceramics Plant in Tonawanda, New York, under
22	the statutory requirements established by

Energy Employees Occupational Illness
Compensation Program Act of 2000, and
incorporated into 42 CFR 83.13."

"The Board respectfully recommends that SEC status be accorded to "all Atomic Weapons Employees" who worked in any area at the Linde Ceramics Plant in Tonawanda, York from November 1, 1947 through December 31, 1953, for number of а work days aggregating at least 250 work days, occurring either solely under this employment or with combination work days within the parameters established for one or more other Classes of employees included in the SEC."

This recommendation is based on the on the following factors: "Individuals employed at the Linde Facility during the time period in question worked on the production of materials for nuclear weapons and/or in the decontamination of buildings where these materials have been previously been produced."

Number two, "The National

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Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) review of available monitoring data, as well as available process and source-term information for this facility found that NIOSH lacks sufficient information necessary to complete individual dose reconstructions with sufficient accuracy for internal radiological exposures due to uranium and uranium progeny (with the exception of radon) during the time period in question. The Board concurs with this determination."

"NIOSH determined that health may have been endangered for these Linde Ceramics Plant employees during the time period in question. The Board also concurs with this determination."

"Based on these considerations and the discussions at the December  $7^{\rm th}$  and  $8^{\rm th}$ , 2011 Board meeting held in Tampa, Florida, the Board recommends that this Class be added to the SEC."

"Enclosed is the documentation

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1	from the Board meeting, where this SEC Class
2	was discussed. The documentation includes
3	copies of the petition, NIOSH review thereof,
4	and related materials."
5	"If any of these materials are
6	unavailable at this time, they will follow
7	shortly."
8	Any concern or questions? Again,
9	I will circulate these, so that everybody gets
10	to see them.
11	Okay, Ted, do you want to deal
12	with meeting schedules?
13	MR. KATZ: Sure. So, I'm missing
14	a few for this. I did notice we got Paul
15	Ziemer's availability, and I think at this
16	point, at least tentatively, we've got
17	everybody's availability who is here.
18	We need to schedule another
19	teleconference. Just to remind you, right
20	now, our last teleconference is April 26 <sup>th</sup> ,
21	and our latest Board meeting we scheduled out
22	to is June 19 <sup>th</sup> through 21 <sup>st</sup> . Those have

1	already been scheduled.
2	So, the next teleconference then,
3	the right time frame is August 6 <sup>th</sup> through 10 <sup>th</sup>
4	or 13 <sup>th</sup> through 17 <sup>th</sup> . Both of those time
5	frames work for Paul.
6	Normally, we do them on Wednesday,
7	but of course, any day of the week is okay.
8	MEMBER RICHARDSON: It is 6 <sup>th</sup>
9	through 10 <sup>th</sup> and when is the next option?
LO	MR. KATZ: The 6 <sup>th</sup> through the 10 <sup>th</sup>
11	or the $13^{\rm th}$ through the $17^{\rm th}$ of August.
L2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So, for
L3	argument's sake, the Wednesday would be the
L4	8 <sup>th</sup> or the 15 <sup>th</sup> ?
L5	MR. KATZ: Yes, right.
L6	MEMBER RICHARDSON: The 15 <sup>th</sup> is
L7	better for me.
L8	MR. KATZ: The 15 <sup>th</sup> ? Does that
L9	work for everyone here?
20	Okay, that was quick. August 15 <sup>th</sup> ?
21	MEMBER ANDERSON: At what time?
22	MR. KATZ: Normally, we do 11

1	o'clock, but it's not we're not set on it
2	yet. Very good, that's all. Next, we have
3	the next face-to-face then, and September 10 <sup>th</sup>
4	through 14 <sup>th</sup> , 17 <sup>th</sup> through 21 <sup>st</sup> or 24 <sup>th</sup> through
5	28 <sup>th</sup> . Those are the whole weeks. Of course,
6	the we can pretty much go around that, and
7	Paul has a conflict. He can't do the 10 <sup>th</sup> ,
8	but he can do the $11^{ m th}$ through $14^{ m th}$ , and he
9	can't no, I'm sorry, $24^{ ext{th}}$ and $28^{ ext{th}}$ and is
10	Paul is not certain, but he's pretty sure that
11	doesn't work for him.
12	So, 10 <sup>th</sup> through 14 <sup>th</sup> or 11 <sup>th</sup> through
13	14 <sup>th</sup> or 17 <sup>th</sup> through 21 <sup>st</sup> ?
14	MEMBER MUNN: The 17 <sup>th</sup> through 21 <sup>st</sup>
15	would be better for me.
16	MEMBER BEACH: Me too.
17	MS. LIN: Me too.
18	MR. KATZ: This is September 17 <sup>th</sup>
19	through 21 <sup>st</sup> .
20	MEMBER GRIFFON: What is the
21	location?
22	MR. KATZ: We don't have it.

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We don't have a
2	location, yet.
3	MR. KATZ: Right, we just put it
4	out there, for this Board meeting.
5	Okay, any problems with that?
6	Okay, so, then
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: So, what days
8	are you talking about?
9	MR. KATZ: So, it's better not to
10	start on a Monday. I mean, if people like
11	Tuesday through Thursday, that is okay?
12	So, the $18^{\rm th}$ through the $20^{\rm th}$ , the
13	20 <sup>th</sup> may be a half-day.
14	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: We need to get
15	around Oak Ridge.
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: For the record,
17	we also have a request to meet in Washington,
18	D.C.
19	MR. KATZ: Yes.
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: From some
21	Congressional staff, not naming names.
22	MR. KATZ: So, those are two

1	locations. We can ponder further.
2	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
3	MR. KATZ: We a discussion of this
4	before, and there may be other locations,
5	depending on the progress of work that you see
6	a few months down the road.
7	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay.
8	MR. KATZ: Now, we've done we
9	had a beast of a time getting down a hotel
10	that is available in the entire San Francisco
11	area, apparently, but we do now have a place.
12	It's San Jose.
13	We had hoped to do it closer to
14	Berkeley, because there are more claimants
15	there, but there is not a hotel.
16	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Where is this
17	one going to be?
18	MR. KATZ: So, this is the
19	February, end of February meeting. It will be
20	in San Jose.
21	MEMBER BEACH: So, that is San
22	Jose?

1	MR. KATZ: So, it's San Jose. It
2	sounds like it's a we haven't signed the
3	contract with them, but it's the only hotel we
4	could meet in.
5	Oh, by the way, that meeting will
6	be your ethics training too.
7	MEMBER POSTON: Will you send
8	these out to everybody?
9	MR. KATZ: The dates?
10	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
11	MR. KATZ: Absolutely. I mean,
12	you already have these, the dates right here,
13	for the ones that we've established, right?
14	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
15	MR. KATZ: Yes, I'll send out the
16	new dates.
17	MEMBER POSTON: Yes.
18	MR. KATZ: Absolutely. As I was
19	saying, there was a lot of confusion
20	yesterday. I mentioned smart cards. Andy is
21	going to send me something that I'm going to
22	circulate to those of you who have smart

1	cards, or want them, so that you can fill out
2	applications, extending your coverage with
3	your smart card.
4	MEMBER ROESSLER: What if you
5	don't I missed my opportunity to pick mine
6	up, and I don't have one. Do I need one?
7	MR. KATZ: Well, you did all the
8	paperwork up front?
9	MEMBER ROESSLER: I did all the
10	paperwork.
11	MR. KATZ: Yes, then send me an
12	email to that effect, but it would be a
13	similar situation, and I'll assign someone to
14	get you one.
15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Ted actually
16	told me earlier that I didn't qualify for a
17	smart card. So, I get the dumb card.
18	MEMBER BEACH: Well, one other
19	thing on those smart cards. I just got an
20	email that says they're going to kick me off
21	the training portal, if I don't go in and
22	MR. KATZ: Oh, yes, that is

1	different. So, the training
2	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, but to get
3	into that portal, you have to have the little
4	thing that they send you to read your smart
5	card, which none of us have.
6	MR. KATZ: No, you don't need a
7	smart card right now. You don't. So, you can
8	get into the portal, now, until they say
9	they haven't instituted it yet.
10	MEMBER ANDERSON: But you can't
11	get in to do the training.
12	MR. KATZ: No, no, you don't need
13	a smart card right now, for anything.
14	So, it's not stopping you right
15	now, but
16	MEMBER ANDERSON: But if you go
17	we keep getting these notices about
18	MR. KATZ: So, if you use the
19	portal, it will continue your coverage.
20	MEMBER BEACH: When I tried to get
21	on the portal yesterday, it said I needed to
22	use my smart card.

1	MR. KATZ: There is two ways to
2	get into the portal. One is your smart card.
3	One is your ID and password, all of that, and
4	that middle section.
5	MEMBER BEACH: All right, thank
6	you.
7	MEMBER ANDERSON: But once you get
8	there, then you need to do the training side.
9	MR. KATZ: No, no, no.
10	MEMBER ANDERSON: You can't do the
11	training side.
12	MR. KATZ: Stop trying to make
13	trouble here.
14	MEMBER ANDERSON: Well, I mean,
15	that is the notice for you know, your
16	ethics training and go to the site and try to
17	do it, and it's very frustrating.
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I am not sure
19	what our work load will be for the next
20	meeting. So, we will try to get an estimate
21	of that by the time of our conference call, of
22	whether we can have a two-day meeting given

1	what LaVon presented, I don't think that there
2	will be a lot of maybe 83.14s or newly
3	qualified petitions, evaluations, there may be
4	that, too.
5	So, and we certainly have Fernald
6	to address at that meeting, but we'll do an
7	inventory, to sort of see where we are. I'm
8	not sure on GSI and some of the other
9	outstanding sites, or Mound might be ready,
10	too. So, it could be two and a half days. I'm
11	not predicting.
12	But we will try to make that
13	determination, so, if we can don't have to
14	have the extra day, that's fine.
15	MR. KATZ: Yes, it seems like a
16	good chance we'll be able to have two more?
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, so, I think
18	Fernald, I think we will at least set aside at
19	least two hours for discussion on that,
20	because I think there are a lot of issues
21	there, and I think we're fooling ourselves, if

we think we can do it in an hour.

1	MR. KATZ: And we have the ethics
2	session, and that will be
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, the ethics
4	session.
5	MR. KATZ: at least an hour.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think two and
7	a half days. We'll see. Let's see how it
8	looks.
9	MR. KATZ: Yes.
LO	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, LaVon never
11	gets anything done on time. So, he always
L2	disappoints us. Yes, Brad?
L3	MEMBER CLAWSON: I just wanted to -
L4	- when was passed the SEC for Pantex, the
L5	letter has gone out.
L6	I know that I saw a copy of it and
L7	I reviewed it, but I didn't know if it had
L8	come before the full Board and had been sent
L9	out.
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
21	MR. KATZ: That's all done.
22	MEMBER CLAWSON: That's all done?
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1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
2	MEMBER CLAWSON: Okay, I just
3	wanted to make sure.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, and the
5	package is on its way, or so forth, through
6	the process. So, that's fine.
7	I have one more letter I need to
8	do, which is this is a quick one. This is
9	on the Hooker Electrochemical Site.
10	"The Advisory Board on Radiation
11	Worker Health, the Board, has evaluated a
12	Special Exposure Cohort, SEC Petition 830141,
13	concerning workers at the Hooker
14	Electrochemical Company, under the statutory
15	requirements established by the Energy
16	Employment Occupational Illness Compensation
17	Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA) and incorporated
18	into 42 CFR 83.13."
19	"National Institute for
20	Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has
21	recommended that individual dose
22	reconstructions are feasible for workers at

1	the Hooker Electrochemical during the
2	operational period from January 1, 1943
3	through December 31, 1948, and the residual
4	period from January 1, 1949 to December 31,
5	1976."
6	"NIOSH found that it has access to
7	adequate exposure monitoring, other
8	information necessary to do individual dose
9	reconstructions with sufficient accuracy for
10	members of this group, and therefore, a Class
11	covering this group should not be added to the
12	SEC. The Board concurs with this
13	determination."
14	"Enclosed is the supporting
15	documentation from December $7^{th}$ through $8^{th}$ ,
16	2011 Board meeting, held in Tampa, Florida,
17	and earlier meetings where this potential SEC
18	Class was discussed."
19	"Documentation includes copies of
20	the petition, the NIOSH review thereof and
21	related materials."

any of these

"If

22

aren't

items

1	available at this time, they will follow
2	shortly," and I have one change to the letter,
3	I just noticed, because I haven't
4	Well, it's, I think we really
5	should say that they have NIOSH has access
6	to adequate information necessary to do an
7	individual dose. They really didn't have
8	adequate exposure monitoring at that facility,
9	in order to do that.
10	So, I think just say "adequate
11	information," I think is appropriate, yes.
12	Okay, any other things? And I
13	believe the actually, the official name of
14	the facility under the DOE is Hooker
15	Electrochemical.
16	MR. KATZ: Yes.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Without any
18	it sounds funny, but it's and we have to be
19	tied to that.
20	Okay, 10 year, yes, got your mouth
21	your sandwich adequately finished, Stu? We
22	can call you up here.

1	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, I hate to rub
2	it in, but it was delicious.
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: You can talk
4	with your mouth full.
5	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, to refresh
6	everybody's memory, in my presentation
7	yesterday, I suggest that many of the 10 year
8	review action items fall neatly into the
9	purview of various Work Groups and
LO	Subcommittees of the Board, and I suggested
11	that those Work Groups and Subcommittees stay
L2	engaged with us, as we proceed, maybe by
L3	reviewing intermediate products and choosing,
L4	really, to be as involved as the Work Group or
L5	Subcommittee chooses to be.
L6	So, that is I'll just kind of
L7	leave it at that, and we'll entertain any
L8	questions that anybody might have about what I
L9	presented yesterday, which was just sort of an
20	overview of information.
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Wanda, do you
22	have a question or are you just holding up

1	your pen?
2	MEMBER MUNN: No, I am just
3	holding my pen.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Okay.
5	MEMBER MUNN: I need support.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Support, okay.
7	Yes?
8	MEMBER BEACH: For me, it would be
9	helpful to know which Work Group is going to
LO	be involved in that and maybe what information
11	would go to those Work Groups.
L2	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, here is the
L3	ones that I suggested.
L4	In the quality of 12 of these
L5	service areas, the Worker Outreach Work Group,
L6	dose reconstruction area would be the Dose
L7	Reconstruction Subcommittee.
L8	The quality of science area would
L9	be the Science Issues Work Group, and the
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Put your
21	microphone on.
22	MR HINNEFELD: Is my microphone

1	off? Okay, we can try this. Okay, for the
2	quality of service area, the review, I
3	suggested the Worker Outreach Work Group
4	Okay, we're going to try this
5	again.
6	Okay, for the quality of service
7	area, I suggested the Worker Outreach Work
8	Group, because it has to do with clarity of
9	communication and our receptiveness to
10	communication.
11	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Let's go through
12	them like one area at a time, because
13	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I'm not sure
15	I agree with them.
16	MR. HINNEFELD: Quality of
17	service.
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Quality of
19	service I think, certainly, that would be to
20	the Worker Outreach Work Group.
21	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, and for the
22	dose reconstruction area, I suggested

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, the next
2	slide you have is timeliness.
3	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, and the
4	timeliness one?
5	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Timeliness, and
6	I think regard to dose reconstruction issues,
7	it would go to the Dose Reconstruction
8	Subcommittee.
9	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
10	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Time limits for
11	the completion of SEC petitions, I believe
12	would be the SEC Review Committee.
13	MR. HINNEFELD: I believe that
14	would be true.
15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Work Group,
16	excuse me, Work Group that I chair.
17	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, quality of
18	science?
19	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And well, I
20	guess the question now, SEC petitions is next.
21	Do that.
22	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And again, those
are SEC. I think the one issue we need to
think about is how to deal with sufficient
accuracy, because I think that is a key issue
and it's got some issues related to science
and it's got the you know, some issues
sort of, that are policy issues, and I'm a
little hesitant on sending that to David's
Work Group, because they've got six I think
five or six major issues, and I don't
necessarily think that I don't know if you
want to add that or it would be better to
either have the SEC Work Group deal with that
or form a new Work Group, or something
because it's almost I think it's working
with that, and I think the would prefer the
SEC Evaluation group to simply we've
already gone through a bunch of the SEC
issues, and sort of touched on that, without
ever trying to address it.

So, we may pull in other Members or work with the SEC -- the Science Issues

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1	Work Group, but I don't want to get you bogged
2	down in that issue. Is that
3	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, on the SEC
4	petitions area, then, the issue having to do
5	with sufficient accuracy to keep with
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, keep all
7	the SEC in the SEC area.
8	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.
9	MEMBER MUNN: So, that puts us
10	both doing part of the time on this, and all
11	the quality science?
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: No.
13	MR. HINNEFELD: No.
14	MEMBER MUNN: No?
15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Just the
16	sufficient issues, related issues of
17	sufficient accuracy, is the only sort of
18	quality issue that goes there.
19	Now, quality of science would be -
20	- there is two areas. One is an
21	implementation guide for levels of peer
22	review. I think that is something that comes

1	back to the whole Board. I think Stu is going
2	to develop a recommendation.
3	MR. HINNEFELD: Right.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And because
5	there is so many different types of documents
6	that would overlap, I think it would be more
7	efficient to have a Board discussion of that.
8	Now, if we are uncertain about an
9	area and we think that there is some way of
10	referring that, we can.
11	MR. HINNEFELD: Sure.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: The second one
13	under quality science is assessing validity of
14	indirect exposure methods, which is, I think
15	coworker data
16	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
17	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: and so forth.
18	Now, that could either be a science issue or
19	it could go to the Procedures Work Group,
20	which I think has previously reviewed coworker
21	some of the coworker TIBs and so forth?
22	MEMBER MUNN: We have reviewed the

procedures	and	the	coworkers.

MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Is that -- I can't tell if that's a 'yes' or a 'no', that you think it's -- you're willing to take it on, because I think it's an important issue.

I mean, if you think about the discussions we had earlier today on Fernald, there are issues that SC&A has raised about the adequacy of the coworker models, and they really -- and those were developed under sort of the old procedures.

We have a Science -- quality of science recommendation that those coworker procedures may not be adequate, and those need to be changed, and sort of didn't -- the process on that, and I'm not quite -- I don't know quite where the White -- I just hesitate to put it -- you know, put it off, dealing with that, that issue because it could be a significant change.

It has some implications for a lot

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1	of the sites that we're currently dealing with
2	and will be dealing with.
3	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, the other
4	places that kind of the DR Subcommittee, I
5	think you know, right now, we sort of, at
6	least internally agree, that the quality of
7	science group was going to focus on those
8	scientific issues related to models for
9	disease outcomes, and that's opposed to
10	science related to dose reconstruction because
11	there were a number of other Work Groups
12	already working on that.
13	So I think for our own purposes,
14	it may be useful to keep those scientific
15	issues separate, but certainly, we can
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Another
17	possibility
18	MEMBER MUNN: Procedures can
19	certainly handle that.
20	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Do you have an
21	epidemiologist on Procedures?
22	MEMBER MUNN: No, we don't.

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, you do,
2	Dick Lemen.
3	MEMBER MUNN: No, we don't.
4	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Is Bill? I
5	think Dick Lemen is. Yes, so, okay. Well,
6	let's start there. We can see I just think
7	it needs a
8	There is enough epidemiological
9	issues there in terms of looking at the one
10	of the issues is sort of what how fine
11	how focused down to the job title there, the
12	level, and so forth, should coworker models
13	be, because most of them are not, at the
14	moment.
15	And I think that was the major
16	recommendation in David's talk, in terms of
17	dealing with epidemiological data. It's an
18	ongoing issue, but Dr. Lemen is there, so,
19	that is fine.
20	MEMBER MUNN: Dr. Lemen is fine.
21	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
22	MEMBER MUNN: He can handle that.

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1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: We need to
2	recruit Bill Field in.
3	MEMBER ROESSLER: I would
4	recommend, if you're talking about the quality
5	of science being given over to the SEC Work
6	Group, I would recommend we mention adding
7	something I would recommend adding Bill
8	Field to that group.
9	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: No, I would
10	quality of science we were talking about for
11	the SEC Group.
12	Well, we're talking no, I'm
13	sorry, I meant I was thinking of the
14	science group, for the second one, the
15	indirect exposure, which is that the we
16	which essentially, coworker is one of the main
17	areas, but it's not the only one, that we add
18	that over to the either the Procedures or
19	Science, and I think we just decided
20	Procedures.
21	I will add, and I am, for whatever
22	reason, keep forgetting and I keep trying to

1	mention this at a time when all the Board
2	Members are here so it's sort of fair notice.
3	
4	But we do have to do some
5	modifications to some of our Work Groups in
6	terms of adding people and changing and so
7	forth. Bob Presley needs to be replaced on
8	some and and others, that I think are sort
9	of outstanding.
10	So I will send, after the meeting,
11	I will send out an email to everybody asking
12	for some specificity of that, and adding some
13	asking people to for volunteers,
14	essentially, so that we can bring some of
15	those back up, in terms of numbers and so
16	forth.
17	The other quality the next
18	quality of science issue is characterize
19	degree of claimant-favorability in current
20	methods.
21	MR. HINNEFELD: That is something
	11

22

that we will do.

1	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: You will do?
2	MR. HINNEFELD: We will do.
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think that
4	goes back to the Dose Reconstruction.
5	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: For the most
7	part.
8	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Or whatever the
10	you know I think you do, and then let's
11	see how it shakes out, or what you specify in
12	that, then we go from that.
13	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And then
15	surrogate data, you will be doing?
16	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes, that's that -
17	_
18	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: having
19	outside reviews, and then I think that we have
20	a Surrogate Data Work Group
21	MR. HINNEFELD: Yes.
22	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: which is not

1	active right now.
2	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay.
3	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: But could be
4	reactivated.
5	MR. HINNEFELD: All right.
6	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And then
7	MR. HINNEFELD: The final last big
8	bullet is supposed to be a subordinate bullet.
9	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes.
10	MR. HINNEFELD: That is
11	subordinate to the EPA.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Right, yes,
13	which is another would be input into that.
14	MR. HINNEFELD: Right, yes.
15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And then dose
16	reconstruction, I think that's the Dose
17	Reconstruction Committee.
18	MR. HINNEFELD: Okay, yes.
19	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Is that
20	satisfactory? I mean, we can always change
21	these and if the workload, you know, if it
22	interferes with workload or whatever, we can -

- or if we need a new Work Group to address certain ones, we can do that.

I think one of the other questions, which is always harder to think about, especially at the end of a meeting, is what is missing here? Is there something that we think Stu should be prioritizing, in terms of implementation, that is not on this list, that was from the 10 year review, or some other thing that should be started now?

I think as it goes to the Work Group, if you have suggestions on other approaches or other areas to look at, that is fine, but I guess I'm looking for anything that's missing, and again, I don't think this is something we all have to think of now, but can do so at a later point in time.

But do think about that because I don't think we want to get -- you know, two years from now, suddenly say, "Well, you really should have addressed this. This is what is important," in the program, when a

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1	change that's needed and was recommended, and
2	isn't being implemented.
3	MR. KATZ: Do you want this on the
4	agenda for the teleconference?
5	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I think we have
6	that. We'll put it as an agenda item on the
7	teleconference, yes, seeing how active and
8	vigorous we're all feeling right now.
9	By the way, my plane just got
10	delayed until 9 o'clock. So I think we're
11	going to go for another four or five hours.
12	MEMBER ROESSLER: Then we need a
13	lunch break.
14	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: What do you mean
15	lunch?
15 16	lunch?  MEMBER ANDERSON: Just after
16	MEMBER ANDERSON: Just after
16 17	MEMBER ANDERSON: Just after you've changed it, right?  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I didn't have a
16 17 18	MEMBER ANDERSON: Just after you've changed it, right?
16 17 18 19	MEMBER ANDERSON: Just after you've changed it, right?  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: I didn't have a chance to change it. I decided not to change

this and getting this implemented. I know
it's a lot to do, with all the other things
you have to do, and sort of putting this or
top, and trying to figure out I think one
of the difficulties I foresee is how do you
how do we implement this, at the same time,
without having to go back over everything or
keep progressing on other we don't want to
wait to all of these issues, but at the same
time, it would be terrible to it would be
difficult, I shouldn't say terrible. It could
be difficult if we, you know, evaluate and,
again, just as a hypothetical example,
something with sort of the old coworker
approach, and then we end up, you know, six
months later, recommending a brand new
approach and almost on the face of the old
ones, you know, the old approach is
inadequate, and in terms of recommendation.
T think there is T'm not

predicting that is so, but it's the kind of thing that would be difficult, and I think you

1	from some of the public comments we had
2	from the Petitioners and others, I think you
3	can see there is some expectation of other
4	changes and that these changes be implemented.
5	So, again, I commend you on getting this
6	going.
7	Any other comments? I think we can
8	if not, we finish as promised by 2 o'clock,
9	unless somebody has other business they want
10	to bring up? Yes, Dave? You're brave.
11	MEMBER RICHARDSON: There was an
12	issue raised in correspondence that was
12 13	issue raised in correspondence that was circulated with us.
13	circulated with us.
13 14	circulated with us.  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Oh, thank you
13 14 15	circulated with us.  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Oh, thank you for reminding me. Go ahead.
13 14 15 16	circulated with us.  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Oh, thank you for reminding me. Go ahead.  MEMBER RICHARDSON: It was an
13 14 15 16 17	circulated with us.  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Oh, thank you for reminding me. Go ahead.  MEMBER RICHARDSON: It was an issue about whether the Board should evaluate
13 14 15 16 17	circulated with us.  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Oh, thank you for reminding me. Go ahead.  MEMBER RICHARDSON: It was an issue about whether the Board should evaluate  I don't know anymore what the terminology
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	circulated with us.  CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Oh, thank you for reminding me. Go ahead.  MEMBER RICHARDSON: It was an issue about whether the Board should evaluate  I don't know anymore what the terminology is, perceptions of conflict of interest

program.

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CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, I think there is a specific concern that has been raised in a letter to the DCAS -- not -- I believe to John Howard, wasn't it? Yes, and I just think it certainly raises an issue that certainly made me uncomfortable when I saw it.

Now I don't know the details and there contracting and other issues is involved, but it's certainly, perception on the outside, at least among some of the claimants and claimant representatives, is that that is a -- does raise issues for them, and I would hope that it would get addressed, and I would hope that the Board would be kept informed about it, as you -- as it does get addressed.

Thank you for reminding me, Dave.

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, I guess,

I felt like that these are -- I mean, I guess

-- you know, I find these categories of

conflict of interest difficult to fully

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1	understand, without probably a legal training,
2	and it's probably I felt like looking at
3	it, yes, I had the same sort of sense of
4	sort of unease.
5	I'm not I don't have the
6	capacity to fully make evaluations of it, but
7	I would like to kind of keep on top of it and
8	maybe kind of be educated and informed about
9	it so that the Board can serve its role on
10	these issues.
11	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Well, it just so
12	happens that Ted told me at our next meeting
13	we will have our annual ethics training.
14	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Yes, those
15	have always
16	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Someone will be
17	there, and I think we can certainly ask that
18	that specific that they be ready to if
19	not address the specific issue, to address
20	that the issue that's been raised, in terms
21	of helping us to understand it, in the

because I think what happens is that we're --

1	we're asked these questions, isn't it a
2	conflict of interest on this issue or a
3	perceived conflict with certain individuals or
4	certain situations, and so forth.
5	And it puts us in an awkward
6	position. I don't think we'd say we'd make a
7	determination on it, but for us to claim that
8	we're ignorant of it, it appears as if we
9	don't have any concerns about it. At the same
10	time, you don't want to exaggerate your
11	concern because of the specifics.
12	So I think it helps to have some
13	level of information on it and go forth.
14	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Right.
15	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: And, Jenny, I'll
16	make sure you get that specific, if you're not
17	aware of what it is.
18	MEMBER RICHARDSON: I don't mean
19	to say that I feel like I'm ignorant of I
20	think the training that we've received has
21	been focused on perceptions of bias and
22	conflict of interest as they concern our own

behaviors and the relationships that we engage in, and what is being brought before us concerns organizations that are contracted to do work for the program.

And so, now, we're in a different position, and I don't think we have the responsibility for that sort of oversight or anything, but at some point, I mean, specifically to make those evaluations --

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, but if we're relying on those contractors or subcontractors, then that perception also, in some ways, could apply to the public's --

MEMBER RICHARDSON: Right.

CHAIRMAN MELIUS: -- or claimant's perception of what our work is and NIOSH's and other work, and so -- I think that our -- all of us have been on the Board a while. We've all struggled with this. It's evolved, and I think we finally have gotten at least what's written down, a much more coherent policy that addresses all levels, the Board, the Board

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1	contractor, NIOSH, NIOSH's contractors, and so
2	forth, with some at least not and it
3	can't all be the same, you know, sort of rules
4	and conflicts, there's different balancing
5	that goes on and so forth.
6	But at least it is more coherent
7	than it was before, and it appears, I think,
8	more equitable, but there is still our
9	differences and there is still our details and
10	nuances to it that can be confusing.
11	MEMBER RICHARDSON: Okay, thanks.
12	CHAIRMAN MELIUS: Yes, okay.
13	Anything else? Okay, without objection, we're
14	adjourned.
15	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
16	matter concluded at 2:05 p.m.)
	macter concruded at 2.03 p.m.,
17	macter concruded at 2.03 p.m.,
17 18	macter concruded at 2,03 p.m.,
	macter concruded at 2,03 p.m.,
18	marcel concluded at 2.05 p.m.,
18	marcel concluded at 2.05 p.m.,